ARISTOTLE

ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS
ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY
ON THE COSMOS
ARISTOTLE
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS
ON COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY
BY
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ON THE COSMOS
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PREFATORY NOTE

Professor E. S. Forster completed his versions of *De Sophisticis Elenchis* and *De Generatione et Corruptione* before he died. I have checked the proofs and added a brief index.

London
January 1955

D. J. Furley
DE SOPHISTICIS
ELENCHIS
INTRODUCTION

I. THE PLACE OF THE TOPICA IN THE ORGANON

Both the Topica and the De Sophisticis Elenchis have always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle. The two treatises are closely connected; the De Sophisticis Elenchis is an appendix to the Topica and its final section forms an epilogue to both treatises; indeed Aristotle himself seems sometimes to regard the two as forming a single work, since he twice quotes the De Sophisticis Elenchis under the title of the Topica.

It is generally admitted that what we call logic and Aristotle himself calls analytic was an early pre-occupation of the philosopher and a direct outcome of discussions on scientific method held in the Platonic Academy. Plato himself, however, never attempted a formal treatment of the subject and the theories put forward, for example, in the Theaetetus, Sophist, Parmenides and Politicus were never developed into a regular system. But while Aristotle’s systematic treatment of the process of inference and, above all, his discovery of the syllogism owe little to Plato, it has been generally recognized that the Platonic dialogues contain some of the germs from which the Aristotelian system was afterwards developed; for
example, in the *Theaetetus* the doctrine of the categories is already implicit in the recognition of the abstract notions of substance, quality, quantity, relation, activity and passivity.

Of the logical treatises of Aristotle, which since about A.D. 200 have passed under the title of the *Organon* or 'instrument' of science, the most important are (1) the *Prior Analytics*, in which he sets forth the doctrine of the syllogism in its formal aspect without reference to the subject-matter with which it deals, (2) the *Posterior Analytics*, in which he discusses the characteristics which reasoning must necessarily possess in order to be truly scientific, (3) the *Topica*, in which he treats of the modes of reasoning, which, while syllogistically correct, fall short of the conditions of scientific accuracy. The *Categories* and the *De Interpretatione* are subsidiary treatises dealing, in the main, with the term and the proposition.

A great deal of time and ingenuity has been expended, particularly by German scholars, in an attempt to fix the exact order in which the various treatises which constitute the *Organon* were composed. The problem is complicated by the fact that the treatises, in the form in which they have come down to us, seem to consist of rough notes, which were evidently subjected to a certain amount of revision due to the modification and development of his original doctrines. This process has naturally given rise to minor inconsistencies such as would naturally occur if corrections were made or additions inserted which were not completely adapted to the context in which they were placed.

It has been generally recognized that the whole
of the *Topica* does not belong to the same date. H. Maier holds that the oldest portion consists of Books II-VII and that it was written under the direct influence of the Academy and belongs to the same period as the Aristotelian *Dialogues*, which have survived only in fragments; in particular, he points out that the term *συλλογισμός* is not used in the technical sense which it afterwards acquired (or, if it is used in that sense, e.g., in 130 a 7, it is a late insertion), whereas in the second half of Book VII the term is used in its well-known Aristotelian sense, and that, consequently, Books II-VII were composed before the philosopher made his greatest contribution to logic. He holds that Books I and VIII belong to the same period as Book VII. 4-5, and form an introduction and conclusion to the treatise written after the discovery of the syllogism and that the *De Sophisticis Elenchis* was a subsequent addition to the *Topica*. On the other hand, F. Solmsen and P. Gohlke hold that Books I-VII form the earlier portion of the work and that Book VIII and the *De Sophisticis Elenchis* were added subsequently.

As regards the relation of the *Topica* to the rest of the *Organon*, Maier considers the *Topica* as a whole to be earlier than the *Analytics*; Solmsen suggests that the order was (1) *Topica* I-VII, (2) *Posterior Analytics* I, (3) *Topica* VIII and *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, (4) *Posterior Analytics* II, (5) *Prior Analytics*; Gohlke holds that the traditional order of the two *Analytics* is correct, and that the *Topica* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis* presuppose the *Analytics*.

In short, there is general agreement that the bulk of the *Topica* embodies Aristotle’s earliest contribu-

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*a* See Bibliography.
II. The Content of the Topica

The purpose of the Topica is, in the words of its author (100 a 18 ff.), 'to discover a method by which we shall be able to reason from generally accepted opinions about any problem set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying anything self-contradictory'; that is to say, it aims at enabling the two participants, the 'questioner' and the 'answerer,' to sustain their parts in a dialectical discussion. The subject, then, of the treatise may be described as the dialectical syllogism based on premises which are merely probable as contrasted with the demonstrative, or scientific, syllogism, which is the subject of the Posterior Analytics and is based on premises which are true and immediate. The probable premises which make up the dialectical syllogism are described (100 b 21 f.) as 'those which commend themselves to all or to the majority or to the wise.' The uses of dialectic are, we are told, three in number, (1) for mental training, (2) for general conversation, and (3) for application to the sciences, because (a) if we can argue a question pro and con, we shall be in a better position to recognize truth and falsehood, and (b) since the first principles of the sciences cannot be scientifically demonstrated, the approach to them must be through the study of the opinions generally held about them.

After the general introduction in Book I, Aristotle, in Books II-VII. 3, gives a collection of the τόποι which
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give their name to the treatise. The term τὸποι is somewhat difficult to define. They may be described as 'commonplaces' of argument or as general principles of probability which stand in the same relation to the dialectical syllogism as axioms stand to the demonstrative syllogism; in other words, they are 'the pigeon-holes from which dialectical reasoning is to draw its arguments.'

Books II and III deal with the problems of accident; Books IV and V with those of genus and property; Books VI and VII. 1-3 with those of definition. Books VII. 4-5 and Book VIII, after giving some additional notes, conclude the treatise by describing the practice of dialectical reasoning.

III. THE DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS

Just as Aristotle treats of the demonstrative and the dialectical syllogism in the Posterior Analytics and the Topica, respectively, so in this treatise, which forms a kind of appendix to the Topica, he deals with the sophistical syllogism. A knowledge of this is part of the necessary equipment of the arguer, not in order that he may himself make use of it but that he may avoid it, and that the unwary may not be ensnared in the toils of sophistical argument; in fact, Aristotle is carrying on the Socratic and early-Platonic tradition by attacking the Sophists, who taught the use of logical fallacy in order to make the worse cause appear the better.

The term ἔλεγχος is strictly applied to the confutation of an actual adversary, but it is also used more

a W. D. Ross, Aristotle, p. 59.
widely of the confutation of an imaginary opponent. The treatise is, in fact, a study of fallacies in general, which are classified under various headings and fall into two main classes, those which depend on the language employed and those which do not. Some of these fallacies would hardly deceive the most simple minds; others, which Aristotle seems to have been the first person to expose and define, are capable not only of deceiving the innocent but also of escaping the notice of arguers who are employing them.

After two introductory chapters the work naturally falls into two parts, chapters 3-15, the refutation of fallacies, and chapters 16-33, the solution of fallacies, while chapter 34 forms an epilogue to the work.

IV. The Manuscripts

The chief manuscripts for the *Topica* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis* are:

A Urbinas 35 saec. ix-x ineunt.
B Marcianus 201 an. 955
C Coislinianus 330 saec. xi
D Coislinianus 170 saec. xiv
u Basileensis F. 11.21 saec. xi-xii
C Vaticanus 1024 'satis vetustus'
P Vaticanus 207 'non recens'
f Marcianus App. IV. 5 saec. xiv
q Ambrosianus M. 71 saec. xv
N Laurentianus 72. 18 saec. xv
i Laurentianus 72. 15 saec. xiv
T Laurentianus 72. 12 saec. xiii
O Marcianus 204 saec. xiv

Of these A and B are in a class by themselves.
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Bekker preferred A, Waitz B; the Teubner Editors give a slight preference to B, the readings of which are sometimes supported by papyrus fragments. C sometimes preserves the true reading.

V. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

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In German:
E. Rolfes, Leipzig, 1922.

ARTICLES AND DISSERTATIONS

In translating the *Topica* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis* I have used the text of Bekker in the Berlin Edition, and when I translate any other reading this is noted at the foot of the page. I have constantly referred to the Teubner text of Strache-Wallies, which does not, however, seem to me to mark any considerable advance on that of Bekker. I have found Waitz’s edition of the *Organon* of great use, and the Latin version of Pacius is often helpful. I have frequently consulted the Oxford translation by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge. For the *De Sophisticis Elenchis* the notes and paraphrase in Poste’s edition are often enlightening, though I cannot always agree with his interpretation.

My aim in translating has been to represent Aristotle’s meaning as closely and faithfully as I can in simple English without resorting to paraphrase or trying to express it in modern terminology.

I have to thank my friend and former colleague Professor W. S. Maguinness, of King’s College, London, for reading through my version and giving me the benefit of his fine scholarship and accuracy. He has suggested several improvements in the text which I have been glad to adopt.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ
ΣΟΦΙΣΤΙΚΩΝ ΕΛΕΓΧΩΝ

164 a 20 Ι. Περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων καὶ τῶν
φαινομένων μὲν ἐλέγχων ὄντων δὲ παραλογισμῶν
ἄλλα οὐκ ἐλέγχων λέγομεν, ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν
ἀπὸ τῶν πρῶτων.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν οἱ μὲν εἰσὶ συλλογισμοὶ, οἱ δὲ οὐκ
ὄντες δοκοῦσιν, φανερῶν. ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
25 ἄλλων τούτῳ γίνεται διὰ τινος ὁμοιότητος, καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ὁμαστῶς ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἔξιν
οἱ μὲν ἔχουσιν εὖ, οἱ δὲ φαίνονται, φυλετικῶς

164 b 20 φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπισκευάσαντες αὐτούς, καὶ καλοὶ
οἱ μὲν διὰ κάλλος, οἱ δὲ φαίνονται, κομμωσάντες
αὐτούς. ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἁμάχων ὁμαστῶς. καὶ γὰρ
τούτων τὰ μὲν ἁργυρὸς τὰ δὲ χρυσὸς ἐστὶν ἀληθῶς,
τὰ δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν οὐ, φαίνεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν,
οἶνα τὰ μὲν λιθαργύρινα καὶ τὰ καττιτέρινα ἁργυρᾶ,
25 τὰ δὲ χολοβάφια χρυσᾶ. τὸν αὐτοῦ δὲ τρόπον
καὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἐλεγχὸς οὐκ ἐστίν, οὐ δὲ οὐκ

a The reference appears to be provision of members of the
tribal choruses at Athens for choral competitions (see Xen.
Mem. iii. 4, 5).
I. Let us now treat of sophistical refutations, that is, arguments which appear to be refutations but are really fallacies and not refutations, beginning, as is natural, with those which come first.

That some reasonings are really reasonings, but that others seem to be, but are not really, reasonings, is obvious. For, as this happens in other spheres from a similarity between the true and the false, so it happens also in arguments. For some people possess good physical condition, while others have merely the appearance of it, by blowing themselves out and dressing themselves up like the tribal choruses; again, some people are beautiful because of their beauty, while others have the appearance of beauty because they trick themselves out. So too with inanimate things; for some of these are really silver and some gold, while others are not but only appear to our senses to be so; for example, objects made of litharge or tin appear to be silver, and yellow-coloured objects appear to be gold. In the same way also reasoning and refutation are sometimes real and sometimes not, but appear to be real

*b Protoxide of lead, a by-product in the separation of silver from lead.
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"έστι μὲν, φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν. οἱ γὰρ ἀπειροῦσι ὠσπερ ἃν ἀπέχοντες πόρρωθεν θεωροῦσιν."

165 a ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστὶ τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἐτερόν τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων, ἐλεγχὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ’ ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦσι μὲν οὐ, δοκοῦσι δὲ διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας, ὅν ἐν τούτῳ πρότερον ἐστὶ καὶ δημοσιώτατος ὁ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα διαλέγεσθαι φέροντας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνάμασιν ἀντὶ τῶν πράγματων χρώμεθα συμβόλοις, τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράγματων ἡγούμεθα συμβαίνειν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ψήφων τοῖς λογιζομένοις. τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὅμοιον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα πεπερανταὶ καὶ τὸ τῶν λόγων πλήθος, τὰ δὲ πράγματα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀπειρά ἐστιν. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν πλείω τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τούνομα τὸ ἐν σημαίνειν. ὠσπερ οὖν κακεὶ οἱ μὴ δεινοὶ τὰς ψήφους φέρειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἑπιστημόνων παρακρούονται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων οἱ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπειροῦ παραλογίζονται καὶ αὐτοὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ ἄλλων ἀκούοντες. διὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὰς λεχθησομένας ἐστὶ καὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ ἐλεγχὸς φαινόμενος μὲν οὐκ ὅν δὲ. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τυσι μᾶλλον πρὸ ἐργοῦ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι σοφοῖς ἢ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μῆ δοκεῖν (ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη σοφία οὐδα δ’ οὐ,
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, 1

owing to men's inexperience; for the inexperienced are like those who view things from a distance. Reasoning is based on certain statements made in such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of things other than those statements and as a result of those statements; refutation, on the other hand, is reasoning accompanied by a contradiction of the conclusion. Some refutations do not affect their object but only appear to do so; this may be due to several causes, of which the most fertile and widespread division is the argument which depends on names. For, since it is impossible to argue by introducing the actual things under discussion, but we use names as symbols in the place of the things, we think that what happens in the case of the names happens also in the case of the things, just as people who are counting think in the case of their counters. But the cases are not really similar; for names and a quantity of terms are finite, whereas things are infinite in number; and so the same expression and the single name must necessarily signify a number of things. As, therefore, in the above illustration, those who are not clever at managing the counters are deceived by the experts, in the same way in arguments also those who are unacquainted with the power of names are the victims of false reasoning, both when they are themselves arguing and when they are listening to others. For this reason, therefore, and for others which will be mentioned hereafter, there exist both reasoning and refutation which appear to be genuine but are not really so. But since in the eyes of some people it is more profitable to seem to be wise than to be wise without seeming to be so (for the sophistic art consists in apparent and
καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστής ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ' οὐκ οὕτως), δήλον ὅτι ἀναγκαίον τούτοις καὶ τὸ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἔργον δοκεῖν ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν. ἔστι δ' ὃς ἐν πρὸς ἐν εἰπεῖν ἔργον περὶ ἐκαστὸν τοῦ εἰδότος ἀμευδεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν περὶ δὲν οἶδε, τὸν δὲ ψευδόμενον ἐμφανίζειν δύνασθαι. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι δοῦναι λόγον, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ λαβεῖν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τούς Βουλομένους σοφιστεύειν τὸ τῶν εἰρημένων λόγων γένος ζητεῖν· πρὸ ἔργου γάρ ἐστὶν· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη δύναμις ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι σοφὸν, οὐ τυγχάνοις τὴν προαίρεσιν ἔχοντες.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἑστὶ τι τοιοῦτον λόγων γένος, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτης ἐφίενται δυνάμεως οὐς καλοῦμεν σοφιστάς, δήλον. πόσα δ' ἑστὶν εἴδη τῶν λόγων τῶν σοφιστικῶν, καὶ ἐκ πόσων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἡ δύναμις αὕτη συνέστηκε, καὶ πόσα μέρη τυγχάνει τῆς πραγματείας ὅντα, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συντελουστῶν εἰς τὴν τέχνην ταύτην ἥδη λέγωμεν. II. "латι τῶν ἐν τῷ διάλεγομεθα λόγων τέταρτα γένη, διδάσκαλικοί καὶ διαλεκτικοί καὶ πειρατικοί καὶ ἐριστικοί, διδάσκαλικοί μὲν οἱ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν ἐκάστου μαθήματος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου δοξῶν συλλογιζομένοι (δεἲ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν μανθάνοντα), διαλεκτικοὶ δ' οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων συλλογιστικοὶ ἀντιφάσεως, πειρα-
not real wisdom, and the sophist is one who makes money from apparent and not real wisdom), it is clear that for these people it is essential to seem to perform the function of a wise man rather than actually to perform it without seeming to do so. To take a single point of comparison, it is the task of the man who has knowledge of a particular subject himself to refrain from fallacious arguments about the subjects of his knowledge and to be able to expose him who uses them. Of these functions the first consists in being able to give a reason, the second in being able to exact one. It is essential, therefore, for those who wish to play the sophist to seek out the kind of argument which we have mentioned; for it is well worth his while, since the possession of such a faculty will cause him to appear to be wise, and this is the real purpose which sophists have in view.

It is clear, then, that a class of arguments of this kind exists, and that those whom we call sophists aim at this kind of faculty. Let us next discuss what are the various kinds of sophistical arguments and what are the various component parts of this faculty, and into what different divisions the treatment of the subject falls, and all the other elements which contribute to this art.

II. Of arguments used in discussion there are four kinds, Didactic, Dialectical, Examination-arguments and Contentious arguments. Didactic arguments are those which reason from the principles appropriate to each branch of learning and not from the opinions of the answerer (for he who is learning must take things on trust). Dialectical arguments are those which, starting from generally accepted opinions, reason to establish a contradiction. Examination-arguments
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5 στικοὶ δ’ οἱ ἐκ τῶν δοκοῦντων τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ καὶ ἀναγκαίων εἰδέναι τῷ προσποιουμένῳ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην (ὅν τρόπον ἰδεῖ, διώρισται ἐν ἑτέροις), ἑριστικοὶ δ’ οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὁντων δὲ συλλογιστικοὶ ἣ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοί. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν ἐν τοῖς Ἀνα-
10 λυτικοῖς εἰρηταί, περὶ δὲ τῶν διαλεκτικῶν καὶ πειραστικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγωνιστι-
κῶν καὶ ἑριστικῶν νῦν λέγωμεν.

III. Πρῶτον δὴ ληπτέον πόσων στοχάζονται οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀγωνιζόμενοι καὶ διαφιλονεικοῦντες. ἔστι δὲ πέντε ταῦτα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ἐλεγχὸς καὶ
15 ψεύδος καὶ παράδοξον καὶ σολοικισμὸς καὶ πέμπτων τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχήσαι τοὺς προσδιαλεγόμενον· τούτῳ δ’ ἔστι τὸ πολλάκις ἀναγκαζομαι ταῦτο λέγειν· ἢ τὸ μὴ ὅν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκαστὸν εἶναι τούτων. μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ προαιροῦνται ἐλέγχοντες, δεύτερον δὲ ψευδόμενον τι
20 δεικνύναι, τρίτον εἰς παράδοξον ἁγεῖν, τέταρτον δὲ σολοικίζειν ποιεῖν· τούτῳ δ’ ἔστι τὸ ποιῆσαι τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸν ἀποκρινό-
μενον· τελευταῖον δὲ τὸ πλεονάκις ταῦτο λέγειν.

IV. Τρόποι δ’ εἰσὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐλέγχεων δύο· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἱ δὲ ἐξω τῆς λέξεως.
25 έστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν φαντασίαν ἐξ τῶν ἀριθμῶν· ταῦτα δ’ ἔστιν ὁμωνυμία, ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσωδία, σχῆμα λέξεως. τούτου δὲ πίστις ἢ τε διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ συλλογισμὸς, ἂν τε ληφθῇ τις ἄλλος, καὶ ὁτι

a Topics 159 a 25 ff.
b Topics i-viii.
are those which are based on opinions held by the answerer and necessarily known to one who claims knowledge of the subject involved (in what manner, has been described elsewhere \(a\)). Contentious arguments are those which reason or seem to reason from opinions which appear to be, but are not really, generally accepted. Demonstrative arguments have been treated in the *Analytics*, and dialectical arguments and examinations have been dealt with elsewhere.\(^b\) Let us now deal with competitive and contentious arguments.

III. We must first of all comprehend the various objects at which those aim who compete and contend in argument. They number five: refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism, and, fifthly, the reduction of one’s opponent to a state of babbling, that is, making him to say the same thing over and over again; or, if not the reality, at any rate the appearance of each of these things. Their first choice is a plain refutation, their second to show that their opponent is lying, their third to lead him on to a paradox, their fourth to make him commit a solecism (that is, to make the answerer, as a result of the argument, speak ungrammatically), and, lastly, to make him say the same thing over and over again.

IV. There are two modes of refutations; one has to do with the language used, the other is unconnected with the language. The methods of producing a false illusion in connexion with language are six in number: equivocation, ambiguity, combination, division, accent and form of expression. The truth of this can be verified by induction and by syllogistic proof based on this (though some other assumption is also possible), that this is the number of ways in


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tosantachōs ἂν τοὺς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ λόγοις μὴ
tautō δηλώσαμεν: εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὀμω-
νυμίαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων, οἶον ὦτι μανθάνουσιν
οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι· τὰ γὰρ ἀποστοματιζόμενα μανθά-
νουσιν οἱ γραμματικοὶ. τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὀμω-
νυμον, τὸ τε ἐξυνεῖν χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ
tὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην. καὶ πάλιν ὦτι τὰ κακὰ

35 ἅγαθα· τὰ γὰρ δέοντα ἅγαθα, τὰ δὲ κακὰ δέοντα.

166 a διττὸν γὰρ τὸ δέον, τὸ τ' ἀναγκαῖον, ὦ συμβαίνει
πολλάκις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν (ἔστι γὰρ κακὸν τι
ἀναγκαῖον), καὶ ἅγαθὰ δὲ δέοντα φαμεν εἶναι.
ἐτὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καθῆσθαι καὶ ἐστάναι, καὶ κάμνειν
καὶ υγιαίνειν. ὃσπερ γὰρ ἀνίστατο, ἔστηκεν, καὶ

ὁσπερ ύγιαζετο, υγιαίνει· ἀνίστατο δ' ὦ καθήμενος
καὶ ύγιαζετο ὦ κάμνων. τὸ γὰρ τὸν κάμνοντα
ὅτι οὖν ποιεῖν ἡ πάσχειν οὐ ἐν σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ὦτε
μὲν ὦτι ὦ νῦν κάμνων, ὥστε ὦτι ὦτι ὡς ἐκαμυνε πρῶτερον.

5 πλὴν ύγιαζετο μὲν καὶ κάμνων καὶ ὦ κάμνων·

ὑγιαίνει δ' οὐ κάμνων, ἀλλ' ὦ κάμνων, οὐ νῦν, ἀλλ' ὦ

πρῶτερον. παρὰ δὲ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, τὸ

βούλεσθαι λαβεῖν μὲ τοὺς πολέμους. καὶ ἃρ'

ὁ τις γυνώσκει, τοῦτο γυνώσκει; καὶ γὰρ τὸν γυνώ-

σκοντα καὶ τὸ γυνωσκόμενον ἐνδέχεται ὡς γυνώ-

σκοντα σημάνηαι τοῦτω τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ ἄρα ὦ ὁ ὀρᾶ

1 Deleting ἦ καθήμενος after κάμνων with Wallies.

a i.e. can write or spell.
b i.e. 'ought to be.'
which we can fail to indicate the same thing by the same terms or expressions. Arguments such as the following are based on equivocation: ‘Those who know, learn; for it is those who know the use of letters that learn what is dictated to them.’ Here ‘learn’ is equivocal, meaning ‘understand by using knowledge’ and ‘acquire knowledge.’ Or again, ‘Evils are good, for what must exist is good, and evil must exist.’ Here ‘must exist’ is used in two senses; it means ‘what is necessary,’ which is often true of evils (for some evil is necessary), and we also say that good things ‘must exist.’ Or again, ‘the same man is seated and standing and is a sick man and restored to health; for it is the man who stood up that is standing, and it is he who was recovering his health that is restored to health, but it was the man who was seated that stood up and the man who was sick that was recovering.’ For that ‘the sick man’ does such and such a thing or has such and such a thing done to him, has not one meaning only but at one time means ‘the man who is now sick,’ and at another time ‘the man who was formerly sick.’ But it was the sick man who began to recover his health when he was actually sick, but he is in good health when he is not sick and is not the sick man now but the man who was formerly sick. The following examples are connected with ambiguity: ‘To wish me the enemy to capture,’ and ‘when a man knows something, surely there is knowledge of this’; for it is possible by this expression to signify both the knower and the thing known as knowing. And ‘what a man sees, surely that

\[i.e.\text{‘knowledge of this’ can mean either knowledge on the part of the knower or knowledge of the thing known.}\]
10 τις, τούτο ὡρᾶ; ὡρᾶ δὲ τὸν κύονα, ὡστε ὡρᾶ ὁ
c kýnow. καὶ ἄρα ὁ σὺ φης εἶναι, τοῦτο σὺ φῆς εἶναι;
φῆς δὲ λίθον εἶναι, σὺ ἄρα φῆς λίθος εἶναι. καὶ
ἀρ’ ἔστι συγώντα λέγειν; διδτόν γὰρ καὶ τὸ συ-
gώντα λέγειν, τὸ τε τὸν λέγοντα σιγάν καὶ τὸ τὰ
λεγόμενα. εἰσὶ δὲ τρεῖς τρόποι τῶν παρὰ τὴν
ὁμονυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἄμφισβολίαν, εἰς μὲν ὅταν ἡ ὁ
λόγος ἡ τοῦνομα κυρίως σημαινή πλείω, οἶνον ἀετὸς
καὶ κύων: εἰς δὲ ὅταν εἰωθότες ὤμεν οὕτω λέγειν-
τρίτος δὲ ὅταν τὸ συντεθὲν πλείω σημαινή, κεκω-
ρισμένον δὲ ἀπλῶς, οἶνον τὸ ἐπίσταται γράμματα.
ἐκάτερον μὲν γὰρ, εἰ ἐτυχεν, ἐν τι σημαίνει, τὸ
ἐπίσταται καὶ τὰ γράμματα· ἀμφω δὲ πλείω, ἢ τὸ
tὰ γράμματα αὐτὰ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἢ τῶν γραμ-
μάτων ἁλλον.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἄμφισβολία καὶ ὁμονυμία παρὰ τού-
tους τοὺς τρόπους ἐστίν, παρὰ δὲ τὴν σύνθεσιν τὰ
tοιάδε, οἶνον τὸ δύνασθαι καθήμενον βαδίζειν καὶ
μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτο σημαινεῖ,
aν διελών τις εἰπῃ καὶ συνθέσις, ως δυνατὸν τὸ¹
kαθήμενον βαδίζειν². καὶ τοῊ ὡσαύτως ἃν τις
συνθή, τὸ μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν· σημαινεῖ γὰρ ὃς
ἔχει δύναμιν τοῦ μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν. εάν δὲ
μὴ συνθή, ὅτι ἔχει δύναμιν, ὅτε οὐ γράφει, τοῦ

1 Reading τὸ for τὸν.
2 Deleting καὶ μὴ γράφοντα γράφειν after βαδίζειν with
Wallies.

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a The personal pronoun not being expressed in Greek,
touto. being neuter, can be either the subject or object of the
verb ōrā.

b 'eagle' or 'pediment.'

c 'Dog,' 'dogstar' or 'Cynic philosopher.'

d In which case the meaning is that a man, while sitting,
has the power to walk (if he wishes to do so).
(he) a sees: a man a pillar sees, therefore the pillar sees.' Again, 'Surely you insist on being what you insist on being. You insist on a stone being: therefore, you insist on being a stone.' Again 'Surely speaking is possible of the silent.' 'Speaking of the silent' can also be taken in two ways, either that the speaker is silent or the things spoken of are silent. There are three modes connected with equivocation and ambiguity: (1) when the expression or name properly signifies more than one thing, such as ἀετός b and κῦων, c (2) when we customarily use a word in more than one sense, (3) when a word has more than one meaning in combination with another word, though by itself it has only one meaning, for example, 'knowing letters'; for it may so happen that taken separately 'knowing' and 'letters' have only one meaning, but taken together they have more than one meaning, namely, either that the letters themselves have knowledge or that someone else has knowledge of the letters.

Ambiguity and equivocation then take these forms. The following examples are connected with the combination of words, for instance, 'A man can walk when sitting and write when not writing.' The significance is not the same if one utters the words separately d as it is if one combines them, namely, 'a man can walk-while-sitting,' e and, similarly, in the other example, if one combines the words and says 'a man can write-when-not-writing,' for it means that he can write and not write at the same time; whereas if one does not combine the words it means that, when he is not writing, he has the power to

In which case the meaning is that it is possible for a man to walk and sit at the same time.
γράφειν. καὶ, μανθάνει νῦν γράμματα, εἰπερ ἐμάνθανεν ἃ ἐπίσταται. ἔτι τὸ ἐν μόνων δυνάμενον φέρειν πολλὰ δύνασθαι φέρειν.

Παρὰ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὅτι τὰ πέντε ἐστὶ δύο καὶ τρία, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἵσον:

35 τοσοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ἐτὶ πρὸς. ὃ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος διηρμένος καὶ συγκεῖμενος οὐκ ἀεὶ ταὐτὸ σημαίνειν ἃν δόξειεν, οἶον "ἐγὼ ὁ ἔθηκα δούλων ὄντ' ἐλεύθερον" καὶ τὸ "πεντήκοντ' ἀνδρῶν ἐκατὸν λίπε δῖος Ἰ' Αχιλλεύς."

166 b  Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσωπικὰν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄνευ γραφῆς διαλεκτικοῖς οὐ ράδιον ποιῆσαι λόγον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ποιῆμαι μᾶλλον, οἶον καὶ τὸν "Ομηρον ἐνιοῦ διορθοῦνται πρὸς τοὺς ἑλέγχοντας

5 ὃς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα "τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὀμβρῷ." λύουσι γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇ προσωπικᾷ, λέγοντες τὸ οὐ δέπτερον. καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦ 'Αγαμέμνονος, οἳ οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν "διδομέν δὲ οἱ εὕχος ἀρέσθαι," ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ ἐνετέλεσθε διδόναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα παρὰ τὴν προσωπικὰν ἐστίν.

10 Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως συμβαίνουσιν,

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a With a different combination of words this can mean, 'He understands now what he knows because he has understood letters.'

b This can also be taken to mean, 'Being able to carry many things, you can carry one single thing only.'

c If 5 = 2 and 3, 5 = 2 and 5 = 3, and so 5 is both odd and even: again, if 5 = 2 and 5 = 3, then 3 = 2, i.e. the greater = the less, since 3 is also 2 + 1.

d From an unknown source in Greek comedy imitated by Terence, Andria 37.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, iv

write. Again, 'He now understands letters, since he has understood what he knows' \(^a\); and further, 'One single thing being able to carry, many things you can carry.' \(^b\)

The following propositions are connected with division: '5 is 2 and 3,' '5 is odd and even,' 'the greater is equal to the less,' for it is so much and something more. \(^c\) For the same sentence divided would not always seem to have the same meaning as when taken as a whole, for example, 'Free I made thee a slave' \(^d\) and 'goodly Achilles left a hundred (and) fifty men.' \(^e\)

It is not easy to construct an argument relating to accent in discussions which are not written down, but it is easier in written matter and poetry. For example, some people emend Homer to meet the objection of critics that his phrase 'τὸ μὲν ὁ ἡκαταπτῆται ὅμβρῳ' is a strange one. \(^f\) For they solve the difficulty by a change of accent, pronouncing the ὅμβρῳ more sharply. \(^g\) Also in the passage about Agamemnon's dream they say that Zeus himself did not say, 'But we grant him to secure the fulfillment of his prayer' but bade the dream to grant it. \(^h\) Such examples, then, depend on accentuation.

Refutations which depend on the form of expression.

\(^a\) Probably quoted from some Cyclic poem. The words can mean either 'left 150 men' or 'left a hundred men fifty.'

\(^b\) II. xxiii. 328: 'part of which decays in the rain.'

\(^c\) i.e. substituting οὖ, 'not,' for οὗ: 'and it does not decay in the rain.'

\(^d\) II. ii. 1-35; but the actual words quoted occur in II. xxii. 297 and are spoken by Poseidon. For this and the following example see Poet. 1461 a 22-23.

\(^e\) i.e. διδομεν.

\(^f\) i.e. διδομεν = διδόναι, the infinitive being used as an imperative.
라리토

166 b

όταν τὸ μὴ ταύτο ὤσαύτως ἐρμηνεύηται, οἰον τὸ ἀρρεν θήλυ ἢ τὸ θήλυ ἀρρεν, ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ θάτερον τούτων, ἢ πάλιν τὸ ποιόν ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ποιόν, ἢ τὸ ποιοῦν πάσχον ἢ τὸ διακείμενον ποιεῖν, καὶ 15 τάλλα δ', ὡς διήρηται πρότερον. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ τῶν ποιεῖν ὃν ὡς τῶν ποιεῖν τι τῇ λέξει σημαίνειν. οἰον τὸ υγιαίνειν ὁμοίως τῷ σχῆματι τῆς λέξεως λέγεται τῷ τέμνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν· καίτοι τὸ μὲν ποιόν τι καὶ διακείμενόν πως δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν τι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων.

20 Οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἔλεγχοι ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων εἰσίν· τῶν δ' ἐξὶ τῆς λέξεως παραλογισμῶν εἰδὴ ἐστὶν ἐπτά, ἐν μὲν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἢ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πὴ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρὸς τι λέγεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν τού ἐλέγχου ἀγνοιαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὸ 25 παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, πέμπτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ (τὸ) τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν, ἐκτὸν δὲ τὸ μὴ αὐτίον ὡς αὐτίον τιθέναι, ἐβδομον δὲ τὸ τὰ πλεῖω ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν.

V. Οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός παραλογισμοὶ εἰσίν, ὅταν ὁμοίως ὁτιοῦν ἀξιωθῆ τῷ πράγματι καὶ τῷ συμβεβηκότι ὑπάρχειν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πολλὰ συμβεβηκεν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη πάσι τοῖς κατηγορομένοις, καὶ καθ' οὐ κατηγορεῖται, ταυτὰ 30 πάντα ὑπάρχειν. οἰον εἰ ο Κορίσκος ἐτερον ἀν-

1 Reading παρὰ (τὸ) τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν with Strache.
2 Reading ταυτὰ with Casaubon.
sion occur when what is not the same is expressed in the same form; for example, when the masculine is expressed by the feminine or *vice versa*, or the neuter by the masculine or feminine; or again when a quality is expressed by a quantity or *vice versa*, or the active by a passive or a state by the active, and so forth according to the distinctions previously made.

For it is possible for something which is *not* of the nature of an action to signify by the language used something which is of the nature of an action; for example, to 'flourish' is a form of expression like to 'cut' or to 'build'; yet the former denotes a quality and a certain disposition, the latter an action. So too with the other possible examples.

Refutations, then, connected with language are based on these commonplaces. Of fallacies unconnected with language there are seven kinds: (1) those connected with Accident; (2) those in which an expression is used absolutely, or not absolutely but qualified as to manner or place or time or relation; (3) those connected with ignorance of the nature of refutation; (4) those connected with the consequent; (5) those connected with the assumption of the original point to be proved; (6) those which assert that what is not a cause is a cause; (7) the making of several questions into one.

V. Fallacies connected with Accident occur when it is claimed that some attribute belongs similarly to the thing and to its accident; for since the same thing has many accidents, it does not necessarily follow that all the same attributes belong to all the predicates of a thing and to that of which they are predicated. For example, 'If Coriscus is different

*Topics 103 b 20 ff.*
Arístotlē

166 b

θρώπου, αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἑτέρος· ἔστι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος.

ἡ εἰ Σωκράτους ἑτέρος, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἄνθρωπος,

35 ἑτέρον ἄνθρωπον φασὶν ὁμολογηκέναι διὰ τὸ συμ-

βεβηκέναι, οὐ ἐφησὲν ἑτέρον εἶναι, τοῦτον εἶναι

ἄνθρωπον.

Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς τόδε ἡ πὴ λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ

κυρίως, ὅταν τὸ ἐν μέρει λεγόμενον ὡς ἀπλῶς

167 a εἰρημένον ληφθῇ, οἶον εἰ τὸ μὴ ὅν ἔστι δοξαστόν,

ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὅν ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ταύτων εἶναι τὲ τι καὶ

εἶναι ἀπλῶς. ἡ πάλιν ὅτι τὸ ὅν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅν, εἰ

τῶν ὄντων τι μὴ ἔστιν, οἶον εἰ μὴ ἄνθρωπος. οὐ

5 γὰρ ταὐτὸ μὴ εἶναι τι καὶ ἀπλῶς μὴ εἶναι· φαίνεται

dὲ διὰ τὸ πάρεγγυς τῆς λέξεως καὶ μικρὸν διαφέ-

ρεῖν τὸ εἶναι τι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τι τοῦ μὴ

εἶναι. ὧμοιως δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ πη καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς.

οἶον εἰ ὁ Ἰνδὸς ὅλος μέλας ὅν λευκός ἐστὶ τοὺς

ὀδόντας· λευκός ἄρα καὶ οὐ λευκός ἐστιν. ἡ εἰ

10 ἄμφω πη, ὅτι ἀμα τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει. τὸ δὲ

tουοῦτον ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων μὲν παντὶ θεωρῆσαι βαθὺν, οἶον

εἰ λαβὼν τὸν Αἰθίοπα εἶναι μέλανα τοὺς ὀδόντας

ἐροῦτ᾽ εἰ λευκός· εἰ οὖν ταύτῃ λευκός, ὅτι μέλας

καὶ οὐ μέλας, οὐοτο διειλέχθαι συλλογιστικῶς

tελειώσας τὴν ἐρώτησιν. ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων δὲ λανθάνει

26
from "man," he is different from himself, for he is a
man; or 'if he is different from Socrates, and
Socrates is a man,' they say that it has been admitted
that Coriscus is different from a man, because it is
an accident that the person from which he said that
Coriscus is different is a man.

Fallacies connected with the use of some particular
expression absolutely or in a certain respect and not
in its proper sense, occur when that which is pre-
dicated in part only is taken as though it was predi-
cated absolutely. For example, 'If that-which-is-not
is an object of opinion, then that-which-is-not is';
for it is not the same thing 'to be something' and
'to be' absolutely. Or again, 'That-which-is is not,
if it is not one of the things which are, e.g. if it is not
a man.' For it is not the same thing 'not to be some-
thing' and 'not to be' absolutely; but, owing to
the similarity of the language, 'to be something'
appears to differ only a little from 'to be,' and 'not
to be something' from 'not to be.' In like manner
when something is predicated in a certain respect
and absolutely; for example, 'If an Indian, being
black all over, is white in respect of his teeth, then
he is white and not white.' Or if both attributes
belong in a certain respect, they say that the contrary
attributes belong simultaneously. In some cases this
sort of fallacy can be easily perceived by anyone;
if, for example, after securing an admission that the
Ethiopian is black, one were to ask whether he is
white in respect of his teeth, and then, if he be white
in this respect, were to think that he had finished
the interrogation and had proved dialectically that
he was both black and not black. In some cases, on
the other hand, the fallacy escapes detection, namely,
ARISTOTLE

167 a

15 πολλάκις, ἐφ’ ὀσων, ὅταν πὴ λέγηται, κἂν τὸ ἀπλῶς δοξεῖν ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἐν ὅσοις μὴ ῥάδιον θεωρῆσαι πότερον αὐτῶν κυρίως ἀποδοτέον. γίνεται δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν οἷς ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει τὰ ἀντικείμενα· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἁμφω ἡ μηδέτερον δοτέον ἀπλῶς εἶναι κατηγορεῖν, ὅτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ἡμιον 20 λευκὸν τὸ δ’ ἡμιον μέλαιν, πότερον λευκὸν ἤ μέλαιν;

Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ μὴ διωρίσθαι τί ἐστὶ συνλογισμὸς ἢ τί ἐλεγχος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν ἐλλειψιν γίνονται τοῦ λόγου· ἐλεγχος μὲν γὰρ ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐνὸς, μὴ ὁνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὁνόματος 25 μὴ συνωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ συναριθμομένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ, κατὰ ταύτῳ καὶ πρὸς ταύτῳ καὶ ὁσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῶ χρόνῳ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ψεύσασθαι περί τινος. ἐνοὶ δὲ ἀπολυπόντες τι τῶν λεξθέντων φαίνονται ἐλέγχειν, οἷον ὅτι ταύτῳ διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον· τὰ γὰρ δύο τοῦ μὲν ἐνὸς διπλάσια, τῶν δὲ τριῶν οὐ διπλάσια. ἦς εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ διπλάσιον καὶ οὐ διπλάσιον, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ ταύτῳ· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μῆκος διπλάσιον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάτος οὐ διπλάσιον. ἦς εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ ταύτῳ καὶ ὁσαύτως, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἁμα· διότι 30 ἐστὶ φαινόμενος ἐλεγχος. ἐλκοι δ’ ἀν τις τούτου καὶ εἰς τοὺς παρὰ τὴν λέξειν.

Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν γίνονται μὲν
where, when an attribute is ascribed in some respect only, an absolute attribution would also seem to follow, and where it is not easy to see which of the attributes can be properly assigned. An instance of this occurs when both the opposite attributes belong similarly; for then it is generally held that it must be conceded that either both or neither can be predicated absolutely; for example, if something is half white and half black, is it white or black?

Other fallacies arise because no definition has been given of what a syllogism is and what a refutation, and there is some defect in their definition. For a refutation is a contradiction of one and the same predicate, not of a name but of a thing, and not of a synonymous name but of an identical name, based on the given premisses and following necessarily from them (the original point at issue not being included) in the same respect, relation, manner and time. A false statement about something also occurs in the same manner. Some people, however, appear to refute, omitting some of the above-named points, showing, for example, that the same thing is double and not double, because two is the double of one but not the double of three. Or, they show that if the same thing is double and not double of the same thing, yet it is not double in the same respect; for it is double in length but not double in breadth. Or, if it is double and not double of the same thing and in the same respect and manner, yet it is not so at the same time; and so there is only an apparent refutation. One might, indeed, force this fallacy also into the category of those connected with language.

Fallacies connected with the assumption of the (4) Petitio principii.
οὕτως καὶ τοσαυταχῶς ὅσαχώς ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἔξ ἄρχης αἰτεῖσθαι, φαίνονται δὲ ἐλέγχειν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν τὸ ταῦταν καὶ τὸ ἑτερον.

167 b Ὅδε παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον ἐλέγχος διὰ τὸ οἷεσθαι ἀντιστρέφειν τῇν ἀκολούθησιν. ὅταν γὰρ τούθε ὄντος ἔξ ἀνάγκης τοδὶ ἤ, καὶ τούθε ὄντος οἰονται καὶ θάτερον εἶναι ἔξ ἀνάγκης. ὀθεν καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀπάται γίνονται. πολλάκις γὰρ τὴν χολὴν μέλι ὑπέλαβον δια τὸ ἐπεσθαί τὸ ἕανθόν χρώμα τῷ μέλιτι. καὶ ἐπεὶ συμβαίνει τῇν γην ὑσαντος γίνεσθαι διάβροχον, κἀν ἧ διάβροχος, ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅσαι. τὸ δὲ ὅπικ ἀναγκαῖον. ἐν τε τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων εἰσίν. βουλόμενοι γὰρ δείξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἐπόμενον ἐλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστῆς ἤ ὅτι νῦκτωρ ῥάται πλανώμενοι. πολλοὶς δὲ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ κατηγοροῦμενον οὐχ ὑπάρχει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογιστικοῖς, οἰον ὁ Μελίσσου λόγος ὅτι ἄπειρον τὸ ἀπαν, λαβὼν τὸ μὲν ἀπαν ἀγένητον (ἐκ γὰρ μὴ 15 ὄντος οὐδὲν ἀν γενέσθαι), τὸ δὲ γενόμενον ἔξ ἄρχης γενέσθαι. εἰ μὴ οὖν γέγονεν, ἄρχην οὐκ ἔχει τὸ πάν, ὃστε ἄπειρον. οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν. οὐ γὰρ εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἀπαν ἄρχην ἔχει, καὶ εἰ τὶ ἄρχην ἔχει, γέγονεν, ὡσπερ οὐδ' εἰ ὁ 20 πυρέττων θερμός, καὶ τὸν θερμὸν ἀνάγκη πυρέττειν.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, v

original point to be proved arise in the same manner and in the same number of ways as it is possible to beg the original point; they have an appearance of achieving a refutation because men fail to perceive at the same time what is the same and what is different.

The refutation connected with the consequent is due to the idea that consequence is convertible. For whenever, if A is, B necessarily is, men also fancy that, if B is, A necessarily is. It is from this source that deceptions connected with opinion based on sense-perception arise. For men often take gall for honey because a yellow colour accompanies honey; and since it happens that the earth becomes drenched when it has rained, if it is drenched, we think that it has rained, though this is not necessarily true. In rhetorical arguments proofs from signs are founded on consequences; for, when men wish to prove that a man is an adulterer, they seize upon the consequence of that character, namely, that the man dresses himself elaborately or is seen wandering abroad at night—facts that are true of many people, while the accusation is not true. So, too, in dialectical reasonings; for example, the argument of Melissus that the universe is infinite assumes that the universe has not come into being (for nothing could come into being from what does not exist) and that everything which has come into being has come from a beginning; if, therefore, the universe has not come into being, it has no beginning and therefore is infinite. But this does not necessarily follow; for even if what has come into being always has a beginning, anything that has a beginning need not have come to be, any more than it follows that a man who is hot must be in a fever because a man who is in a fever is hot.
'Ο δὲ παρὰ τὸ μὴ αἰτίον ὡς αἰτίον, ὅταν προσληφθῇ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς παρ’ ἐκεῖνο γινομένου τοῦ ἐλέγχου. συμβαίνει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον συλλογισμοῖς· ἐν τούτοις γάρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀναίρειν τι τῶν κειμένων. έάν οὖν ἐγκαταριθμηθῇ ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις ἐρωτήμασι πρὸς τὸ συμβαίνον ἀδύνατον, δόξει παρὰ τούτῳ γίνεσθαι πολλάκις ὁ ἐλέγχος, οίον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ψυχὴ καὶ ζωὴ ταυτών· εἰ γὰρ φθορᾷ γένεσις ἐναντίον, καὶ τῇ τινὶ φθορᾷ ἔσται τις γένεσις ἐναντίον· ὁ δὲ θάνατος φθορά τις καὶ ἐναντίον ζωῆς, ὡς τε γένεσις ἢ ζωῆ καὶ τὸ ζῆν γίνεσθαι τούτῳ δ’ ἀδύνατον· οὐκ ἀρα ταυτών ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἡ ζωή. οὐ δὲ συλλελογισταί· συμβαίνει γάρ, κἂν μὴ τις ταυτὸ φῇ τῆν ζωὴν τῇ ψυχῇ, τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐναντίον ζωῆς μὲν θανάτῳ ὑπτ’ φθορᾶ, φθορᾶ δὲ γένεσιν. ἀυλλογιστοι μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ἀυλλογιστοί. καὶ λανθάνει πολλάκις οὐχ ἦττον αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐρωτῶντας τὸ τοιοῦτον. Οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὸ ἐπούμενον καὶ παρὰ τὸ μὴ αἰτίον λόγοι τοιούτοι εἰσιν· οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ τὰ δύο ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν, ὅταν λανθάνῃ πλεῖω ὄντα καὶ ὑσ ἐνὸς ὄντος ἀποδοθῇ ἀπόκρισις μία. ἐπ’ ἐνών μὲν οὖν ῥάδιον ἱδεῖν ὅτι πλεῖω καὶ ὅτι οὐ δοτέον
The refutation connected with taking as a cause what is not a cause, occurs when that which is not a cause is foisted into the argument as though the refutation were due to it. Such a case occurs in reasonings leading up to an impossibility; for in these one is bound to destroy one of the premisses. If, therefore, what is not a cause is enumerated among the questions which are necessary for the production of the resultant impossibility, the refutation will often seem to come about as the result of it; for example, in the argument that 'soul' and 'life' are not identical. For if coming-into-being is contrary to perishing, then a particular kind of coming-into-being will be contrary to a particular kind of perishing; now death is a particular kind of perishing and contrary to life; life, therefore, is a coming-into-being and to live is to come-into-being. But this is impossible; and so the soul and life are not identical. But this conclusion is not the result of reasoning; for the impossibility occurs even if one does not assert that life is identical with the soul but merely says that life is contrary to death, which is a perishing, and that coming-into-being is contrary to perishing. Such arguments are not absolutely inconclusive but only inconclusive as regards the point at issue, and the questioners themselves are often equally unconscious of such a state of affairs.

Such, then, are the arguments connected with the consequent and the falsely imputed cause. Those which are connected with the union of two questions in one occur, when it is not noticed that they are more than one and one answer is given as though there was only one question. Sometimes it is easy to see that there is more than one question and
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

168 a

άπόκρισιν, οἷον πότερον ἢ γῆ θάλαττά ἐστιν ἢ ὁ οὐρανός; ἐπ’ ἐνώπιον δ’ ἦττον, καὶ ως ἐνὸς οὐντος ἢ ὀμολογοῦσι τῷ μὴ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἔρωτάμενον,

5 ἢ ἐλεγχεσθαι φαίνονται, οἷον ἂρ’ οὐτός καὶ οὐτός ἐστιν ἀνθρώπος; ἀντ’ ἂν τις τῆς τύπης θοῦτον καὶ θοῦτον, ἀνθρωπον ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνθρώπους τυπτήσει. ἢ πάλιν, ἄν τὰ μὲν ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθά, πάντα ἀγαθὰ ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθά; ὁπότερον γὰρ ἂν φη, ἐστι μὲν ως ἐλεγχον ἢ ψεύδος φαινόμενον δόξειν

10 ἃν ποιεῖν· τὸ γὰρ φάναι τῶν μὴ ἀγαθῶν τι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθὸν ψεύδος. ὅτε δὲ προσληφθέντων τινῶν καὶ ἐλεγχοις γίνοιτο ἄληθινός, οἷον εἰ τις δοιχ ὀμοίως ἐν καὶ πολλὰ λέγεσθαι λευκὰ καὶ γυμνὰ καὶ τυφλὰ. εἰ γὰρ τυφλὸν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὁφυν πεφυκός δ’ ἔχειν, καὶ τυφλὰ ἔσται

15 τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα ὁφυν πεφυκότα δ’ ἔχειν. ὅταν οὖν τὸ μὲν ἔχει τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχει, τὰ ἀμφῶ ἔσται ἡ ὀρθώτα ἥ τυφλὰ· ὀπερ ἀδύνατον.

VI. Ἡ δὴ οὕτως διαιρετέον τοὺς φαινομένους συλλογισμοὺς καὶ ἐλέγχους, ἢ πάντας ἀνακτέον εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἀγνοιαν, ἀρχὴν ταύτην ποιη- 20 σαμένους· ἐστι γὰρ ἀπαντάς ἀναλύσαι τοὺς λεχθέν-

τας τρόπους εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἐλέγχου διορισμὸν. πρῶτον
μὲν εἰ ἀσυλλογιστοί· δει γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κειμένων συμβαίνειν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὥστε λέγειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλὰ μὴ φαίνεσθαι. ἐπειτα καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τοῦ

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that an answer should not be given, for example, when it is asked 'Is the earth sea, or is the sky?' Sometimes, however, it is less easy, and thinking that there is only one question, people either give in by not answering the question or suffer an apparent refutation. For example, 'Is A and is B a man?' 'If so, if a man strikes A and B, he will strike a man, not men?' Or again, 'Where part is good and part evil, is the whole good or evil?' Either answer might possibly seem to involve an apparent refutation or false statement; for to say that something is good when it is not good or not good when it is good is a false statement. Sometimes, however, if certain premises are added, there might be a genuine refutation. For example, if one agrees that a single thing and a number of things are alike called 'white' or 'naked' or 'blind.' For if 'blind' is used of something which does not possess sight though it is its nature to possess it, it will also describe a number of things which do not possess sight though it is their nature to possess it. When, therefore, one thing has sight while another has not, they will either both be able to see or both be blind; which is impossible.

VI. We must either divide apparent reasonings and refutations in the manner just described or else refer them all to a false conception of refutation, making this our basis; for it is possible to resolve all the kinds of fallacy which we have mentioned into violations of the definition of refutation. Firstly, we must see if they are inconclusive; for the conclusion ought to follow from the premises laid down, so that we state it of necessity and do not merely appear to do so. Next, we ought to see if they accord with the
Διωρισμοῦ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ λέξει οἱ μὲν εἰσίν
25 παρὰ τὸ δυτίτον, οἳ τε ὁμοιωμαία καὶ ὁ λόγος
καὶ ὁ ὁμοιοσχημοσύνη (σύνθες γὰρ τὸ πάντα ὡς
tόδε τι σημαίνειν), ἢ δὲ σύνθεσις καὶ διαίρεσις καὶ
προσῳδία τῷ μὴ τὸν αὐτόν εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἢ
tούνομα διαφέρον. ἔδει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, καθάπερ
καὶ τὸ πράγμα, ταύτόν, εἰ μέλλει έλεγχος ἡ συλ-
30 λογισμὸς ἐσεσθαι, οἳν εἰ λόπιον, μὴ ἴματιον συλ-
λογίσασθαι ἄλλα λόπιον. ἀληθὲς μὲν γὰρ κάκεινον,
ἄλλα οὐ συνελόγισται, ἄλλα ἐτί ἐρωτήματος δεῖ,
ὅτι ταύτον σημαίνει, πρὸς τὸν ξητούντα τὸ διὰ τί.
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὀρισθέντος τοῦ συλ-
35 λογισμοῦ φανεροί γίνονται. τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ ὁρισμὸν
dεῖ καὶ τοῦ ἐλέγχου γίνεσθαι, πλὴν προσκείσθαι
tὴν ἀντίφασιν· ὁ γὰρ ἐλέγχος συλλογισμὸς ἀντι-
φάσεως. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς τοῦ συμ-
βεβηκότος, οὐ γίνεται ἐλεγχος. οὐ γὰρ εἰ τούτων
ἀντίων ἀνάγκη τόδ᾽ εἶναι, τούτῳ δ᾽ ἔστι λευκὸν,
40 ἀνάγκη λευκὸν εἶναι διὰ τὸν συλλογισμὸν. οὐδ᾽
168 b εἰ τὸ τρίγωνον δυοῖν ὀρθῶν ἵσας ἔχει, συμβεβηκε
δ᾽ αὐτῷ σχῆματι εἶναι ἡ πρώτῳ ἡ ἀρχῇ, ὅτι
σχῆμα ἡ ἀρχῇ ἡ πρώτῳ τούτῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἡ σχῆμα
οὐδ᾽ ἡ πρώτῳν, ἄλλ᾽ ἡ τρίγωνον, ἡ ἀπόδειξις.
ὁμοιὸς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥστε εἰ ὁ ἐλεγχος
5 συλλογισμὸς τις, οὐκ ἂν εἶ ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
ἐλεγχος. ἄλλα παρὰ τούτῳ καὶ οἱ τεχνῖται καὶ
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remaining parts of the definition. For of the fallacies connected with language, some are due to a double meaning, for example equivocation and ambiguous phraseology and similarity of formation (for it is customary to indicate everything as a particular substance), whereas composition, division and accentuation are due to the phrase not being the same or the name different. For the name also, like the thing signified, ought to be the same, if refutation or reasoning is to result. For example, if the subject is a mantle, you should come to a conclusion about a mantle, not about a cloak; for the latter conclusion is also a true one, but the reasoning is not complete, and a further question must be asked to prove that words mean the same thing, if the answerer asks how you have refuted him.

Fallacies connected with Accident become obvious when 'proof' has been defined. For the same definition ought to be true also of refutation, except that 'the contradictory' is added; for refutation is a proof of the contradictory. If, therefore, there is no proof of the accident, no refutation takes place. For if, when A and B are, C is, and C is white, it does not necessarily follow that it is white because of the syllogism. And again, if the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, and it happens to be a figure, element or principle, it does not necessarily follow that because it is a figure, element or principle it has this character; for the demonstration is concerned with it not qua figure or qua element but qua triangle. And so likewise with the other instances. Thus, if refutation is a kind of proof, an argument depending on an accident could not be a refutation. Yet it is along these lines that specialists and men of
οι ἐπιστήμονες ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνεπιστημόνων ἐλέγχονται· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ποιοῦνται τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς πρὸς τοὺς εἰδότας. οἱ δ’ οὐ δυνάμενοι διαφεύγειν ἢ ἐρωτώμενοι διδόσι τὸ οὐ δόντες οἴονται δεδωκέναι.

Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ πῆ καὶ ἀπλῶς, ὅτι οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ κατάφασις καὶ ἢ ἀπόφασις. τοῦ γὰρ πῆ λευκοῦ τὸ πῆ οὐ λευκὸν, τοῦ δ’ ἀπλῶς λευκὸν τὸ ἀπλῶς οὐ λευκὸν ἀπόφασις. εἰ οὖν δόντος πῆ εἶναι λευκὸν 15 ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰρημένου λαμβάνει, οὐ ποιεῖ ἐλέγχον, φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀγνοιαν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἐλέγχος.

Φανερώτατοι δὲ πάντων οἱ πρότερον λειτύντες παρὰ τοῦ τοῦ ἐλέγχου διορισμὸν· διὸ καὶ προσηγορεύθησαν οὔτως· παρὰ γὰρ τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἐλλεύψιν ἢ φαντασία γίνεται, καὶ διαφορομένους οὔτως κοινῶν ἑπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις θετέον τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐλλεύψιν.

Οἱ τε παρὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς αἰτίων τιθέναι δῆλοι διὰ τοῦ ορισμοῦ. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ συμπέρασμα τῷ ταύτῃ εἶναι συμβαίνει, 25 ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀναιτίοις· καὶ πάλιν μὴ ἀρίθμουμενον τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ παρὰ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ.

Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον μέρος εἰσὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος· τὸ γὰρ ἐπόμενον συμβεβηκε, διαφέρει δὲ

1 Omitting αἰτία τοῦ after εἶναι with ABC.

a 167 a 21 ff.
b παραλογισμοὶ from παρά and λόγος in the sense of 'definition.'
science in general are refuted by the unscientific; for they argue with the men of science with reasonings based on accident, and the latter, being incapable of making distinctions, either give in when questioned, or think that they have done so when they have not.

Fallacies which depend on whether a statement is made in a limited sense or absolutely occur because the affirmation and denial are not of the same thing. For 'not partly white' is the negation of 'partly white,' and 'not absolutely white' of 'absolutely white.' If, then, one takes the admission that something is partially white to mean that it is absolutely white, he does not cause a refutation but only seems to do so owing to ignorance of what a refutation is.

The clearest fallacies of all are those already mentioned as connected with the definition of refutation (hence also their name); for the semblance of a refutation is due to the defect in the definition, and, if we distinguish fallacies in this way, we must put down 'defect of definition' as common to all these cases.

Fallacies due to assuming the original point and stating as a cause what is not a cause are clearly exposed by means of the definition. For the conclusion ought to follow because this and that is so, which is not the case when the alleged cause is not the cause; and, again, the conclusion should follow without the original point being included, which is not true of arguments based on the begging of the original point.

Fallacies connected with the consequent form part of those due to accident; for the consequent is an accident but differs from the accident because the
ARISTOTLE

168 b
tou sumbebehkotos; oti to mene sumbebehkos estin
30 ef' enos monon labev, oion tauto einai to eaxthon
kai meli kai to leuken kai kwnon, to de parrepom
meon ae' en pleiosin: tα γαρ ενi tauto tauta
kai allhous axioumen einai tauta: di' ginetai
para to epomenon eleghos. esti de' ou pantos
allthes, oion eni leuken kata sumbebehkos: kai
35 gar h' xwv kai o kwnos tu leukw tauton. h'
paliv, ws en tis Melissou logos, to auto einai
lambanei to gegovenei kai arxh' exhein, h to isas
ginesai kai tauto megethos lambanein. oti gar
to gegovos exei arxh', kai to exon arxh' gegovenei
axioi, ws amfow tauta ontas tis arxh' exhein, to
40 te gegovos kai to peperasmven.2 omoiwos de kai
169 a epit ton ison ginomenon ei tα to auto megethos
kai en lambanonta isas ginetai, kai to isas ginomena
en megethos lambanei. woste to epomenon lambanei.
epi oni o para to sumbebehkos eleghos en tis
agnoia ton eleghous, fanerov oti kai o para to
5 epomenon. episkuppetevo de touto kai allwos.
Oe de para to tα pleioi erwtirma en poiiein en
tis mh diarhrooun hmais mh diarhein ton tis pro-
tassews logos. h gar prorasis estin en kath' enos.

1 Reading isas for ison.
2 Bekker misprints peperasmven as peperasmvenw.

a But it does not follow that because snow is white and
swan is white, therefore snow is swan.
b Cf. 167 b 13 f.
c Cf. 179 a 26 ff., 181 a 22 ff.
accident can be secured in the case of a single thing by itself, for example, a yellow thing and honey are identical, and so is a white thing and a swan, whereas the consequent always exists in more than one thing; for we claim that things which are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another; and this is how refutation proceeds when the consequent is involved. It is not, however, always true, for example, in the case of accidental whiteness; for both 'snow' and 'swan' are the same in respect of whiteness. Or again, as in the argument of Melissus, someone takes 'to have come into being' and 'to have a beginning' as the same thing, and 'to become equal' as the same thing as 'to take on the same magnitude.' For because what has come into being has a beginning, he claims also that what has a beginning has come into being, on the ground that 'having come into being' and 'being finite' are both the same thing, because both have a beginning. Similarly, too, in the case of things which become equal, he assumes that, if things which take on one and the same magnitude become equal, then also things which become equal take on the same magnitude. In doing so he is assuming the consequent. Since, then, the refutation where accident is concerned depends on ignorance of the nature of refutation, so also, it is clear, does the refutation where the consequent is concerned. But we must examine this question from other points of view also.

Fallacies connected with the union of several questions in one are due to our failure to differentiate or distinguish the definition of the term 'proposition.' For a proposition is a single predication about a single subject. For the same definition applies

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ο γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁρος ἐνὸς μόνου καὶ ἄπλως τοῦ πράγματος, οἶον ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐνὸς μόνου ἀνθρώπου ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ οὖν μία πρώταις ἡ ἐν καθ’ ἐνὸς ἄξιον, καὶ ἄπλως ἐσται πρώταις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐρώτησις. ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεων, ὁ δ’ ἐλεγχὸς συλλογισμὸς, καὶ ὁ ἐλεγχὸς ἐσται ἐκ προτάσεων. εἰ οὖν ἡ πρώταις ἐν καθ’ ἐνὸς, φανερον ὅτι καὶ οὕτος ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἀγνοίᾳ φαίνεται γὰρ εἰναι πρώταις ἡ οὐκ οὕσα πρώταις. εἰ μὲν οὖν δέδωκεν ἀπόκρισιν ὡς πρὸς μίαν ἐρώτησιν, ἐσται ἐλεγχὸς, εἰ δὲ μὴ δέδωκεν ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, φαινόμενος ἐλεγχὸς. ὡστε πάντες οἱ τρόποι πίπτουσι εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἀγνοίαν, οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι φαινομένην ἡ ἀντίφασις, ὅπερ ἦν ῥίον τοῦ ἐλέγχου, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ὅρον.

VII. 'Ἡ δ’ ἀπάτη γίνεται τῶν μὲν παρὰ τὴν ὀμωνυμίαν καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶ ὑμὴ δύνασθαι διαφέρειν τὸ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον (ἐνια γὰρ οὐκ εὑρομον διελείν, οἶον τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν), τῶν δὲ παρὰ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μηδὲν οἴσημα διαφέρειν συντιθέμενον ἡ διαφρούμενον τὸν λόγον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν προσῳδίαν. οὗ γὰρ ἄλλο δοκεῖ σημαινεῖν ἀνιέμενος καὶ ἐπιτεινόμενος ὁ λόγος, ἐπ’ οὐδένος

1 Reading τρόποι for τόποι with Michael Ephesius.
2 Adding ἡ with Wallies.
to 'one single thing' and to 'the thing' simply; the definition, for example, of 'man' and of 'one single man' is the same, and so, too, with the other instances. If, therefore, a 'single proposition' is one which claims a single predicate for a single subject, a 'proposition,' simply, will also be a question of this kind. And since reasoning is based on propositions, and refutation is a process of reasoning, refutation will also be based on propositions. If, therefore, a proposition is a single predication about a single thing, clearly this fallacy also depends on ignorance of the nature of refutation; for what is not a proposition appears to be one. If, therefore, a man has given an answer as though to a single question, there will be a refutation, but if he has not given it but only appears to have done so, there will be only an apparent refutation. Thus all the kinds of fallacy fall under the heading of ignorance of the nature of refutation — those connected with language because the contradiction, which is a particular characteristic of refutation, is only apparent, and the rest because of the definition of reasoning.

VII. In fallacies connected with verbal equivocation and ambiguous phrases the deception arises from the inability to distinguish the various meanings of a term (for there are some which it is not easy to distinguish, for example, the meanings of 'unity,' 'being' and 'identity'). In fallacies connected with combination and disjunction the deception is due to the supposition that it makes no difference whether the term is combined or disjoined, as indeed is generally the case. So, too, in those connected with accentuation; for it does not seem ever, or seems very seldom, to alter the significance of the word whether it is pronounced [Note (8). All the above fallacies arise from confused thinking and the inability to make distinctions.]
Aristotle

169 a

30 ἡ οὖς ἐπὶ πολλῶν. τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς λέξεως. χαλεπὸν γὰρ διελείπτει ποῖα ὁμαίνεται καὶ ποῖα ὡς ἑτέρως λέγεται· σχεδὸν γὰρ ὁ τούτω δυνάμενος ποιεῖν ἐγγὺς ἐστὶν τοῦ θεωρεῖν τάληθες. μάλιστα δ’ ἐπισπάται συνεπινεῦσιν, ὦτι πᾶν τὸ κατηγοροῦμεν τὸν ὑπο-

35 λαμβάνομεν τὸδε τι καὶ ὡς ἐν ὑπακούομεν· τῶ γὰρ ἐν καὶ τῇ οὔσιᾳ μάλιστα δοκεῖ παρέπεσθαι τὸ τὸδε τι καὶ τὸ ὅν. διὸ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξειν ὁμοσὶς ὁ τρόπος θετέος, πρῶτον μὲν ὦτι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται μετ’ ἄλλων σκοπουμένων ἡ καθ’ αὐτοῦς (ἡ μὲν γὰρ μετ’ ἄλλου σκέψις διὰ λόγουν,

40 ἡ δὲ καθ’ αὐτὸν οὖς ἦττον δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγ-

169 b ματος), εἶτα καὶ καθ’ αὐτὸν ἀπατᾶσθαι συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου ποιηταὶ τὴν σκέψιν· ἔτι ἡ μὲν ἀπάτη ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἡ δ’ ὁμοιότης ἐκ τῆς λέξεως. τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακρίνειν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἑτέρον καὶ 5 ἐν καὶ πολλά, μηδὲ τοῖς ποῖοις τῶν κατηγορημάτων πάντα ταῦτα καὶ τῷ πράγματι συμβέβηκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον· κεῖτο γὰρ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος τὸ ἐπόμενον. ἔτι καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν φαίνεται καὶ ἄξιονται οὕτως, εἰ τὸδε ἀπὸ τοῦδε μὴ χωρίζεται, μηδ’ ἀπὸ θατέρου χωρίζεσθαι θά-

10 τερον. τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐκλειψιν τοῦ λόγου καὶ

1 Reading with Poste ἐπισπάται for ἐπίσταται.
with a lower or a higher pitch. In fallacies connected with the form of expression the deception is due to similarity of language; for it is difficult to distinguish what sort of things belong to the same and what to different categories; for he who can do this very nearly approaches a vision of the truth. What in particular seduces us into giving our assent to the fallacy is the fact that we suppose that every predicate of something is an individual thing and it presents itself to our ears as a single thing; for it is to the one and to substance that 'individuality' and 'being' are generally held most truly to be attached. On this account also this kind of fallacy must be classed among those connected with language; firstly, because the deception occurs more commonly when we are inquiring with others than by ourselves (for an inquiry with someone else is carried on by means of words, whereas in our own minds it is carried on quite as much by means of the thing itself); secondly, because, even in solitary inquiry, a man is apt to be deceived when he carries on his inquiry by means of words; and, thirdly, the deception arises from the similarity, and the similarity arises from the language. In fallacies connected with accident the deception is due to inability to distinguish the identical and the different, the one and the many, and what kinds of predicates have all the same accidents as their subject. So, too, in fallacies connected with the consequent; for the consequent is a branch of the accident. Furthermore, in many cases it appears to be true and is treated as axiomatic that, if A is inseparable from B, then also B is inseparable from A. In fallacies connected with the defect in the definition of refutation and with the distinction
τῶν παρὰ τὸ πῆ καὶ ἄπλως ἐν τῷ παρὰ μικρὸν ἡ ἀπάτη· ὃς γὰρ ούδεν προσσημαίνον τὸ τί ἡ πῆ ἡ πῶς ἡ τὸ νῦν καθόλου συγχωροῦμεν. ὅμοιός δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβανόντων καὶ τῶν ἀναιτίων, καὶ ὁσοὶ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ὃς ἐν 15 ποιοῦσιν· ἐν ἀπασί γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν· οὐ γὰρ διακριβοῦμεν οὔτε τῆς προτάσεως οὔτε τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ τὸν ὁρὸν διὰ τῆν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν.

VIII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔχομεν παρ' ὁσα γίνονται οἱ φαινόμενοι συλλογισμοῖ, ἔχομεν καὶ παρ' ὅποσα οἱ 20 σοφιστικοὶ γένοιτ' ἀν συλλογισμοὶ καὶ ἔλεγχοι. λέγω δὲ σοφιστικὸν ἔλεγχον καὶ συλλογισμὸν οὐ μόνον τὸν φαινόμενον συλλογισμὸν ἡ ἔλεγχον, μὴ ὅντα δὲ, ἄλλα καὶ τὸν ὅντα μὲν, φαινόμενον δὲ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγματος. εἰσὶ δ' οὕτωι οἱ μὴ κατὰ τὸ πράγμα ἐλέγχοντες καὶ δεικνύντες· ἀγνοοῦντας, 25 ὅπερ ἢν τῆς πειραστικῆς. ἔστι δ' ἡ πειραστικὴ μέρος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς· αὕτη δὲ δύναται συλλογίζεσθαι ψεύδος δι' ἁγνοιαν τοῦ διδόντος τὸν λόγον. οἱ δὲ σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι, ἃν καὶ συλλογίζονται τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐ ποιοῦσι δῆλον· εἰ ἁγνοεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸν εἰδότα ἐμποδίζουσι τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις.

30 Ὅτι δ' ἔχομεν αὐτοὺς τῇ αὐτῇ μεθόδῳ, δῆλον· παρ' ὁσα γὰρ φαίνεται τῶς ἁκούονσιν ὡς ἠρωτημένα συλλελογίσθαι, παρὰ ταῦτα κἂν τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ δόξειν. ὡστ' ἔσονται συλλογισμοὶ ψευδεῖς διὰ τούτων ἡ πάντων ἡ ἐνίων· ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἐρωτηθεῖς
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, vii–viii

between a qualified and an absolute statement the deception is due to the minuteness of the difference; for we regard the qualification of a particular case or respect or manner or time as having no extra significance and concede the universality of the proposition. So, too, when people assume the original point and when the wrong cause is assigned and when several questions are united in one; for in all these cases the deception is due to the minuteness of the difference; for we fail accurately to carry out the definition of 'proposition' and 'reasoning' from the above-mentioned cause.

VIII. Since we know the various sources from which apparent reasonings arise, we also know those from which sophistical reasonings and refutations would arise. By sophistical refutation and reasoning I mean not only the seeming but unreal reasoning or refutation but also one which, though real, only seems to be, but is not really, germane to the subject in hand. These are those which fail to refute and show up ignorance within the sphere of the subject in hand, and this is the function of examination. Now this is a department of dialectic, but it may reach a false conclusion owing to the ignorance of the person under examination. But sophistical refutations, even if they prove the contradictory of his view, do not make clear whether he is ignorant; for men try to entrap even the man of scientific knowledge by these arguments. That we know them by the same method is clear; for the same reasons which make the hearers think that a conclusion has been reached as a result of questions, would make the answerer think so too, so that there will be false proofs as a result of all or some of these causes; for what a man thinks he has

(c) By refutations which, though valid, only appear to be germane to the subject under discussion.

[Note (a). Sophistical refutations proceed on the same lines as apparent proof.]
ARISTOTLE

169 b

35 οίεται δεδωκέναι, κἂν ἐρωτηθεὶς θειῆ. πλὴν ἐπὶ γέ τινων ἀμα συμβαίνει προσερωτὰν τὸ ἐνδεές καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐμφανίζειν, οἶον ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν καὶ τὸν σολοικισμὸν. εἰ οὐν οἱ παραλογισμοὶ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως παρὰ τὸν φαινόμενον ἔλεγχον εἰσὶ, δὴ-λον ὅτι παρὰ τοσαῦτα ἄν καὶ τῶν ψευδῶν εἴησαν 40 συλλογισμοὶ παρ’ ὁσα καὶ ὁ φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος.

170 a ὁ δὲ φαινόμενος παρὰ τὰ μόρια τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ· ἐκά-στου γὰρ ἐκλείποντος φανεῖται ἄν ἔλεγχος, οἶον ὁ παρὰ τὸ μῆς συμβαίνον διὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ ὁ τὰς δύο ἐρωτήσεις μίαν ποιών παρὰ τὴν πρότασιν, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ καθ’ αὐτὸ ὁ παρὰ τὸ 5 συμβεβηκός, καὶ τὸ τούτου μόριον, ὁ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον· ἐτὶ τὸ μῆ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου συμβαίνειν· εἰτ’ ἀντὶ τοῦ καθόλου τὴν ἀντίφασιν καὶ κατὰ ταύτῳ καὶ πρὸς ταύτῳ καὶ ὲσαύτως παρά τε τὸ ἐπὶ τὶ ἡ παρ’ ἐκαστὸν τούτων· ἐτὶ παρὰ τὸ μῆ ἐναριθμούμενον τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ τὸ ἐν 10 ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν. ὡστ’ ἔχομεν ἄν παρ’ ὁσα γίνονται οἱ παραλογισμοὶ· παρὰ πλεῖω μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν εἶπεν, παρὰ δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἔσονται πάντες.

"Εστὶ δ’ ὁ σοφιστικὸς ἔλεγχος οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἔλεγ-χος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τινὰ· καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ὲσαύτως.
conceded without being questioned, he would grant if he were to be questioned. But of course it sometimes happens that, as soon as we ask the requisite question, we make the falsehood obvious, as happens in verbal fallacies and those due to solecism. If, therefore, false proofs of the contradictory depend on the apparent refutation, it is clear that proofs of false conclusions must be also due to the same number of causes as the apparent refutation. Now the apparent refutation depends on the elements which compose a genuine one; for, if any one of these is lacking, there would only be an apparent refutation, for example, that which is due to the conclusion not resulting from the argument (the reduction to an impossibility), and that which unites two questions in one and is due to a fault in the proposition, and that which is due to the substitution of an accident for the essence of a thing, and—a subdivision of the last mentioned—that which is due to the consequent; moreover, there is the case where the result follows in word only and not in reality, and also where, instead of the contradiction being universal and in the same respect, relation and manner, there is a restriction in extent or in connexion with another of these qualifications; and then again there is the case of the assumption of the original point due to a disregard of the principle of not reckoning it in. Thus we should know the various conditions under which false proofs occur, for there are no further conditions under which they could occur, but they will always result from the above causes.

A sophistical refutation is not an absolute refutation but is relative to some person, and so likewise is a sophistical proof. For unless the refutation which

(Note (g). A sophistical refutation is not
Ἀριστοτέλης

15 σημαίνειν καὶ ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὁμοιοσχημοσύνην τὸ μόνον τόδε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὁπαῦτὼς, οὐτ' ἐλεγχοὶ οὔτε συλλογισμοὶ ἐσονται, οὐθ' ἀπλῶς οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτώμενον· έὰν δὲ λάβωσι, πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἐσονταί, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐκ ἐσονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν σημαίνον εἰλήφασιν, ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο.

20 IX. Παρὰ πόσα δ' ἐλεγχονται οἱ ἐλεγχόμενοι, οὐ δεὶ πειράσθαι λαμβάνειν ἁνεῦ τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμησις ἀπάντων. τοῦτο δ' οὐδεμᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης· ἄπειροι γὰρ ἵπσως αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἀποδείξεις. ἐλεγχοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἀληθεῖς· ὅσα γὰρ ἐστιν ἀποδείξει, ἐστὶ καὶ ἐλέγξει τὸν ἑμενον τὴν ἀντίφασιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, οἰον εἰ σύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον ἐθηκεν, ἐλέγξειν ἀν τις τῇ ἀποδείξει ὅτι ἀσύμμετρος. ὡστε πάντων δεήσει ἐπιστήμων εἰναι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐσονταί παρὰ τᾶς ἐν γεωμετρία ἀρχάς καὶ τὰ τούτων συμπεράσματα, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τᾶς ἐν ἰατρικῇ, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τᾶς τῶν ἀλλων ἐπιστημῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ ψευδεῖς ἐλεγχοὶ ὁμοίως ἐν ἀπειροῖς· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τέχνην ἐστὶ ψευδής συλλογισμός, οἰον κατὰ γεωμετρίαν ὁ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κατὰ ἰατρικὴν ὁ ἰατρικὸς. λέγω δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὸ κατὰ τᾶς ἐκείνης ἀρχάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάντων τῶν ἐλέγχων ἀλλὰ τῶν

50
depends on equivocation assumes that the equivocal term has only a single meaning, and unless that which depends on similarity of termination assumes that there is only substance, and so on, neither refutation nor proof will be possible, either absolutely or relatively, to the answerer; whereas, if they do make these assumptions, they will be possible relatively to the answerer, but not absolutely; for they have not secured a statement which has a single meaning but only one which appears to be such, and only from a particular person.

IX. Without a knowledge of everything which exists we ought not to try and grasp the various ways in which the refutation of those who are refuted is brought about. This, however, is not the function of any art; for the sciences are possibly infinite, and so clearly demonstrations are also infinite. Now there are true as well as false refutations; for wherever demonstration is possible, it is possible also to refute him who maintains the contradictory of the truth; for example, if a man maintains that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its sides, one should refute him by proving that it is incommensurate. So we shall need to have scientific knowledge of everything; for some refutations will depend on the principles of geometry and their conclusions, others on those of medicine, and others on those of the other sciences. Moreover, false refutations also are among things which are infinite; for every art has a false proof peculiar to it, geometry a geometrical proof and medicine a medical proof. By 'peculiar to an art' I mean 'in accordance with the principles of that art.' It is clear, then, that we need not grasp the commonplaces of all refutations
παρά τιν διαλεκτικήν ληπτέον τοὺς τόπους· οὕτωι
gὰρ κοινοὶ πρὸς ἀπασαν τέχνην καὶ δύναμιν. καὶ
tὸν μὲν καθ' ἐκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἐλεγχον τοῦ ἐπι-
στήμονος ἐστὶ θεωρεῖν, εἴτε μὴ ὅν φαίνεται εἰ τ'
ἐστι, διὰ τί ἐστι· τὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ὑπὸ
40 μηδεμίαν τέχνην τῶν διαλεκτικῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἔχομεν
ἐξ ὅν οἱ ἐνδοξοὶ συλλογισμοὶ περὶ ὅτι οὖν, ἔχομεν
170b εξ ὅν οἱ ἐλεγχοὶ.  ὥστε ἐλεγχὸς ἐστιν ἀντιφάσεως
συλλογισμός, ὥστ' ἢ εἰς ἡ ἄλλο συλλογισμὸς ἀντι-
φάσεως ἐλεγχὸς ἐστιν. ἔχομεν ἃρα παρ' ὅποσα
πάντες εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι. εἰ δὲ τούτ' ἔχομεν, καὶ
5 τὰς λύσεις ἔχομεν· αἱ γὰρ τούτων ἐνστάσεις λύσεις
εἰσίν. ἔχομεν δὲ, παρ' ὅποσα γίνονται, καὶ τοὺς
φαινομένους, φαινομένους δὲ οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλα τοῖς
tοιοῦτοι. ἀξιός τις γὰρ ἐστιν, εἰάν τις σκοπῆ παρ'
ὅποσα φαίνονται τοῖς τυχοῦσιν. ὥστε φανερῶν
ὅτι τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ δύνασθαι λαβεῖν παρ'
ὅσα γίνεται διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ ὅν ἐλεγχὸς ἡ φαινό-
10 μενος ἐλεγχὸς, καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὸς ἡ φαινομένος
dιαλεκτικὸς ἡ πειραστικὸς.

X. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορά τῶν λόγων ἢν λέγουσιν
tines, τὸ εἶναι τοὺς μὲν πρὸς τοῦνομα λόγους,
ἔτερους δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν· ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ ὑπο-
15 λαμβάνειν ἄλλως μὲν εἰναι πρὸς τοῦνομα λόγους,
ἔτερους δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοὺς αὐτοὺς.
tι γὰρ ἔστι τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ἀλλ' ἡ ὅταν
μὴ χρῆται τῷ ὁνόματι, ἐφ' ὑ οἰόμενος ἐρωτάσθαι,1

1 Reading with Poste ἐφ' ὑ οἰόμενος ἐρωτάσθαι for οἰόμενος ἐρωτάσθαι ἐφ' ὑ of the mss.
but only those which concern dialectic; for these are common to every art and faculty. And it is the function of the scientific man to examine the refutation which is peculiar to each science and see whether it is apparent only and not real, or, if it is real, why it is so; whereas it is the function of dialecticians to examine a refutation which depends on common principles which do not fall under any one art. For if we know the sources of generally accepted proofs about any particular subject, we know also the sources of the refutations; for a refutation is a proof of a contradictory, and so one or two proofs of a contradictory make up a refutation. We know, then, the various sources of all such proofs, and, knowing these, we also know their solutions; for the objections to these are the solutions. We also know the various sources of apparent refutations—apparent, that is, not to everyone but only to a certain kind of mind; for it would be an endless task to examine the various ways in which they are apparent to the man in the street. It is, therefore, clear that it is the function of the dialectician to be able to grasp the various ways in which, on the basis of common principles, a real or apparent refutation, that is, dialectical or apparently dialectical or part of an examination, is brought about.

X. No real distinction, such as some people propose, exists between arguments used against the word and those used against the thought; for it is absurd to suppose that some arguments are used against the word and others against the thought, and not the same in both cases. For what is failure to use the argument against the thought except what happens when a man does not apply the term in the meaning about which the man questioned thought that he
ο ἐρωτώμενος ἔδωκεν; τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τούτο ἔστι καὶ πρὸς τοῦνομα. τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅταν ἐφ' 20 ὦ ἐδωκεν διανοθεῖς. εἰ δὴ1 πλεῖω σημαίνοντος τοῦ ὀνόματος οἴοτο ἐν σημαίνει καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος, οἶον ἦσω τὸ ἢ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν2 ἐν οἰόμενος εἶναι ἡρώτησε, καὶ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἐν πάντα, οὕτως πρὸς τοῦνομα ἔσται ἢ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου διειλεγμένος; εἰ δὲ γέ τις πολλὰ οἴεται σημαίνειν, δήλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους ἐστὶ λόγους τὸ πρὸς τοῦνομα καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ὅσοι πλεῖω σημαίνουσιν, εἰτα περὶ ὄντινοῦ ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς τὰ δεδομένα. εἰτα πρὸς τοῦνομα πάντας ἐνδέχεται αὐτοὺς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦνομα τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι ἐστὶν ἐνταῦθα. εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντες, ἐσονταί τινες ἐτεροὶ οὐτε πρὸς τοῦνομα οὐτε πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν· οἱ δὲ φασί πάντας, καὶ διαμορφοῦται ἡ πρὸς τοῦνομα ἡ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι πάντας, ἀλλούς δ' οὐ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσοι συλλογισμοῖ εἰσὶ παρὰ τὸ πλεοναχῶς, τοῦτων εἰσὶ τινές οἱ παρὰ

1 Omitting τὶς after εἰ δή.
2 Omitting Ζῆρων after ἐρωτῶν as a gloss.
was being questioned when he made the concession? And this is equivalent to using it against the word; whereas to use it against the thought is to apply it to the sense about which the man was thinking when he made the concession. If, then, when the word has more than one meaning, both the questioner and the man questioned were to think that it had only one meaning—as, for example, 'unity' and 'being' have several meanings but both the answerer answers and the questioner puts his question on the supposition that there is only one meaning and that the argument is that all things are one—will the argument have been directed against the word and not rather against the thought of the man questioned? If, on the contrary, one of them thinks that the word has several meanings, obviously the argument is not directed against the thought. For application to the word and application to the thought belong primarily to arguments which signify several things ambiguously, but, secondarily, to any argument whatsoever; for the application to the thought does not depend on the argument but on a certain attitude of mind in the answerer towards what has been conceded. Next, it is possible for all arguments to be applied to the word; for in the case under discussion 'to be applied to the word' means 'not to be applied to the thought.' For if all are not applied to the word or the thought, there will be a third class not applied to either; but they declare that the classification is exhaustive and divide them into those applied to the word and those applied to the thought, and there is no other class. But, as a matter of fact, reasonings dependent on the word are amongst those dependent on a multiplicity of meanings. For it is an
170 b
toûnoûma. ἀτόπως μὲν γὰρ καὶ εἶρηται τὸ παρὰ
toûnoûma φάναι πάντας τοὺς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν. ἀλλ'οὖν εἰσὶ τινὲς παραλογισμοί οὐ τῷ τὸν ἀποκρινό-
μενον πρὸς τούτους ἔχειν πως, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦδι
40 ἐρωτήμα τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν ἔχειν, ὃ πλεῖω σημαινεῖ.

171 a Ὄλονς τε ἀτοπον τὸ περὶ ἐλέγχου διαλέγεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ μὴ πρότερον περὶ συλλογισμοῦ. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέγχου
συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν, ὥστε χρὴ καὶ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ
πρότερον ἡ περὶ ψευδοῦς ἐλέγχου. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦ-
τος ἐλέγχος φαινόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως.
διὸ ἡ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἔσται τὸ αἴτιον ἡ ἐν τῇ
ἀντιφάσει (προσκείσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὴν ἀντιφάσιν),
ότε δ' ἐν ἁμφοῖν, ἂν ἡ φαινόμενος ἐλέγχος. ἔστι
δὲ ὁ μὲν τοῦ συγώντα λέγειν ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει, οὐκ
ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ, ὃ δὲ, ὃ μὴ ἔχοι τις, δοῦναι, ἐν
10 ἁμφοῖν, ὃ δὲ ὅτι Ὁμήρου ποίησις σχῆμα διὰ τοῦ
κύκλου ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ. ὃ δ' ἐν μηδετέρῳ
ἀληθῆς συλλογισμός.

'Αλλὰ δὴ οὖθεν ὁ λόγος ἦλθε, πότερον οἱ ἐν τοῖς
μαθήμασι λόγοι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἰσιν ἡ οὕ; καὶ
ἐὰν τοις δοκεῖ πολλὰ σημαινεῖν τὸ τρίγωνον, καὶ
15 ἐδοκεῖ μὴ ὡς τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα ἐφ' οὐ συνεπεράνατο
ὅτι δύο ὀρθά, πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὗτος
dιείλεκται τὴν ἐκεῖνον ἡ οὕ; ὃ

'Ετι εἰ πολλὰ μὲν σημαινεῖ τοῦνομα, ὃ δὲ μὴ νοεῖ
absurd statement that 'dependent on the name' describes all arguments connected with language. The truth is that there are some false arguments which do not depend on a particular attitude of mind on the part of the answerer towards them but are due to the fact that the argument itself involves the kind of question which can bear more than one meaning.

It is quite absurd to discuss refutation without previously discussing proof; for refutation is a proof, and so we ought to discuss proof before discussing false refutation; for such refutation is an apparent proof of a contradiction. Therefore the cause of falsity will lie either in the proof or in the contradiction (for the contradiction must be added), but sometimes in both, if there be a merely apparent refutation. In the argument that 'the silent speaks,' the refutation lies in the contradiction, not in the proof; in the argument that 'a man can give away what he has not got,' it lies in both; in the argument that 'Homer's poetry is a figure' because it forms a 'cycle,' it lies in the proof. The argument that errs in neither respect is a true proof.

But to resume from the point whence the argument digressed, Are mathematical arguments always applied to the thought or not? If anyone thinks that the term 'triangle' has several meanings and has granted it in a sense other than a figure which he has proved to contain two right angles, has the questioner reasoned against the answerer's thought or not?

Further, if the name has several meanings but the answerer does not think or imagine that this is so, 

\* 170 b 40.
μηδ' οίεται, πώς οὔτος οὖ πρός τὴν διάνοιαν διεί-
λεκται; ἣ πῶς δεῖ ἐρωτᾶν πλὴν διδόναι διαίρεσιν,
20 εἴτ' ἐρωτήσει1 τις εἰ ἐστὶ σιγώντα λέγειν ἢ οὗ, ἢ
ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς οὖ, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς ναι; εἰ δὴ τις δοιή
μηδαμῶς, ὁ ὃς διαλεξθεῖη, ἄρ' οὐ πρός τὴν διάνοιαν
dieiλεκται; καίτοι οὗ λόγοις δοκεῖ τῶν παρὰ τοῦ-
nομα εἶναι. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ γένος τι λόγων τὸ πρὸς
tὴν διάνοιαν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πρὸς τοῦνομα εἰσίν καὶ
25 τοιοῦτοι οὐ πάντες, οὐχ ὃτι οἱ ἐλέγχοι, ἀλλ' οὐδ'
oi ψανόμενοι ἐλέγχοι. εἰσί γὰρ καὶ μὴ παρὰ τὴν
λέξιν ψανόμενοι ἐλέγχοι, οἶον οἱ παρὰ τὸ συμ-
βεβηκὸς καὶ ἑτεροι.

Εἰ δὲ τις ἄξιοι διαίρειν, ὅτι λέγω δὲ σιγώντα
λέγειν τὰ μὲν ὡδὶ τὰ δ' ὡδὶ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γ' ἐστὶ
30 πρῶτον μὲν ἀτοπον, τὸ ἄξιον (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ
tὸ ἐρωτώμενον πολλαχῶς ἔχειν, ἀδύνατον δὲ
diaiřειν ὃ μὴ οὐεται). ἐπειτα τὸ διδάσκειν τι ἄλλο
ἐσται; φανερὸν γὰρ ποιήσει ὡς ἔχει τῷ μήτ'
eskemmenw mou' ei' odoi mu'θ' ὑπολαμβάνοντι ὅτι ἄλ-
lως λέγεται. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μη διπλοῖς τι κωλύει
35 τοῦτο παθεῖν; ἄρα ίσαί αἱ μονάδες ταῖς δυάσιν ἐν
tois tétparson; εἰσὶ δὲ δυάσι αἱ μὲν ὡδὶ ἐνοῦσαι
αἱ δὲ ὡδί. καὶ ἄρα τῶν ἑναντίων μία ἐπιστήμην ἢ
οὗ; ἐστὶ δ' ἑναντία τὰ μὲν γνωστὰ τὰ δ' ἄγνωστα.

1 Reading εἴτ' ἐρωτήσει for εἴτ' ἐρωτήσει.
has not the questioner reasoned against his thought? Or how else must the question be asked except by offering a distinction? In which case one will ask, 'Is it or is it not possible for a man to speak when silent, or is the answer in one sense "No," in another "Yes"?' But if the answerer were to refuse to grant the possibility in any sense and the questioner were to argue that it is possible, has he not argued against the thought of his opponent? Yet the argument is generally regarded as among those connected with the name; there is not, therefore, any class of argument which is directed against the thought. Some arguments are directed against the name, and such arguments are not all of them even apparent refutations, still less true refutations. For there are also apparent refutations which are not connected with language, for example, amongst others, those connected with accident.

But if one claims to make distinctions, saying, 'By "the silent speaking" I mean sometimes one thing and sometimes another,' this claim is, in the first place, absurd (for sometimes the question does not seem to involve any ambiguity, and it is impossible to make a distinction where no ambiguity is suspected); and, secondly, what else will didactic argument be but this? For it will make clear the position to one who neither has considered nor knows nor conceives that a second meaning is possible. For why should not the same process be used where there is no double meaning? 'Are the units in four equal to the twos? Bear in mind that the twos are contained in one sense in one way and in another sense in another way.' Again, 'Is the knowledge of contraries one or not? Notice that some contraries
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171 b ὥστ' ἐσικεν ἀγνοεῖν ὅ τούτο ἀξιῶν ὅτι ἑτερον τὸ διδάσκειν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι δὲὶ τὸν μὲν διδάσκοντα μὴ ἐρωτῶν ἀλλ' αὐτὸν δῆλα ποιεῖν, τὸν δ' ἑρωτάν.

XI. Εἰς τὸ φάναι ἡ ἄποφάναι ἀξιοῦν οὐ δεικνύντος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πείραν λαμβάνοντος. ἡ γὰρ 5 πειραστικῆ ἐστὶ διαλεκτικῆ τις καὶ θεωρεῖ οὐ τὸν εἰδότα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα καὶ προσποιούμενον. δ' μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πράγμα θεωρῶν τὰ κοινὰ διαλεκτικὸς, δ' δὲ τοῦτο φαινομένως ποιῶν σοφιστικός. καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἔριστικός καὶ σοφιστικὸς ἐστὶν εἰς μὲν ὁ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, περὶ ὧν ἡ δια-

10 λεκτικῆ πειραστικῆ ἐστι, κἂν ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ τοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὶ ἀπαθητικὸς ἐστίν. καὶ ὅσοι μὴ ὁντες κατὰ τὴν ἐκάστου μέθοδου παραλογισμὸι δοκοῦσιν εἴναι κατὰ τὴν τέχνην. τὰ γὰρ ψευδογραφήματα οὐκ ἔριστικά (κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν τέχνην οἱ παραλογισμοί), οὐδὲ γ' εἰ τί ἐστὶ ψευδογράφημα

15 περὶ ἀληθές, οἷον τὸ Ἰπποκράτους ἢ τὸ τετραγωνισμὸς ὁ διὰ τῶν μηνίσκων. ἀλλ' ὡς Βρύσων ἑτεραγωγῆς τὸν κύκλον, εἰ καὶ τετραγωνιζέται ὁ κύκλος, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὸ πράγμα, διὰ τοῦτο σοφιστικός. ὥστε ὁ τε περὶ τῶν ὁποῖος συλλογισμὸς ἔριστικός λόγος, καὶ δ' κατὰ τὸ πράγμα

a On the method of squaring the circle by means of lunules and those employed by Hippocrates and Bryson see Ivor Thomas, Greek Mathematical Works (Loeb Classical Library), vol. I, pp. 234-253, 310-313 (Hippocrates); 314-317 (Bryson); and E. Poste, Soph. El. pp. 245 ff.
are knowable, others are not.' Thus the man who makes this claim seems not to know that didactic is one thing and dialectic another, and that the man who employs didactic should not ask questions but himself make things clear, while the dialectician asks questions.

XI. Further, to demand that the answerer should either affirm or deny is not the function of one who is displaying something but of one who is making an examination. For the art of examination is a kind of dialectic and has in view not the man who knows but the man who is ignorant and pretends to know. The man, then, who views general principles in the light of the particular case is a dialectician, while he who only apparently does this is a sophist. Now one form of contentious and sophistic reasoning is reasoning which is only apparent, with which dialectic deals as a method of examination, even though the conclusion be true; for it is deceptive in the matter of cause. Then there are those false reasonings which do not accord with the method of inquiry peculiar to the subject yet seem to accord with the art concerned. For false geometrical figures are not contentious (for the resultant fallacies accord with the subject-matter of the art), and the same is the case with any false figure illustrating something which is true, for example, Hippocrates' figure or the squaring of the circle by means of lunules. On the other hand, Bryson's method of squaring the circle, even though this be successful, is nevertheless sophistical, because it does not accord with the subject-matter concerned. And so any merely apparent reasoning on these topics is a contentious argument, and any reasoning which merely appears to accord
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20 φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, κἂν ἢ συλλογισμός, ἐριστικὸς λόγος· φαινόμενος γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τὸ πράγμα, ἀστὰ ἀπατητικὸς καὶ ἄδικος. ἔστερ γὰρ ἢ ἐν ἀγὼν ἀδικία εἶδός τι ἔχει καὶ ἐστιν ἄδικομαχία τις, οὕτως ἐν ἀντιλογίᾳ ἄδικομαχίᾳ ἢ ἐριστικῇ ἐστιν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οἱ πάντως νικᾶν προαιρούμενοι 25 πάντων ἀπτονται καὶ ἐνταῦθα οἱ ἐριστικοὶ. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμὸν σοφιστικοὶ· ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ ἐστιν, ἦσσερ εἰπομέν, χρηματιστικὴ τις ἀπὸ σοφίας φαινομένης, διὸ φαινομένης ἀπο- 30 δείξεως ἐφίενται. καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν εἰσὶν οἱ φιλέριδες καὶ σοφισταὶ, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνεκεν. καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσται σοφιστικὸς καὶ ἐριστικὸς, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταύτων, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν νίκης φαινομένης, ἐριστικός, ἢ δὲ σοφίας, σοφιστικός· καὶ γὰρ ἡ σοφιστική ἐστι φαινομένη σοφία 35 τις ἀλλ' οὐκ οὕσα. ὁ δ' ἐριστικός ἐστι πως οὕτως ἔχων πρὸς τὸν διαλεκτικὸν ὡς ὁ ψευδογράφος πρὸς τὸν γεωμετρικὸν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ διαλεκτικῷ 1 παραλογιζεται καὶ ὁ ψευδογράφος τῷ γεωμέτρῃ. 2 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐριστικός, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ 172 a συμπερασμάτων τῶν ύπὸ τῆν τέχνην ψευδογράφει· ὁ δ' ύπὸ τῆν διαλεκτικῆν περὶ μὲν τὰλλα ὡτι ἐρι-

1 Reading τῷ διαλεκτικῷ with Wallies for διαλεκτικῇ.
2 Reading τῷ γεωμέτρῃ with Poste for τὸν γεωμέτρην.

a 165 a 22.
with the subject-matter, even though it be genuine reasoning, is contentious argument; for it only apparently accords with the subject-matter and so is deceptive and unfair. For just as unfairness in an athletic contest takes a definite form and is an unfair kind of fighting, so contentious reasoning is an unfair kind of fighting in argument; for in the former case those who are bent on victory at all costs stick at nothing, so too in the latter case do contentious arguers. Those, then, who behave like this merely to win a victory, are generally regarded as contentious and quarrelsome, while those who do so to win a reputation which will help them to make money are regarded as sophistical. For, as we have said, the art of the sophist is a money-making art which trades on apparent wisdom, and so sophists aim at apparent proof. Quarrelsome people and sophists use the same arguments, but not for the same reasons; and the same argument will be sophistical and contentious but not from the same point of view. If the semblance of victory is the motive, it is contentious; if the semblance of wisdom, it is sophistical: for sophistry is an appearance of wisdom without the reality. The contentious arguer bears much the same relation to the dialectician as the drawer of false geometrical figures bears to the geometrician; for he reasons falsely on the same basis as the dialectician, while the drawer of false figures argues on the same basis as the true geometrician. But the latter is not a contentious reasoner, because he constructs his false figure on the principles and conclusions which come under the art of geometry, whereas the former, arguing on principles which come under dialectic, will clearly be contentious on the other subjects.
ος τικός ἐσται δήλον. οἴον ὁ τετραγωνισμὸς ὁ μὲν
dιὰ τῶν μνήμων ὁμικρὸν ἐριστικός, ὁ δὲ Βρύσωνος
ἐριστικός· καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁμικρὸν ἐστὶ μετενεγκεῖν ἀλλ' ἡ
πρὸς γεωμετρίαιν μόνον διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων
eἰναι ἀρχῶν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς πολλοὺς, ὅσοι μὴ ἱσασὶ
tὸ δυνατὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀρμόσει
gάρ. ἡ ὡς Ἀντιφῶν ἑτετραγωνίζειν. ἡ εἰ τις μὴ
φαίνει βέλτιον εἰναι ἀπὸ δείπνου περιπατεῖν διὰ τὸν
Ζήμωνος λόγον, ὁμικρὸς· κοινὸς γάρ. εἰ μὲν
οὖν πάντη ὁμοιῶς εἴχεν ὁ ἐριστικός πρὸς τὸν δια-
λεκτικὸν τῷ ψευδογράφῳ πρὸς τὸν γεωμετρήτην, οὐκ
ἀν ἦν περὶ ἐκείνων ἐριστικός. νῦν δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν ὁ
dιαλεκτικός περὶ γένους τι ωρισμένον, οὐδὲ δεικ-
tικός οὐδενός, οὐδὲ τοιοῦτος οἶδος ὁ καθόλου. οὔτε
gάρ ἐστιν ἄπαντα εἰν εἰνι τινι γένει, οὔτε εἰ εὕή, οἴον
τε ὑπὸ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς εἰναι τὰ ὅντα. ὡς τ' οὐ-
δεμία τέχνη τῶν δεικνυοντιν τινὰ φύσιν ἐρωτη-
tικὴ ἐστὶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐξεστὶν ὀποτερονοῦν τῶν μορίων
dοῦναι· συλλογισμὸς γὰρ οὐ γίνεται εἰς ἄμφοιν. ἡ
dὲ διαλεκτικὴ ἐρωτητικὴ ἐστὶν. εἰ δ' ἐδείκνυεν,
eἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τά γε πρῶτα καὶ τὰς οἰκεῖας
ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἄν ἡρῶτα. μὴ διδόντος γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ἔτι
eἰχεν εἰς ὃν ἐτι διαλέξεται πρὸς τὴν ἐνοτασιν. ἡ

1 Bekker's didontos is a misprint for didontos.

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*a* See *Phys.* 185 a 17; Ivor Thomas, *op. cit.* pp. 310-317.
*b* That motion is impossible; see *Phys.* 239 b 10 ff.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi

For example, the squaring of the circle by means of lunules is not contentious, whereas Bryson’s method is contentious. It is impossible to transfer the former outside the sphere of geometry because it is based on principles which are peculiar to geometry, whereas the latter can be used against many disputants, namely, all those who do not know what is possible and what impossible in any particular case; for it will always be applicable. And the same is true of the way in which Antiphon used to square the circle. Or, again, if someone were to deny that it is better to take a walk after dinner because of Zeno’s argument, it would not be a medical argument; for it is of a general application. Accordingly, if the contentious argument stood in every respect in the same relation to the dialectical as the constructor of false figures stands to the geometrician, there would be no contentious argument on those topics. But, as it is, dialectical argument has no definite sphere, nor does it demonstrate anything in particular, nor is it of the nature of the universal. For there is no genus which includes all things, and, if there were, it would not be possible for them to come under the same principles. So no art which aims at showing the nature of anything proceeds by interrogation; for it is impossible to grant either one of two portions of the question; for a proof cannot result from both of them. Dialectic, however, does proceed by interrogation, whereas, if it aimed at showing something, it would refrain from questions, if not about everything, at any rate about primary things and particular principles; for if the opponent refused to grant these, dialectic would no longer have any basis on which to argue against the
δ' αὐτῇ καὶ πειραστικῇ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ πειραστικὴ
tοιαῦτη ἔστιν οἷα ἡ γεωμετρία, ἀλλ' ἦν ἄν ἔχω
καὶ μὴ εἰδῶς τις. ἔξεστι γὰρ πεῖραν λαβεῖν καὶ
tὸν μὴ εἰδότα τὸ πράγμα τοῦ μὴ εἰδότος, εἴπερ
25 καὶ δίδωσιν οὐκ ἔξ ὄν οἴδεν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἴδιων,
ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων, ὅσα τοιαῦτά ἔστιν αἱ εἰδότα
μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει μὴ εἰδέναι τὴν τέχνην, μὴ εἰδότα
δ' ἀνάγκη ἄγνοειν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδενὸς
ὅρισμένου ἡ πειραστικὴ ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν. διὸ καί
περὶ πάντων ἐστὶν πᾶσα γὰρ αἱ τέχναι χρῶνται
30 καὶ κοινῶς τισίν. διὸ πάντες καὶ οἱ ἱδιῶται τρόπον
tινὰ χρῶνται τῇ διαλεκτικῇ καὶ πειραστικῇ πάντες
gὰρ μὲχρι τινὸς ἐγχειροῦσιν ἀνακρίνειν τοὺς ἑπαγ-
γελλομένους. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ κοινὰ· ταῦτα γὰρ
35 οὐδὲν ἦττον ἵσασιν αὐτοῖ, κἂν δοκῶσι λίαν ἔξω
λέγειν. ἐλέγχουσιν οὖν ἀπαντές· ἀτέχνως γὰρ
μετέχουσι τούτου οὐ ἐντέχνως ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἐστὶ,
καὶ ὁ τέχνη συλλογιστικὴ πειραστικὸς διαλεκτικὸς.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ πολλὰ μὲν ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων, οὐ
τοιαῦτα δ' ὅστε φύσιν τινὰ εἶναι καὶ γένος, ἀλλ'
oiōn αἱ ἀποφάσεις, τὰ δ' οὐ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ ἰδια,
ἐστιν ἐκ τούτων περὶ ἀπάντων πειραν λαμβάνειν,

1 Reading ταῦτα for ταῦτα with BC and omitting καὶ with 
AB.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xi

objection. Dialectic is at the same time an art of examination; for neither is the art of examination of the same nature as geometry but it is an art which a man could possess even without any scientific knowledge. For even a man without knowledge of the subject can examine another who is without knowledge, if the latter makes concessions based not on what he knows nor on the special principles of the subject but on the consequential facts, which are such that, though to know them does not prevent him from being ignorant of the art in question, yet not to know them necessarily involves ignorance of it. Clearly, therefore, the art of examination is not knowledge of any definite subject, and it therefore follows that it deals with every subject; for all the arts employ also certain common principles. Accordingly, everyone, including the unscientific, makes some kind of use of dialectic and the art of examination; for all, up to a certain point, attempt to test those who profess knowledge. Now this is where the common principles come in; for they know these of themselves just as well as the scientists, even though their expression of them seems to be very inaccurate. Thus they all practise refutation; for they perform unmethodically the task which dialectic performs methodically, and the man who carries out an examination by means of an art of reasoning is a dialectician. Now there are many identical principles in every sphere, but these are not such as to have a particular nature and form a particular class—resembling, in this respect, negations—while others are not of this kind but limited to special spheres; it is, therefore, possible by means of these to hold examinations on every subject, and that there can be an
172 b καὶ εἶναι τέχνην τινά, καὶ μὴ τοιαύτην εἶναι οἶαι
αἱ δεικνύουσαι. διόπερ ὁ ἐρυστικὸς οὐκ ἔστιν
οὕτως ἔχων πάντη ὡς ὁ ψευδογράφος. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται
παραλογιστικὸς ἐξ ὅρισμένου τινὸς γένους ἀρχῶν,
ἀλλὰ περὶ πᾶν γένος ἔσται ὁ ἐρυστικὸς.

5 Ὁρῶν μὲν οὖν ὕμων οὕτως τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγ-
χων· ὅτι δ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ
tούτων καὶ δύνασθαι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, οὐ χαλεπὸν
idente· ή γὰρ περὶ τὰς προτάσεις μέθοδος ἀπασαν
ἐστιν τούτην τήν θεωρίαν.

XII. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐλέγχων εἰρηται τῶν
10 φαινομένων· περὶ δὲ τοῦ ψευδόμενον τι δεῖξαι καὶ
tὸν λόγον εἰς ἀδοξὸν ἀγαγεῖν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἢν δεύ-
tερον τῆς σοφιστικῆς προορέσεως) πρῶτον μὲν οὖν
ἐκ τοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι πως καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐρωτήσεως
συμβαίνει μάλιστα. τὸ γὰρ πρὸς μηδὲν ὀρίσαντα
κείμενον ἑρωτῶν θηρευτικὸν ἔστι τούτων· εἰκὴς γὰρ
15 λέγοντες ἀμαρτάνουσι μάλλον· εἰκὴ δὲ λέγουσιν,
ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχωσι προκείμενον. τὸ τε ἑρωτῶν
πολλά, κἂν ὄρισμένον ἢ πρὸς δ’ διαλέγεται, καὶ τὸ
tὰ δοκοῦντα λέγειν ἄξιον ποιεῖ τιν’ εὐπορίαν τοῦ
eἰς ἀδοξὸν ἀγαγεῖν ἢ ψεύδος· εάν τε ἑρωτώμενος
φη ἢ ἀποφη τούτων τι, ἄγειν πρὸς ἄ εἰσιν εἰσὶν
20 εὐπορεῖ. δυνατὸν δὲ νῦν ἤττον κακούργειν διὰ
tούτων ἢ πρότερον· ἀπαίτοῦνται γὰρ τὶ τούτο πρὸς
tὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ. στοιχεῖον δὲ τοῦ τυχεῖν ἢ ψεύδους
tινὸς ἢ ἀδοξοῦ τὸ μηδεμίαν εὐθὺς ἑρωτῶν θέσιν,
art of doing this, though not of the same kind as the demonstrative arts. For this reason the contentious arguer is not in all respects in the same position as the constructor of a false geometrical figure; for the contentious arguer will not reason falsely on principles of a definite class but will deal with every kind.

These, then, are the modes of sophistical refutations. It is easy to see that to investigate them and to be able to apply them is the task of the dialectician; for the method of dealing with propositions constitutes the whole of this study.

XII. We have now dealt with apparent refutations. As for showing that the answerer is stating a fallacy and leading the argument towards a paradox—for this was the second aim of the sophist—this is, in the first place, best achieved by some kind of inquiry and by questioning. For to ask a question without defining it in relation to a subject laid down is a good method of hunting out things of this sort; for people are more likely to fall into error when they speak at random, and they speak at random when they have no definite subject set before them. Also to ask a number of questions, even though the point against which one is arguing is defined, and to demand that the answerer should say what he thinks, gives ample opportunity of leading a man into a paradox or fallacy, and also, if, when asked, he says ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to any of the questions, of leading him to topics on which one has abundant material for attacking him. This unfair method, however, is much less practicable than formerly; for people demand, ‘What has this to do with the original question?’ An elementary rule for obtaining a fallacious or paradoxical statement is not to put any thesis directly but to pretend that
Ἀλλὰ φάσκειν ἐρωτᾶν μαθεῖν βουλόμενον· χῶραν γὰρ ἐπιχειρήματος ἡ σκέψις ποιεῖ.

Πρὸς δὲ τὸ ψευδόμενον δεῖξαι ἵδιος τόπος ὁ σοφιστικὸς, τὸ ἀγεῖν πρὸς τοιαῦτα πρὸς ἀ εὐπορεῖ λόγων· ἔσται δὲ καὶ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον.

Πάλιν πρὸς τὸ παράδοξα λέγειν σκοπεῖν ἐκ τίνος γένους ὁ διαλεγόμενος, εἰτ' ἐπερωτῶν ὁ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτωι λέγουσι παράδοξον· ἔστι γὰρ ἐκάστοις τι τοιοῦτον. στοιχεῖον δὲ τούτων τὸ τὰς ἐκάστων εἰληφέναι θέσεις ἐν ταῖς προτάσεισιν. λύσις δὲ καὶ τούτων ἡ προσήκουσα φέρεται τὸ ἐμφανίζειν ὅτι οὐ διὰ τὸν λόγον συμβαίνει τὸ ἄδοξον· ἀεὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ βούλεται ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος.

"Ετι δ' ἐκ τῶν βουλῆσεων καὶ τῶν φανερῶν δοξῶν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα βούλονται τε καὶ φασίν, ἀλλὰ λέγουσι μὲν τοὺς εὐσχημονεστάτους τῶν λόγων, βούλονται δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα λυσιτελεῖν, οἷον τεθνάναι καλῶς μᾶλλον ἡ ξῆν ήδέως φασὶ δεῖν καὶ πένεσθαι δικαίως μᾶλλον ἡ πλούτειν αἰσχρῶς, βούλονται δὲ τᾶναντία. τὸν μὲν οὖν λέγοντα κατὰ τὰς βουλήσεις εἰς τὰς φανερὰς δόξας ἀκτέον, τὸν δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα εἰς τὰς ἀποκεκρυμμένας· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον παράδοξα λέγειν· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς φανερὰς ἡ πρὸς τὰς ἀφανεῖς δόξας ἐροῦσιν ἕναντία.

a Topics 111 b 32 ff.
one is asking from a desire to learn; for this method of inquiry gives an opening for attack.

A special method of showing up a fallacy is the sophistical method, namely, to lead one's opponent to the kind of statements against which one has plenty of arguments; it will be possible to do this in a right and in a wrong way, as has already been said.

Again, to elicit a paradox, you should see to what school the person who is discussing with you belongs, and then question him on some pronouncement of that school which most people regard as paradoxical; for every school has some tenet of this kind. An elementary rule in this connexion is to have a ready-made collection of the theses of the different schools among your propositions. The proper solution here too is to make it clear that the paradox does not result because of the argument; now your opponent always desires that this should be so.

Furthermore, you should seek for paradoxes in men's wishes and professed opinions. For they do not wish the same things as they declare that they wish, but they give utterance to the most becoming sentiments, whereas they desire what they think is to their interest. They declare, for example, that a noble death ought to be preferred to a pleasurable life and honourable poverty to discreditable wealth; but their wishes are the opposite of their words. He, therefore, whose statements agree with his wishes must be led to express the opinions usually professed, and he whose statements agree with the latter must be led to state the opinions usually hidden; for in both cases they must necessarily fall into paradox, for they will contradict either their professed or their secret opinions.
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Πλείστος δὲ τόπος ἐστὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν παράδοξα λέγειν, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργίᾳ γέγραπται λέγων, καὶ οἱ ἄρχαίοι δὲ πάντες ἔστιν τὸν νόμον ἐναντία γὰρ εἶναι φύσιν καὶ νόμον, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην κατὰ νόμον μὲν εἶναι καλὸν κατὰ φύ-

15 σιν δ' οὐ καλὸν. δεῖν οὖν πρὸς μὲν τὸν εἰπόντα κατὰ φύσιν κατὰ νόμον ἀπαντᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν κατὰ νόμον ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν ἁγεῖν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ἔσται¹ λέγειν παράδοξα. ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀληθὲς, τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦν. ὥστε δὴλον ὅτι κάκευνοι, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν, ἦ ἐλεγξαὶ ἤ παράδοξα λέγειν τὸν ἀποκρινό-

20 μενον ἐπεξείρουν ποιεῖν.

"Ενια δὲ τῶν ἔρωτημάτων ἔχει ἀμφοτέρως ἁδοξὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρυσιν, οἷον πότερον τοῖς σοφοῖς ἡ τῷ πατρὶ δεῖ πείθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττειν ἡ τὰ δίκαια, καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι αἱρέτωτερον ἡ βλάπτειν. δεῖ δ' ἁγεῖν εἰς τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐναντία, ἐὰν μὲν λέγῃ τις ὃς οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἐὰν δ' ὃς οἱ πολλοί, ἐπὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐν λόγῳ. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἔξ ἀνάγκης τὸν εὐδαιμονα δίκαιον εἶναι· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἁδοξὸν τὸ βασιλέα μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἰς τὰ οὕτως ἁδοξα συνάγειν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἰς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ νόμον ὑπεναντίωσιν ἁγεῖν· δ' οὐ γὰρ νόμος δόξα τῶν πολλῶν, οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν λέγουσιν.

¹ Reading ἔσται for ἔστιν.

² Plato, Gorgias 482 E.
A commonplace rule which makes men utter paradoxes in abundance is the application of the standards of nature and law, which Callicles is represented as applying in the *Gorgias* and which all the ancients regarded as valid; for according to them Nature and Law are opposites, and justice is a good thing according to law but not according to nature. Therefore, to a man who speaks in terms of nature you must reply in terms of law, and when he speaks in terms of law you must lead the argument to terms of nature; for in both cases the result will be that he utters paradoxes. In the view of the ancients what accorded with nature was the truth, while what accorded with law was the general opinion of mankind. It is, therefore, clear that they also, like the men of to-day, tried to refute the answerer or to make him utter paradoxes.

Some questions involve a paradox whichever way they are answered; for example, ‘Ought one to obey the wise or one’s father?’ and, ‘Ought one to do what is expedient or what is just?’ and ‘Is it preferable to suffer or to inflict a wrong?’ You ought to lead men to opinions opposed to those of the majority and of the wise—if a man speaks as trained arguers do, you should lead him to opinions opposed to the majority; if he speaks as do the majority, to opinions opposed to expert reasoners. For some say that the happy man is necessarily just, but in the view of the majority it is paradoxical that a king should not be happy. To lead a man to paradoxes of this kind is the same thing as to bring him into opposition to the standards of nature and law; for law is the opinion of the majority, but the utterances of the wise accord with the standards of nature and truth.
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173 a

XIII. Καὶ τὰ μὲν παράδοξα ἐκ τούτων δεῖ ζητεῖν τῶν τόπων· περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιήσαι ἀδολσχεῖν, ὁ μὲν λέγομεν τὸ ἀδολσχεῖν, εἰρήκαμεν ἡδη. πάντες δὲ οἱ τοιοῦτα λόγοι τούτο θεύλονται ποιεῖν· εἰ μηδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ὄνομα ἢ τὸν λόγον εἰπεῖν, διπλάσιων δὲ καὶ διπλάσιων ἡμίσεως ταύτα, εἰ ἀρα ἐστὶν ἡμί-

35 σεος διπλάσιον, ἐσται ἡμίσεος ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον. καὶ πάλιν ἂν ἀντὶ τοῦ διπλάσιον διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος τεθη, τρῖς ἐσται εἰρημένον, ἡμίσεος ἡμίσεος ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον. καὶ ἀρα ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἡδεός; τούτο 40 δ' ἐστὶν ὀρέξις ἡδεός· ἐστιν ἀρα ἡ ἐπιθυμία ὀρέξις ἡδεός ἡδεός.

173 b  Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἐν τε τοῖς πρὸς τι, ὅσα μὴ μόνον τὰ γένη ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς τι λέγεται, καὶ πρὸς τό αὐτό καὶ ἐν ἀποδίδοται (οἱον ἡ τε ὀρέξις τινὸς ὀρέξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τινὸς ἐπι-

5 θυμία, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τινὸς διπλάσιον καὶ δι-

πλάσιον ἡμίσεως). καὶ ὅσων ἡ οὐσία οὐκ οὕτων πρὸς τι ὅλως, ὡν εἰσὶν ἐξεις ἡ πάθη ἡ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῶν προσδηλοῦται κατηγορομένων ἐπὶ τούτοις. οἰον τὸ περιττὸν ἀριθμός μέσον ἐχων· ἐστι δ' ἀριθμός περιττός· ἐστιν ἀρα ἀριθμός μέσον 10 ἐχων ἀριθμός. καὶ εἰ τὸ σιμὸν κοιλότης ῥινὸς ἐστιν, ἐστι δὲ ρῦσ σιμῆ, ἐστιν ἀρα ρῦσ ρῦσ κοίλη.

Φαίνονται δὲ ποιεῖν οὗ ποιοῦσιν ἐνίοτε διὰ τὸ μη προσπυνθάνεσθαι εἰ σημαινει τι καθ' αὐτὸ λεχθὲν

a 165 b 16.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, XIII

XIII. It is, then, by these commonplace rules that you should seek to obtain paradoxes. Next, as to making people babble, we have already said what we mean by this term. Arguments of the following kind all have this end in view; 'If it makes no difference whether one uses the term or the definition of it, and "double" and "double of half" are the same thing, then if "double" is "double of half," it will be "double of half of half"; and if "double of half" be substituted again for "double," there will be a triple repetition, "double of half of half of half."' Again, 'Is not "desire" "desire of pleasure?" Now "desire is an appetite for pleasure": therefore "desire is an appetite for pleasure."

All arguments of this kind take place (a) when relative terms are used, where not only the genera but the terms themselves are relative and are rendered in relation to one and the same thing (for example, appetite is appetite for something, and desire is desire of something, and double is double of something, namely, double of half), and (b) where terms are used of which, though they are not relative at all, the substance (namely, the things of which they are states or affections or the like) is indicated in their definition, since they are predicated of these things. For example, 'odd' is a 'number which has a middle unit,' and an 'odd number' exists, therefore an 'odd number' is 'number-that-has-a-middle-unit number.' Again, if 'snubness' is 'concavity of the nose,' and there is a 'snub nose,' then a 'snub nose' is a 'concave-nose nose.'

Men sometimes appear to induce 'babbling' when they do not really do so, because they do not further inquire whether 'double' used by itself has a signifi-
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173 b
tο διπλάσιον ἡ οὐδέν, καὶ εἰ τι σημαίνει, πότερον
15 τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ ἔτερον; ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα λέγειν εὐθὺς. ἀλλὰ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τὸ ὅνομα ταύτῳ εἶναι
tαὐτὸ καὶ σημαίνειν.

XIV. Σολοικισμὸς δ’ οίνον μὲν ἐστὶν εὑρηται πρό-
tερον. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντα
φαίνεσθαι καὶ ποιοῦντα μὴ δοκεῖν, καθάπερ ὁ
20 Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν, εἰ δ’ μὴν καὶ ὁ πήλης ἄρρεν
ἔστιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λέγων οὐλομένην σολοικίζει μὲν
κατ’ ἐκείνον, οὐ φαίνεται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὁ δὲ οὐλο-
μενον φαίνεται μὲν ἄλλ’ οὐ σολοικίζει. δῆλον οὖν
ὅτι καὶ τέχνη τις τοῦτο δύνατο ποιεῖν· διὸ πολλοὶ
tῶν λόγων οὐ συλλογιζόμενοι σολοικισμὸν φαίνον-
25 ταίς συλλογίζεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠλέγχοις.

Εἰςὶ δὲ πάντες σχεδὸν οἱ φανόμενοι σολοικισμοὶ
παρὰ τὸ τόδε, καὶ ὅταν ἡ πτώσις μὴντε ἄρρεν μὴν
θῆλυ δῆλοι ἄλλα τὸ μεταξύ. τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἄρρεν
σημαίνει, τὸ δ’ αὐτή θῆλυ· τὸ δὲ τοῦτο θέλει μὲν τὸ
30 μεταξύ σημαίνειν, πολλάκις δὲ σημαίνειν κάκεινων
ἐκάτερον, οἰον τί τοῦτο; Ἐλληνική, κυττῆ, Κορι-
σκος. τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἄρρενοι καὶ τοῦ θῆλεος δια-
φέρουσιν αἰ πτώσεις ἀπασαι, τοῦ δὲ μεταξὺ αἰ μὲν
αἰ δ’ οὐ. δοθέντος δὴ πολλάκις τοῦτο, συλλογι-
ζονται ὡς εἰρήμενον τοῦτον· ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἄλλην
35 πτώσιν ἀντὶ ἄλλης. ὁ δὲ παραλογισμὸς γίνεται
diā τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο πλείονων πτώσεων·

a 165 b 20. b Because it is in fact feminine.
cipation or no, and, if it has, whether the same or a different one, but they appear to draw the conclusion immediately. It appears, however, to have the same signification also because the word is the same.

XIV. What solecism is has already been stated.\(^a\) It is possible to commit it, and not to commit it, yet to seem to do so, as well as to commit it, yet seem not to do so. If, as Protagoras used to say, \(\mu\nu\upsilon\nu\varsigma\) (wrațh) and \(\pi\eta\lambda\eta\varsigma\) (helmet) are masculine, according to him, he who calls wrath a ‘destruc-tress’ (\(\omega\upsilon\lambda\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\nu\)) commits a solecism, though he does not appear to anyone else to do so,\(^b\) but he who calls it a ‘destructor’ (\(\omega\upsilon\lambda\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\nu\)) appears to commit a solecism but does not do so. It is obvious, therefore, that one might produce this effect by art also; therefore many arguments appear to infer a solecism, when they do not really do so, as happens also with refutations.

Almost all apparent solecisms occur owing to the word ‘this’ or ‘it’ (\(\tau\omicron\delta\epsilon\)) and when the inflection denotes neither the masculine nor the feminine but the neuter. ‘\(\text{He}’(\omega\omicron\tau\omicron\sigma\nu\nu)\) denotes a masculine, ‘she’ (\(\alpha\omicron\nu\tau\eta\)) a feminine, whereas ‘this’ or ‘it’ (\(\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\omicron\)) , though meaning to signify a neuter, often signifies either a masculine or a feminine. For example, ‘What is this (\(\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\omicron\))? ’ ‘It is Calliope,’ or ‘It is a log’ or ‘It is Coriscus.’ The case-forms of the masculine and feminine are all different, but some of those of the neuter are different and others not. Often, therefore, when ‘it’ (\(\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\omicron\)) has been granted, people argue as if ‘him’ (\(\tau\omicron\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon\nu\nu\)) had been used, and they similarly use another case in place of some other. The false reasoning arises because ‘it’ (\(\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\omicron\)) is common to more than one case; for it signifies
τὸ γὰρ τοῦτο σημαίνει ὅτε μὲν οὗτος ὅτε δὲ τοῦτον. 

dei δ' ἐναλλάξ σημαίνειν, μετὰ μὲν τοῦ ἔστι τὸ

οὗτος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ τοῦτον, οἶνον ἔστι

Κορίσκος, εἶναι Κορίσκον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηλέων

40 ὄνομάτων ωσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων μὲν

174 a σκευῶν ἔχοντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος κλῆσιν. ὅσα

gὰρ εἰς τὸ ο καὶ τὸ ν τελευτᾷ, ταῦτα μόνα σκεύους

ἐχεῖ κλῆσιν, οἶνον ξύλων, σχοινίων, τὰ δὲ μὴ οὗτως

ἀρρενος ἢ θήλεος, ὃν ἔνια φέρομεν ἐπὶ τὰ σκεύη,

5 οἶνον ἁσκός μὲν ἄρρεν τοῦνομα, κλίνῃ δὲ θῆλυ.

διόπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ωσαύτως τὸ ἔστι καὶ

tὸ εἶναι διοίσει. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ὁμοίος ἔστιν ὁ

σολοικισμὸς τοῖς παρὰ τὸ τὰ μὴ ὁμοία ὁμοίως

λεγομένους ἐλέγχοις. ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐκείνους ἐπὶ τῶν

πραγμάτων, τούτως ἐπὶ τῶν ὄνομάτων συμπίπτει

σολοικίζειν· ἀνθρώπος γὰρ καὶ λευκὸν καὶ πράγμα

καὶ ὁνομά ἔστων.

10 Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸν σολοικισμὸν πειρατέον ἐκ

τῶν εἰρημένων πτώσεων συλλογίζεσθαι.

Εἰδὴ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν λόγων καὶ

μέρη τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τρόποι οἱ εἰρημένοι. διαφέρει

δ' οὐ μικρόν, ἐὰν ταχθῇ πως τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐρώτησιν

15 πρὸς τὸ λανθάνειν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς.

ἐφεξῆς οὖν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ταῦτα πρῶτον λεκτέον.

XV. Ἑστὶ δὴ πρὸς τὸ ἐλέγχειν ἐν μὲν μῆκος.

a i.e. the fallacy from the figure of speech (figura dictionis).
sometimes 'he' (ὅδεῖος) and sometimes 'him' (τοῦτον). It ought to signify them alternately; with the indicative 'is' (ἐστὶ) it ought to signify the nominative 'he' (ὁδεῖος); with the infinitive 'to be' (ἐίναι) it ought to signify 'him' (τοῦτον), for example, 'It is Coriscus,' '[I believe] it to be Coriscus.' So likewise with feminine nouns and with so-called articles of use, which can have either a masculine or a feminine designation; for only those which end in -ον have the designation which belongs to an article of use, e.g., ἡτοι (log), ἔχοι (rope). Those which do not take this form have a masculine or a feminine termination, and some of these we apply to articles of use; for example, ἀερία (wine-skin) is masculine and κλίνη (bed) is feminine. Therefore, in such cases there will be the same difference when the indicative 'is' (ἐστὶ) is used and the infinitive 'to be' (ἐίναι). Also, in a way, solecism resembles the kind of refutation which is due to the use of similar terms for dissimilar things; for as in the one case it happens that we commit a solecism in the category of actual things, so in the other we commit it in that of names; for 'man' and 'white' are both names and things.

Clearly, then, we must try and argue up to a solecism on the basis of the above-mentioned case-forms.

These are the branches of competitive arguments and their sub-divisions, and the above are the methods of employing them. Now it makes no small difference whether the accompaniments of the question are arranged in a certain way with a view to concealment, as in dialectics. Therefore, as a sequel to what has been said above, we must first treat of this subject.

XV. To effect a refutation one expedient is length; How to ask
χαλεπόν γὰρ ἀμα πολλὰ συνορᾶν. εἰς δὲ τὸ μήκος
toὶς προειρημένοις στοιχείοις χρηστέον. ἐν δὲ
20 τάχος: ὑστερίζοντες γὰρ ἤττον προορῶσιν. ἐτὶ δ’
ὁργὴ καὶ φιλονεικία: ταραττόμενοι γὰρ ἤττον δύ-
νανται φυλάττεσθαι πάντες. στοιχεῖα δὲ τῆς ὁργῆς
tὸ τε φανερὸν ἕαυτὸν ποιεῖν βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν
καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀναισχυντεῖν. ἐτὶ τὸ ἐναλλάξ τὰ
ἐρωτήματα τιθέναι, εάν τε πρὸς ταυτὸ πλείους τις
25 ἔχῃ λόγους, εάν τε καὶ ὅτι οὕτως καὶ ὅτι οὐχ
οὕτως: ἀμα γὰρ συμβαίνει ἡ πρὸς πλείω ἡ πρὸς
τάναντια ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν. ὅλως δὲ πάντα
τὰ πρὸς τὴν κρύψιν λεχθέντα πρότερον χρήσιμα
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγωνιστικοὺς λόγους: ἡ γὰρ κρύψις
ἐστὶ τοῦ λαθείν χάριν, τὸ δὲ λαθείν τῆς ἀπάτης.
30 Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνανεύοντας ἀττ’ ἂν οὐθὸσιν
εἶναι πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἐξ ἀποφάσεως ἐρωτητέον,
ὡς τούναντίον βουλόμενον, ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἰδίου ποιοῦντα
τὴν ἐρωτήσιν: ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ τί βουλεῖται
λαβεῖν ἤττον δυσκολαίνουσιν. ὅταν τ’ ἐπὶ τῶν
μερῶν διδῶ τις τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν, ἐπάγοντα τὸ
35 καθόλου πολλάκις οὐκ ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ’ ὡς δεδο-
μένως χρηστέον: ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἴσται καὶ αὐτὸι δε-
dωκέναι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούονσι φαίνονται διὰ τὴν τῆς

a Topics viii. 1.
for it is difficult to keep many things in view simultaneously. To produce length the above-mentioned elementary rules must be employed. One resource is speed; for when people lag behind they see less far ahead. Further, there are anger and contentiousness; for when people are agitated they are always less capable of being on their guard. Elementary rules for rousing anger are to make it plain that one wishes to act unfairly and to behave in an altogether shameless manner. Another device is to put one’s questions alternately, whether one has several arguments leading up to the same point or whether one has arguments proving both that this is so and that this is not so; for the result is that the answerer is on his guard at the same time against either several or contrary attacks. In a word, all the resources for concealment mentioned before are also useful against competitive arguments; for concealment is for the purpose of escaping detection, and escape from detection is for the purpose of deception.

When dealing with those who refuse to consent to anything which they think is in favour of your argument, you must put your question in a negative form, as though you wanted the opposite of what you really want, or, at any rate, as if you were asking your question with indifference; for people are less troublesome when it is not clear what one wants to secure. Often, when in dealing with particulars a man grants the individual case, you ought not, in the process of induction, to make the universal the subject of your question but assume that it is granted and use it accordingly; for sometimes people think that they have themselves granted it and appear to their hearers to have done so, because they recall
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ἐπαγωγής μενεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἥρωτημένα μάτην. ἐν οἷς τε μὴ οὐνόματι σημαίνεται τὸ καθόλου, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὁμοιότητι χρηστέον πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον λανθάνει γὰρ ἡ ὁμοιότης πολλάκις. πρὸς τε τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν πρότασιν τούναντίον παραβάλλοντα χρὴ πυνθάνεσθαι. οἷον εἰ δεῖ οὐκ ἂν τοι δεῖ πάντα τῶν πατρί πείθεσθαι, πότερον ἀπαντᾷ δεῖ πείθεσθαι τοῖς γενεῖσιν ἡ πάντ' ἀπείθειν; καὶ τὸ πολλάκις πολλά, πότερον πολλὰ συγχωρητέον ἡ ὀλίγα; μᾶλλον γὰρ, εἰπέρ ἀνάγκη, δοξεῖν ἂν εἰναὶ πολλὰ παρατιθεμένων γὰρ ἐγγὺς τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ μεῖζον καὶ μεγάλα φαίνεται καὶ χείρω καὶ βελτίω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Σφόδρα δὲ καὶ πολλάκις ποιεῖ δοκεῖν ἐληλέγχθαι τὸ μάλιστα σοφιστικὸν συνοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτῶν τῶν, τὸ μηδὲν συλλογισμένον μὴ ἐρώτημα ποιεῖν τὸ τελευταίον, ἀλλὰ συμπεραντικῶς εἰπεῖν, ὡς συλλογισμένους, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τὸ. 

Σοφιστικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ κειμένου παραδόξου τὸ φαινόμενον ἀξιοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι προκειμένου τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἰς ἀρχῆς, καὶ τὴν ἐρώτησιν τῶν τοιούτων οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι, πότερον σοι δοκεῖ; ἀνάγκη γὰρ, ἂν ἂν τὸ ἐρώτημα εἰς ὃν ὁ συλλογισμός, ἡ ἐλεγχοῦ ἡ παράδοξον γίνεσθαι, δόντος μὲν ἐλεγχοῦν,
the process of induction and think that the question would not have been asked without some object. Where there is no term to signify the universal, you should nevertheless use the resemblance of the particulars for your advantage; for the resemblance often passes unnoticed. Also, in order to secure your premiss, you should contrast it with its contrary in your question. For example, if you want to secure the premiss that one ought to obey one’s father in all things, you should ask whether one should obey one’s parents in all things or disobey them in all things. If you want to establish that the multiplication of a number many times over results in a large number, you should ask whether it should be conceded that it is a large or that it is a small number; for, if pressed, one would rather that it should seem to be large. For the juxtaposition of contraries increases the quantity and quality of things, both relatively and absolutely, in the eyes of men.

Often the most sophistical of all frauds practised by questioners produces a striking appearance of refutation, when, though they have proved nothing, they do not put the final proposition in the form of a question but state conclusively, as though they had proved it, that ‘such and such a thing, then, is not the case.’

Another sophistical trick is, when the thesis is a paradox, to demand, when the generally accepted view is originally proposed, that the answerer should reply what he thinks about it, and to put one’s question in some such form as ‘Is that your opinion?’ For, if the question is one of the premisses of the argument, either a refutation or a paradox must result. If he grants the premiss, there will be a
μὴ δόντος δὲ μὴδὲ δοκεῖν φάσκοντος ἁδοξον, μὴ δόντος δὲ δοκεῖν δ’ ὀμολογοῦντος ἐλεγχοῦντες.

"Ετι καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὀμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἦν πρὸς τὰ υφ’ ἐαυτοῦ λεγόμενα, ἦν πρὸς οὓς ὀμολογεῖν καλῶς λέγειν ἦν πράττειν, ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς δοκοῦντας τοιούτους ἦν πρὸς τοὺς ὀμοίους ἦν πρὸς τοὺς πλείοντος ἦν πρὸς πάντας. ὡσπερ τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι πολλάκις, ἦταν ἐλεγχόμεναι, ποιοῦσι διττόν, ἀν 25 μέλλῃ συμβαίνειν ἐλεγχθῆσθαι, καὶ ἐρωτῶν τὰς χρηστέον ποτὲ τούτω πρὸς τοὺς ἐνισταμένους, ἃν ὦδι μὲν συμβαίνῃ ὦδι δὲ μὴ, ὧτι οὕτως εἴληφεν, οἷον ὁ Κλεοφῶν ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Μανδροβοῦλῳ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀφισταμένους τοῦ λόγου τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐπιτέμνειν, καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον, ἀν 30 προαισθάνηται, προενίστασθαι καὶ προαιρεῖν ἐπιχειρητέον δ’ ἐνίοτε καὶ πρὸς ἅλλα τοῦ εἰρημένου, ἐκεῖνο ἐκλαβόντας, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον ἔχῃ τοῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν· ὅπερ ὁ Δυκόφρων ἐποίησε προβληθέντος λύραν ἐγκωμιάζειν. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀπαιτοῦντας πρὸς τι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐπειδὴ δοκεῖ δεῖν 35 ἀποδιδόναι τῇν αὐτίαν, λεξιθέντων δ’ ἐνίων εὐφυλακτότερον, τῷ καθόλου συμβαίνον ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις λέγειν, τῇν ἀντίφασιν, ὃ τι ἐφησεν ἀποφήγει, ἦν ὁ

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*It has been conjectured that the author of this dialogue was Speusippus.*

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refutation; if he refuses to grant it and even denies
that it is the generally accepted view, he utters a
paradox; if he refuses to grant it but admits that
it is the generally accepted view, there will be the
appearance of a refutation.

Moreover, as in rhetorical arguments, so likewise
also in refutations, you ought to look for contradic-
tions between the answerer’s views and either his
own statements or the views of those whose words
and actions he admits to be right, or of those who are
generally held to bear a like character and to re-
semble them, or of the majority, or of all mankind.
Also, just as answerers, when they are being refuted,
often draw a distinction, if they are on the point of
being refuted, so questioners also ought sometimes,
when dealing with objectors, if the objection is valid
against one sense of the word but not against another,
to resort to the expedient of declaring that the
opponent has taken it in such and such a sense, as
Cleophon does in the Mandrobulus. They ought also
to withdraw from the argument and cut short their
other attacks, while the answerer, if he perceives this
move in time, should raise anticipatory objections and
get his argument in first. One should also sometimes
attack points other than the one mentioned, excluding
it if one can make no attack on the position laid down,
as Lycophron did when it was suggested that he
should deliver an encomium on the lyre. To those
who demand that one should take some definite
point of attack (since it is generally held that one
ought to assign the object of a question, whereas if
certain statements are made the defence is easier),
you should say that your aim is the usual result of
refutation, namely, to deny what your opponent

(8) By seek-
ing contra-
dictions
between the
views of
your op-
ponent and
the school
to which he
belongs.

(9) By
pleading
that a term
has a double
sense.

(10) By
withdrawal
from your
position to
avoid
attack.

(11) By
attacking
irrelevant
points.

(12) By
maintaining
that your
object is
simply the
contradic-
tion of your
opponent’s
thesis.
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άπεφησε φήσαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ. οὐ δὲ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα προτατικῶς ἐρωτᾶν· ἐνια δ’ οὔδ’ ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὦμολογουμένους χρηστέον.

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Χρήσιμοι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πρὸς μὲν φιλοσοφίαν διὰ δύο. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γνώμενοι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἁμεινὸν ἐχειν ποιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ ποσαχὺς ἐκαστὸν λέγεται, καὶ ποία ὁμοίως καὶ ποία ἐτέρως ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄνομάτων. δεύτερον δὲ πρὸς τὰς καθ’ αὐτὸν ζητήσεις· ο γὰρ υφ’ ἐτέρου ῥαδίως παραλογιζόμενος καὶ τούτο μὴ αἰσθανόμενος κἂν αὐτὸς υφ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο πάθοι πολλάκις. τρίτον δὲ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπὶ πρὸς δόξαν, τὸ περὶ πάντα γεγυμνάσθαι δοκεῖν καὶ μηδενὸς ἀπείρως ἐχειν· τὸ γὰρ κοινωνοῦντα λόγων ψέγειν λόγους, μηδὲν ἔχοντα διορίζειν περὶ τῆς φαυλότητος αὐτῶν, ὕποπιαν δίδωσι τοῦ δοκεῖν δυσχεραίνειν οὐ διὰ τάληθες ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀπειρίαν.

Ἀποκρινομένοις δὲ πῶς ἀπαντητέον πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους, φανερὸν, εἴπερ ὁρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον ἐξ ὧν εἰσίν οἱ παραλογισμοί, καὶ τὰς ἐν τῷ πυθαγόρει τις πλεονεξίας ἴκανῶς διείλομεν. οὐ ταῦτον δ’ ἐστὶ λαβόντα τε τὸν λόγον ἰδεῖν καὶ λῦσαι τὴν μοχθηρίαν, καὶ ἐρωτώμενον ἀπαντῶν δύνασθαι

1 Reading ὦμολογουμένουs with Wallies for ὦμολογουμένωs.
 affirmed and affirm what he denied, and not to prove that the knowledge of contraries is the same or not the same. One should not ask the conclusion in the form of a proposition, and some propositions should not be asked at all but treated as admitted.

XVI. We have now dealt with the sources of questions and how they ought to be asked in competitive arguments. We must next treat of answering, and how solutions are brought about, and what are their subjects, and for what purpose such arguments are useful.

They are useful for philosophy for two reasons. In the first place, as they generally turn on language, they put us in a better position to appreciate the various meanings which a term can have and what similarities and differences attach to things and their names. Secondly, they are useful for the questions which arise in one’s own mind; for he who is easily led astray by another person into false reasoning and does not notice his error, might also often fall into this error in his own mind. A third and last reason is that they establish our reputation, by giving us the credit of having received a universal training and of having left nothing untried; for that one who is taking part in an argument should find fault with arguments without being able to specify where their weakness lies, rouses a suspicion that his annoyance is apparently not in the interests of truth but due to inexperience.

How answerers should meet such arguments is obvious if we have adequately described above the sources of false arguments and distinguished the fraudulent methods of questioning. To take an argument and see and disentangle the fault in it is not the same thing as to be able to meet it promptly when
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tαχέως. δ' γὰρ ἢςμεν, πολλάκις μετατιθέμενον ἄγνοοῦμεν. ἔτι δ', ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ θάττον καὶ τὸ βραδύτερον ἐκ τοῦ γεγυμνάσθαι γίνεται μᾶλλον,
25 οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει, ὡστε, ἄν δὴλον μὲν ἧμῖν ἦ, ἀμελέτητοι δ' ὡμεν, ύστεροῦμεν τῶν καιρῶν πολλάκις. συμβαίνει δὲ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν· καὶ γὰρ ἑκεί ἀναλύσαντες ἐνίοτε συνθείναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς
30 ἐλέγχοις, εἰδότες παρ' ὃ ὁ λόγος συμβαίνει συνεἱραι, διαλύσαι τὸν λόγον ἀποροῦμεν.

XVII. Πρώτον μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ συλλογίζεσθαι φαμεν ἐνδόξως ποτὲ μᾶλλον ἦ ἀλῆθῶς προαιρεῖσθαι δεῖν, οὗτῳ καὶ ἐν τὸν ποτὲ μᾶλλον ἐνδόξως ἦ κατὰ τάληθες. ὅλως γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς μαχε-35 τέον οὖχ ὡς ἐλέγχωντας ἄλλ' ὡς φαινομένους· οὐ γάρ φαμεν συλλογίζεσθαι γε αὐτούς, ὡστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν διορθωτέον. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἐλεγχὸς ἀντίφασις μὴ ὁμώνυμος ἐκ τινων, οὐδὲν ἄν δέοι διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰμφιβολα καὶ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν· οὐ γὰρ ποιεὶ συλλογισμόν. ἄλλ' οὐδενὸς ἄλλου
40 χάριν προσδιαρετέον ἄλλ' ἢ ὅτι τὸ συμπέρασμα φαίνεται ἐλεγχοειδες. οὐκουν τὸ ἐλεγχθήναι ἄλλα τὸ δοκεῖν εὐλαβητέον, ἔπει τὸ γ' ἐρωτᾶν ἀμφίβολα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὅσαι τ' ἄλλαι τοιαῦτα παρακρούσεις, καὶ τὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐλεγχὸν ἀφανίζει καὶ τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον καὶ μὴ ἐλεγχόμενον ἄδηλον
175 b ποιεὶ. ἔπει γὰρ ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ τέλει συμπεραναμένου
one is asked a question. For we often fail to recognize something which we know when it is presented in a different form. Furthermore, as in other spheres a greater degree of speed or slowness is rather a question of training, so in argument also; therefore, even though something may be clear to us, yet, if we lack practice, we often miss our opportunities. The same thing happens sometimes as with geometrical diagrams; for there we sometimes analyse a figure but cannot reconstruct it; so too in refutations we know how the argument is strung together, but we are at a loss how to take it to pieces.

XVII. In the first place, then, just as we say that we ought sometimes deliberately to argue plausibly rather than truthfully, so too we ought sometimes to solve questions plausibly rather than according to truth. For, generally speaking, when we have to fight against contentious arguers, we ought to regard them not as trying to refute us but as merely appearing to do so; for we deny that they are arguing a case, so that they must be corrected so as not to appear to be doing so. For if refutation is unequivocal contradiction based on certain premisses, there can be no necessity to make distinctions against ambiguity and equivocation; for they do not make up the proof. But the only other reason for making further distinctions is because the conclusion looks like a refutation. One must, therefore, beware not of being refuted but of appearing to be so, since the asking of ambiguities and questions involving equivocation and all similar fraudulent artifices mask even a genuine refutation and make it uncertain who is refuted and who is not. For when it is possible in the end, when the conclusion is reached, to say that
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5 μὴ ὅπερ ἔφησεν ἀποφήσαι λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὀμωνύμως, 
εἰ καὶ στὶ μᾶλιστ' ἔτυχεν ἐπὶ ταύτων φέρων, ἄδηλον 
ei ἐλήλεγκται. ἄδηλον γὰρ εἰ ἄληθή λέγει νῦν. εἰ 
de δὲ διελὼν ἦρετο τὸ ὀμώνυμον ἢ τὸ ἀμφίβολον, 
οὐκ ἄν ἄδηλος ἢν ὁ ἔλεγχος. οὐ τ' ἐπιξητούσι νῦν 
μὲν ἦττον πρότερον δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐριστικοί, τὸ ἢ 

10 ναὶ ὃ ̃ οὐ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, ἐγίνετ' 
ἀν. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἐρωτᾶν τοὺς πυνθανο- 
mένους ἀνάγκη προσαποκρίνεσθαι τι τὸν ἐρωτώ- 
μενον, διορθοῦντα τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῆς προτάσεως, 
ἐπεὶ διελομένου γε ἰκανῶς ἢ ναὶ ἢ οὐ ἀνάγκη λέγειν 
tὸν ἀποκρινόμενον.

15 Εἰ δὲ τις ὑπολήψεται τὸν κατὰ ὀμωνυμίαν ἔλεγχον 
eἶναι, τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἐσται διαφυγεῖν τὸ ἔλεγ- 
χεσθαι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὀρατῶν 
ἀναγκαίον ὁ ἔφησεν ἀποφήσαι ὅνομα, καὶ ὁ ἀπ- 
ἔφησε φήσαι. ὡς γὰρ διορθοῦντα τίνες, οὐδὲν 
ὀφελοῦ. οὐ γὰρ Κορίσκον φασίν εἶναι μουσικὸν 
καὶ ἄμουσον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον τὸν Κορίσκον μουσικὸν 
καὶ τοῦτον τὸν Κορίσκον ἄμουσον. οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς 
ἐσται λόγος τὸ τοῦτον1 τὸν Κορίσκον τῷ τοῦτον 
tὸν Κορίσκον ἄμουσον εἶναι ἦ μουσικὸν. ὅπερ ἀμα 
φησί τε καὶ ἀπόφησιν. ἀλλ' ἵσως οὐ ταύτῳ ση- 
μαίνει: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῦνομα. ἀφέτε τι διαφέρει;² 

1 τοῦτον added by Waitz.
² Poste reads τι for τι and adds the question mark.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xvii

one's opponent contradicted what he asserted only by means of an equivocation, however true it may be that he happened to be tending in the same direction, it is uncertain whether a refutation has taken place; for it is uncertain whether he is speaking the truth now. If, however, one had made a distinction and questioned the equivocal or ambiguous term, the refutation would not have been uncertain. Also, the object of contentious arguers—though it is less their aim in these days than formerly—would have been carried out, namely, that the person questioned should answer 'Yes' or 'No'; as it is, however, because the questioners put their questions improperly, the person questioned is obliged to add something in his answer by way of correcting the unfairness of the proposition, since, if the questioner makes adequate distinctions, the answerer must say either 'Yes' or 'No.'

If anyone is going to imagine that an argument which rests on equivocal terms is a refutation, it will be impossible for the answerer to avoid being refuted in a certain sense; for in dealing with visible things one must necessarily deny the term which he asserted and assert that which he denied. For the correction which some people suggest is useless. For they do not say that Coriscus is musical and unmusical, but that \textit{this} Coriscus is musical and \textit{this} Coriscus is unmusical. For it will be making use of the same expression to say that \textit{this} Coriscus is unmusical (or musical) as to say that \textit{this} Coriscus is so; and one is affirming and denying this at the same time. But perhaps it does not mean the same thing; for neither did the name in the former case; so what is the difference? But if he is going to assign to the
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25 ei de τῷ μὲν τὸ ἀπλῶς λέγειν Κορίσκον ἀποδώσει, τῷ δὲ προσθῆσει τὸ τινὰ ἢ τόνδε, ἀτοπον· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον θατέρῳ ὀποτέρῳ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ ἀδηλος μὲν ἐστιν ὁ μὴ διορισάμενος τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν πότερον ἐλήλεγκται ἢ οὐκ ἐλήλεγκται, δέδοται δʼ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὸ διελεῖν, φανερὸν ότι τὸ μὴ διορίσαντα δοῦναι τὴν ἐρώτησιν ἀλλʼ ἀπλῶς ἀμάρτημα ἐστιν, ὡστε κἂν εἰ μὴ αὐτὸς, ἀλλʼ ο γε λόγος ἐληλεγμένω ὁμοίως ἐστιν. συμβαίνει μέντοι πολλάκις ὀρῶντας τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ὁκνεῖν διαιρεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν πυκνότητα τῶν τὰ τοι-

30 αὕτα προτεινόντων, ὅπως μὴ πρὸς ἀπαν δοκῶσι δυσκολαίνειν· εἰτʼ οὐκ ἂν οὐθέντων παρὰ τοῦτο γενέσθαι τὸν λόγον, πολλάκις ἀπήντησε παράδοξον. ὡστʼ ἐπειδὴ δέδοται διαιρεῖν, οὐκ ὄκνητεόν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον.

Εἰ δὲ τὰ δύο ἐρωτήματα μὴ ἐν ποιεῖ τις ἐρώτημα, 40 οὐδʼ ἂν ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὁμομοίως καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἐγίνετο παραλογισμός, ἀλλʼ ἡ ἐλεγχὸς ἡ οὐ. τί

176 a γὰρ διαφέρει ἐρωτήσαι εἰ Καλλίας καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς μουσικοὶ εἰσιν ἢ εἰ ἀμφότερος ἐν ὁνόμα ἡν ἐτέροις οὗσιν; εἰ γὰρ πλεῖω δηλοὶ ἐνός, πλεῖω ἡρώτησεν. εἰ οὖν μὴ ὀρθὸν πρὸς δύο ἐρωτήσεις μίαν ἀπόκρισιν ἀξιοῦν λαμβάνειν ἀπλῶς, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν προσ- 5 ἴκει τῶν ὁμομοίων ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀπλῶς, οὐδʼ εἰ
one person the simple appellation 'Coriscus,' while to the other he adds 'a certain' or 'that,' it is absurd; for the addition belongs no more to the one than to the other; for it makes no difference to whichever of the two he adds it.

However, since, if one does not distinguish the meanings of a doubtful term, it is not clear whether he has been confuted or not, and since the right to draw distinctions is conceded in arguments, it is obvious that to grant the question simply, without making distinctions, is a mistake; so that, even if the man himself does not appear to be refuted, yet his argument certainly appears to be so. It frequently happens, however, that, though people see the ambiguity, they hesitate to make the distinction, because of the numerous occasions on which people propose subjects of this kind, in order to avoid seeming to be acting perversely all the time. Then, again, though people would never have thought that the argument would hinge upon this point, they are often confronted with a paradox. So, since the right to draw a distinction is conceded, we must not hesitate to use it, as was said before.

If one does not make two questions into one, the fallacy which depends on equivocation and ambiguity would not exist either, but either refutation or absence of refutation. For what is the difference between asking whether Callias and Themistocles are musical and asking the same question about two people both with the same name? For if one indicates more things than one, one has asked more questions than one. If, therefore, it is not correct to demand simply to receive one answer to two questions, clearly it is not proper to give a simple answer to any equivocal
κατὰ πάντων ἄληθέσ, ὤσπερ ἀξιοῦσι τινες. οὔδέν γὰρ τούτῳ διαφέρει ἤ ei ἤρετο, Κορίσκος καὶ Καλλίας πότερον οἶκοι εἰσίν ἤ οὐκ οἶκοι, εἶτε παρόντων ἀμφοῖν εἶτε μὴ παρόντων ἀμφότερως γὰρ πλείους αἰ προτάσεις· οὔ γὰρ εἰ ἄληθέσ εἶπεν, ἀρχαίοι οὐ πονεῖν ἢ ἔρωτησι. ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ καὶ μυρία ἑτέρᾳ ἐρωτηθέντα ἐρωτήματα ἀπαντᾷ ἤ ναι ἤ οὐ ἄληθές εἰναι λέγειν· ἀλλ' οἵμοις οὐκ ἀποκριτεῖν μιᾷ ἀποκρίσειν· ἀναφεῖται γὰρ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι. τούτῳ δ' οἷμοιον ὡς εἰ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπομενεῖ τοῖς ἑτέροις. εἰ οὖν μὴ δεῖ πρὸς δὺο ἔρωτησιν μιᾶν ἀποκρισιῶν διδόναι, φανερῶν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμονύμων τὸ ναὶ ἤ οὐ λεκτεύων. οὔδέ γὰρ ὁ εἰπόν ἀποκέκριται ἀλλ' εἰδήκεν. ἀλλ' ἀξιοῦται πως ἐν τοῖς διαλεγομένοις διὰ τὸ λανθάνειν τὸ συμβαῖνον. Ὡσπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἐπειδὴ μὲν οὐδ' ἐλεγχόμεν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ λύσεις δόξουσιν εἴναι τινές οὐκ οὕσας λύσεις· ἃς δὴ φαμεν ἐνιστε μάλλον δεῖν φέρειν ἤ τὰς ἄληθεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀγωνιστικοῖς λόγοις καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ διττὸν ἀπαντῆσει. ἀποκριτεῖν δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν δοκούντων τὸ ἐστὶ λέγοντα· καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἦκιστα γίνοντ' ἀν παρεξέλεγχος· ἀν δὲ τι παράδοξον ἀναγκάζηται λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μάλιστα προσθετέον τὸ δοκεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν οὔτ' ἐλεγχὸς οὕτε παράδοξον γίνεσθαι δόξειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πῶς αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐν ἀρχῃ ἡ

1 Reading eipev for eipev.
2 Reading axioutai for axioutai with Wallies.
question, even though the term is true of all the subjects, as some people claim that one ought. For this is just the same as asking 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home or not at home?,' whether they are both at home or not there; for in both cases the number of propositions is more than one. For if the answer is true, it does not follow that the question is a single one. For it is possible that it is true to say 'yes' or 'no' when asked a countless number of questions; but, for all that, one ought not to answer them with a single reply, for that means the ruin of discussion. This resembles the case of the same name being applied to different things. If, therefore, one must not give one answer to two questions, it is obvious that neither should one say 'yes' or 'no' where equivocal terms are used; for then the speaker has not given an answer but made a statement, but it is regarded in a way as an answer amongst those who argue, because they do not realize what is the result.

As we said, then, since there are some seeming refutations which are not really refutations, in like manner also there are some seeming solutions which are not really solutions. These we say that we ought sometimes to bring forward in preference to true refutations in competitive argument and in meeting ambiguity. In the case of statements which appear to be true one must answer with the phrase 'granted'; for then there is the least likelihood of any accessory refutation; but if one is obliged to say something paradoxical, then in particular one must add that it seems so, for then there can be no appearance either of refutation or of paradox. Since it is clear what 'begging the original question' means and since
176 a

δήλου, οὗνται δὲ πάντες, ἂν ἢ σύνεγγυς, ἀναιρε-

τέον καὶ μὴ συγχωρητέον εἶναι ἕνα ὡς τὸ ἐν ἄρχῃ
30 αἰτοῦντος, ὅταν τὸ² τοιοῦτον ἄξιοὶ τις ὃ ἀναγκαῖον
μὲν συμβαίνειν ἐκ τῆς θέσεως, ἢ δὲ ἀρχοῦσῃ ἢ ἀδοξοῦν,

ταῦτα λεκτέον. τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνοντα

τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ θέσεως. ἕτερον ὅταν τὸ καθόλου
μὴ ὅνωμαι ληφθῇ ἄλλα παραβολῆς, λεκτέον ὅτι οὐχ

35 ὡς ἐδόθη οὐδ’ ὡς προὔτεινε λαμβάνει. καὶ γὰρ

παρὰ τούτο γίνεται πολλάκις ἔλεγχοι.

Ἐξειργόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ καλῶς δε-

δεῖχθαι πορευτέον, ἀπαντῶντα κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον

διορισμὸν.

Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κυρίως λεγομένοις ὁνόμασιν

ἀνάγκη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ διαρροῦμενον. ἃ

40 δὲ συνυπονοοῦντες τίθημεν, οἶνον ὡς μὴ σαφῶς

176 b ἀλλὰ κολοβῶς ἐρωτᾶται, παρὰ τούτο συμβαίνει

ὁ ἔλεγχος, οἰον ἄρ’ ὃ ἂν ἢ Ἅθηναῖων, κτήμα ἐστὶν

‘Αθηναίων; ναὶ. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστὶ τῶν ζωῶν; ναὶ. κτήμα

ἄρα ὁ ἀνθρωπός τῶν ζωῶν. τὸν γὰρ ἀνθρωπὸν

5 τῶν ζωῶν λέγομεν, ὅτι ζώον ἐστὶ, καὶ Λύσανδρον

τῶν Λακώνων, ὅτι Λάκων. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἐν οἷς

ἀσαφές τὸ προτεινόμενον οὐ συγχωρητέον ἀπλῶς.

"Ὅταν δὲ δυοῖν οὖντων θατέρου μὲν οὖντος ἐξ

1 Reading ἂν for ἂν with Wallies.

2 Reading τὸ for τὲ with Wallies.

α 168 a 17 ff.
people always consider that assumptions which lie near the conclusion must be demolished and that some of them must not be conceded on the ground that the opponent is begging the question, so when someone claims something of such a nature that it must necessarily follow from the thesis and it is false or paradoxical, we must use the same plea; for the necessary consequences are generally regarded as part of the same thesis. Furthermore, when the universal which has been obtained has no name but is indicated by a comparison only, we must say that the questioner takes it not in the sense in which it was granted nor as he proposed it; for a refutation often hinges on this point too.

When we are excluded from these expedients, we must have recourse to the plea that the argument has not been properly set forth, attacking it on the basis of the classification of fallacies given above.\(^a\)

When terms are used in their proper senses, one must answer either simply or by making a distinction. It is when our statement implies our meaning without expressing it—for example, when a question is not asked clearly but in a shortened form—that refutation ensues. For instance, 'Is whatever belongs to the Athenians a property of the Athenians?' 'Yes; and this is likewise true of everything else.' 'Well, then, does man belong to the animals?' 'Yes.' 'Then man is a property of the animals. For we say that man "belongs to" the animals because he is an animal, just as we say that Lysander "belongs to" the Laconians because he is a Laconian.' Obviously, therefore, when the premiss is not clear, it must not be conceded simply.

When it is generally held that, if one of two things...
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ἀνάγκης θάτερον εἶναι δοκῆ, θατέρου δὲ τοῦτο μὴ
10 ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐρωτῶμενον πότερον⁠¹ δεῖ τὸ ἔλαττον
didόναι: χαλεπώτερον γὰρ συλλογίσασθαι ἐκ πλειό-
νων. ἐὰν δ᾿ ἐπιχειρῇ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐναντίον
τῷ δ᾿ οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἂν ὁ λόγος ἀληθῆς ἢ, ἐναντίον
φάναι, ὄνομα δὲ μὴ κεῖσθαι τοῦ ἐτέρου.

’Επεὶ δ᾿ ένια μὲν ὀν λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ μὴ
15 συγχωροῦντα ψεύδεσθαι ἂν φαῖνεν ένια δ᾿ οὐ, οἷον
ὁσα ἀμφιδοξοῦσιν (πότερον γὰρ φθαρτῇ ἢ ἄθανατος
ἡ ψυχή τῶν ζῶν, οὐ διάνοιαν τοῖς πολλοῖς), ἐν
οῖς οὖν ἄδηλον ποτέρως εἶσθε λέγεσθαι τὸ προ-
teinómēnov, πότερον ὡς οἱ γνώμαι (καλοῦσι γὰρ
γνώμας καὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς δόξας καὶ τὰς ὅλας ἀποφά-
20 σεις), ἡ ὡσ ἡ διάμετρος ἀσύμμετρος, ἔτι τε⁡² οὐ
tάληθες ἀμφιδοξεῖται, μάλιστα μεταφέρων ἂν τις
λανθάνοι τὰ ὀνόματα περὶ τούτων. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ
ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρως ἔχει τάληθες, οὐ δόξει σοφι-
ζεσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν οὐ δόξει ψεύδεσθαι:
25 ἡ γὰρ³ μεταφορὰ ποιῆσε τὸν λόγον ἀνεξέλεγκτον.

"Ετι ὅσα ἂν τις προαναθάνηται τῶν ἐρωτημάτων,
προενστάτεν καὶ προαγορευτέαν ὁυτῶ γὰρ ἂν
μάλιστα τὸν πυθανόμενον κωλύσειεν.

¹ Reading πότερον for πρότερον.
² Inserting τε after ἔτι.
³ Reading γὰρ for δὲ with AB.
is true, then the other is necessarily true, but, if the second is true, the first is not necessarily true, when asked which is true, we ought to concede the less inclusive; for the greater the number of premisses, the more difficult it is to draw a conclusion. If the disputant tries to establish that A has a contrary while B has not, if his contention is true, we ought to say that both have a contrary but that no name is laid down for one of the two.

Regarding some of the statements which they make, most people would declare that anyone who did not concede them was lying, while they would not say so about others, for example, about subjects on which people disagree (for instance, most people have no decided opinion whether the soul of living creatures is destructible or immortal). Therefore, when it is uncertain in which sense the suggested premiss is generally used, whether as maxims are employed (for people call both true opinions and general affirmations by the name of 'maxims') or like the statement, 'the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its sides,' and further, where the truth is a matter of uncertainty,—in these cases one has an excellent opportunity of changing the terms without being found out. For, because it is uncertain in which sense the premiss bears its true meaning, one will not be regarded as playing the sophist, and, because of the disagreement on the subject, one will not be regarded as lying; for the change will make the argument proof against refutation.

Furthermore, whenever one foresees any question, one must be the first to make one's objection and say what one has to say, for thus one can best disconcert the questioner.
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176 b

XVIII. 'Επεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν ὀρθὴ λύσις ἐμφανισις ἑυδοὺς συλλογισμοῦ, παρ' ὅποιαν ἐρώτησιν συμβαίνει τὸ ἑυδος, ὃς ἐς ἑυδής συλλογισμὸς λέγεται διιχῶς (ἡ γὰρ εἰ συλλελογίστατι ἑυδος, ἢ εἰ μὴ ὅν συλλογισμὸς δοκεὶ εἶναι συλλογισμὸς), εὐθές ἂν ἦ τε εἰρημένη νῦν λύσις καὶ ἡ τοῦ φαϊνομένου συλλογισμοῦ παρὰ τί φαίνεται τῶν ἐρωτηματων διόρθωσις. ὡστε συμβαίνει τῶν λόγων τοὺς μὲν συλλελογισμένους ἀνελόντα, τοὺς δὲ φαϊνομένους διελόντα λύειν. πάλιν δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν συλλελογισμένων λόγων οἱ μὲν ἀλήθες οἱ δὲ ἑυδοῦς ἐχουσί τὸ συμπέρασμα, τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἑυδείς διιχῶς ἐνδέχεται λύειν· καὶ γὰρ τῷ ἀνελείν τι τῶν ἡρωτημένων, καὶ τῷ δειξαί τὸ συμπέρασμα ἑχον οὐχ οὕτως· τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς προτάσεις τῷ ἀνελείν τι μόνον· τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές. ὡστε τοὺς βουλομένους λύειν λόγον πρῶτον μὲν σκέπτεον εἰ συλλελογίστατι ἡ ἀσυλλογιστος, εἰτα πότερον ἀληθές τὸ συμπέρασμα ἡ ἑυδος, ὅπως ἡ διαιροῦντες ἡ ἀναιροῦντες λῦσιν, καὶ ἀναιροῦντες ἢ ὡδε ἢ ὡδε, καθάπερ ἐλέξηα πρότερον. διαφέρει δὲ πλείστου ἑρωτώμενον τε καὶ μὴ λυειν λόγων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ προϊδεῖν χαλεπῶν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἰδεῖν ράον.

XIX. Τῶν μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν ὁμονυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἐλέγχων οἱ μὲν ἔχοντι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων τι πλείω σημαίνον, οἱ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα πολλαχῶς

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a In ch. xvii. b 176 b 36 ff.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xviii—xix

XVIII. Since a correct solution is an exposure of false reasoning, indicating the nature of the question on which the fallacy hinges, and since 'false reasoning' can mean one of two things (for it occurs either if a false conclusion has been reached or if what is not a proof appears to be such), there must be both the solution described just now, and also the rectification of the apparent proof by showing on which of the questions it hinges. The result is that one solves the correctly reasoned arguments by demolishing them, the apparent reasonings by making distinctions. Again, since some correctly reasoned arguments are true, while others are false, in their conclusions, it is possible to solve those which are false in their conclusion in two ways, either by demolishing one of the questions or by showing that the conclusion is not as stated. Those arguments, on the other hand, which are false in their premisses can only be solved by the demolition of one of the premisses, since the conclusion is true. Those, therefore, who wish to solve an argument should observe, firstly, whether it has been correctly reasoned or is not reasoned, and, next, whether the conclusion is true or false, in order that we may achieve a solution either by making a distinction or by demolishing a premiss and doing so in one or other of the two ways just described. There is a very wide difference between solving an argument when one is being questioned and when one is not; for in the latter case it is difficult to see what is coming, but when one is at leisure it is easier to see one's way.

XIX. Of the refutations which hinge upon equivocation and ambiguity some involve a question which bears more than one sense, while others have
λεγόμενον, οἷον ἐν μὲν τῷ συγώντα λέγειν τὸ συμπέρασμα διττόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μὴ συνεπίστασθαι τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἐν τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἀμφίβολον. καὶ τὸ διττόν ὅτε μὲν ἐστὶν, ὅτε δ’ οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ 15 σημαίνει τὸ διττόν τὸ μὲν ὅν τὸ δ’ οὐκ ὄν.

"Ὅσοις μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ τέλει τὸ πολλαχῶς, ἀν μὴ προλάβῃ τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐ γίνεται ἐλεγχος, οἷον ἐν τῷ τῶν τυφλῶν ὀράν· ἀνευ γὰρ ἀντιφάσεως οὐκ ἦν ἐλεγχος. ὦσος δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, οὐκ 20 ἀνάγκη προαποφήσαι τὸ διττόν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ λόγος. ἐν ἄρχῇ μὲν οὖν τὸ διπλοῦν καὶ ὅνομα καὶ λόγον οὕτως ἀποκριτέον, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁς, ἔστι δ’ ὃς οὗ, ὡσπερ τὸ συγώντα λέγειν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὁς, ἔστι δ’ ὃς οὗ. καὶ τὰ δέοντα πρακτέον ἐστὶν α’, ἔστι δ’ α’ οὗ· τὰ γὰρ δέοντα 25 λέγεται πολλαχῶς. ἔαν δὲ λάθη, ἐπὶ τέλει προστιθέντα τῇ ἐρωτήσει διορθωτέον· ἃρ’ ἔστι συγώντα λέγειν; οὗ, ἀλλὰ τόνδε συγώντα. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι δὲ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσιν ὀμοίως. οὐκ ἃρα συνεπίστανται ὅ τι ἐπίστανται; ναὶ, ἀλλ’ οὗ καὶ οὐτως ἐπιστάμενοι· οὐ γὰρ ταύτον ἐστὶν ὅτι

1 Reading προλάβῃ with B.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xix

a conclusion which can bear several meanings; for example, in the argument about 'the speech of the silent,' the conclusion has a double meaning, and in the argument that 'a man who knows is not conscious of what he knows,' one of the questions involves ambiguity. Also, that which has a double meaning is sometimes true and sometimes false, the term 'double' signifying that which is partly true and partly untrue.

When the diversity of meaning occurs in the conclusion, no refutation takes place, unless the questioner secures a contradiction beforehand, as, for example, in the argument about the 'seeing of the blind'; for there never was refutation without contradiction. Where the diversity of meaning occurs in the questions, there is no need to deny the ambiguity beforehand; for the argument is not directed towards it as a conclusion but carried on by means of it. At the beginning, therefore, one ought to reply to an ambiguous term or expression in the following manner, that 'in one sense it is so and in another it is not so'; for example 'the speaking of the silent' is possible in one sense but not in another. Or again, 'what needs must is to be done sometimes and not at other times'; for the term 'what needs must' can bear several meanings. If one does not notice the ambiguity, one should make a correction at the end by adding to the questioning: 'Is the speaking of the silent possible?' 'No, but speaking of this particular man when he is silent is possible.' So likewise also where the variety of meaning is contained in the premisses: 'Are not people conscious of what they know?' 'Yes, but not those who know in this particular way'; for it is not the same thing.

(a) Those dependent on diction: (chs. xix-xxiii).
(1) Equivocation.
(2) Ambiguity.
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177 a

30 οὐκ ἐστὶ συνεπίστασθαι καὶ ὅτι τοὺς ὡδὲ ἐπισταμένους οὐκ ἐστὶν. ὅλως τε μαχετέον, ἂν καὶ ἀπλῶς συναγιζηται, ὅτι οὐχ ὃ ἐφησεν ἀπεφησε πράγμα, ἀλλὰ ὄνομα· ὅστι οὐκ ἔλεγχος.

XX. Φανερῶν δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν πῶς λυτέον· ἂν γὰρ διαιροῦμενος καὶ 35 συντιθέμενος ὁ λόγος ἐτερον σημαίνῃ, συμπερανομένου τοῦναντίον λεκτέον. εἰςὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιούτοι λόγοι παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν. ἀρ' ὃ εἶδες σὺ τοῦτον τυπόμενον, τοῦτῳ ἐτύπτετο οὔτος; καὶ ὃ ἐτύπτετο, τοῦτῳ σὺ εἶδες; ἔχει μὲν οὖν τι κάκ τῶν ἀμφιβόλων ἐρωτημάτων, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ παρὰ σύνθεσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ διττὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν (οὐ γὰρ ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος γίνεται διαιροῦμενος), εἰπερ μὴ καὶ τὸ ὁρος καὶ ὁρος τῇ προσῳδίᾳ λεχθὲν σημαίνει ἐτερον. (ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμένοις ταῦτον ὄνομα, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων γεγραμμένον ἢ καὶ ὁσαύτως, κάκει δ' ἡδη παράσημα ποιοῦται, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα οὐ ταῦτα.) ὅστ' οὗ διττὸν τὸ παρὰ διαίρεσιν. φανερῶν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐ πάντες οἱ ἔλεγχοι παρὰ τὸ διττὸν, καθάπερ τινὲς φασιν.

177 b

Διαιρετέον οὖν τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ταυτὸν

a In both examples the meaning can be either 'with a stick' or 'with your eyes.'

b i.e. breathings and accents.
to say that it is not possible for those who know to be conscious of what they know and that those who know in a particular way cannot be conscious of their knowledge. Generally speaking, too, even though one’s opponent argues in a straightforward manner, one must contend that what he has contradicted is not the actual fact which one affirmed but merely its name, and so there is no refutation.

XX. It is evident, too, how fallacies which turn on the division and combination of words should be solved; for, if the expression signifies something different when it is divided and when it is combined, when the opponent is drawing his conclusion we must take the words in the contrary sense. All such expressions as the following turn upon the combination or division of words: ‘Was so-and-so being beaten with that with which you saw him being beaten? ’ and ‘ Did you see him being beaten with that with which he was being beaten? ’ The argument here has something of the fallacy due to ambiguous questions, but it actually turns on combination. For what turns on the division of words is not really ambiguous (for the expression when divided differently is not the same), unless indeed ὁποῖς and ὁπὸσ, pronounced according to the breathing, constitute a single word with different meanings. (In written language a word is the same when it is written with the same letters and in the same manner, though people now put in additional signs, but the words when spoken are not the same.) Therefore an expression whose meaning turns on division is not ambiguous, and it is clear also that all refutations do not turn upon ambiguity, as some people say.

It is for the answerer to make the division; for
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ιδείν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τυπτόμενον καὶ τὸ φάναι ἵδειν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τυπτόμενον. καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμου δὲ λόγος, ἃρ’ οἶδας σὺ νῦν οὕσας ἐν Πειραιεὶ τριήρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὅν; καὶ πάλιν, ἃρ’ ἔστιν ἁγαθὸν ὄντα 15 σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι; εἶ ὅ τις ἁγαθὸς ὃν σκυτεὺς μοχθηρὸς· ὡςτ’ ἔσται ἁγαθὸς σκυτεὺς μοχθηρός. ἃρ’ ὃν αἱ ἐπιστήμαι σπουδαία, σπουδαῖα τὰ μαθήματα; τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ σπουδαίον τὸ μάθημα· σπουδαῖον ἀρὰ μάθημα τὸ κακὸν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κακὸν καὶ μάθημα τὸ κακὸν, ὥστε κακὸν μάθημα τὸ κακὸν. ἀλλ’ ἔστι κακῶν σπουδαία ἐπι-

20 στήμη. ἃρ’ ἅληθὲς εἰπεῖν νῦν ὅτι σὺ γέγονας; γέγονας ἀρὰ νῦν. ἡ ἅλλο σημαίνει διαερεθέν; ἅλη-
θές γὰρ εἰπεῖν νῦν ὅτι σὺ γέγονας, ἅλλ’ οὐ νῦν γέγονας. ἃρ’ ὅσ δύνασαι καὶ ἀ δύνασαι, οὕτως καὶ ταῦτα ποιήσαις ἃν; οὐ κιθαρίζων δ’ ἔχεις 25 δύναμιν τοῦ κιθαρίζειν· κιθαρίζαις ἃν ἃρα οὐ κιθαρί-
ζων. ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔχει τήν δύναμιν τοῦ οὐ κιθαρί-
ζων κιθαρίζειν, ἀλλ’ ὅτε οὐ ποιεῖ, τοῦ ποιεῖν;

Λύουσι δὲ τινες τούτον καὶ ἄλλως. εἰ γὰρ ἐδωκέν ὥς δύναται ποιεῖν, οὐ φασί συμβαίνειν μὴ κιθαρί-
ζοντα κιθαρίζειν· οὐ γὰρ πάντως ὃς δύναται ποιεῖν, 30 δεδόσθαι ποιήσειν· οὐ ταῦτον δ’ εἶναι ὃς δύναται

a See Rhet. 1401 a 27 and Cope and Sandys’ note.
106
'I-saw-a-man-being-beaten with my eyes' is not the same thing as to say 'I saw a man being-beaten-with-my-eyes.'—Then there is Euthydemus' saying, 'Do you know now in Sicily that there are triremes in Piraeus? '—And, again, 'Can a good man who is a cobbler be bad?' 'No.' 'But a man who is good can be a bad cobbler; therefore he will be a good-bad cobbler.'—Again, 'Things of which the knowledge is good are good objects of learning, are they not?' 'Yes.' 'But the knowledge of evil is good; therefore evil is a good object of learning.'

But, further, evil is both evil and an object of learning, so that evil is an evil object of learning; but it has already been seen that the knowledge of evils is good.'—'Is it true to say at the present moment you are born?' 'Yes.' 'Then you are born at the present moment.' Does not a different division of the words signify something different? For it is true to say-at-the-present-moment that you are born, but not to say you are born-at-the-present-moment.—Again, 'Can you do what you can and as you can?' 'Yes.' 'And when you are not playing the harp you have the power of playing the harp; and so you could play the harp when you are not playing the harp.' In other words, he does not possess the power of playing-when-he-is-not-playing, but he possesses the power of doing it when he is not doing it.

Some people solve this in another manner also. If he has granted that a man can do what he can do, they say that it does not follow that he can play the harp when he is not playing it; for it has not been granted that he will do it in every way in which he can,—for it is not the same thing to do it in the way
καὶ πάντως ὡς δύναται ποιεῖν. ἀλλὰ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λύονσιν· τῶν γὰρ παρὰ ταύτων λόγων ἢ αὐτὴ λύσις, αὐτὴ δὲ οὐχ ἀρμόσει ἐπὶ πάντας οὐδὲ πάντως ἐρωτωμένους, ἀλλ’ ἐστι πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον.

XXI. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσωπίαν λόγου μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, οὔτε τῶν γεγραμμένων οὔτε τῶν λεγομένων, πλὴν εἰ τινὲς ὄλγοι γένοντ’ ἀν, οἰδὼν οὕτος ὁ λόγος. ἀρά γ’ ἐστι τὸ οὐ καταλύεις οἰκία; ναί. οὐκοῦν τὸ οὐ καταλύεις τοῦ καταλύεις ἀπόφασις; ναί. ἔφησας δ’ εἶναι τὸ οὐ καταλύεις οἰκίαν· ἡ οἰκία ἀρα ἀπόφασις. ὡς δὴ λυτέον, δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ταύτῳ σημαίνει ὀξύτερον τὸ δὲ βαρύτερον ῥηθέν.

XXII. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ ὁσαύτως λέ-5 γεσθαί τὰ μὴ ταύτα πῶς ἀπαντητέουν, ἐπείπερ ἔχομεν τὰ γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν. ὦ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωκεν ἐρωτηθεῖς μὴ ὑπάρχειν τι τούτων ὁσα τι ἐστι σημαίνει· ὥς δ’ ἐδείξετο ὑπάρχον τι τῶν πρὸς τι ἡ ποσῶν, δοκοῦντων δὲ τι ἐστι σημαίνειν διὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἰον ἐν τῷ τῷ λόγῳ. ἂρ’ ἐνδέχεται τὸ 10 αὐτὸ ἁμα ποιεῖν τε καὶ πεποιηκέναι; οὐ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅραν γέ τι ἁμα καὶ ἐωρακέναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ ταύτο ἐνδέχεται. ἂρ’ ἐστι τὶ τῶν πάσχειν ποιεῖν τι; οὐ. οὐκοῦν τὸ τέμνεται καίεται αἰσθά-νεται ὁμοίως λέγεται, καὶ πάντα πάσχειν τι ση-

a The point here is the difference of breathing and the presence or absence of the circumflex accent.

108
in which he can and in *every* way in which he can. But clearly this solution is not a good one; for the solution of arguments which turn on an identical principle is identical, whereas this solution will not suit every argument nor every form of question into which it can be put, but is directed against the questioner, not against the argument.

XXI. Arguments do not arise owing to accentuation either in written or in spoken language, though a few might occur such as the following: A house is 'where you lodge' (οὐ καταλύεις), isn't it? Yes. Is not 'you do not lodge' (οὐ καταλύεις) the negation of 'you lodge' (καταλύεις)? Yes. But you said that 'where you lodge' (οὗ καταλύεις) was a house; therefore a house is a negation. It is obvious how this must be solved; for the spoken word is not the same with the acuter and with the graver accent.

XXII. It is plain also how we must meet arguments that turn on the identical expression of things which are not identical, seeing that we possess the various kinds of categories. Suppose that one man when questioned has granted that something which denotes a substance is not an attribute, and another man has shown that something is an attribute which is in the category of relation or quantity but generally held, because of its expression, to denote a substance, as for example in the following argument: Is it possible to be doing and to have done the same thing at the same time? No. But it is surely possible to be seeing and to have seen the same thing at the same time and under the same conditions. Or again, Is any form of passivity a form of activity? No. Then 'he is cut,' 'he is burnt,' 'he is affected by a sensible object' are similar kinds of expression and all denote...
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178 a

μαίνει· πάλιν δὲ τὸ λέγειν τρέχειν ὅραν ὁμοίως
15 ἀλλήλοις λέγεται· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γ' ὅραν αἰσθάνεσθαι
tί ἔστιν, ὡστε καὶ πάσχειν τι ᾠμα καὶ ποιεῖν. εἴ
dὲ τις ἐκεῖ δοῦσιν μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμα ταῦτα ποιεῖν
cαὶ πεποιηκέναι, τὸ ὅραν καὶ ἐωρακέναι φαίη
ἐγχωρεῖν, οὐπω ἐλήλεγκται, εἰ μὴ λέγοι τὸ ὅραν
ποιεῖν τι ἀλλὰ πάσχειν· προσδεί γὰρ τούτοι ποῦ
20 ἔρωτήματος· ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀκούοντος ὑπολαμ-
βάνεται δεδωκέναι, ὅτε τὸ τέμνειν ποιεῖν τι καὶ τὸ
tετμηκέναι πεποιηκέναι ἔδωκε, καὶ ὁσα ἀλλὰ
ὁμοίως λέγεται. τὸ γὰρ λοιπὸν αὐτὸς προστίθησιν
ὀ ἀκούων ὡς ὁμοίως λεγόμενον· τὸ δὲ λέγεται μὲν
οὐχ ὁμοίως, φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν λέξιν. τὸ αὐτὸ
25 δὲ συμβαίνει ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ὁμωνυμίαις· οἴεται γὰρ
ἐν τοῖς ὁμωνύμοις ὁ ἄγνως τῶν λόγων ὁ ἐφησεν
ἀποφήσας πράγμα, οὐκ ὀνομα· τὸ δὲ ἐτι προσδεῖ
ἔρωτήματος, εἰ ἔφ' ἐν βλέπων λέγει τὸ ὁμώνυμον·
οὕτως γὰρ δόντος ἐσται ἐλεγχος.

"Ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ οἶδε οἱ λόγοι τούτοις, εἰ ο τις
30 ἔχων ὑστερον μὴ ἔχει ἀπέβαλεν· ὁ γὰρ ἑνα μόνον
ἀποβαλὼν ἀστράγαλον οὐχ ἔξει δέκα ἀστραγάλους.
ἦ δὲ μὲν μὴ ἔχει πρότερον ἔχων, ἀποβέβληκεν, οὖσον
dὲ μὴ ἔχει ἦ ὁσα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τοσαύτα ἀποβάλειν.

a Knucklebones were used as dice by the Greeks.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxii

some form of passivity; and, on the other hand, 'to say,' 'to run,' and 'to see' are forms of expression similar to one another; but 'to see' is surely a way of being affected by a sensible object, so that passivity and activity occur at the same time. In the former case, if someone, after granting that it is impossible to be doing and to have done the same thing at the same time, were to say that it is possible to see a thing and to have seen it, he has not yet been refuted supposing that he declares that seeing is a form not of activity but of passivity. For this further question is necessary, though he is supposed by the hearer to have granted it when he granted that 'to cut' is 'to be doing something' and 'to have cut' is 'to have done something,' and so with similar forms of expression. For the hearer himself adds the rest, on the supposition that the significance is similar, whereas it is not really similar but only appears so owing to the expression. The same thing occurs as in fallacies of ambiguity; for in dealing with ambiguous terms the man who is not an expert in argument thinks that his opponent has denied the fact which he asserted, not the term, whereas yet another question needs to be asked, namely, whether he is using the ambiguous term with his eye upon one meaning only; for if he grants this, a refutation will be achieved.

Similar to the above are also the following arguments: Has a man lost what he had and afterwards has not? For he who has lost one die only will no longer have ten dice. Is not what really happens that he has lost something which he had before but no longer has, but it does not follow that he has lost the whole amount or number which he no longer

Examples (continued).
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178 a

ἐρωτήσας οὖν ὁ ἐχει, συνάγει ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅσα· τὰ γὰρ
35 δέκα ποσά. εἰ οὖν ἤρετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰ ὅσα τις μὴ
ἐχει πρώτερον ἔχων, ἀρά γε ἀποβεβληκε τοσάδτα,
οὐδεὶς ἄν ἐδώκεν, ἀλλ' ἡ τοσάδτα ἡ τούτων τι. καὶ
ὅτι δοῖη ἄν τις ὁ μὴ ἐχει. οὐ γὰρ ἐχει ἕνα μόνον
ἀστράγαλον. ἡ οὖ δεδώκεν ὁ οὐκ ἐχειν, ἀλλ' ὃς
οὐκ ἐχε, τὸν ἔνα; τὸ γὰρ μόνον οὐ τόδε σημαίνει

178 b οὐδὲ τοιόνδε οὐδὲ τοσόνδε, ἀλλ' ὃς ἐχει πρός τι,
οἶον οτι οὐ μετ' ἄλλου. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ἤρετο ἃρ' ὁ
μὴ τις ἐχει δοῖη ἄν, μὴ φάντος δὲ ἔροιτο εἰ δοῖη
ἄν τις τι ταχέως μὴ ἔχων ταχέως, φήσαντος δὲ
συλλογίζοιτο ὅτι δοῖη ἄν τις ὁ μὴ ἐχει. καὶ
5 φανερὸν οτι οὐ συλλελόγισται· τὸ γὰρ ταχέως οὐ
τόδε διδόναι ἀλλ' ὃδε διδόναι ἐστίν· ὃς δὲ μὴ ἐχει
τις, δοῖη ἄν, οἶον ἡδέως ἔχων δοῖη ἄν λυπηρῶς.

"Ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοίδε πάντες. ἃρ' ἡ μὴ ἐχει
χειρὶ τύπτοι ἄν; ἡ ὃ μὴ ἐχει ὀφθαλμῶν ἕτοι ἄν;
10 οὐ γὰρ ἐχει ἕνα μόνον. λύσουσι μὲν οὖν τινὲς λέ-
γοντες καὶ ὃς ἐχει ἕνα μόνον καὶ ὀφθαλμὸν καὶ
has? In the question, therefore, he is dealing with that which he has, in the conclusion with the total number; for the number was ten. If, therefore, he had asked in the first place whether a man who formerly possessed a number of objects which he no longer possesses, has lost the total number of them, no one would have granted this, but would have said that he had lost either the total number or one of the objects. Again, it is argued that a man could give what he had not got; for what he has not got is one die only. Is not what really happens that he has not given that which he has not got but has given it in a manner in which he has not got it, namely, as a single unit? For 'single unit' does not denote either a particular kind of thing or a quality or a quantity but a certain relation to something else, namely, dissociation from anything else. It is, therefore, as though he had asked whether a man could give what he has not got, and on receiving the answer 'No,' were to ask whether a man could give something quickly when he had not got it quickly, and, on receiving the answer 'Yes,' were to infer that a man could give what he had not got. It is obvious that he has not drawn a correct inference; for 'giving quickly' does not denote giving a particular thing but giving in a particular manner, and a man could give something in a manner in which he did not get it; for example, he could get it with pleasure and give it with pain.

Similar also are all the following arguments: 'Could a man strike with a hand that he has not got or see with an eye that he has not got?' For he has not got only one eye. Some people, therefore, solve this by saying that the man who has more than one
ARISTOTLE

178 b

ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὖν ὁ πλείω ἔχων. οἱ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὦ ἔχει ἐλαβεν· ἐδίδου γὰρ μίαν μόνον οὗτος ψῆφον· καὶ οὗτός γ’ ἔχει, φασί, μίαν μόνην παρὰ τοῦτον ψῆφον. οἱ δ’ εὐθὺς τὴν ἔρωτησιν ἀναίροιντες, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ὁ μὴ ἐλαβεν ἔχειν, οἱον οἰον λαβόντα ἤδιν, διαφθαρέντος ἐν τῇ λήψει, ἔχειν ὀξύν. ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, οὗτοι πάντες οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν λῦοναν. εἰ γὰρ ἦν αὐτὴ λύσις, δόντα τὸ ἀντικείμενον οὐχ οἰον τε λύειν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οἱον εἰ ἔστι μὲν ὅτι δ’ ὦ, ἥ λύσις, ἀν ἀπλῶς δῷ λέγεσθαι, συμπεραῖνεται· εάν δὲ μὴ συμπεραίνηται, οὐκ ἂν εἰ ἡ λύσις· ἐν δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις πάντων διδομένων οὐδὲ φαμεν γίνεσθαι συλλογισμοῦ.

"Ετὶ δὲ καὶ οἶδ’ εἰσὶ τούτων τῶν λόγων. ἄρ’

25 ὁ γέγραπται, ἔγραφέ τις· γέγραπται δὲ νῦν ὅτι οὐ κάθησαι, ψευδής λόγος· ἦν δ’ ἄληθής, οτ’ ἐγράφετο· ἀμα ἄρα ἐγράφετο ψευδής καὶ ἄληθής. τὸ γὰρ ψευδή ἦ ἄληθή λόγον ἦ δόξαν εἶναι οὐ τόδε ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε σημαινει· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης. καὶ ἄρ’ ὁ μανθάνει ὁ μανθάνων, τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὁ μανθάνει; μανθάνει δὲ τις τὸ βραδὺ ταχὺ. οὐ τοῖνυν ὁ μανθάνει ἀλλ’ ὡς μανθάνει εἰρηκεν. καὶ ἄρ’ ὁ βαδίζει τις πατεί; βαδίζει δὲ τὴν ἡμέραν

a It seems probable that a new argument is dealt with here, cf. b 36 καὶ ὅτι κτλ. οἱ δὲ possibly introduced a second solution of the previous argument which has fallen out.

b But B may already possess other pebbles.

c 177 b 33.
eye (or whatever it is) has also only one. There is also the argument of some people that 'what a man has, he has received': A only gave one pebble, and B has, they say, only one pebble from A. Other people argue by directly demolishing the question raised, saying that one can have what one has not received; for example, one can receive wine that is sound but have it in a sour condition if it has gone bad in the process of transfer. But, as was said before, all these people direct their solutions not to the argument but to the man. For if this were a real solution, it would be impossible to achieve a solution by granting the opposite, as happens in all other cases; for example, if 'it is partly so and partly not so' is the solution, an admission that the expression is used without qualification makes the conclusion valid; but if no conclusion is reached, there cannot be a solution. In the above examples, even though everything is conceded, yet we say that no proof has been effected.

Moreover, the following also belong to this class of arguments: 'If something is written, did someone write it?' It is written that 'you are sitting'; this is a false statement, but was true at the time when it was written; therefore what was written is at the same time false and true. No, for the falsity or truth of a statement or opinion does not denote a substance but a quality; for the same account applies to an opinion as to a statement. Again, 'Is what the learner learns that which he learns?' A man learns a slow march quick; it is not then what he learns that is meant but how he learns it. Again, 'Does a man trample on that through which he walks?' But he walks through the whole day. Was not what
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178 b

"ολην. ἡ οὔχ ὁ βαδίζει ἄλλ' ὁτε βαδίζει εἰρηκεν·
οὐδ' ὁταν τὴν κύλικα πίνειν, ὁ πίνει ἄλλ' ἐξ οὐ.
35 καὶ ἀρ' ὁ τις οἴδεν ἡ μαθὼν ἡ εὑρὼν οἴδεν; ὧν δὲ
tὸ μὲν εὑρὲ τὸ δ' ἐμαθὲ, τὰ ἁμφω οὐδέτερον. ἡ ὁ
μὲν ἀπαν, ἀ δ' ὡς ἡ ἀπαντα; 1 καὶ ὁτι ἐστὶ τις τρί-
tος ἀνθρωπος παρ' αὐτόν καὶ τοὺς καθ' ἐκαστον. τὸ
γὰρ ἀνθρωπος καὶ ἀπαν τὸ κοινὸν οὐ τόδε τι, ἄλλα
tοιόνδε τι ἡ πρός τι ἡ πῶς ἡ τῶν τοιούτων τι ση-
179 a

μαίνει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Κορίσκος καὶ Κο-
ρίσκος μονσικός, πότερον ταυτὸν ἡ ἐτερον; τὸ
μὲν γὰρ τόδε τι τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε σημαίνει, ὡστ' οὐκ
ἐστιν αὐτὸ ἐκθέσθαι· οὐ τὸ ἐκτίθεσθαι δὲ ποιεῖ τὸν
τρίτον ἀνθρωπον, ἄλλα τὸ ὁπερ τόδε τι εἶναι συγ-
5 χωρεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἐσται τόδε τι εἶναι, ὁπερ Καλλίας,
cαι ὁπερ ἀνθρωπος ἐστιν. οὐδ' εἰ τις τὸ ἐκτίθε-
μενον μὴ ὁπερ τόδε τι εἶναι λέγοι ἄλλ' ὁπερ τοιῶν,
oυδὲν διοίσει· ἐσται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς εὖ
τι, οἶον ὁ ἀνθρωπος. φανερὸν οὐν ὁτι οὐ δοτέον
τόδε τι εἶναι τὸ κοινῆ κατηγοροῦμενον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν,
10 ἄλλ' ἦτοι ποιῶν ἡ πρός τι ἡ ποσὸν ἡ τῶν τοιούτων
ti σημαίνειν.

XXIII. "Ολως δ' εν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν λόγοις
ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἐσται ἡ λύσις ἡ παρ' ὁ

1 Reading ἀ δ' ὡς ἡ ἀπαντα with Pickard-Cambridge.
was meant not what he walks through but when he walks? Just as when we talk of a man drinking a cup, we refer not to what he drinks but to that out of which he drinks. Again, 'Is it not either by learning or by discovery that a man knows what he knows?' But, supposing that of two things he has discovered one and learnt the other, he has not either discovered or learnt the two taken together. Is it not true to say that what he knows is each single thing, but not all the things taken together? There is also the argument that there is a 'third man' beside 'man' and 'individual men.' This is not so, for 'man' and every generic term denotes not an individual substance but a quality or relation or mode or something of the kind. So, too, with the question whether 'Coriscus' and 'the musician Coriscus' are the same thing or different. For the one term denotes an individual substance, the other a quality, so that it is impossible to isolate it; for it is not the process of isolation which produces the 'third man' but the admission that there is an individual substance. For 'man' will not be an individual substance as Callias is, nor will it make any difference if one were to say that what is isolated is not an individual substance but a quality; for there will still be a one as contrasted with the many, for instance 'man.' It is obvious, therefore, that it must not be granted that the term predicated universally of a class is an individual substance, but we must say that it denotes either a quality or a relation or a quantity or something of the kind.

XXIII. To sum up, in dealing with arguments which turn on language the solution will always depend on the opposite of that on which the argument
179 a

έστιν δ’ λόγος. οἰον εἰ παρὰ σύνθεσιν ὁ λόγος, ἡ λύσις διελόντι, εἰ δὲ παρὰ διαίρεσιν, συνθέντι. πάλιν
15 εἰ παρὰ προσῳδίαν ὁξεῖαν, ἡ βαρεία προσῳδία λύσις, εἰ δὲ παρὰ βαρείαν, ἡ ὁξεία. εἰ δὲ παρ’ ὁμωνυμίαν, ἐστὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον ὁνόμα εἰπόντα λύειν, οἰον εἰ ᾧψυχον1 συμβαίνει λέγειν, ἀποφήσαντα μὴ εἶναι, δηλοῦν ὡς ἐστίν ἐμψυχον. εἰ δ’ ᾧψυχον ἐφησεν, δ’ ἐμψυχον συνελογίσατο, λέγειν
20 ὡς ἐστίν ᾧψυχον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀμφι-βολίας. εἰ δὲ παρ’ ὁμοιότητα λέξεως, τὸ ἀντικεί-
μενον ἐσται λύσις. ἀρ’ δ’ ὁ μὴ ἔχει, δοιγ ἀν τις;
ἡ οὐχ ὁ μὴ ἔχει, ἀλλ’ ὡς οὐκ ἔχει, οἰον ἕνα μὸνον ἀστράγαλον. ἀρ’ ὁ ἐπίσταται, μαθὼν ἡ εὐρών ἐπίσταται; ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἃ ἐπίσταται. καὶ2 δ’ βαδίζει
25 πατεῖ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅτε. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

XXIV. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός μία
μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις πρὸς ἀπαντᾷ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀδι-
όριστον ἐστὶ τὸ πότε λεκτέον ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος,
ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ὑπάρχῃ, καὶ ἐπ’ ἐνῶν
μὲν δοκεῖ καὶ φασίν, ἐπ’ ἐνῶν δ’ οὔ φασιν ἀναγ-
καῖον εἶναι, ῥητέον οὖν συμβιβασθέντος3 ὁμοίως
πρὸς ἀπαντᾷ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. ἔχειν δὲ δεὶ
προφέρειν τὸ οἶον. εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἳ τοιοῦτοι τῶν
λόγων παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός. ἄρ’ οἶδας ὁ μέλλω

1 Reading ᾧψυχον with Poste for ἐμψυχον.
2 Omitting ei after καὶ.
3 Reading συμβιβασθέντος with A.

\[\text{Note on 178 a 31.} \quad \text{See 178 b 32-33.}\]
turns; for example, if the argument turns on combination, the solution will be by division, if on division, by combination. Again, if it turns on acute accentuation, grave accentuation will be the solution, and vice versa. If it turns on equivocation, it can be solved by the use of the opposite term; for example, if it so happens that one says something is inanimate after having denied that it is so, one must show that it is animate; and, if one has said that it is inanimate and one's opponent has argued that it is animate, one must assert that it is inanimate. Similarly, too, in the case of ambiguity; if the argument turns on similarity of language, the opposite will be the solution. ‘Could one give what one has not got?’ Surely not what he has not got but he could give it in a way in which he has not got it, for example, a single die by itself. ‘Does a man know the thing which he knows by learning or discovery?’ Yes, but not ‘the things which he knows.’ Also a man tramples on the thing through which he walks, not on the time through which he walks. And similarly, too, with the other instances.

XXIV. To meet arguments which turn upon accident one and the same solution is universally applicable. It is undetermined on what occasions the attribute should be applied to the subject where it belongs to the accident, and sometimes it is generally held and stated to belong and sometimes it is denied that it necessarily belongs. We must, therefore, when a conclusion has been reached, assert in every case alike that it does not necessarily belong. But we must have an example to bring forward. All such arguments as the following turn on accident: ‘Do you know what I am about to ask you?’ ‘Do you know the man
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179 a

σε ἐρωτάν; ἃρ' οίδας τὸν προσιόντα ἢ τὸν ἐγ-
κεκαλυμμένον; ἃρ' ὁ ἀνδριάς σὸν ἔστιν ἔργον, ἢ
35 σὸς ὁ κύων πατήρ; ἄρα τὰ ὀλιγάκις ὀλίγα ὀλίγα;
φανερὸν γὰρ ἐν ἀπασὶ τούτοις ὥτι οὐκ ἁνάγκη τὸ
κατὰ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος
ἀληθεύεσθαι: μόνοις γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν
ἀδιαφόροις καὶ ἐν οὕσιν ἀπαντᾷ δοκεῖ ταύτα ὑπάρ-

179 b χειν. τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ οὗ ταυτόν ἐστὶν ἀγαθῷ τ' εἶναι
καὶ μέλλοντι ἐρωτᾶσθαι, οὐδὲ τῷ προσιόντι ἢ ἐγ-
κεκαλυμμένῳ προσιόντι τε εἶναι καὶ Κορίσκῳ· ὡστ' οὐκ
ei οἴδα τὸν Κορίσκον, ἀγνών δὲ τὸν προσιόντα,
tὸν αὐτὸν οίδα καὶ ἄγνων· οὐδ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐμὸν,
5 ἔστι δ' ἔργον, ἐμὸν ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ' ἡ κτίμα ἡ
πράγμα ἡ ἀλλο τι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ
tῶν ἄλλων.

Λύονσι δὲ τινες ἀναιροῦντες τὴν ἐρώτησιν: φασὶ
γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ταύτῳ πράγμα εἰδέναι καὶ ἄγνωειν,
ἀλλ' μὴ κατὰ ταύτο. τὸν οὖν προσιόντα οὐκ εἰδότες,
10 τὸν δὲ Κορίσκον εἰδότες, ταύτῳ μὲν εἰδέναι καὶ
ἀγνωεῖν φασίν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταύτο. καὶ τοῖς πρῶτοι
μὲν, καθάπερ ἢδ' εἴπομεν, δεὶ τῶν παρὰ ταύτῳ
λόγων τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι διόρθωσιν· αὐτὴ δ' οὐκ
ἐσται, ἂν τις μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰναι
ἡ πῶς ἔχειν τὸ αὐτὸ ἄξιωμα λαμβάνῃ, οἶον εἰ ὃδε

a See 179 b 15. Cf. Plato, Euthydemus 298 e.

b The reference here is to the question (a 33) 'Do you
know what I am about to ask you?' The reply is 'no.'
'I am going to ask you about the good; therefore, you do
not know about the good.'

c 177 b 31.

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who is coming towards us?' or 'the man with his face covered?' 'Is the statue your work?' or 'Is the dog your father?' 'Is the result of multiplying a small number by another small number itself a small number?' It is obvious that in all these instances it does not necessarily follow that the attribute which is true of the accident is also true of the subject. For it is only to things which are indistinguishable and one in essence that all the same attributes are generally held to belong; but in the case of the good, it is not the same thing to be good and to be about to be the subject of a question. Nor in the case of 'the man who is coming towards us' (or 'with his face covered'), is 'to be coming towards us' the same thing as 'to be Coriscus'; so that, if I know Coriscus but do not know the man who is coming towards me, it does not follow that I know and do not know the same man. And again, if this is 'mine' and if it is also 'a piece of work,' it is not therefore 'a piece of my work' but may be my possession or chattel or something else. The other instances can be treated in the same way.

Some people obtain a solution by demolishing the thesis of the question; for they say that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing but not in the same respect; when, therefore, they do not know the man who is coming towards them but know Coriscus, they say that they know and do not know the same thing but not in the same respect. Yet in the first place, as we have already said, the method of correcting arguments which turn on the same principle ought to be identical, yet this will not be so, if one takes the same axiom to apply not to 'knowledge' but to 'existence' or 'being in a certain state'; for...
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15 ἐστὶ πατὴρ, ἐστὶ δὲ σὸς· εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐνίων τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς καὶ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτό εἰδέναι καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐνταῦθα οὐδὲν κοινωνεῖ τὸ λεγθέν. οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον πλείους μοχθηρίας ἔχειν. ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡ πάσης ἀμαρτίας ἐμφάνισις λύσις ἐστὶν· ἐγχωρεῖ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν ψεῦδος συλλελόγισται

20 δεῖξαι τινα, παρ’ ὅ δὲ μὴ δεῖξαι, οἶον τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ κινηθῆναι. ὡστε καὶ εἰ τις ἐπιχειροῖ συνάγειν ὡς ἄδυνατον, ἀμαρτάνει, κἂν εἰ μυριάκις ἡ συλλελογισμένος· οὗ γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτὴ λύσις. ἢ γὰρ ἡ λύσις ἐμφάνισις ψευδοῦς συλλογισμοῦ, παρ’ ὃ ψευδῆς· εἰ οὖν μὴ συλλελόγισται ἦ

25 καὶ ἀληθὲς ἡ ψεῦδος <ψευδῶς> ἐπιχειρεῖ συνάγειν, ἡ ἐκεῖνον δῆλωσις λύσις ἐστὶν. ἵσως δὲ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπ’ ἐνίων οὐδὲν κωλύει συμβαίνειν· πλὴν ἐπὶ γε τοῦτων οὐδὲ τοῦτο δόξειν ἂν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Κορίσκον ὅτι Κορίσκος οἶδε, καὶ τὸ προσιόν ὅτι προσιόν. ἐνδέχεσθαι δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ αὐτὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μή,

30 οἶον ὅτι μὲν λευκὸν εἰδέναι, ὅτι δὲ μουσικὸν μὴ γνωρίζειν· οὔτω γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ οἶδε καὶ οὐκ οἶδεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ ταῦτον. τὸ δὲ προσιόν καὶ Κορίσκον, καὶ ὅτι προσιόν καὶ ὅτι Κορίσκος, οἶδεν.

‘Ὅμοιως ὅ’ ἀμαρτάνουσι καὶ οἱ λύοντες, ὅτι ἄπας

1 Reading with W. A. Pickard-Cambridge ψεῦδος <ψευδῶς>.

*a Cf. a 34 f., the false conclusion being, ‘This dog is your father.’

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example, 'this dog is a father, this dog is yours.' Though it is sometimes true and it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, yet the suggested solution is quite inapplicable in the above instance. But there is no reason why the same argument should not contain several flaws, but it is not the exposure of every fault that forms a solution; for it is possible for a man to show that a false conclusion has been reached without showing on what point it turns, as, for instance, in Zeno's argument that motion is impossible. Even, therefore, if one were to attempt to infer the impossibility of this view, he is wrong, even though he has given countless proofs; for this procedure does not constitute a solution, for a solution is, as we saw, an exposure of false reasoning, showing on what the falsity depends. If, therefore, he has not proved his case or else if he attempts to draw an inference, whether true or false, by false means, the unmasking of this procedure is a solution. But perhaps, though in some cases there is nothing to prevent this happening, yet it would not be generally admitted in the instances given above; for he knows that Coriscus is Coriscus and that what is coming towards him is coming towards him. But there are cases in which it is generally held to be possible to know and not to know the same thing; for instance, one can know that someone is white but be ignorant of the fact that he is musical, thus knowing and not knowing the same thing but not in the same respect; but as to what is coming towards him and Coriscus, he knows both that it is coming towards him and that he is Coriscus.

An error similar to that made by those whom we have mentioned is committed by those who solve (Erroneous methods of solution.)
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35 ἀριθμὸς ὀλίγος, ὥσπερ οὐς εἴπομεν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ συμπεραινομένου, τοῦτο παραλιπόντες, ἀλήθες συμ-
πεπεράνθαι φασί, πάντα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ πολὺν καὶ ὀλίγον, ἀμαρτάνουσιν.

"Εννοι δὲ καὶ τῷ διυττῷ λύουσι τοὺς συνθετικοὺς, ὁδόν ὅτι σὸς ἐστὶ πατήρ ἢ νεώτερὸς ἢ δουλός. καὶ τοι

180 α φανερὸν ὡς εἰ παρὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς λέγεσθαι φαίνεται ὡς ἔλεγχοι, δεῖ τούνομα ἢ τὸν λόγον κυρίως εἶναι
πλειόνων· τὸ δὲ τόνδ᾿ εἶναι τοῦτο τέκνον οὐδεὶς λέγει κυρίως, εἰ δεσπότης ἐστὶ τέκνον· ἀλλὰ παρὰ

καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὼς ἢ σύνθεσις ἐστίν. ἂρ᾿ ἐστὶ τούτῳ σὸν· ναὶ. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο τέκνον; σὸν ἄρα τοῦτο τέκ

νον· ὁτι συμβεβηκέν εἶναι καὶ σὸν καὶ τέκνον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ σὸν τέκνον.

Καὶ τὸ εἶναι τῶν κακῶν τι ἁγαθῶν· ἢ γὰρ φρόνη-

σίς ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη τῶν κακῶν. τὸ δὲ τούτῳ τοῦ-

10 τῶν εἶναι οὐ λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ κτῆμα. εἰ

δ᾿ ἄρα πολλαχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῶν ζῷων

φαμέν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τι κτῆμα) καὶ εἶναι τι πρὸς τὰ

κακὰ λέγεται ώς τινός, διὰ τὸ τοῦτο τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν,

ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τοῦτο τῶν κακῶν. παρὰ τὸ πῃ οὖν καὶ

ἀπλῶς φαίνεται. καὶ τοι ἐνδέχεται ἵσως ἁγαθὸν

15 εἶναι τι τῶν κακῶν διττῶς, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου
tούτου, ἀλλ᾿ εἴ τι δοῦλον εἴπῃ ἁγαθὸν μοχθηροῦ,

μᾶλλον. ἵσως δ᾿ οὖδ᾿ οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἁγαθὸν καὶ

*When it is equivalent to our ' so-and-so's.'
the argument that every number is small; for if, when no conclusion has been reached, they pass over the fact and say that a conclusion has been reached and is true because every number is both large and small, they are committing an error.

Some people, too, solve these reasonings by the principle of ambiguity, saying, for example, that 'yours' means 'your father' or 'your son' or 'your slave.' Yet it is obvious that, if the refutation turns upon the possibility of several meanings, the term or expression ought to be used literally in several senses; but no one speaks of A as B's child in the literal sense if B is the child's master, but the combination is due to accident. 'Is A yours?' 'Yes.' 'Is A a child?' 'Yes.' 'Then A is your child,' for he happens to be both yours and a child; but for all that he is not 'your child.'

There is also the argument that 'something "of evils" is good; for wisdom is a knowledge "of evils."' But the statement that this is 'of so-and-so' is not used with several meanings but denotes possession. Granting, however, that the genitive has more than one meaning (for we say that man is 'of the animals,' though not a possession of theirs), and if the relation of so-and-so to evils is expressed by the genitive, it is therefore a so-and-so 'of evils,' but so-and-so is not one of the evils. The difference seems to be due to whether the genitive is used in a particular sense or absolutely. Yet it is perhaps possible for the saying 'Something of evils is good' to be ambiguous, though not in the example given above, but rather in the phrase 'a slave is good of the wicked.' But perhaps this example is not to the point either; for if something is 'good' and 'of so-and-so,' it is not at
τούτου, ἀγαθὸν τούτου ἀμα. οὖδὲ τὸ τὸν ἀνθρωπον
φάναι τῶν ζῴων εἰναι οὐ λέγεται πολλαχῶς· οὐ
20 γὰρ εἳ ποτέ τι σημαίνομεν ἀφελόντες, τοῦτο λέ-
γεται πολλαχῶς· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡμιου εἰπόντες τοῦ
ἔπους δός μοι Ἡλιάδα σημαίνομεν, οἷον τὸ μῆνιν
ἀείδε θεά.

XXV. Τοὺς δὲ παρὰ τὸ κυρίως τόδε ἡ πῇ ἡ
ποῦ ἡ πῶς ἡ πρός τι λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς,
25 λυτέον σκοπούντι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντὶ-
φασιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τούτων τι πεπονθέναι. τὰ γὰρ
ἐναντία καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα καὶ φάσιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν
ἀπλῶς μὲν ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ, πῇ μὲντοι
ἐκάτερον ἡ πρὸς τι ἡ πῶς, ἡ το μὲν πῇ τῳ ὁ
ἀπλῶς, οὐδὲν καλύει. ὥστ' εἰ τόδε μὲν ἀπλῶς
30 τόδε δὲ πῇ, οὔπω ἔλεγχος. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ συμ-
περάσματι θεωρητέον πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν.

Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιούτοι λόγοι τοῦτ' ἔχοντες.
ἀρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸ μή ὅν εἶναι; ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐστὶν γέ
τι μὴ ὅν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὅν οὐκ ἐσται· οὐ γὰρ
35 ἐσται τι τῶν ὄντων. ἀρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν ἀμα
εὐορκεῖν καὶ ἐπιορκεῖν; ἀρ' ἐγχωρεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν
ἀμα τῷ αὐτῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀπείθειν; ἡ οὔτε
τὸ εἶναι τι καὶ εἶναι ταὐτὸν; τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅν, οὐκ εἰ
ἐστὶ τι, καὶ ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς· οὔτ' εἰ εὐορκεῖ τόδε ἡ
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the same time 'so and-so's good.' Nor is the statement that 'man is of the animals' used with several meanings; for a phrase does not acquire several senses every time we express its meaning in an elliptical form; for we express, 'Give me the Iliad' by quoting the half line 'Sing, goddess, the wrath.'

XXV. Arguments which turn upon the use of an expression not in its proper sense but with validity in respect only of a particular thing or in a particular respect or place or degree or relation and not absolutely, must be solved by examining the conclusion in the light of its contradictory, to see if it can possibly have been affected in any of these ways. For it is impossible for contraries and opposites and an affirmative and a negative to belong absolutely to the same subject; on the other hand, there is no reason why each should not belong in a particular respect or relation or manner, or one in a particular respect and the other absolutely. Thus if one belongs absolutely and the other in a particular respect, no refutation has yet been reached. This point must be examined in the conclusion by comparison with its contradictory.

All the following arguments are of this kind: Is it possible for what is-not to be? But surely it is something which is not. Similarly, too, Being will not be; for it will not be any particular thing which is.—Is it possible for the same man at the same time to keep and to break his oath?—Is it possible for the same man at the same time to obey and disobey the same order? Is it not true, in the first place, that being something and Being are not the same thing? On the other hand, Not-being, even if it is something, has not absolute being as well. Secondly, if a man keeps his oath on a particular occasion or in a par-
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τηδε, ἀνάγκη καὶ εὐορκεῖν, ὁ δ’ ὁμόσας ἐπιορκήσειν ἐυορκεῖ ἐπιορκῶν τοῦτο μόνον, εὐορκεῖ δὲ οὐ· οὐδ’ ὁ ἀπειθῶν πείθεται, ἀλλὰ τι πείθεται. ὁμοίως δ’ ὁ λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν αὐτόν ἁμα καὶ ἀληθεύειν· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι εὐθεώρητον, ποτέρως ἂν τις ἀποδοῖ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδε-5 σθαι, δύσκολον φαίνεται. κωλύει δ’ τὸν αὐτόν ὁδὲν ἀπλῶς μὲν εἶναι ψευδή, πη δ’ ἀληθῆ, ἡ τινὸς καὶ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τινά, ἀληθῆ δὲ <αὐτόν> μή.2. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς τι καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε· πάντες γὰρ οἱ τουσοῦτοι λόγοι παρὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνουσιν. ἄρ’ ἡ υγίεια ἢ ὁ πλοῦτος ἀγαθόν; ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄφρονι 10 καὶ μὴ ὁρθῶς χρωμένῳ οὐκ ἀγαθόν· ἀγαθόν ἀρα καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν. ἄρα τὸ υγιαίνειν ἡ δύνασθαι εἰν πόλει ἀγαθόν; ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν ὅτε οὐ βέλτιον· ταῦτάν ἀρα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν. ἡ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀπλῶς ὅν ἀγαθόν τῷ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἡ τῷ δὲ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ οὐ νῦν ἡ οὐκ ἐνταῦθ’ ἀγαθόν; 15 ἄρ’ ὁ μὴ βούλοιτ’ ἃν ὁ φρόνιμος, κακόν· ἀποβαλεῖν δ’ οὐ βούλεται τάγαθον· κακόν ἥρα τάγαθον. οὐ γὰρ ταῦταν εἰπεῖν τάγαθον εἶναι κακόν καὶ τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν τάγαθον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ τοῦ κλέπτου

1 Reading τὸν αὐτόν or τοῦτον for αὐτόν.
ticular respect, it does not necessarily follow that he is a keeper of oaths, but he who he has sworn that he will break his oath keeps his oath on this particular occasion only by foreswearing himself, but is not a keeper of oaths; nor is he who disobeys obedient, except to a particular order. The argument is similar which deals with the question whether the same man can say what is at the same time both true and false; but it presents apparent difficulties because it is not easy to see whether the qualification 'absolutely' should be applied to 'true' or to 'false.' But there is no reason why the same man should not be absolutely a liar yet tell the truth in some respects, or that some of a man's words should be true but he himself not be truthful. Similarly, too, if there are qualifications of relation or place or time. All the following arguments turn upon a point of this kind. Is health (or wealth) a good thing? But to the fool who misuses it, it is not a good thing; it is, therefore, a good thing and not a good thing.—Is health (or political power) a good thing? But there are times when it is not better than other things; therefore the same thing is both good and not good for the same man. Or is there no reason why a thing should not be absolutely good but not good for a particular person, or good for a particular person, but not good at the present moment or here?—Is that which the wise man would not wish, an evil? But he does not wish for the rejection of the good; therefore, the good is an evil. This is not true; for it is not the same thing to say that the good is an evil and that the rejection of the good is an evil. So likewise with the argument about the thief; it does not follow,
λόγος. οὐ γὰρ εἰ κακόν ἔστιν ὁ κλέπτης, καὶ τὸ
λαβεῖν ἔστὶν κακόν· οὐκοῦν τὸ κακὸν βούλεται, ἄλλα
tάγαθον· τὸ γὰρ λαβεῖν ἁγαθὸν ἁγαθὸν. καὶ ἡ
νόσος κακόν ἔστιν, ἄλλ' οὐ τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν νόσον.
ἀρα τὸ δίκαιον τοῦ ἄδικου καὶ τὸ δικαίως τοῦ
ἀδίκους αἰρετότερον; ἄλλ' ἀποθανεῖν ἀδίκως αἰρε-
tότερον. ἀρα δίκαιον ἔστιν τὰ αὐτοῦ ἔχειν ἕκαστον;
ἀδ' ἀν τις κρίνῃ κατὰ δόξαν τῆν αὐτοῦ, κἂν ἡ
ψευδὴς, κύρια ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου· τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρα
dίκαιον καὶ οὐ δίκαιον. καὶ πότερα δεὶ κρίνειν τὸν
τὰ δίκαια λέγοντα ἡ τὸν τὰ ἁδίκα; ἄλλα μὴν καὶ
tὸν ἀδικουμένον δίκαιον ἔστιν ἴκανῶς λέγειν ἃ
ἐπάθεν· ταῦτα δ' ἦν ἁδίκα. οὐ γὰρ εἰ παθεῖν τὶ
ἀδίκως αἰρετόν, τὸ ἀδίκως αἰρετότερον τοῦ δι-
καίως· ἄλλ' ἀπλῶς μὲν τὸ δικαίως, τοὺς μέντοι
οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀδίκως ἡ δικαίως. καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ
αὐτοῦ δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ τάλλοστα ὑπὸ δίκαιον· κρίσιν
μέντοι ταύτην δικαίαν εἶναι οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον ἂν
ἡ κατὰ δόξαν τοῦ κρίναντος· οὐ γὰρ εἰ δίκαιον
tοδὲ ἡ ὁδικαίως· ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἀδίκα ὁντα οὐδὲν κωλύει λέγειν γε αὐτὰ δίκαιον
εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ εἰ λέγειν δίκαιον, ἀνάγκη δίκαια
eῖναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' εἰ ωφέλιμον λέγειν, ωφέλιμα.
ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαίων. ὅστ' οὖκ εἰ 130
if the thief is an evil, that to acquire things is also an evil. The thief, therefore, does not wish for what is evil but for what is good; for to acquire something good is good. Also disease is an evil, but to get rid of disease is not an evil.—Is what is just preferable to what is unjust and are just circumstances preferable to unjust? But it is preferable to be put to death unjustly.—Is it just that each man should have his own? But judgements which a man passes in accordance with his personal opinion, even if they are false, are valid in the eyes of the law; the same thing, therefore, is just and not just.—Again, should judgement be given in favour of him who says what is just or of him who says what is unjust? But it is just for the victim of injustice to state in full the things which he has suffered, and these things were unjust. For if to suffer something unjustly is an object of choice, it does not follow that unjust circumstances are preferable to just, but, absolutely, justice is preferable; but this does not prevent unjust circumstances being preferable to just in a particular case. Again, it is just that a man should have his own, and it is not just that he should have what belongs to another; but there is no reason why any judgement which is given in accordance with the judge's opinion should not be just; for, if it is just in a particular case and in particular circumstances, it is not also absolutely just. Similarly, too, there is no reason why, though things are unjust, merely saying them should not be just. For if to say things is just, it does not follow that they are just, any more than, if it is expedient to say things, it follows that those things are expedient. Similarly, too, with things that are just. So that if what is said is unjust,
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tά λεγόμενα άδικα, δέ λέγων άδικα νικά. λέγει γάρ ἃ λέγειν ἐστι δίκαια, ἀπλῶς δὲ καὶ παθεῖν άδικα.

181 a  XXVI. Τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸν όρισμὸν γινομένοις τοῦ ἐλέγχου, καθάπερ ὑπεγράφη πρότερον, ἀπαντητέον σκοποῦσι τὸ συμπέρασμα πρὸς τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ὥσπερ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ δ καὶ ὠσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. εἰάν δὲ ἐν ἀρχῇ προσέρηται, οὐχ ὀμολογητέον ὡς ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι διπλάσιον καὶ μὴ διπλάσιον, ἀλλὰ φατέον, μὴ μέντοι ὁδί, ὡς ποτ' ἢν τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι διωμολογημένον. εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἴδ' οἱ λόγοι παρὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο. ἄρ' δ' εἰδὼς ἔκαστον ὅτι ἔκαστον, 10 οἶδε τὸ πράγμα; καὶ δ' ἄγνων ὠσαύτως; εἰδὼς δὲ τὸν Κορίσκον ὅτι Κορίσκος, ἄγνοοι ἂν ὅτι μουσικός, ἀστε ταύτῳ ἐπίσταται καὶ ἄγνοει. ἂρα τὸ τετράπτυχον τοῦ τριπτῆχος μεῖζον; γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἐκ τριπτήχου τετράπτυχον κατὰ τὸ μήκος· τὸ δὲ μεῖζον ἐλάττωνος μεῖζον· αὐτὸ ἄρα αὐτὸν μεῖζον καὶ ἐλαττόν.

15  XXVII. Τοὺς δὲ παρὰ τὸ αὐτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ πυθανομένῳ μέν, ἂν ἦ δὴλον, οὐ δοτέον, οὐδ' ἂν ἐνδοξὸν ἦ, λέγοντα τάληθες. ἂν δὲ λάθη, τὴν ἄγνοιαν διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν

* 167 a 23.
it does not follow that it is a case of the man who uses unjust pleas winning his cause; for he is saying things which it is just for him to say but which are, absolutely, unjust for anyone to suffer.

XXVI. Refutations which are connected with the definition of the refutation must, as suggested above, be met by examining the conclusion in the light of its contradictory and seeing how the same term shall be present in the same respect and in the same relation, manner and time. In putting this additional question at the beginning, you must not admit that it is impossible for the same thing to be both double and not double but must admit the possibility but not in the way that was once admitted to fulfil the conditions of a refutation. All the following arguments depend upon a point of this kind. ‘Does he who knows that A is A, know the thing A?’ And, similarly, ‘Does he who does not know that A is A, not know the thing A?’ But one who knows that Coriscus is Coriscus, might not know that he is musical, so that he both knows and is ignorant of the same thing.—Again, ‘Is an object which is four cubits long greater than an object which is three cubits long?’ But an object three cubits long might become four cubits long. Now the greater is greater than the less; therefore the object is itself greater and less than itself.

XXVII. In refutations which are connected with the begging and assuming of the original point at issue, it should not be granted to a questioner, if his procedure is obvious, even though his view is generally accepted, but you should state the truth. If, on the other hand, his procedure is not detected, you should, owing to the badness of such arguments,
τοιούτων λόγων εἰς τὸν ἑρωτῶντα μεταστρεπτέον ὃς οὐ διειλεγμένον· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος ἀνευ τοῦ ἐξ 20 ἀρχῆς. εἴθε ὅτι ἐδόθη οὐχ ὃς τούτω χρησομένου, ἂλλ' ὃς πρὸς τοῦτο συλλογιουμένου τούναντίον ἦ ἐπὶ τῶν παρεξελέγχων.

XXVIII. Καὶ τοὺς διὰ τοῦ παρεπομένου συμβιβάζοντας ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου δεικτέον. ἔστι δὲ διττῇ ἡ τῶν ἐπομένων ἀκολούθησις. ἡ γὰρ ὃς τῷ ἐν μέρει τὸ καθόλου, οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ ζῷον· ἡξιοῦται γὰρ, εἰ τόδε μετὰ τοῦτο, καὶ τόδ' εἶναι μετὰ τούτῳ. ἡ κατὰ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις· εἰ γὰρ τόδε τῶδε ἀκολουθεῖ, τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. παρ' ὦ καὶ ὁ τοῦ Μελίσσου λόγος· εἰ γὰρ τὸ γεγονός ἔχει ἀρχὴν, τὸ ἀγένητον ἀξιοῦ μὴ ἔχειν, ὡστ' εἰ ἀγένητος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ ἀπειρος. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀνάπαυν γὰρ ἡ ἀκολούθησις.

XXIX. "Ὅσοι τε παρὰ τὸ προστιθέναι τι συλλογίζονται, σκοπεῖν εἰ ἀφαιρουμένου συμβαίνει μηδὲν ἦττον τὸ ἀδύνατον. κάπειτα τοῦτο ἐμφανιστέον, καὶ λεκτέον ὃς ἑδωκεν οὐχ ὃς δοκοῦν ἀλλ' ὃς 35 πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὁ δὲ κέχρηται οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον.

XXX. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τὰ πλείω ἑρωτήματα ἐν ποιοῦντας εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ διοριστέον. ἑρώτησις γὰρ μία πρὸς ἦν μία ἀπόκρισις ἐστιν, ὡστ' οὐτε
make your ignorance recoil on the head of the questioner, on the ground that he has not argued properly; for refutation must proceed without any assumption of the original point. Next, you must argue that the point was granted with the idea that he was going to use it not as a premiss but in order to argue the opposite view to it or for the purpose of refutations on side issues.

XXVIII. Again, those refutations which draw their conclusions through the consequent must be exposed in the argument itself. There are two ways in which consequences follow: Either as the universal follows from the particular, as 'animal' follows from 'man'; for it is claimed that, if A accompanies B, then B also accompanies A. Or else the process goes by opposites; for if A follows B, A's opposite will follow B's opposite. It is on this, too, that the argument of Melissus depends; for he claims that, if that which has come to be has a beginning, that which has not come to be has no beginning, and so, if the heaven has not come to be, it is also eternal. But this is not true; for the sequence is the reverse.

XXIX. In refutations which are argued by means of some addition, you must examine whether the impossibility occurs none the less when the addition has been withdrawn. If so, then the answerer should make this fact clear and should state that he granted the addition not because he believed in it but for the sake of the argument, but that his opponent has made no use of it at all for his argument.

XXX. In dealing with those who make several questions into one, you should draw a distinction immediately at the beginning. For a question is single to which there is only one answer, so that one
πλείω καθ’ ἑνὸς οὕτε ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐν καθ’. 5 ἑνὸς φατέων ἢ ἀποφατέων. ὥσπερ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀμωνύμων δὴ μὲν ἁμφοῖν ὅτε δ’ οὐδετέρῳ ὑπάρχει, ὥστε μὴ ἀπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος ἀπλῶς ἀποκρινομένοις οὐδέν συμβαίνει πάσχειν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων. ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὸ πλείω τῷ ἐνὶ ἡ τὸ ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχῃ, τῷ ἀπλῶς δόντι καὶ ἁμαρτόντι ταῦτην τὴν ἁμαρτίαν οὐδέν ὑπεναντίωμα συμβαίνει. ὅταν δὲ τῷ μὲν τῷ δὲ μὴ, ἡ πλείω κατὰ πλειόνων, καὶ ἐστὶν ὡς ὑπάρχει ἁμφότερα ἁμφότερος, ἐστὶ δ’ ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει πάλιν, ὥστε τοῦτ’ εὐλαβητέον. οἷον ἐν τοῖς τοῖς λόγοις. εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἁγαθὸν τὸ δὲ κακὸν, οτὶ ταῦτα Ἁληθείς εἴπειν ἁγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ πάλιν μὴ ἁγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν (οὐκ ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐκάτερον ἐκάτερον), ἥστε ταῦτ’ ἁγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ οὔτ’ ἁγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν. καὶ εἰ ἐκαστὸν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ταύτον, καὶ ἄλλου ἔτερον, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἄλλοις ταῦτα ἄλλ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἔτερα αὐτῶν, ταῦτα ἐαυτοῖς ἔτερα καὶ ταῦτα. ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ἁγαθὸν κακὸν γίνεται, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἁγαθὸν ἐστὶν, δῦο γένοιτ’ ἂν. δυὸν τε καὶ ἁνίσων ἐκάτερον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἴσον, ὥστε ἵσα καὶ ἁνίσα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς.

Ἐμπίπτονσι μὲν οὖν οὕτω καὶ εἰς ἄλλας λύσεις: 20 καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἁμφὸς καὶ τὸ ἀπαντα πλείω σημαίνει· οὐκόν ταῦτον, πλὴν ὄνομα, συμβαίνει φήσαι καὶ

1 Reading ἐπειδὴ for ἐστὶ δ’ with Poste.
must not affirm or deny several things of one thing
nor one thing of several things, but one thing of one
thing. But just as in the case of equivocal terms, a
predicate is sometimes true of both meanings and
sometimes of neither, and so, though the question
is not simple, no detriment results if people give a
simple answer, so too with these double questions.
When, therefore, the several predicates are true of one
subject, or one predicate of several subjects, no con-
tradiction is involved in giving a simple answer, though
he has made this mistake. But when the predicate
is true of one subject but not of the other, or several
predicates are true of several subjects, then there is
a sense in which both are true of both but another
sense, on the other hand, in which they are not; so
one must be on one’s guard against this. The follow-
ing arguments illustrate this: (1) Supposing A is
good and B evil, it is true to say that they are good
and evil and, on the other hand, that they are neither
good nor evil (for A is not evil and B is not good), so
that the same thing is good and evil and neither good
nor evil; (2) If everything is the same as itself and
different from anything else, since things are not the
same as other things but the same as themselves,
and also different from themselves, the same things
are both different from themselves and the same as
themselves; (3) Moreover, if that which is good
becomes evil and that which is evil is good, they
would become two; and of two unequal things each
is equal to itself, so that they are both equal and
unequal to themselves.

These refutations also fall under other solutions;
for the terms ‘both’ and ‘all’ have several meanings,
so that to affirm or deny the same thing is verbal only,
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ἀποφήσαι· τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἦν ἔλεγχος· ἀλλὰ φανερὸν ὅτι μὴ μιᾶς ἐρωτήσεως τῶν πλειονῶν γινομένης,1 ἀλλ’ ἐν καθ’ ἐνὸς φάντος ἡ ἀποφάντος, οὐκ ἐσταὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον.

25 XXXI. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπαγόντων εἰς τὸ2 ταύτῳ πολλάκις εἶπείν, φανερὸν ὡς οὐ δοτέον τῶν πρὸς τι λεγομένων σημαίνειν τι χωρίζομένας καθ’ αὐτὰς τὰς κατηγορίας, οἷον διπλάσιον ἀνευ τοῦ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος, ὅτι ἐμφαίνεται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ δέκα ἐν τοῖς ἐνὸς δέουσι δέκα καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ποιῆσαι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει ἡ φασὶς· ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὐκ εἰ τις λέγοι τοδ’ μὴ εἶναι λευκόν, λέγει αὐτὸ λευκὸν εἶναι. τὸ δὲ διπλάσιον οὐδὲ σημαίνει οὐδὲν ὦσις, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει· εἰ δ’ ἄρα καὶ σημαίνει, ἀλλ’ οὐ ταύτῳ καὶ συνηρημένον. οὐδ’ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῷ εἰδεί, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη, ὅπερ τὸ κοινὸν· ἐκεῖνο δ’ ἦν ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς δι’ ὃν δηλοῦται κατηγορομένους τοῦτο λεκτέον, ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ χωρίς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ δηλούμενον. τὸ γὰρ κοίλον κοινῇ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ δηλοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ροικοῦ, προστιθέμενον δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀλλὰ, τὸ μὲν τῇ ρώμῃ τὸ δὲ τῷ σκέλει, σημαίνειν3· ἐνθα μὲν γὰρ τὸ σῦμον, ἐνθα δὲ

1 Reading γινομένης for γινομένων.
2 Inserting τὸ before ταύτῳ.
3 Reading σημαίνειν (σημαίνει ABD).
and this, as we saw, is not a refutation. But clearly, if one of the several questions is not asked but the answerer affirms or denies a single predicate of a single subject, the reduction to an impossibility will not occur.

XXXI. As regards those who lead one on to repeat the same thing several times over, it is clear that one must not allow that predications of relative terms have any signification in themselves when separated from their correlatives; for example, that 'double' apart from the expression 'double of half' is significant, just because it appears in that expression. For 'ten' appears in the expression 'ten minus one' and 'do' in the expression 'not do,' and affirmations in general in negations; but, all the same, if one were to say 'this is not white,' one is not saying that it is white. 'Double' has possibly no signification at all, just as 'the' in 'the half' too signifies nothing. If it* has any signification, it is not the same as in the combined expression. Nor is 'knowledge' of a specific kind, such as 'medical knowledge,' the same as 'knowledge' as a general term; for the latter has always meant 'knowledge of the knowable.' When dealing with terms which are predicated of the terms by means of which they are defined, you must say that the term defined is not the same when taken separately as it is in the combined expression. For 'concave' has the same general meaning when used of the snub-nosed and of the bandy-legged, but when it is combined in the one case with the nose and in the other with the leg, there is no reason why it should not signify different things, for in the first case it signifies 'snub,' in the other 'bandy,' and it makes
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XXXII. Peri de tōn soloiκισμῶν, par' o ti mēn fainontai symβainein, eîpomev proṭerōn, ὡς de lυτέon, ἐπ' autōn tōn lόgyωn ēstai fānerōn.

10 ἀπαντεῖς γάρ οἱ τοιοῦτο τοῦτο βούλονται κατασκευάζειν. ἄρ' ὁ λέγεις ἀληθῶς, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἀληθῶς; φήσει δ' εἴναι τι λίθον· ἐστὶν ἀρα τι λίθον. ἦ τό λέγειν λίθον οὐκ ἔστι λέγειν ὁ ἄλλ' οὖν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοῦτον· εἰ οὖν ἐροιτό τις, ἄρ' οὖν ἀληθῶς λέγεις, ἐστὶ τοῦτον, οὐκ ἂν δοκοῖ ἐλληνίζειν, 15 ὥσπερ οὖν εἶ ἐροιτό, ἄρ' ἢν λέγεις εἶναι, ἐστὶν οὖτος; ξύλον δ' εἰπεῖν οὖτος, ἤ οὐ ποτ' θῆλυ μήτ' ἄρρεν σημαίνει, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. διὸ καὶ οὗ γίνεται σολοικισμός, εἰ ὁ λέγεις εἶναι, ἐστὶ τοῦτο; ξύλον δὲ λέγεις εἶναι· ἐστὶν ἀρα ξύλον. ὁ δὲ λίθος καὶ τό οὖτος ἄρρενος ἔχει κλῆσιν. εἰ δ' τις ἐροιτό, ἄρ' οὖτός ἐστιν αὐτη; εῖτα πάλιν, τί δ'; οὐχ 20 οὖτός ἐστι Κορίσκος; εἶτ' εἰπεῖν, ἐστιν ἀρα οὖτος αὐτη, οὐ συλλελόγισται τόν σολοικισμόν, οὖδ' εἰ

1 Reading eîpeîn οὖτως for eîpeîn οὖτος.
2 Reading δὲ for δὴ.

* 165 b 20 f.
* The argument is clear in the original, because Greek is an inflected language, whereas English does not distinguish
no difference whether you say 'a snub nose' or 'a concave nose.' Further, the expression must not be allowed to pass without qualification; for it is a falsehood. For snubness is not a concave nose but something, namely a condition, appertaining to a nose; so there is nothing absurd in supposing that a snub nose is one which possesses nasal concavity.

XXXII. As regards solecisms, we have already stated the apparent cause of their occurrence; how they should be solved will be clear in the actual arguments. All the following arguments aim at producing this result: 'Is a thing truly that which you truly affirm it to be?' You affirm something to be a stone (accusative masculine); therefore something (nominative neuter) is a stone (accusative masculine). Or does speaking of a stone (a masculine word) involve the use of the relative 'whom' rather than 'which' and the pronoun 'him' rather than 'it'? If, then, one were to ask, 'Is a stone *him whom* you truly state him to be?', he would not be considered to be talking good Greek any more than if he were to ask, 'Is *he* whom you state *her* to be?' But the use of the word 'stick,' or any other neuter word, in this way, involves no difference between the nominative and accusative; therefore no solecism is committed if you say, 'Is this what you affirm it to be?' You affirm it to be a stick; therefore it is a stick. 'Stone,' however, and 'he' have the masculine gender. Now if one were to ask, 'Can "he" be a "she"?', and then again, 'Why? Is he not Coriscus?' and then were to say, 'Then he is a she,' he has not proved the solecism even if Coriscus between the nominative and accusative except in the personal pronouns and the relative.
τὸ Κορίσκος σημαίνει ὅπερ αὐτή, μὴ δίδωσι δὲ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος, ἀλλὰ δεὶ τοῦτο προσερωτηθῆναι. εἰ δὲ μὴτ' ἔστων μὴτε δίδωσι, οὐ συλλελόγισται οὔτε τῷ ὄντι οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ἠρωτημένον. ὁμοίως 25 οὖν δεὶ κάκει τὸν λίθον σημαίνειν οὖτος. εἰ δὲ μὴτε ἔστι μὴτε δίδοται, οὐ λεκτέον τὸ συμπέρασμα·

φαίνεται δὲ παρὰ τὸ τὴν ἀνόμοιον πτῶσιν τοῦ ἀνόματος ὁμοίαν φαίνεσθαι. ἃρ' ἀληθὲς ἐστιν εἰ- 

πεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτή, ὅπερ εἶναι φής αὐτήν; εἶναι δὲ φής ἀσπίδα· ἔστιν ἀρα αὐτή ἀσπίδα. ἦ οὐκ 30 ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὴ τὸ αὐτὴ ἀσπίδα σημαίνει ἀλλ' ἀσπίς,

tὸ δ' ἀσπίδα ταύτην; οὐδ' εἰ δ' φής εἶναι τοῦτον,

ἔστιν οὖτος, φής δ' εἶναι Κλέωνα, ἔστιν ἀρα οὖτος 

Κλέωνα· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὖτος Κλέωνα· εἰρηται γὰρ

ὅτι δ' φήμι εἶναι τοῦτον, ἔστιν οὖτος, οὐ τοῦτον·

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν ἐλληνίζοι οὖτως τὸ ἔρωτιμα λεχθὲν. 35 ἃρ' ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο; τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ λίθος· ἐπί- 

στασαι ἀρα λίθος. ἦ οὐ ταυτὸ σημαίνει τὸ τοῦτο

ἐν τῷ ἃρ' ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῷ τοῦτο δὲ 

λίθος, ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν τῷ πρῶτῳ τοῦτον, ἐν δὲ τῷ 

ὑστέρῳ οὖτος; ἃρ' οὐ ἐπιστήμην ἔχεις, ἐπίστασαι 

τοῦτο; ἐπιστήμην δ' ἔχεις λίθου· ἐπίστασαι ἀρα 182 b 

λίθου. ἦ τὸ μὲν τοῦτο λίθου λέγεις, τὸ δὲ τοῦτον

But Cleon.
signifies a 'she,' though the answerer refuses to concede this; but this must be the subject of a further question. But if neither this is so nor does he concede it, then the solecism has not been proved either in fact or relatively to the person to whom the question was put. Similarly, therefore, in the first example also, 'he' must signify the stone. If, however, this is neither true nor is conceded, the conclusion must not be stated, though it is apparently true, because the case which is used of the word, which is unlike, appears to be like.—'Is it true to say that this object is what you affirm it to be?' You affirm it to be a shield (accusative), therefore it is a shield (accusative). Or is this not necessarily so, if 'this object' (nominative) signifies not shield (accusative) but shield (nominative), while 'this object' (accusative) signifies shield (accusative).—Nor again if he is what you affirm him to be, and you affirm him to be Cleona (accusative of Cleon), is he therefore Cleona? for he is not Cleona; for the statement was that he not him is what I affirm him to be. For the question if asked in this form would not be Greek either.—'Do you know this?' But this is a stone (nominative); therefore you know a stone (nominative). Has not 'this' a different force in the question 'Do you know this?' and in 'This is a stone,' in the first case standing for an accusative and in the second for a nominative?—When you exercise recognition of an object, do you not recognize it? You exercise recognition of a stone; therefore you recognize 'of a stone.' Do you not in the one case put the object in the genitive and say 'of the stone,' and in the other case in the accusative and

\[ b \text{ i.e. with the subject in the accusative.} \]
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λίθον· ἐδόθη δ’, οὖ ἐπιστήμην ἔχεις, ἐπίστασθαι, οὐ τούτον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ὥστ’ οὐ λίθον ἀλλὰ τὸν λίθον. "Οτι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων οὐ συλλογίζονται συνολικισμὸν ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, καὶ διὰ τί τε 5 φαίνονται καὶ πῶς ἀπαντητέον πρὸς αὐτοὺς, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

XXXIII. Καὶ δὲ καὶ κατανοεῖν ὅτι πάντων τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσὶ βάσις κατιδεῖν οἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεροι, παρὰ τί καὶ ἐν τίνι παραλογίζονται τὸν ἀκούοντα, πολλάκις οἱ αὐτοὶ ἑκεῖνοι ὄντες. τὸν αὐτό 10 τὸν γὰρ λόγον δεὶ καλεῖν τὸν παρὰ ταύτῳ γινόμενον· οἱ αὐτοῖς δὲ λόγος τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός τοῖς δὲ παρ’ ἑτερον δόξειν, ἀν εἶπαι διὰ τὸ μεταφερόμενον ἔκαστον μη ὁμοίως εἶναι δῆλον. ἢσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν ὁμοιωμαίαν, ἢσπερ δοκεῖ τρόπος εὐθέστατος εἶναι 15 τῶν παραλογισμῶν, τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν ἐστὶ δῆλα (καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι σχεδὸν οἱ γελοιοὶ πάντες εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν), οἶον ἀνὴρ ἐφέρετο κατὰ κλίμακον δίφρον, καὶ ὅπου στέλλεσθε; πρὸς τὴν κεραιαν. καὶ ποτέρα τῶν βοῶν ἐμπροσθεν τέξεται; οὐδετέρα, ἀλλ’ ὀπίσθεν ἀμφω. καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ βορέας; οὐ 20 δητα· ἀπεκτόνηκε γὰρ τὸν πτωχὸν καὶ τὸν ὠνοῦμεν. ἄρ’ Ἐὔαρχος; οὐ δήτα, ἀλλ’ Ἀπολλωνίδης.

a The two meanings of the phrase are uncertain; the Oxford translation suggests (1) ‘a man got the body of the car taken off its chassis,’ and (2) ‘he came a “sitter” (δίφρος) down from the ladder.’

b The reply takes the word in the sense of ‘To what do you fasten the sail when you furl it?’

c The answer understands the question to mean ‘which cow will calve forwards?’
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxii—xxxiii

say 'a stone'? But it was granted that, when you exercise recognition of a thing, you recognize 'it' not 'of it,' so that you recognize not 'of a stone' but 'a stone.'

That arguments of this kind, then, do not prove solecism but only appear to do so, and why they appear to do so and how you must face them, is clear from what has been said.

XXXIII. It must be noted about arguments in general that in some it is easier and in some more difficult to see why and where they mislead the listener, though often the latter are identical with the former. For an argument must be called identical when it depends on the same principle, but the same argument might be held by some people to depend on diction, by others on accident and by others on something else, because each, when applied in different contexts, is not equally clear. So, just as fallacies due to equivocation, which are generally regarded as the stupidest form of fallacy, some are obvious even to ordinary minds (for almost all the most laughable remarks depend upon diction). For example, 'A man was carried over the standing board of the framework of the chariot'⁴; and 'Whither are you bound?' 'To the yard-arm'⁵; 'Which of the two cows will calve in front?' 'Neither, but both behind.' ᵆ 'Is the north wind clear?' 'No, certainly not; for he has killed the beggar and the purchaser.' ᵇ 'Is he Evarchus?' 'Certainly not; he is Apollonides.'

⁴ The answerer takes Boreas as a proper name.
⁵ kal tov wvovpevov is almost certainly corrupt; Poste suggests kai Tis o wvovmevos;
⁶ The literal meaning of these names might be rendered 'good-manager' and 'squanderson.'
ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΕῈ

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τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν ἀλλών σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι, τὰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐμπειροτάτους φαίνεται λανθάνειν· σημεῖον δὲ τούτων ὅτι μάχονται πολλάκις περὶ τῶν ὅνομάτων, οἶον πότερον ταύτον σημαίνει κατὰ πάντων τὸ ὑπὲρ ἢ ἐτερον. τοῖσ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ταύτον σημαίνειν τὸ ὑπὲρ καὶ τὸ ἐτερον 25 οἴ δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λύουσι διὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς φάναι τὸ ἐν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἔκαστον οἱ μὲν ἐσονταί βάους ἀδείν οἱ 30 δὲ χαλεπώτεροι τῶν λόγων· καὶ λαβεῖν εὖ τίνι γένει, καὶ πότερον ἔλεγχος ἢ οὐκ ἔλεγχος, οὐ διὰδιον ὁμοίως περὶ πάντων.

"Εστὶ δὲ δριμὺν λόγον ὅστις ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ μάλιστα· δάκνει γὰρ οὗτος μάλιστα. ἀπορία δ' ἐστὶ δυστή, ἢ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλεγομενοῖς, ὃ τι ἀνέλῃ 35 τις τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἢ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, πῶς εἶπη τις τὸ προταθέν. διόπερ ἐν τοῖς συλλογιστικοῖς οἱ δριμύτεροι λόγοι ζητεῖν μᾶλλον ποιοῦσιν. ἔστι δὲ συλλογιστικὸς μὲν λόγος δριμύτατος, ἄν εἴξ ὅτι μάλιστα δοκοῦντων ὅτι μάλιστα ἐνδοξον ἀναρή. εἴς γὰρ ὡν ὁ λόγος μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἀπαντάς ὁμοίως ἐξει τοὺς συλλογισμούς· αἰε γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδοξων ὁμοίως ἐνδοξον ἀναρήσει ἢ κατασκευάσει, διόπερ ἀπορεῖν ἀναγκαίον. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος δριμύς, ὁ ἐξ ἵσου τὸ συμπέρασμα ποιῶν 183 a τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι, δεύτερος δ' ὁ ἐξ ἀπάντων ὁμοίων.

Reading with Poste τῶν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός καὶ παρὰ for τῶν περὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος καὶ περὶ.
And so on with almost all the rest of the ambiguities, but some even the most expert seem to fail to discern. A proof of this is that people often dispute about the terms used, for example, whether 'Being' and 'Unity' always mean the same thing or something different; for some people hold that 'Being' and 'Unity' are identical in meaning, while others solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by saying that 'Unity' and 'Being' are used in several senses. Similarly, too, of the arguments which are dependent on accident and each of the other classes, some will be easier to detect and others more difficult, and it is not always equally easy to grasp into which class they fall and whether refutation takes place or not.

A shrewd argument is one which causes most embarrassment; for it bites deepest. Embarrassment is of two kinds. In a reasoned discussion one is in doubt which of the questions one should subvert, whereas in contentious arguments it is about the way in which one is to express the proposition. Hence it is in reasoned discussions that shrewder arguments are more stimulative of inquiry. Now a reasoned argument is shrewdest when from the most generally accepted premisses possible it subverts the most generally accepted thesis possible. For the single argument, if the contradictory is changed about, will result in all the syllogisms being alike; for from generally accepted premisses it will subvert or establish an equally generally accepted conclusion; therefore embarrassment must necessarily arise. Such, then, is the shrewdest argument which puts the conclusion on an equality with the premisses. The next shrewdest is that which argues from premisses which are all on an equality; for this will cause an equal
οὗτος γὰρ ὁμοίως ποιήσει ἀπορεῖν ὅποιον τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἀναφέτεον. τούτῳ δὲ χαλεπόν· ἀναφέτεον μὲν γὰρ, οicap δ’ ἀναφέτεον, ἁδηλον. τῶν δ’ ἑριστικῶν δρμύτατος μὲν ὁ πρῶτον εὐθὺς ἁδηλος πότερον συλλελογισται ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον παρὰ ἱεῦδος ἢ διαίρεσιν ἐστὶν ἢ λύσις, δεύτερος δὲ τῶν 10 ἀλλων ὁ δήλος μὲν οτι παρὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀναίρεσιν ἐστι, μὴ φανερὸς δ’ ἢν διά τίνος τῶν ἡρωτημένων ἀναίρεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν λυτέος ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἢ1 πότερον αὐτὴ παρὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ παρὰ τι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἐστῖν.

Ἔνιοτε μὲν οὖν ὁ μὴ συλλογισθεὶς λόγος εὐθῆς 15 ἐστιν, εὰν ἢ λιαν ἀδοξα ἢ ψευδὴ τὰ λήμματα· ἐνίοτε δ’ οὐκ ἄξιος καταφρονεῖσθαι. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἐλλεῖπη τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτημάτων, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος καὶ δι’ ὁ, καὶ μὴ προσλαβὼν τοῦτο καὶ μὴ συλλογισάμενος εὐθῆς ὁ συλλογισμός, ὅταν 20 δὲ τῶν ἐξωθεν, οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐπιεικής, ὁ δ’ ἐρωτῶν ἡρώτηκεν οὐ καλῶς.

"Ἐστὶ τε, ὅσπερ λύειν ὅτε μὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὅτε δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὴν ἐρώτησιν ὅτε δὲ πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ἐστι καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν θέσιν καὶ πρὸς τὸν 25 ἀποκρινόμενον καὶ πρὸς τὸν χρόνον, ὅταν ἢ πλείονος χρόνου δεομένη ἢ λύσις ἢ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ."

XXXIV. Ἕκ πόσων μὲν οὖν καὶ ποίων γίνονται τοῖς διαλεγομένοις οἱ παραλογισμοὶ, καὶ πῶς δεῖ-ξομέν τε ψευδόμενου καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ποιή-

1 Reading ἢ with Wallies.
2 Omitting with Waitz τὸ διαλεχθῆναι πρὸς τὴν λύσιν as a gloss.
ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, xxxiii–xxxiv

embarrassment as to which kind of question ought to be subverted. The difficulty lies in this, that something must be subverted but it is not clear what. The shrewdest of contentious arguments is that which, in the first place, immediately makes it uncertain whether the reasoning is conclusive or not, and also whether the solution is due to a false premiss or a distinction. Of the rest, that comes next which clearly depends on a distinction or a subversion, but it is not clear which of the premisses it is on the subversion or distinction of which the solution depends, but only whether this process depends upon the conclusion or one of the premisses.

Now sometimes an inadequately reasoned argument is stupid if the premisses assumed are too paradoxical or false; but sometimes it is not deserving of contempt. For when some question is wanting such as concerns the argument or the means of carrying it on, the reasoning which has failed to supply this and is not properly argued is stupid; but when something which is merely extraneous has been omitted, the reasoning is by no means to be lightly condemned but is respectable, though the questioner has not asked his questions well.

As it is possible to address the solution sometimes to the argument, sometimes to the questioner and his mode of questioning and sometimes to neither of these, so likewise also it is possible to address one’s questions and reasonings both to the thesis and to the answerer and to the time, when the solution needs more time than the present occasion supplies.

XXXIV. The number, then, and the nature of the sources from which fallacies arise in discussion, and how we are to show up a pretender and make him  

EPILOGUE.  
(1) Summary of results.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΕΣ

30 σομεν, ἐτὶ δ’ ἐκ τίνων συμβαίνει ὁ σολοκυκσμός,1 καὶ πῶς ἐρωτητέον καὶ τίς ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἐτὶ πρὸς τί χρήσιμοι πάντες εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι, καὶ περὶ ἀποκρίσεως ἀπλῶς τε πάσης καὶ πῶς λυτέον τοὺς λόγους καὶ τοὺς σολοκυκσμούς,2 εἰρήσθω περὶ ἀπάντων ἡμῖν ταῦτα. Λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ 35 τῆς ἐξ άρχῆς προθέσεως αναμνήσασιν εὑπείν τι βραχῦ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ τέλος ἐπιθείναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

Προειλόμεθα μὲν οὖν εὑρεῖν δύναμιν τινα συλλογιστικὴν περὶ τοῦ προβληθέντος ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὡς ἐνδοξοτάτων· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καθ’ αὐτὴν καὶ τῆς πειραστικῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ προσκατασκευάζεται πρὸς αὐτὴν διὰ τὴν τῆς σοφιστικῆς γειτνίασιν, ὡς οὐ μόνον πείραν δύναται λαβεῖν διαλεκτικῶς ἄλλα καὶ ὡς εἰδῶς, διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μόνον τὸ λεχθὲν ἔργον ὑπεθέμεθα τῆς πραγματείας, τοῦ λόγου δύνασθαι λαβεῖν, ἄλλα καὶ ὅπως λόγον ὑπέχουντες φυλάξομεν τὴν θέσιν ὡς δ’ ἐνδοξοτάτων ὁμοτρόπως. τὴν δ’ αὐτίαν εἰρήκαμεν τούτου, ἐπεὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἦρωτα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο· ὁμολογεὶ γὰρ οὐκ εἰδέναι. δεδῆλωται δ’ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καὶ πρὸς πόσα καὶ ἐκ πόσων 10 τοῦτο ἔσται, καὶ οἶδεν εὐπορήσαμεν τούτων, ἐτι δὲ πῶς ἐρωτητέον ἡ τακτέον τὴν ἔρωτησιν πάσαιν, καὶ

1 Reading with Pacius σολοκυκσμός for συλλογισμός.
utter paradoxes, and, further, in what circumstances a solecism occurs, and how to ask questions, and what is the right arrangement of questions, and, moreover, what is the use of all such arguments, and also about all answering of questions in general and in particular how to solve arguments and solecisms, on all these subjects let the treatment we have given suffice. There remains to call to mind our original purpose and say a few words about it and then bring our treatise to an end.

Our purpose, then, was to discover a faculty which could reason on the problem set before us from the most generally accepted premisses that exist; for this is the function of dialectic in itself and of the art of examination. But, since there is further added to it, on account of its close affinity with the art of sophistry, that it can undertake an examination not only dialectically but also with a pretence of knowledge, we therefore proposed as the purpose of our treatise not only the above-mentioned task of being able to conduct an argument but also the discovery how, when supporting an argument, we are to defend our thesis by means of the most generally accepted premisses in a consistent manner. Of this we have given the reason; for this was why Socrates used to ask questions but never answered them, because he confessed ignorance. An indication has been given, in what has been said above, of the number of cases in which this will apply and of the various kinds of material which can be used for this and the various sources from which we may obtain an abundance of them; moreover also how questions must be asked and about the arrangement of questions in

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2 Reading with Pacius σολοκισμοὺς for συλλογισμοὺς.
15 ὁσπερ εὐρήκαμεν ἦδη πρότερον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τέλος ἰκανῶς ἀ προελόμεθα, φανερὸν· δεῖ δ’ ἦμᾶς μὴ λειτθέναι τὸ συμβεβηκός περί ταύτην τὴν πραγματείαν. τῶν γὰρ εὐρισκομένων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ’ ἑτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδεδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὑστερον· τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὐρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἰσι, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ τῆς ὑστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξῆσεως. μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχῇ παντός, ὁσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τὸσοῦτῳ μικρότατον ὅν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατον ἐστιν ὁφθηναι. ταύτης δ’ εὐρημένης βάον τὸ προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐστίν· ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ῥήτορικοὺς λόγους συμβεβηκε, σχεδον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πάσας τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὐρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν τι προήγαγον·

30 οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρά πολλῶν οἶνον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως τιθήκασι, Τισίας μὲν μετὰ τοὺς πρῶτους, Ὀρασύ-μαχος δὲ μετὰ Τισίαν, Θεόδωρος δὲ μετὰ τούτον, καὶ πολλοὶ πολλὰ συνεννόχασι μέρη· διόπερ οὐδέν θαυμαστὸν ἔχειν τι πλῆθος τὴν τέχνην. ταύτης δὲ
general, and about answers and solutions applicable to the reasonings employed. All the other points have also been set forth which belong to the same system of argument. In addition to these we have also explained about fallacies, as we have already remarked above. That what we purposed has been satisfactorily carried through to the end is plain; but we must not fail to observe what has happened regarding this inquiry. In all discoveries, either the results of other people's work have been taken over and after having been first elaborated have been subsequently advanced step by step by those who took them over, or else they are original inventions which usually make progress which at first is small but of much greater utility than the later development which results from them. It is perhaps a true proverb which says that the beginning of anything is the most important; hence it is also the most difficult. For, as it is very powerful in its effects, so it is very small in size and therefore very difficult to see. When, however, the first beginning has been discovered, it is easier to add to it and develop the rest. This has happened, too, with rhetorical composition, and also with practically all the other arts. Those who discovered the beginnings of rhetoric carried them forward quite a little way, whereas the famous modern professors of the art, entering into the heritage, so to speak, of a long series of predecessors who had gradually advanced it, have brought it to its present perfection—Tisias following the first inventors, Thrasymachus following Tisias, Theodorus following Thrasymachus, while numerous others have made numerous contributions; hence it is no wonder that the art possesses a certain amplitude. Of our (3) Origin-
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35 τής πραγματείας οὐ τὸ μὲν ἢν τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἢν προεξειργασμένον, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπήρχεν. καὶ γὰρ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους μισθαρνοῦντων ὤμοια τις ἢν ἢ παίδευσις τῇ Γοργίου πραγματείᾳ. λόγους γὰρ οἱ μὲν ῥητορικοὺς οἱ δὲ ἐρωτητικοὶ εὐδίδοσαν ἐκμανθάνειν, εἰς οὓς πλειστάκις ἐμπίπτειν

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ὑήθησαν ἐκάτεροι τοὺς ἰλλήλων λόγους. διόπερ ταχεία μὲν ἀτεχνὸς δ’ ἢν ἢ διδασκαλία τοῖς μανθάνουσι παρ’ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παίδευειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὡσπερ ὅ τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδώσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν ποιεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἶτα σκυτοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκουν, μηδ’ οἶδαν δυνῆσθαι πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοιχ ὅτι πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημότων· οὕτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε μὲν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, τέχνην δ’ οὐ παρέδωκεν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ῥητορικῶν ὑπήρχε πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ τὰ λεγόμενα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ συλλογιζεσθαι παντελῶς οὐδὲν εἶχομεν πρότερον ἄλλο λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἢ τριβή ἦτοι πολλῶν χρόνων ἑπονοῦμεν. εἰ δέ φαίνεται θεαισαμενος ὑμῖν ὡς ἐκ τοιοῦτων ἔξ ἄρχης ὑπαρχόντων ἔχειν ἢ

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μέθοδος ἰκανῶς παρὰ τὰς ἀλλὰς πραγματείας τὰς ἐκ παραδόσεως νῦξημένας, λοιπὸν ἄν εἰ μὲν πάντων ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν ἕκοισμένων ἐργον τοῖς μὲν παραλειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ’ εὐρημένοις πολλήν ἔχειν χάριν.
present inquiry, however, it is not true to say that it had already been partly elaborated and partly not; nay, it did not exist at all. For the training given by the paid teachers of contentious argument resembled the system of Gorgias. For some of them gave their pupils to learn by heart speeches which were either rhetorical or consisted of questions and answers, in which both sides thought that the rival arguments were for the most part included. Hence the teaching which they gave to their pupils was rapid but unsystematic; for they conceived that they could train their pupils by imparting to them not an art but the results of an art, just as if one should claim to be about to communicate knowledge for the prevention of pain in the feet and then were not to teach the cobbler’s art and the means of providing suitable foot-gear, but were to offer a selection of various kinds of shoes; for he has helped to supply his need but has not imparted an art to him. Also, on the subject of rhetoric there already existed much material enunciated in the past, whereas regarding reasoning we had absolutely no earlier work to quote but were for a long time labouring at tentative researches. If, therefore, on consideration, it appears to you that, in view of such original conditions, our system is adequate when compared with the other methods which have been built up in the course of tradition, then the only thing which would remain for all of you, or those who follow our instruction, is that you should pardon the lack of completeness of our system and be heartily grateful for our discoveries.
DE GENERATIONE ET CORRUPTIONE
INTRODUCTION

That the *De Generatione et Corruptione* is a genuine work of Aristotle has never been disputed. It belongs to the group of physical treatises which also includes the *Physics*, the *De Caelo* and the *Meteorologica*. Its composition has been generally ascribed to the period covered by Aristotle's residence in the Troad, in Mitylene and in Macedonia, that is, *circa* 347 to 335 B.C.

Professor H. H. Joachim, to whose work I am deeply indebted, tells us that during the preparation of his version for the Oxford Translation of Aristotle he realized that something more was called for. "It soon became evident," he writes, "that a mere translation would be of little or no value, since the intrinsic philosophical interest of the original depends, to a large extent, upon what it implies and presupposes. In short, Aristotle's fascinating and masterly little treatise calls for a commentary in almost every sentence. It is full of allusions to the speculations of his predecessors and contemporaries, and inextricably interwoven with the theories elaborated in his other works, particularly in the *Physics*, *De Caelo* and *Meteorologica*, of which no modern English editions exist." Anyone who attempts to translate the *De Generatione et Corruptione* must feel that a translation by itself is unsatisfactory, but the present translator
ARISTOTLE

has found it impossible, within the scope of a Loeb version, to do more than provide brief explanatory notes on some of the major obscurities and to give the references where Aristotle is obviously referring to passages in his other treatises, and to recommend those who require something more to consult Professor Joachim’s masterly commentary (*Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away*, Oxford, 1922).

Amongst the other works which have been consulted most use has been made of the Latin Version of Franciscus Vatablus in vol. iii of the Berlin Aristotle and of *Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away: Some Comments* by Dr. W. T. Verdenius and Dr. T. H. Waszink (Leiden, 1946), which was kindly sent to me by a friend, Dr. H. J. Drossaart Lulof. The summary of the treatise given by Sir W. D. Ross in his *Aristotle* (pp. 99-108) has also been very useful.

The text which has been used is that of I. Bekker in the Berlin Aristotle, any divergences from which, except for obvious misprints, have been noted.

The *De Generatione et Corruptione* discusses the πάθη to which the natural bodies in the sublunary sphere are liable, namely, "coming-to-be" (γένεσις) and "passing-away" (φθορά). In Book I these processes are explained and distinguished from alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) and from "growth and diminution" (αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις); incidentally the views of Anaxagoras and Empedocles are examined and shown to be inconsistent. In the second half of the book it is shown that what comes-to-be is formed by combination (μίξις) of certain natural constituents, a process which implies "action and passion" (ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν), which in their turn imply contact (αφίση). Book II proves that the material constituents of
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY

all that comes-to-be are the elements or "simple bodies," Earth, Air, Fire, and Water, and shows the manner in which they are transformed into one another and how they combine. Aristotle then briefly discusses the material, formal and final causes of "coming-to-be" and "passing-away," in particular criticizing the theory of Socrates in the *Phaedo*. He further states that the efficient cause of the double process is the sun's annual movement, and, in conclusion, shows that what "comes-to-be" is necessary, since absolute necessity is characteristic of a sequence of events which is cyclical, that is to say, continuous and returning upon itself.

**Manuscripts**

\[ J = \text{Vindobonensis, phil. Graec. 100 (10th century)} \]
\[ E = \text{Parisiensis Regius 1853 (10th century)} \]
\[ F = \text{Laurentianus 87. 7 (12th century)} \]
\[ H = \text{Vaticanus 1027 (12th century)} \]
\[ L = \text{Vaticanus 253 (14th or 15th century)} \]

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ 
ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΘΟΡΑΣ

Α

314 α 1 1. Περὶ δὲ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν φύσει γινο-
μένων καὶ φθειρομένων, ὁμοίως κατὰ πάντων, τὰς
τε αἰτίας διαρετέον καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῶν, ἔτι
δὲ περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ ἄλλοιώσεως, τὶ ἐκάτερον,
5 καὶ πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ὑποληπτέον φύσιν εἶναι
ἄλλοιώσεως καὶ γενέσεως, ἡ χωρίς, ὥσπερ δι-
ώρισται καὶ τοῖς όνόμασιν.

Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀρχαίων οἱ μὲν τὴν καλομένην
ἀπλῆ γένεσιν ἄλλοιώσων εἶναι φασίν, οἱ δὲ ἔτερον
ἄλλοιώσων καὶ γένεσιν. ὃσοι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τὸ πᾶν
λέγουσιν εἶναι καὶ πάντα ἕξ ἐνὸς γεννώσιν, τούτοις
μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν γένεσιν ἄλλοιώσων φάναι καὶ τὸ
κυρίως γινόμενον ἄλλοιούσθαι· ὃσοι δὲ πλεῖον τὴν
ὑλὴν ἐνὸς τιθέασιν, οἶον Ἕμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξα-
γόρας καὶ Λεύκιππος, τούτοις δὲ ἔτερον. καὶ τοῖς
Ἀναξαγόρας γε τὴν οἰκείαν φωνήν ἡγνώσεν· λέγει
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1. In discussing coming-to-be and passing-away of things which by nature come-to-be and pass-away, as exhibited uniformly wherever they occur, we must distinguish their causes and definitions; further, we must deal with "growth" and "alteration," and inquire what each of these terms means, and whether we are to suppose that the nature of "alteration" and coming-to-be is the same, or whether each is of a separate nature corresponding to the names by which they are distinguished.

Of the ancient philosophers some assert that what is called "simple" coming-to-be is "alteration," while others hold that "alteration" and coming-to-be are different processes. Those who hold that the universe is a simple entity and who generate all things from a single thing, must necessarily maintain that coming-to-be is "alteration," and that what comes-to-be in the proper sense of the term undergoes "alteration." Those, on the other hand, who hold that the matter of things is more than one, must regard the two processes as different—Empedocles, for example, and Anaxagoras and Leucippus. Anaxagoras, however, misunderstood his own statement;
15 kathestike to alloïousothei. *Empedoklesis men
gar ta mev symbatika tetrapara, ta de pantta metata
tow kynoùntow ex twn arithmon, *Anaxagoras de
apeira kai Leukippos kai Dhmokritos. * Em
20 sarika kai mnelon, kai twn allon ovn ekastos
sunvonu mon to meros eistin. Dhmokritos de kai
Leukippos ek symbatow adiairetwn talla syl
keisthai fasi, tauta de apeira kai to plithos einai
kai tais morfais, auta de proa auta diapherein tout-
tois ex ouv eisai kai thesei kai tagei touton. Euan-
tos de faivontai ledontes ei peri *Anaxagorovan
tois peri *Empedokleia. * Em
25 tois peri *Em
dedokleia. * Em

Tois men ouv ex enos pantta kata skevenasoun
anagkaïon legein tin genesin kai tin phorán al-
loisoun. * ai gar men ein to upokeimenon tauto kai
en (to de toutoutou alloiousothai famen); tois de ta
5 geni pleiws pouos diapherein tin alloisoun ths

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314 a


gouv ou to ginestei kai apollusethai tautov

15 kathestike to alloïousothei. *Empedoklèsis men
gar tā mēn symbatikē tēptara, tā de pānta metā
tōn kynoùntōn ex tōn arithmōn, *Anaxagōras de
āpeira kai Leukippos kai Dhmokritos. * Em
20 sārka kai mnelōn, kai tōn allōn ōn ēkāstōn
sunwānyumōn tō méros ēstīn. Dhmokritos de kai
Leukippos ek symbatōn ēdaiarētōn tāllα syl-
keisthai fasi, tānta de ēpeira kai tō plēthos ēinai
kai tās morfās, autā de prosw autā diapherēn tou-
tois ēx ōn ēsai kai thesei kai tāxei tōutōn. Ēvan-
tos de faĩvontai leģontes oĩ peri *Anaxagōran
toıs peri *Empeðoklēía. * Em
25 tīwos de faĩvontai leģontes oĩ peri *Anaxagōran
toıs peri *Empeðoklēía. * Em

Tois men ouv ēx ēnōs pānta kata skevenázousin
anagkaiōn legein tēn ēnēsēn kai tēn phorān āl-
loisoun. * aī ēgar menēn tō upokeimenon tauto kai
ēn (tō de toutōtou alloiōsotai fāmen); tois δe tā
5 ēnē pλeiō poioūsai diapherēn tēn alloiōson tēs

314 b pανσπερμίαν ēgar ēinai tōutōn.

Tois men ouv ēx ēnōs pānta kata skevenázousin
anagkaiōn legein tēn ēnēsēn kai tēn phorān āl-
loisoun. * aī ēgar menēn tō upokeimenon tauto kai
ēn (tō de toutōtou alloiōsotai fāmen); tois δe tā
5 ēnē pλeiō poioūsai diapherēn tēn alloiōson tēs

a Diels, fr. 17.

b i.e. compounds (though, it may be, in different propor-
tions) of the same four simple bodies—Earth, Air, Fire and
Water—such as wood, the metals, and blood, flesh and
marrow in animals. Such compounds, when divided, still
retain the same constituents.

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for example, he says that coming-to-be and destruction constitute the same process as "being altered," though, like others, he says that the elements are many. Thus Empedocles holds that the corporeal elements are four, but that all the elements, including those which create motion, are six in number, while Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus hold that their number is infinite. For Anaxagoras puts down as elements things which have like parts, for example bone, flesh and marrow, and anything else of which the part bears the same name as the whole; whereas Democritus and Leucippus say that all other things are composed of indivisible bodies, and that these are infinite both in number and in the forms which they take, while the compounds differ from one another in their constituents and the position and arrangement of these. Anaxagoras and his school obviously take a view directly opposite to that of Empedocles and his school; for Empedocles says that Fire, Water, Air and Earth are four elements and are "simple" rather than flesh and bone and similar things which have like parts, whereas Anaxagoras and his school assert that the things which have like parts are "simple" and are elements, but that Earth, Fire, Water and Air are composite, for each of them is, they say, a "general seed-ground" for things which have like parts.

Those, therefore, who construct everything out of a single element must necessarily say that coming-to-be and passing-away are "alteration," for their substratum remains the same and one (and it is such a substratum which we say undergoes "alteration"); but those who make the kinds of things more than one must hold that "alteration" differs from coming-
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314 b

gene\'sews\' suv\'iotwv g\'ar kai dia\nu\'mewn h\' gene\'sis
suv\'bainei kai h\' phor\'a. di\' h\' le\'gei to\'ut\'on to\'n
tr\'p\'on kai 'Empe\dokl\'h\'s, o\'ti "f\'usi\'s ou\'d\'e\'n\'os
\'estiv, al\'la mou\'n m\'i\'zis te di\'al\'la\'zis te mu\'g\'e\'ntwv."
"o\'ti me\'n ou\'n oikei\'os o l\'ogos aut\'\'on t\'h up\'o\'bhe\'se\'i

10 ou\'t\'w f\'anai, dh\'\'lon, kai o\'ti le\'goun kai to\'n tr\'p\'on

tou\'t\'on anag\'kai\'on de kai to\'ut\'ois t\'h al\'lou\'s\i\'n
e\'nai me\'n ti f\'anai para t\'h gene\'sis, ad\'unat\'on
m\'e\'ntoi kat\'a t\'a u\'p\' ek\'e\'in\'on le\'g\'om\'e\'na. to\'ut\'o de

"o\'ti le\'gome\'n or\'h\'d\', r\'\'ad\'i\'on suv\'i\'de\'i\'n. w\'sper g\'ar

dr\'\'ome\'n \'hreme\u03b3\'i\'s\'h t\'h su\'si\'a\'s ev aut\'h me\'ta\'bo\l\'h
15 k\'at\'a me\'ge\c\'h\'os, t\'h kalou\'me\'n\'h a\'\'x\'h\'s\i\'n kai ph\'i\'si\'n,
ou\'t\'w kai al\'lou\'s\i\'n. ou\' me\'n all\'e ez \'an le\'gou\'s\i\'n
oi plei\'ous ar\c\'h\'as po\'i\'ou\ntes mu\'\'s ad\'unat\'on al\'lou-
ou\'s\'h\'ai. ta g\'ar pa\'\'thi, kath\' a f\'ame\'n tou\'t\'o suv-
bai\'n\'e\'i\'n, diaf\'or\'ai to\'n sto\'i\'xei\'o\'n ei\'si\'n, le\'g\'w de

ou\'n th\'er\'m\'on psuc\'r\'on, le\'uk\'o\'n me\'l\'a\'n, \'e\'\r\'h\'on \\u03b9\'g\'r\'o\'n,

20 malak\'o\'n skle\'r\'o\'n kai to\'n al\'l\'o\'n ek\'ast\'o\'n, w\'sper
kai ph\'e\'si\'n 'Empe\dokl\'h\'s "he\'li\'on me\'n le\'uk\'o\'n o\'r\'a\'n
kai th\'er\'m\'on ap\'an\'thi, o\'mbr\'o\'n de \'en pa\'\'s\i\'n d\'o\'nof\'o\'n\'ta

te \'ri\'g\'a\'l\'e\'on te," o\'moi\'o\'s de dior\'i\'z\'e\'i kai ei\' t\'o\'n
lo\'u\'t\'o\'n. \'o\'st\'e e\'i \'h\'\'en d\'u\'n\'a\'t\'o\'n ek pu\'\'r\'o\'s gene\'\'st\'h\'ai

\'\'d\'w\'r \'h\'\'d\'e\'n o\'d\' e\'x \'u\'d\'a\'t\'o\'s g\'i\'n, ou\'\'de ek le\'u\'k\'o\'n me\'l\'a\'n

25 e\'st\'a\'i ou\'d\'e\'n ou\'d\'e ek malak\'o\'n skle\'r\'o\'n. ou\' de aut\'o\'s

\'l\'o\'g\'o\'n kai per\'i t\'o\'n al\'l\'o\'n. to\'u\'t\'o de \'h\' al\'lou\'s\'i\'s.

\'h kai fane\'r\'o\'n o\'ti mi\'a\'n a\'e i to\'i\'s enant\'i\'o\'s upo-

\n\n\n\na Diels, fr. 8. b Diels, fr. 21 lines 3 and 5.

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to-be, for coming-to-be and passing-away occur when things come together and are dissolved. This is the reason why Empedocles also is speaking to this effect, when he says that “there is no origin of anything, but only a mingling and separation of things which have been mingled.” It is clear then, that their description of coming-to-be and passing-away in this way accords with their assumption and that they actually describe them in this way; they also must, however, admit that “alteration” is something different from coming-to-be, though they cannot possibly do so consistently with the views which they express. It is easy to see that we are correct in saying this; for just as we see changes in magnitude taking place in a thing while its substance remains unchanged (what we call “increase” and “diminution”), so also we see “alteration” occurring. Nevertheless, the statements of those who suppose the existence of more than one first principle make it impossible for “alteration” to take place. For the qualities, in respect of which we say that “alteration” occurs (for example, hot and cold, white and black, dry and moist, soft and hard, etc.) are differences affecting the elements. As Empedocles says,

The sun is white to look upon and hot
In every part, the rain is dark and chill;

and he likewise characterizes also the other elements. Hence, as it is impossible for Water to come-into-being from Fire, or Earth from Water, neither will black come into existence out of white, nor hard out of soft; and the same argument applies also to the other qualities. Now this is what “alteration” has always meant. From this it is also clear that it must be assumed that a single matter belongs to the “con-
314 b
θετέον ὑλήν, ἂν τε μεταβάλλῃ κατὰ τόπον, ἂν τε κατ’ αὐξήσιν καὶ φθίσιν, ἂν τε κατ’ ἄλλοισιν. ἔτι δ’ ὄμοιοις ἀναγκαῖοι εἶναι τούτο καὶ ἄλλοισιν.

315 a εἴτε γὰρ ἄλλοισις ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐν στοιχεῖον καὶ μία ἡ πάντων ὑλή τῶν ἐχόντων εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολήν, κἂν εἶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐν, ἐστιν ἄλλοισις.

'Εμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ὀὖν ἔοικεν ἐναντία λέγειν καὶ πρὸς τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτός. ἅμα 5 μὲν γὰρ οὐ φθείνει ἑτέρου ἐξ ἑτέρου γίνεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τάλα πάντα ἐκ τούτων, ἅμα δ’ ὅταν εἰς ἐν συναγάγῃ τὴν ἀπασαν φύσιν πλὴν τοῦ νείκους, ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς γίνεσθαι πάλιν ἐκαστον. ὥστ’ ἐξ ἐνὸς τινος δῆλον ὅτι διαφοράς τιοι χωρίζομένων καὶ πάθεσιν ἐγένετο τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ τὸ δὲ πῦρ, καθάπερ λέγει τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λευκὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν βαρὺ καὶ σκληρόν. ἀφαίρουμένων οὖν τούτων τῶν διαφορῶν (εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀφαιρεταὶ γενόμεναι) δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι καὶ γῆν ἐξ ὑδατος καὶ ὕδωρ ἐκ γῆς, ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστον, οὐ τότε μόνον ἄλλα καὶ νῦν, 10 τὸ δὲ πῦρ, καθάπερ λέγει τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λευκὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν βαρὺ καὶ σκληρόν. ἀφαίρουμένων οὖν τούτων τῶν διαφορῶν (εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀφαιρεταὶ γενόμεναι) δῆλον ὡς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι καὶ γῆν ἐξ ὑδατος καὶ ὕδωρ ἐκ γῆς, ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστον, οὐ τότε μόνον ἄλλα καὶ νῦν, 15 μεταβάλλοντα γε τοῖς πάθεσιν. ἔστι δ’ ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκει δυνάμενα προσγίνεσθαι καὶ χωρίζεσθαι πάλιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ μαχομένων ἄλληλοις ἐτι τοῦ νείκους καὶ τῆς φιλίας. διόπερ καὶ τότε ἐξ ἐνὸς ἐγεννηθησαν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ γε καὶ γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ

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*a i.e. when the elements originally came-to be.*
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1

trary poles,” whether they change in respect of place, or of “growth” and “diminution,” or of “alteration”; furthermore, that the existence of a single matter and that of “alteration” are each as necessary as the other, for, if “alteration” takes place, then the substratum is a single element, and so all things which change into one another have a single matter, and, conversely, if the substratum is one, “alteration” takes place.

Empedocles, then, seems to contradict the observed facts and himself as well. For he denies that any one of his elements comes-to-be from any other element, but declares that all other things come-to-be from these elements, and at the same time, after collecting all nature, except Strife, together into one, he declares that each thing again comes-to-be out of the One. Hence it is clear that out of a One, when separation took place owing to certain differences and qualities, one thing came-to-be Water and another Fire, as is shown by his calling the sun “white and hot” and the earth “heavy and hard.” If, therefore, these differences are taken away (and it is possible to take them away, since they came-to-be), it is clear that Earth must necessarily come-to-be out of Water, and Water out of Earth, and similarly with each of the other elements, not only then but also now, when they undergo a change in their qualities. According to his statements, the qualities can be attached and can be separated again, especially as Strife and Love are still fighting against one another. This is also the reason why the elements were originally generated from the One; for, I suppose, Fire, Earth and Water

\[ i.e. \] when according to Empedocles “Strife” is gaining the upper hand.

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315 a

ēτί ὄντα ἐν ἧν τὸ πᾶν. ἀδηλοῦν δὲ καὶ πότερον
20 ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν θετεόν τὸ ἐν ἧ τὰ πολλὰ, λέγω δὲ πῦρ
καὶ γῆν καὶ τὰ σύστοιχα τοῦτων. ἦ μὲν γὰρ ὡς
ὕλη ὑπόκειται, εἶ γὰρ μεταβάλλοντα διὰ τὴν κίνησιν
γίνονται γῆ καὶ πῦρ, τὸ ἐν στοιχείον. ἦ δὲ τούτῳ
μὲν ἐκ συνθέσεως γίνεται συνιόντων ἐκεῖνων,
ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἐκ διαλύσεως, στοιχειωδώτερα ἐκεῖνα
25 καὶ πρότερα τὴν φύσιν.

2. Ὁλος τε δὴ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς
ἀπλῆς λεκτέον, πότερον ἐστὶν ἦ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ πῶς
ἐστίν, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπλῶν κινήσεων, οἷον
περὶ αὐξήσεως καὶ ἀλλωσέως. Πλάτων μὲν οὖν
30 μόνον περὶ γενέσεως ἐσκέψατο καὶ φθορᾶς, ὡς
ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως οὐ
πάσης ἄλλα τῆς τῶν στοιχείων. πῶς δὲ σάρκες ἦ
ὀστᾶ ἥ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων, οὐδέν. ἐτὶ
οὔτε περὶ ἀλλωσέως οὔτε περὶ αὐξήσεως, πίνα
35 τρόπον ὑπάρχουσι τοῖς πράγμασιν. Ὡλος δὲ παρὰ
tὰ ἐπιστολῆς περὶ οὕδενος οὕδεις ἐπέστησεν ἐξω

315 b φροντίσαι, ᾦδη δὲ ἐν τῷ πῶς διαφέρει. οὔτε γὰρ
περὶ αὐξήσεως οὕδεις οὕδεν διώρισεν, ὡσπερ λέ-
gομεν, ὃ τι μὴ κἂν ὁ τυχῶν εἴπειεν, ὅτι προσιόντος
αὐξάνονται τοῦ ὀμοίου τῷ ὀμοίῳ (πῶς δὲ τούτῳ,

1 τοῦ ὀμοίου addidi.

a i.e. Water and Air.
b Namely, that set up by Strife.
c Timaeus 52 D ff.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 1–2

did not exist separately at all while they were still one. Now it is also not clear whether we must ascribe to him the One as his starting-point, or the Many—by which I mean Fire and Earth and their co-ordinates. For the One, in as much as it forms, as its matter, the substratum from which Earth and Fire come-to-be through the change due to motion, is an element; on the other hand, in as much as the One comes-to-be through a process of composition, due to the coming together of the Many, whereas the Many are the result of dissolution, the Many are more "elementary" than the One and by nature prior to it.

2. We must, therefore, deal in general with the subject of unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away, and discuss whether they exist or not, and how they exist, and with the other simple motions, such as "growth" and "alteration." Plato, it is true, Plato's investigated coming-to-be and passing-away, but only as to the manner in which passing-away is inherent in things, and as regards coming-to-be he did not deal with it in general but only that of the elements; he never inquired how flesh or bones or any other similar things came-to-be, and, further, he did not discuss how "alteration" and "growth" are present in things. In fact no one at all has applied himself to any of these subjects, except in a superficial manner, with the single exception of Democritus. He seems to have thought about them all, and from first to last he excels in his manner of treatment. For, as we assert, no one else made any definite pronouncement about "growth," except such as any man-in-the-street might make, namely, that things grow by the coming together of like with like (without a word as
οὐκέτι), ούδὲ περὶ μίξεως, ούδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
5 ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐδενός, οἶνον τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν,
τίνα τρόπον τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχει τὰς φυσικὰς
ποιήσεις. Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος ποιή-
σαντες τὰ σχῆματα τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν
ἐκ τούτων ποιοῦσι, διακρίσεις μὲν καὶ συγκρίσεις
γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, τάξει δὲ καὶ θέσει ἀλλοίωσιν.
10 ἔπει δ’ ὁντὸ τάληθες ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι, ἑναντία δὲ
καὶ ἄπειρα τὰ φαινόμενα, τὰ σχῆματα ἄπειρα
ἐποίησαν, ὡστε ταῖς μεταβολαῖς τοῦ συγκειμένου
τὸ αὐτὸ ἑναντίον δοκεῖν ἄλλω καὶ ἄλλω, καὶ μετα-
κινεῖσθαι μικρῶ ἐμμυγυμένου, καὶ ὅλως ἔτερον
φαίνεσθαι ἐνὸς μετακινηθέντος· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ
15 τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία γίνεται γραμμάτων.

’Επεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν πᾶσιν ἔτερον εἶναι γένεσιν
καὶ ἀλλοίωσις, καὶ γίνεσθαι μὲν καὶ φθείρεσθαι
συγκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα, ἀλλοιώσθαι δὲ
μεταβαλλόντων τῶν παθημάτων, περὶ τούτων ἔπι-
στήσασι θεωρητέον. ἀπορίας γὰρ ἔχει ταῦτα καὶ
20 πολλὰς καὶ εὐλόγους. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ σύγκρισις
ἡ γένεσις, πολλὰ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει· εἰσὶ δὲ αὐ
λόγοι ἔτεροι ἀναγκαστικοὶ καὶ οὐκ εὐποροὶ διαλύειν
ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ τῇ μὴ ἐστὶ σύγ-
κρισις ἡ γένεσις, ἡ ὅλως οὐκ ἐστὶ γένεσις ἡ ἄλ-
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to how this happens), and they tell us nothing about "mixing" and practically nothing about the other terms, such as "action" and "passion," that is, how one thing acts upon and another is affected by physical action. Democritus, however, and Leucippus postulate the "figures" and make "alteration" and coming-to-be result from these, attributing coming-to-be and passing-away to their dissociation and association, and "alteration" to their arrangement and position; and, since they held that the truth consisted in appearance, and appearances are contrary to one another and infinite in number, they made the "figures" infinite in number, so that, owing to changes in the compound, the same thing seems to be contrary to different people and to be "transposed" by the mixing in of a small ingredient and to appear quite different owing to "transposition" of one constituent. For a tragedy and a comedy are composed of the same letters.

Since almost all philosophers think (a) that coming-to-be and "alteration" are different processes and (b) that things come-to-be and pass-away by "association" and "dissociation," whereas they undergo "alteration" by a change of their qualities, we must fix our attention on these views and examine them; for they present many arguable questions for discussion. For if coming-to-be is "association," many impossible situations arise; and, on the other hand, there are other compelling arguments, not easy to disentangle, to prove that coming-to-be cannot be anything else. If, on the other hand, coming-to-be is not "association," either coming-to-be does not

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1 *el ò scripsi: eître codd.*
λοίσωσις, ἡ′ καὶ τοῦτο διαλύσαι χαλεπὸν ὄν πειρα-τέον.

25 Ἀρχῇ δὲ τούτων πάντων, πότερον οὐτω γίνεται καὶ ἄλλοιούται καὶ αὐξάνεται τὰ ὅντα καὶ τάναντια τούτοις πάσχει, τῶν πρῶτων ὑπαρχόντων μεγεθῶν ἀδιαίρετων, ἦ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ μέγεθος ἀδιαίρετον· δια-φέρει γὰρ τούτο πλείστον. καὶ πάλιν εἰ μεγέθη, πότερον, ὡς Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεόκκιππος, σώματα

30 ταῦτ' ἐστὶν, ἢ ὤσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ, ἑπίπεδα. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις εἰρή-καμεν, ἄλογον μέχρι ἑπιπέδων διαλύσαι. διὸ μᾶλλον εὐλογον σώματα εἶναι ἀδιαίρετα. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα πολλὴν ἔχει ἄλογιαν. ὁμως δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοισι φέρεται καὶ ταῦτα πολλὴν ἐνδεχεται ποιεῖν, καθάπερ

35 εἰρηται, τροπῇ καὶ διαθηγῇ μετακινοῦντα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ταῖς τῶν σχημάτων διαφοραῖς, ὅπερ ποιεῖ Δημόκριτος (διὸ καὶ χροιὰν οὐ φησιν εἶναι· τροπῇ γὰρ χρωματίζεσθαι), τοῖς δὲ εἰς ἑπίπεδα διαρρόουσιν οὐκέτι. οὐδὲν γὰρ γίνεται πλὴν στερεὰ συντιθε-μένων· πάθος γὰρ οὔδ' ἐγχειροῦσι γεννᾶν οὐδὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν.

316 a καὶ ταῖς τῶν σχημάτων διαφοραῖς, ὅπερ ποιεῖ Δημόκριτος (διὸ καὶ χροιὰν οὐ φησιν εἶναι· τροπῇ γὰρ χρωματίζεσθαι), τοῖς δὲ εἰς ἑπίπεδα διαρρόουσιν οὐκέτι. οὐδὲν γὰρ γίνεται πλὴν στερεὰ συντιθε-μένων· πάθος γὰρ οὔδ' ἐγχειροῦσι γεννᾶν οὐδὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν.

5 Ἀίτιον δὲ τοῦ ἐπ' ἐλαττόν δύνασθαι τὰ ὁμολογοῦμενα συνορᾶν ἡ ἀπειρία. διὸ ὁσοὶ ἐνσκήκασι μᾶλ-λον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, μᾶλλον δύνανται ὑποτίθεσθαι τοιαύτας ἀρχὰς αἱ ἐπὶ πολὺ δύνανται συνειρεῖν·

1 ei' post ἦ omisi cum EH.

a Plato, Timaeus 53 c ff.
b De Caelo 299 a 6 ff.
c These terms are explained in Met. 985 b 15 ff.
exist at all or it is "alteration"; or else we must try to unravel this problem too, difficult as it is.

The starting-point for dealing with all these problems is the question, "Do things which exist come-to-be and 'alter' and 'grow,' and undergo the contrary changes, because the primary existences are indivisible magnitudes? Or is no magnitude indivisible?" For it makes a great difference which view we take. Again, if primary existences are indivisible magnitudes, are they bodies, as Democritus and Leucippus assert? Or are they planes, as is the view expressed in the Timaeus? To resolve them into planes and to stop at that point is, as we have said elsewhere, in itself contrary to reason. Hence it is more reasonable to hold that they are indivisible bodies, though this view also involves considerable irrationality. Nevertheless, as has been said, it is possible with these bodies to bring about "alteration" and coming-to-be if one "transposes" the same thing by "turning" and "intercontact" and by variations of the "figures," as Democritus does (hence he denies that colour exists, for coloration, he says is due to the "turning" of the "figures"); but it is impossible for those who divide bodies into planes to bring about "alteration" and coming-to-be; for, when planes are put together, nothing can result except solids; for they never even try to generate any quality from them.

The reason why we have not the power to comprehend the admitted facts is our lack of experience. Hence those who have lived in a more intimate communion with the phenomena of nature are better able to lay down such principles as can be connected together and cover a wide field; those, on the other
οί δ' ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀθεώρητοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, πρὸς ὅλην βλέψαντες ἀποφαίνονται ῥάον. ἵδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες· περὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἀτόμα εἶναι μεγέθη οἱ μέν φασιν ὅτι τὸ αὐτωτρίγυων πολλὰ ἔσται, Δημόκριτος δ' ἂν φανεῖ ὀικείος καὶ φυσικο�� λόγοις πεπείσθαι. δῆλον δ' ἔσται δ' λέγομεν προϊόσθων.

"Εχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν, εἰ τις θείη σώμα τι εἶναι καὶ μέγεθος πάντη διαιρέτων, καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν. τι γὰρ ἔσται ὅπερ τὴν διαίρεσιν διαφεύγει; εἰ γὰρ πάντη διαιρέτων, καὶ τοῦτο δυνατόν, κἂν ἄμα εἰ ἰδον πάντη διηρημένον, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἄμα διηρηταί· κἂν εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο, οὐδὲν ἂν εἰ ἀδύνατον. οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέσον ὁσαύτως, καὶ ὅλως δέ, εἰ πάντη πέφυκε διαιρέτων, κἂν διαιρεθῇ, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον γεγονός, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν εἰς μυρία μυριάκις διηρημένα ἦ, οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον· καίτοι ἵσως οὐδεὶς ἂν διελοὶ. ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν πάντη τοιοῦτον ἔστι τὸ σῶμα, διηρήσθω. τι οὖν ἔσται λοιπόν; μέγθος; οὐ γὰρ οἶδον τε· ἔσται γὰρ τι οὐ διηρημένον, ἣν δὲ πάντη διαιρέτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδὲν ἔσται

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a i.e. the Platonists.
b See De Lin. Insec. 968 a 9 ff.
hand, who indulge in long discussions without taking the facts into account are more easily detected as men of narrow views. One can see, too, from this the great difference which exists between those whose researches are based on the phenomenon of nature and those who inquire by a dialectical method. For on the subject of atomic magnitudes one school maintains their existence on the ground that otherwise the "ideal triangle" will be many, while Democritus would appear to have been convinced by arguments germane to the subject and founded on the study of nature. What we mean will be clear as we proceed.

If one postulates that a body, that is, a magnitude, is divisible throughout and that such a division is possible, a difficulty arises, namely, what will the body be which escapes division? If it is divisible throughout and this procedure is possible, it might be simultaneously divided throughout, even though the divisions have not been made simultaneously, and, if this were to result, no impossibility would be involved. Therefore, supposing it is of a nature to be divisible throughout, by a series of similar bisectons or on any other principle, nothing impossible will have been achieved if it has actually been divided, since, even if it has been divided into innumerable parts innumerable times, there is no impossibility, though perhaps no one would carry out this division. Since, therefore, the body is divisible throughout, let us suppose that it has been divided. What then will be left? A magnitude? No: that is impossible, since then there will be something which has not been divided, and it was divisible throughout. But if no body or magnitude is to be left
σώμα μηδὲ μέγεθος, διαίρεσις δ’ ἐσται, ἢ ἐκ στιγμῶν ἔσται, καὶ ἀμεγέθη ἡ ἐξ ὑπὸ συγκειτα, ἢ οὐδὲν παντάπασιν, ὥστε κἂν γίνοιτο ἐκ μηδενὸς κἂν εὑς συγκείμενον, καὶ τὸ πάν δὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλῃ ἢ 30 φανόμενον. ὀμοίως δὲ κἂν ἢ ἐκ στιγμῶν, οὐκ ἔσται ποσόν. ὅποτε γὰρ ἦπτοντό καὶ ἐν ἤν μέγεθος καὶ ᾨμα ἦσαν, οὐδὲν ἐπόιον μείζον τὸ πάν. διαμεθέντος γὰρ εἰς δύο καὶ πλείω, οὐδὲν ἔλαττον οὐδὲ μείζον τὸ πάν τοῦ πρώτον, ὥστε κἂν πάσας συντεθῶσιν, οὐδὲν πούσσουσι μέγεθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ

316 b εἴ τι διαιρομένου οἷον ἐκπρίμα γίνεται τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ μεγέθους σώμα τι ἀπερχεται, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ἐκεῖνο πῶς διαιρετόν; εἴ δὲ μὴ σώμα ἄλλ’ εἰδὸς τι χωριστόν ἢ πάθος ὁ ἀπῆλθεν, καὶ ἔστι τὸ μέγεθος στιγμαῖ ἢ ἄφαι τοδὲ παθοῦσαι, ἀτοπον ἐκ μὴ μεγεθῶν μέγεθος εἶναι. ἐτὶ δὲ ποῦ ἔσονται καὶ ἀκίνητοι ἢ κινούμεναι αἱ στιγμαί; ἀφὴ τε ἀεί μία δυνῶν τινῶν, ὡς ὦντος τινὸς παρὰ τὴν ἀφὴν καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν στιγμήν. εἴ δὴ τις θήσεται ὀτιοῦ ἢ ὀπηλικοῦν σῶμα εἶναι πάντῃ διαιρετόν, πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει. ἐτὶ ἐὰν διελὼν συνθὴ τὸ ξύλον ἢ τι ἄλλο, πάλιν ἵσον τε καὶ ἔν. οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἐχει δηλονότι κἂν τέμω τὸ ξύλον καθ’ ὀτιοῦν σημεῖον. πάντῃ ἀρα διήρθηται δυνάμει. τί οὖν ἔστι παρὰ τὴν διαι-
and yet division is to take place, the body either will consist of points, and its constituents will be things of no magnitude, or else it will be absolutely nothing; and so it would come-to-be and be compounded of nothing, and the whole would be nothing but an illusory appearance. Similarly, if it consists of points, it will not be a magnitude; for when the points were in contact and formed a single magnitude and were together, they did not make the whole any larger. For when it was divided into two or more parts, the whole was no smaller or larger than before; so that, if all the points were to be put together, they will not make any magnitude. Further, if, when the body is being divided, a minute portion of it, like a piece of saw-dust, is formed and in this way a body is detached from the magnitude, the same argument holds good, and the question arises: "In what sense is this portion divisible?" If it was not a body which was detached but a separable form or quality, and if the magnitude is points or contacts thus qualified, it is absurd that a magnitude should be composed of things which are not magnitudes. Furthermore, where will the points be? And, are they motionless or do they move? Also a contact is always a contact of two things, since there is always something as well as the contact or the division or the point. All this results, if one is going to posit that any body of any size whatever is divisible throughout. Furthermore, if, after having divided a piece of wood or some other object, I put it together again, it is again both equal to what it was and a unity. Obviously this is so at whatever point I cut the wood. The wood has, therefore, been divided potentially throughout. What then, is there in the wood besides the division? For
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reσιν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἕστι τι πάθος, ἄλλα πῶς εἰς ταῦτα διαλύεται καὶ γίνεται ἐκ τούτων; ἡ πῶς χωρίζεται ταῦτα; ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδύνατον εἰς ἄφων ἡ στιγμῶν εἶναι τὰ μεγέθη, ἀνάγκη εἶναι σώματα ἀδιαίρετα καὶ μεγέθη. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ ταῦτα θεμένοις οὐχ ἦττον συμβαίνει ἀδύνατον. ἐσκεπταὶ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐτέροις. ἄλλα ταῦτα πειρατέον λύειν· διὸ πάλιν εἰς ἀρχὴς τῆς ἀπορίαν λεκτέον.

20 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀπαν σώμα αἰσθητὸν εἶναι διαιρετὸν καθ' ὄτιούν σημεῖον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμει διαιρετὸν, τὸ δὲ ἐντελεχεία ὑπάρξει. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἁμα πάντη διαιρετὸν δυνάμει ἀδύνατον δόξειεν ἄν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν, κἂν γένοιτο, οὐχ ὥστε εἶναι ἁμα ἄμφω ἐντελεχεία ἀδιαίρετον καὶ διηρημένων, ἄλλα διηρημένων καθ' ὄτιοιν σημεῖον. οὐδὲν ἄρα ἕσται λοιπὸν, καὶ εἰς ἀσώματον ἐφθαρμένον τὸ σῶμα, καὶ γένοιτο δ' ἄν πάλιν ἦτοι ἐκ στιγμῶν ἡ ὅλως εἰς οὐδένος. καὶ τούτο πῶς δυνατὸν;

30 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε διαιρεῖται εἰς χωριστὰ καὶ ἀεὶ εἰς ἐλάστῳ μεγέθη καὶ εἰς ἀπέχοντα καὶ κεχωριστὰ σμένα, φανερὸν. οὔτε δὴ κατὰ μέρος διαιροῦντι εἶναν ἀπειροῖς ήθρύψεις, οὔτε ἁμα οἶον τε διαιρεθήναι κατὰ πάν σημεῖον (οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν) ἄλλα μέχρι τον. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἀτόμα ἐνυπάρχειν μεγέθη ἀόρατα, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ εἴπερ ἕσται γένεσις καὶ φθορά ἡ

* i.e. points of division and quality.
*b Phys. 231 a 21 ff.
c i.e. uncuttable.
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even if there is some quality, how is it dissolved into these constituents \(^a\) and how does it come-to-be out of them? And how are these constituents separated? Therefore, since it is impossible for magnitudes to consist of contacts or points, there must be indivisible bodies and magnitudes. However, if we posit these, an equally impossible consequence arises, which has been the subject of discussion elsewhere.\(^b\) But we must try to solve these difficulties, and so the problem must be stated again from the beginning.

It is, then, in no wise absurd that every perceptible body should be divisible at any point whatsoever and also indivisible; for it will be potentially divisible and actually indivisible. But it would seem impossible that it should be, even potentially, divisible throughout at the same time; for, if that were possible, it would actually happen, with the result, not that it would actually be simultaneously both things—indivisible and divided—but that it would be divided simultaneously at any and every point. Nothing will, therefore, be left, and the body will have passed-away into a state of incorporeity, and so it also might come-to-be again either from points or absolutely from nothing. And how is this possible?

It is clear, however, that a body is divided into magnitudes which are separable and grow smaller and smaller and come apart from one another and are separated. If you divide a body piece by piece, the process of breaking it up would not be infinite, nor can it be divided simultaneously at every point (for this is not possible), but the process can only be carried on within a certain limit. There must, then, exist in a body atomic \(^c\) magnitudes which are invisible, especially if coming-to-be and passing-away
μὲν διακρίσει ἢ δὲ συγκρίσει.  ὦ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκάζειν
dοκῶν λόγος εἶναι μεγέθη ἄτομα οὗτος ἐστὶν· ὅτι
dὲ λανθάνει παραλογιζόμενος, καὶ ἢ λανθάνει, λέ-
γωμεν.

Ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι στιγμὴ στιγμῆς ἐχομένη, τὸ
πάντη εἶναι διαιρετὸν ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ὑπάρχει τοῖς
μεγέθεσιν, ἐστὶ δ’ ὡς οὔ. δοκεῖ δ’ ὅταν τοῦτο
τεθῇ, καὶ ὅπερον καὶ πάντῃ στιγμῆν εἶναι, ὥστ’
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διαιρεθήναι τὸ μέγεθος εἰς μηδεν-
pάντῃ γὰρ εἶναι στιγμῆν· ὅστε ἢ ἐὰν ἄφων ἢ ἐὰν
στιγμῶν εἶναι. τὸ δ’ ἔστιν ὡς ὑπάρχει πάντῃ,
ὅτι μία ὁπεροῦ ἐστὶ, καὶ πάσαι ὡς ἐκάστη, πλείους
δὲ μιᾶς οὐκ εἰσίν (ἐφεξῆς γὰρ οὐκ εἰσίν), ὥστ’ οὐ
πάντῃ. εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μέσον διαιρετὸν, καὶ κατ’
ἐχομένην στιγμῆν ἔσται διαιρετὸν· οὐχὶ δὲ’ οὐ
γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐχομενὸν σημεῖον σημείου ἢ στιγμὴ
stigμῆς. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ διαίρεσις καὶ ἂν σύνθεσις.

"Ὡστ’ ἔστι καὶ διακρίσις καὶ σύγκρισις, ἄλλ’ οὐ
eἰς ἄτομα καὶ εἴς ἄτομων (πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ ἀδύνατα)
oὔτε οὔτως ὅστε πάντῃ διαίρεσιν γενέσθαι (ἐἰ
gὰρ ἢν ἐχομένη στιγμῆ στιγμῆς, τοῦτ’ ἢν ἢν), ἄλλ’
eἰς μικρὰ καὶ ἐλαττῶν ἐστὶ, καὶ σύγκρισις εἰς
ἐλαττόνως. ἄλλ’ οὐχ ἢ ἀπλὴ καὶ τελεία γένεσις
συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει ὁρίσται, ὡς τινὲς φασιν,
tὴν δ’ ἐν τῷ συνεχεί μεταβολὴν ἀλλοίωσιν. ἄλλα

1 οὐχὶ δὲ J : om. cet. codd.
2 καὶ H : ἢ.
are going to take place by association and dissociation respectively. This, then, is the argument which is thought to necessitate the existence of atomic magnitudes, but let us now show that it conceals a false inference, and where this false inference lies.

Since no point is contiguous to another point, the divisibility throughout of a body is possible in one sense, but not in another sense. When such divisibility is postulated, it is generally held that there is a point both anywhere and everywhere in it, so that it follows that the magnitudes must be divided until nothing is left. For, it is urged, there is a point everywhere in it, so that it consists either of contacts or of points. But divisibility-throughout is possible only in the sense that there is one point anywhere within it and that all its points taken separately are within it; but there are not more points than one anywhere in it (for the points are not "consecutive"), so that it is not divisible throughout; for then, if it was divisible at its centre, it will also be divisible at a contiguous point. But it is not; for one moment in time is not contiguous to another, nor is one point to another. So much for division and composition.

Hence both association and dissociation occur but neither into atomic magnitudes and out of them (for the impossibilities involved are numerous), nor in such a way that division-throughout occurs (for this would be possible only if point were contiguous to point); but dissociation occurs into small, or relatively small, parts, while association occurs out of relatively small parts. But unqualified and complete coming-to-be is not defined as due to association and dissociation, as some people assert, while they say that change in what is continuous is "alteration." In fact,
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20 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν οἴσφαλλεται πάντα. ἔστι γὰρ γένεσις ἀπλῆ καὶ φθορὰ οὐ συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει, ἀλλ' ὅταν μεταβάλλῃ ἐκ τούθε ε ἵ στόδε οἷνον. οἱ δὲ οἴονται ἄλλοιώσων πάσαν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολήν· τὸ δὲ διαφέρει. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ τὸ μέν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν λόγον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑλήν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἡ μεταβολή, γένεσις ἔσται ἡ φθορά, ὅταν δ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ κατά συμβεβηκός, ἄλλοιώσις. διακρινόμενα δὲ καὶ συγκρινόμενα εὐθαρστα γίνεται. εἰάν μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττων ὕδατα διαφρεθή, θάττον ἁπρ γίνεται, εἰάν δὲ συγκριθῆ, βραδύτερον. μᾶλλον δ' ἔσται δήλον ἐν τοῖς ὑστερον. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω, ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὴν γένεσιν σύγκρισιν, οἰαν δὴ τινὲς φασιν.

3. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, πρῶτον θεωρητέον πότερον ἑστὶ τι γινόμενον ἀπλῶς καὶ ψευδόμενον, ἡ κυρίως μὲν οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δ' ἐκ τινός καὶ τί, λέγω δ' 35 οἶον ἐκ κάμνοντος υγιαῖνον καὶ κάμνον ἐξ υγιαίνοντος, ἡ μικρὸν ἐκ μεγάλου καὶ μέγα ἐκ μικροῦ, καὶ τάλλα πάντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἔσται γένεσις, ἀπλῶς ἄν γίνοιτο ἐκ μὴ ὁντος, ὥστ' ἀληθές ἄν εἰη λέγειν ὅτι ὑπάρχει τοιοῦ τοῦ μὴ ὁν.
this is where the whole mistake occurs; for unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away are not due to association and dissociation, but take place when something as a whole changes from "this" to "that." But some philosophers hold that all such change is "alteration," whereas there is a difference. For in that which underlies the change there is a factor corresponding to the definition and a material factor; when, therefore, the change takes place in these, coming-to-be or passing-away will occur, but, when the change is in the qualities (that is to say, there is an accidental change), "alteration" will result. Things which are associated and dissociated become liable to pass-away; for if drops of water are divided into still smaller drops, air comes-to-be from them more quickly, whereas, if they are associated together, air comes-to-be more slowly. This, however, will be clearer in what follows; for the moment let us assume this much as established, namely, that coming-into-being cannot be association of the kind which some people assert it to be.

3. Having made the above distinctions, we must first inquire whether there is anything which comes-to-be and passes-away in an unqualified sense, or whether nothing comes-to-be in the strict sense, but everything comes-to-be something, and out of something—for example, comes-to-be healthy out of being ill, and ill out of being healthy, or small out of being large, and large out of being small, and so on in the other instances which one might give. For, if there is to be coming-to-be without qualification, something must come-to-be out of not-being without qualification, so that it would be true to say that there are things of which "not-being" can be predicated; for
tis men gar gênesis ek mi h éntos tinos, oino ek
5 mi h leukou h mi h kalou, h de aplh eis aplwos mi h
êntos.

To de aplwos htoj to prôtou semeiwei kath'
êkásthen kathgoriàn toû òntos, h to katholou kai
to panta perièchon. ei men oin to prôtou, oustias
êstai gênesis ek mi h oustias. o de mi h upárxhei oustia
muwde tode, òhlon ws oude toû òllwn oudeimia kathe-
10 goriwôn, oin ou te poin ou te poson ou te to poû-
churistà gar an eî h ta páthi toû oustwôn. eî de
to mi h òn òllws, ápostasis êstai katholou pántwn,
ôste ek miwdenos anángkê ginsebhai to ginwmein.

Peri men oin toutwv en òlloi te diptóritai kai
15 diwristai tois logois epî pleîon. sumpómos de kai
vûn lektêon, ôti tròpon men tina ek mi h òntos aplwos
ginetai, tròpon de òllon ek òntos aei. to gar
dunâmêi ôn entelexeia de mi h ôn anángkê proûptárchein
leugómenvon amfortéros. o de kai toutwn diwri-
sméwnon êxei thumàsthn aporiaian, pálin epavanapo-
20 diстатûn, pws estin aplh gênesis, eît' ek dunâmêi
òntos ousta eite kai pws òllws. aporîseie gar an
tis ár' estin oustias gênesis kai toû toutde, òllâ
mi h tou toioûde kai tosoûde kai pou (tou avtôn de'

a Phys. i. 6-9.
b i.e. as “being” and as “not-being.”
some kind of coming-to-be proceeds from some kind of not-being, for example, from “not-white” and “not-beautiful,” but unqualified coming-to-be proceeds from unqualified not-being.

Now “unqualified” signifies either (a) that which is primary in each category, or (b) that which is universal and universally comprehensive. If, then, it signifies that which is primary, there will be a coming-to-be of substance out of not-substance; but that which has not a substance or a “this” obviously cannot have any predicate from the other categories, either, for example, quality, quantity or position, for then the properties would exist apart from the substances. If, on the other hand, “unqualified not-being” signifies that which does not exist at all, this will be a general negation of all being, and, therefore, what comes-to-be must come-to-be out of nothing.

This problem has been discussed and settled at greater length elsewhere; but a short restatement of it is called for here: In one way things come-to-be out of that which has no unqualified being, in another way they always come-to-be out of what is; for there must be a pre-existence of that which potentially is, but actually is not, in being, and this is described in both ways. This having been established, a question involving extraordinary difficulty must be re-examined, namely, how can there be “unqualified coming-to-be,” whether it comes from what exists potentially or in some other way? For one might raise the question whether there is a coming-to-be of substance (that is, of the “this”) at all, and not rather of a “such” or a “so-great” or a “some-where”; and the same question might be asked...
τρόπον καὶ περὶ φθορᾶς). εἰ γὰρ τι γίνεται, δῆλον ὡς ἔσται δυνάμει τις οὐσία, ἐντελεχεία δ᾿ οὐ, ἐξ 25 ἢς ἡ γένεσις ἔσται καὶ εἰς ἡν ἀνάγκη μεταβάλλειν τὸ φθειρόμενον. πότερον οὐν ὑπάρξει τι ποῦτω τῶν ἄλλων ἐντελεχεία; λέγω δ᾿ οὖν ἢρ ἔσται ποςον ἡ ποιῶν ἡ ποῦ τὸ δυνάμει μόνον τόδε καὶ ὡς, ἀπλῶς δὲ μὴ τόδε μηδ᾿ ὡς; εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλα πάντα δυνάμει, χωριστόν τε συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ οὖτως ὡς, καὶ ἔτι, ὁ μάλιστα φοβοῦμεν διετέλεσαν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαι προὐπάρχωτος. εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τόδε τι ἡ οὐσίαν οὐχ ὑπάρξει, τῶν δ᾿ ἄλλων τι τῶν εὑρημένων, ἔσται, καθάπερ εὐπομεν, χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη τῶν οὐσιῶν. περὶ τε τούτων οὖν ὡςον ἐνδέχεται πραγματευτέον, 30 καὶ τίς αἰτία τοῦ γένεσιν ἂεὶ εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἀπλὴν καὶ τὴν κατὰ μέρος.

318 a  Οὕσης δ᾿ αἰτίας μᾶς μὲν ὡθεὶν τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴναι φαμεν τῆς κινήσεως, μᾶς δὲ τῆς ὤλης, τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν λεκτέον. περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνης εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγοις, ὅτι ἔστὶ τὸ 5 μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸν ἀπαντα χρόνον, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον ἂεὶ. τούτων δὲ περὶ μὲν τῆς ἀκίνητου ἀρχῆς τῆς ἐτέρας καὶ προτέρας διελεῖν ἐστὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐργον·

a In lines 10, 11 above.

b i.e. qualified, that is, changing in respect of quality, quantity or position.

c Phys. 258 b 10 ff.

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about passing-away also. For, if something comes-to-be, it is clear that there will be substance, not actually but potentially, from which the coming-to-be will proceed and into which that which is passing-away must change. Will any other attribute then belong actually to this supposed substance? For example, I mean, will that which is only potentially a "this" (and only potentially exists), and which is not a "this" and does not exist without qualification, possess size or quality or position? For, (1) if it actually possessed none of these determinations but possesses them all potentially, the result is (a) that a being which is not a determined being can possess a separate existence, and (b) that coming-to-be arises out of nothing pre-existent—a view which inspired great and continuous alarm in the minds of the early philosophers. On the other hand, (2) if, although it is not to be a "this" or a substance, it is to possess some of the other attributes which we have mentioned, then, as we said, the qualities will be separable from the substance. We must, therefore, deal with these matters to the best of our ability, and also with the causes of continuous coming-to-be, both the unqualified and the partial.

Now there are two meanings of "cause," one being that which, as we say, results in the beginning of motion, and the other the material cause. It is the latter kind with which we have to deal here; for with cause in the former sense we have dealt in our discussion of Motion, when we said that there is something which remains immovable through all time and something which is always in motion. To come to a decision about the first of these, the immovable original source, is the task of the other and prior
περὶ δὲ τοῦ διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς κινεῖσθαι τὰλλα κινούν-
tos ύστερον ἀποδοτέον, τι τοιοῦτον τῶν καθ’
ἐκαστα λεγομένων αὐτίων ἐστὶν. νῦν δὲ τὴν ὡς ἐν
10 ὦλης εἶδει τιθεμένην αἰτίαν εἴπωμεν, δι’ ἣν ἂεὶ
φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις οὐχ ὑπολείπει τὴν φύσιν· ἀμα
gὰρ ἂν ἵσως τούτῳ γένοιτο δῆλον, καὶ περὶ τοῦ
νῦν ἀπορηθέντος, πῶς ποτὲ δεῖ λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῆς
ἀπλῆς φθορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως.

"Ἐχει δ’ ἀπορίαν ἱκανὴν καὶ τί το αἰτίον τοῦ
συνείρειν τὴν γένεσιν, εἴπερ τὸ φθειρόμενον εἰς τὸ
15 μὴ ὅν ἀπέρχεται, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅν μηθὲν ἐστὶν· οὔτε
gὰρ τὶ οὔτε ποιῶν οὔτε ποσῶν οὔτε ποῦ τὸ μὴ ὅν.
eἴπερ οὖν ἂεὶ τῶν ὀντῶν ἀπέρχεται, διὰ τί ποτ’
οὐκ ἀνήλωται πάλαι καὶ φροῦδον τὸ πᾶν, εἰ γε
πεπερασμένον ἢν εἰς οὐ γίνεται τῶν γινομένων
ἐκαστὸν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ ἀπειρον εἶναι εἰς οὐ
20 γίνεται, οὐχ ὑπολείπει· τούτῳ γὰρ ἀδύνατον. κατ’
ἐνεργειαν μὲν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστὶν ἀπειρον, δυνάμει
d’ ἐπὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν, ὡστ’ ἐδει ταῦτην εἶναι μόνην
tὴν μὴ ὑπολείπουσαν τῷ γίνεσθαι τι ἂεὶ ἐλαττον-
νῦν δὲ τοῦτο οὐχ ὀρώμεν.

"Αρ’ οὖν διὰ τὸ τῆς τοῦδε φθοράν ἄλλον εἶναι
25 γένεσιν καὶ τῆς τοῦδε γένεσιν ἄλλον εἶναι φθορὰν

*a Usually called πρώτη φιλοσοφία.
b See 336 a 13 ff.
c Or “specific” causes, as opposed to causes in the
branch of philosophy, while, regarding that which moves all other things by its own continuous motion, we shall have to explain later which of the individual causes is of this kind. For the moment let us deal with the cause which is placed in the class of matter, owing to which passing-away and coming-to-be never fail to occur in nature; for perhaps this may be cleared up and it may become evident at the same time what we ought to say about the problem which arose just now, namely, about unqualified passing-away and coming-to-be.

What is the cause of the continuous process of coming-to-be is a perplexing enough problem, if it is really true that what passes-away vanishes into "what is not" and "what is not" is nothing; for "what is not" is not anything and possesses neither quality nor quantity nor position. If, therefore, some one of the "things-which-are" is constantly vanishing, how is it that the whole of being has not long ago been used up and has not disappeared, provided, of course, that the source of each of the things which come-to-be was limited? For, I suppose, the fact that coming-to-be never fails is not because the source from which it comes is infinite; for this is impossible, since nothing is actually infinite but only potentially so for the purpose of division, so that there would have to be only one kind of coming-to-be, namely, one which never fails, because something which comes-to-be is successively smaller and smaller. But, as a matter of fact, we do not see this happening.

Is it, then, because the passing-away of one thing is the coming-to-be of another thing, and the coming-to-be of one thing the passing-away of another thing,
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318 a ἀπαντον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν; περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθοράν ὁμοίως περὶ ἐκαστον τῶν ὁντων, ταύτην οὐητέον εἶναι πᾶσιν ἰκανήν αἰτίαν. διὰ τί δὲ ποτε τα μὲν ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι λέγεται καὶ φθείρεσθαι τὰ δ’ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, πάλιν σκεπτέον, εἰπέρ το αὐτὸ ἐστὶ γένεσις μὲν τοudd φθορά δὲ τοudd, καὶ φθορά μὲν τοудί γένεσις δὲ τοудί· ξητεί γὰρ τινα τοῦτο λόγον. λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι φθείρεται νῦν ἀπλῶς, καὶ οὐ μόνον τοδί· καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν γένεσις ἀπλῶς, αὐτῇ δὲ φθορά. τοδί δὲ γίνεται μὲν τι, γίνεται δ’ ἀπλῶς οὐ· φαιμὲν γὰρ τὸν μανθάνοντα γίνεσθαι μὲν ἐπιστήμονα, γίνεσθαι δ’ ἀπλῶς οὐ.

318 b Καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις διορίζομεν λέγοντες ὅτι τὰ μὲν τόδε τι σημαίνει τὰ δ’ οὐ, διὰ τοῦτο συμβαῖνει τὸ ξητούμενον· διαφέρει γὰρ εἰς ἀ μεταβάλλει τὸ μεταβάλλον. οἰον ἵπσως ἥ μὲν εἰς πῦρ ὃδὸς γένεσις μὲν ἀπλῆ, φθορά δὲ τινὸς ἐστιν, οἰον γῆς, ἥ δὲ γῆς γένεσις τῆς γένεσις, γένεσις δ’ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, φθορά δ’ ἀπλῶς, οἰον πυρός, ὡσπερ Παρμενίδης λέγει δύο τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅν εἶναι φάσκων, πῦρ καὶ γῆν. τὸ δὴ ταῦτα ἢ τουαῦθ’ ἐτερα ὑποτίθεσθαι διαφέρει οὐδέν· τὸν γὰρ τρόπον ξητούμεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ ὑπο-

a Fr. 8 lines 53 ff. (Diels), but Parmenides mentions this theory as being wrong.
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that the process of change is necessarily unceasing? As regards the occurrence of coming-to-be and passing-away in everything which exists alike, the above must be regarded by all as an adequate cause; but why some things are said to come-to-be and to pass-away without qualification and others with qualification, must be examined once more, if it is true that the same process is a coming-to-be of "this," but a passing-away of "that," and a passing-away of "this" but a coming-to-be of "that"; for the question calls for discussion. For we say "It is now passing-away" without qualification, and not merely "This is passing-away"; and we call this a "coming-to-be," and that a "passing-away," without qualification. But this "comes-to-be-something," but does not do so without qualification; for we say that the student "comes-to-be learned," not "comes-to-be" without qualification.

Now we often make a distinction, saying that some things signify a "this," and others do not; and it is because of this that the point which we are examining arises, for it makes a difference into what that which is changing changes. For example, perhaps the passage into Fire is "coming-to-be" without qualification but "passing-away-of-something" (for instance, of Earth), while the coming-to-be of Earth is qualified (not unqualified) coming-to-be, but unqualified passing-away (for example, of Fire). This agrees with Parmenides’ theory, for he says that the things into which change takes place are two and asserts that these two things, what is and what is not, are Fire and Earth. Whether we postulate these or other things of a like kind makes no difference; for we are seeking not what underlies these changes, but
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10 κείμενον. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸ μῆ ὑν ἀπλῶς ὁδὸς φθορὰ ἄπλη, ἡ δ' εἰς τὸ ἀπλῶς ὑν γένεσις ἄπλη. οἷς οὖν διώρισται εἰτε πυρὶ καὶ γῆ εἰτε ἀλλοις τυσί, τούτων ἔσται τὸ μὲν ὑν τὸ δὲ μῆ ὑν. ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον τούτῳ διοίσει τὸ ἀπλῶς τι γίνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι τοῦ μῆ ἀπλῶς, ἄλλον δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ ὑποία 15 τις ἂν τῇ ἃ μὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον αἱ διαφοραὶ τόδε τι σημαίνουσι, μᾶλλον οὐσία, ἢς δὲ στέρησιν, μῆ ὑν, οἷον τὸ μὲν θερμὸν κατηγορία τις καὶ εἴδος, ἢ δὲ ψυχρότης στέρησις· διαφέρουσι δὲ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ταύταις ταῖς διαφοραῖς.

Δοκεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πολλοὺς τῷ αἰσθητῷ καὶ 20 μῆ αἰσθητῷ διαφέρειν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἰς αἰσθητὴν μεταβάλλῃ ὕλην, γίνεσθαι φασίν, ὅταν δ' εἰς ἀφανῆ, φθείρεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ὑν καὶ τὸ μῆ ὑν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τῷ μῆ αἰσθάνεσθαι διορίζοισιν, ὥσπερ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήτητον ὑν, τὸ δ' ἀγνωστον μῆ ὑν· ἡ γὰρ αἰσθησις ἐπιστήμης ἔχει δύναμιν. καθάπερ οὖν αὐτοί τῷ 25 αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ ζῆν καὶ εἰναι νομίζοισιν, οὐτω καὶ τὰ πράγματα, τρόπον τινὰ

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the manner in which they take place. The passage, then, into that which "is not" without qualification is unqualified passing-away, while the passage into that which "is" without qualification is unqualified coming-to-be. Hence, whatever it is by which the things which change are distinguished from one another—whether it be Fire and Earth or some other pair—one will be "a being," the other "a not-being."

One way, then, in which unqualified will differ from qualified coming-to-be and passing-away is obtained by this method. Another way of distinguishing them is by the special nature of the material of that which changes; for the more the differences of material signify "a this," the more is it a real being, whereas the more they signify a privation, the more unreal it is. For example, "hot" is a positive predication and a "form," while "cold" is a privation, and Earth and Fire are distinguished from one another by these differences.

In the opinion of most people the difference between qualified and unqualified depends rather on perceptibility and imperceptibility; for when there is a change to perceptible material, they say that coming-to-be takes place, but, when they change to invisible material, they say that passing-away occurs: for they distinguish between "that which is" and "that which is not" by their perception and non-perception, just as what is knowable is and what is unknowable is not (for to them perception has the force of knowledge). As, therefore, they themselves think that they live and have their being in virtue of perceiving or having the power to perceive, so, too, they consider that things exist because they perceive them—and, in a way, they are on the right road to
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diώκοντες τάληθές, αυτὸ δὲ λέγοντες οὐκ ἀληθές. συμβαίνει δὴ κατὰ δόξαν καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἄλλως τὸ γίνεσθαι τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι: πνεῦμα γὰρ καὶ ἄηρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν αἰέσθησιν ἦττὸν ἐστὶν (διὸ καὶ τὰ φθειρόμενα ἀπλῶς τῇ εἰς ταῦτα μεταβολὴν φθείρεσθαι λέγουσιν, γίνεσθαι δὲ ὅταν εἰς ἀπτὸν καὶ εἰς γῆν μεταβάλλῃ), κατὰ δὲ ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον τόδε τι καὶ εἴδος ταῦτα τῆς γῆς. 

Τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὴν μὲν ἀπλὴν γένεσιν φθορὰν οὐσάν τινος, τὴν δὲ φθορὰν τὴν ἀπλὴν γένεσιν οὐσάν τινος, ἑρημταὶ τὸ αὐτὸν (διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν ὑλὴν δια-

319 a/318 b 33) is answered by τοῦ δὲ (319 a 3), and the construction is broken by the parenthesis.

* i.e. in 318 a 33 ff.
* i.e. to the question raised in lines 3-5 above.
the truth, though what they actually say is not true. Indeed, the popular opinion about the way in which unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away occur, differs from the truth; for Wind and Air have less reality according to our perception of them (hence, too, things which pass-away are said to do so in an unqualified sense by changing into Wind and Air, and to come-to-be when they change into what is tangible, namely, into Earth), whereas in truth they are more a definite something and a "form" than Earth.

We have now stated the reason why there is unqualified coming-to-be, which is the passing-away of something, and unqualified passing-away, which is the coming-to-be of something (for it depends on the difference of the material, from which and into which the change takes place, and on its being substance or not, or on its having more or less of the nature of substance, or on its being more or less perceptible); but why are some things said to come-to-be without qualification, while others come-to-be some particular thing only and not by coming-to-be reciprocally out of one another in the manner which we described just now? (For up to the present we have only determined this much, namely, why, although all coming-to-be is a passing-away of something else and all passing-away is a coming-to-be of some other thing, we do not attribute coming-to-be and passing-away uniformly to things which change into one another; but the problem afterwards raised does not discuss this difficulty, but why that which learns is said to come-to-be learned and not to come-to-be without qualification, yet that which grows is said to come-to-be). The answer is that this is determined by the differences of the categories; for
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σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ τοιόνδε, τὰ δὲ ποσὸν· ὅσα οὖν μὴ ουσίαν σημαίνει, οὐ λέγεται ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί γένεσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὀμοίως ἐν πάσι γένεσις μὲν 15 κατὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ ουσιωδίᾳ λέγεται, οὐν ἐν μὲν οὐσία ἐὰν πῦρ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐὰν γῆ, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῶ ἐὰν ἐπιστήμον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὃταν ἀνεπιστήμον.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς γίνεσθαι τὰ δὲ μῆ, καὶ οὕς καὶ ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις αὐταῖς, εἰρηται, καὶ διὸτι τοῦ γένεσιν εἶναι συνεχῶς αὐτία ὡς ὦν 20 τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὅτι μεταβλητικὸν εἰς τάναντια, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ θατέρου γένεσις ἅει ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἄλλου φθορᾶ καὶ ἡ ἄλλου φθορᾶ ἄλλου γένεσις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ διὰ τί γίνεται ἅει ἀπολλυμένων· ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι ἀπλῶς φασίν, ὅταν εἰς ἀναίσθητον ἔλθῃ καὶ τὸ μῆ ὄν, 25 ὀμοίως καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκ μῆ ὄντος φασίν, ὅταν εἰς ἀναίσθητον. εἰτ' οὖν ὄντος τινὸς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου εἰτε μῆ, γίνεται ἐκ μῆ ὄντος. ὥστε ὀμοίως καὶ γίνεται ἐκ μῆ ὄντος καὶ φθείρεται εἰς τὸ μῆ ὄν. εἰκότως οὖν οὐχ ὑπολείπει· ἡ γὰρ γένεσις φθορᾶ τοῦ μῆ ὄντος, ἡ δὲ φθορὰ γένεσις τοῦ μῆ ὄντος.

30 Ἀλλὰ τούτο τὸ μῆ ὄν ἀπλῶς ἀπορήσειν ἂν τις

a i.e. the two parallel columns containing co-ordinate pairs; see W. D. Ross on Met. 1054 b 35.

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some things signify a "this," others a "such-and-such," others a "so-much." Those things, therefore, which do not signify substance are not said to come-to-be without qualification, but to come-to-be something. However, coming-to-be is said to take place in all things alike when a thing comes-to-be something in one of the two columns: in substance if it comes-to-be Fire, but not if it comes-to-be Earth; in quality, if it comes-to-be learned, but not if it comes-to-be ignorant.

It has already been stated how some things come-to-be without qualification and others do not, both generally and in the substances themselves, and that the substratum is the material cause why coming-to-be is a continuous process because it is subject to change into the contraries, and, in the case of substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a passing-away of another, and the passing-away of one thing another's coming-to-be. It is, however, not necessary even to raise the question why coming-to-be goes on when things are being destroyed; for, just as people use the term passing-away without qualification when a thing has passed into the imperceptible and into apparent non-existence, so likewise also they talk of coming-to-be from non-existence, when a thing appears out of imperceptibility. Whether, therefore, the substratum is something or is not, what comes-to-be does so from not-being; and so it comes-to-be from not-being and passes-away into not-being in the same manner. Therefore it is probable that coming-to-be never fails; for it is a passing-away of that which is not, and passing-away is a coming-to-be of that which is not.

But about that which "is not," unless you qualify
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πότερον τὸ ἐτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, οἷον γῆ καὶ τὸ βαρύ μη ὄν, πῦρ δέ καὶ τὸ κούφον ὤν, ἥ οὖ, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ καὶ γῆ τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ μῆ ὄν ὑλὴ ἡ τῆς γῆς, καὶ πυρὸς ὡσαύτως. καὶ ἀρά γε ἐτέρα ἐκα-
319 b τέρον ἡ ὑλή, ἡ οὐκ ἂν γίνοιτο ἐξ ἄλληλων οὐδ' ἐξ ἐναντίων; τούτως γὰρ ὑπάρχει τάναντια, πυρί, γῆ, ύδατι, ἀέρι. ἡ ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ἡ αὐτή, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς ἡ ἐτέρα. δ' μὲν γὰρ ποτε ὄν ὑπόκειται τὸ αὐτὸ, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ 5 τοσοῦτον εἴρησθω.

4. Περὶ δὲ γενέσεως καὶ ἄλλοιώσεως λέγωμεν τι διαφέρουσιν: φαμέν γὰρ ἐτέρας εἶναι ταύτας τὰς μεταβολάς ἄλληλων. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐστὶ τι τὸ ὑποκειμένου καὶ ἐτερον τὸ πάθος δ' κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου 10 λέγεσθαι πέφυκεν, καὶ ἐστὶ μεταβολὴ ἐκατέρου τούτων, ἄλλοιώσις μὲν ἐστὶν, ὅταν ὑπομένοντος τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, αἰσθητοῦ ὄντος, μεταβάλλη ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς πάθεσιν, ἡ ἐναντίοις οὖσιν ἡ μεταξύ, οἷον τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνει καὶ πάλιν κάμνει ὑπομένον γε ταύτο, καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς στρογγυλός, ὅτε δὲ γεννοείδης 15 ὁ αὐτὸς γε ὄν. ὅταν δ' ὁλον μεταβάλλῃ μὴ ὑπο-
μένοντος αἰσθητοῦ τινὸς ὡς ὑποκειμένου τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐκ τῆς γονῆς αἵμα πάσης ἡ ἐξ ὑδατος ἀρ ἡ ἐξ ἀέρος παντὸς ὕδωρ, γένεσις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦ-
τον, τοῦ δὲ φθορᾶ, μάλιστα δὲ, ἂν ἡ μεταβολὴ

1 post κούφον add. τὸ EL.
it, one might well be puzzled. Is it one of the two contraries? For example, is Earth, and that which is heavy, "not-being," but Fire, and that which is light, "being"? Or is this not so, but is Earth also "what is," while "what is not" is matter—the matter of Earth and of Fire alike? And is the matter of each different, or else they would not come-to-be out of one another, that is, contraries out of contraries? For the contraries exist in these things, namely, in Fire, Earth, Water and Air. Or is the matter the same in one sense, but different in another? For their substratum at any particular moment is the same, but their being is not the same. So much, then, on these subjects.

4. Let us now deal with coming-to-be and "alteration" and discuss the difference between them; for we say these forms of change differ from one another. Since, then, the substratum is one thing and the property which is of such a nature as to be predicated of the substratum is another thing, and since change takes place in each of these, "alteration" occurs when the substratum, which is perceptible, persists, but there is change in its properties, which are either directly or intermediately contrary to one another: for example, the body is healthy and then again sick, though it persists in being the same body, and the bronze is spherical and then again angular, remaining the same bronze. But when the thing as a whole changes, nothing perceptible persisting as identical substratum (for example, when the seed as a whole is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a whole into water), such a process is a coming-to-be—and a passing-away of the other substance—particularly if the change proceeds from something imper-
γίνεται ἐκ ἀναισθήτου εἰς αἰσθητὸν ἣ ἀφῇ ἡ πάσαις

20 ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οἷον ὅταν ὕδωρ γένηται ἡ φθαρῆ

eis ἀέρα: ὁ γὰρ ἂν ἔπεικὼς ἀναισθητὸν. ἐν δὲ
tούτως ἂν τι ὑπομένῃ πάθος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐναντιώσεως

ἐν τῷ γενομένῳ καὶ τῷ φθαρέντι (οἷον ὅταν ἢ

ἀέρος ὕδωρ, εἰ ἁμφῶς διαφανῆ ἡ ψυχρὰ), οὐ δὲί
tούτοι θάτερον πάθος εἶναι εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει. εἰ

25 δὲ μὴ, ἔσται ἀλλοίωσις. οἷον ὁ μουσικὸς ἀνθρώπως

ἔφθαρη, ἀνθρώπως δὲ ἀμοινος ἐγένετο, ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώ-
pως ὑπομένει τὸ αὐτὸ. εἰ μὲν οὖν τούτου μὴ πάθος

ἡν καθ’ αὐτὸ ἡ μουσικὴ καὶ ἡ ἀμοινία, τοῦ μὲν
gένεσιν ἢν ἀν, τοῦ δὲ φθορᾶ: διὸ ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν
tαῦτα πάθη, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ μουσικῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ

30 ἀμοίνου γένεσις καὶ φθορᾶ: νῦν δὲ πάθος τούτο
tοῦ ὑπομένοντος. διὸ ἀλλοίωσις τὰ τοιαύτα.

Ὡταν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ ἡ μεταβολή τῆς

ἐναντιώσεως, αὕξῃ καὶ φθίσῃ, οὖν ταῖς τόπων,

φορᾶ, οὖν ταῖς πάθος καὶ τὸ ποσὸν, ἀλλοίωσις,

320 α ὅταν δὲ μηδὲν ὑπομένῃ οὐ θάτερον πάθος ἡ συμ-

βεβηκὼς ὅλως, γένεσις, τὸ δὲ φθορᾶ. ἔστι δὲ ὑλὴ

μάλιστα μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσεως καὶ

φθορᾶς δεκτικῶν, τρόπον δὲ τινα καὶ τὸ ταῖς ἄλλαις

5 μεταβολαῖς, ὅτι πάντα δεκτικὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐναν-
ceptible to something perceptible (either to touch or to all the senses), as when water comes-to-be out of, or passes-away into, air; for air is pretty well imperceptible. But if, in these circumstances, any property belonging to a pair of contraries persists in being the same in the thing which has come-to-be as it was in the thing which has passed-away—if, for instance, when water comes-to-be out of air, both are transparent or cold—that into which it changes is not necessarily another property of this thing; otherwise the change will be "alteration." For example, the musical man passed-away and an unmusical man came-to-be, but the man persists as identically the same. Now if musicality (and unmusicality) were not in itself a property of man, there would be a coming-to-be of the one and passing-away of the other; therefore, these are qualities of a man, but the coming-to-be and the passing-away of a musical man and of an unmusical man; but, in fact, musicality (and unmusicality) are a quality of the persistent identity. Consequently such changes are "alteration."

When, therefore, the change from one contrary to another is quantitative, it is "growth and diminution"; when it is a change of place, it is "motion"; when it is a change of property (or quality), it is "alteration"; but when nothing persists of which the resulting state is a property or an accident of any kind, it is a case of coming-to-be, and the contrary change is passing-away. Matter, in the chief and strictest sense of the word, is the substratum which admits of coming-to-be and passing-away; but the substratum of the other kind of change is also in a sense matter, because all the substrata admit of
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τιώσεών τινων. περὶ μὲν οὖν γενέσεως, ἕτερον δὲ χαὶ πῶς ἐστι, καὶ περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

5. Περὶ δὲ αὐξήσεως λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, τὶ τε διαφέρει γενέσεως καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, καὶ πῶς αὐξάνεται
tῶν αὐξανομένων ἐκαστὸν καὶ φθίνει ὁτιοῦν τῶν
φθινόντων. σκεπτέον δὴ πρῶτον πότερον μόνως
ev τῷ περὶ ὁ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ πρὸς ἀλληλα διαφορά,
οἷον ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐκ τούτῳ εἰς τὸδε μεταβολή, οἷον ἐκ
dυνάμει οὐσίας εἰς ἐντελεχεία οὐσίαν, γένεσις ἐστὶν,
ἡ δὲ περὶ μέγεθος αὐξησις, ἡ δὲ περὶ πάθος ἀλ
λοίωσις. ἀμφότερα δὲ ἐκ δυνάμει οὐντων εἰς ἐντε
λεχείαν μεταβολή τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶν, ἡ καὶ ὁ
τρόπος διαφέρει τῆς μεταβολῆς. φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ
μὲν ἀλλοιώμενον οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μεταβάλλων κατὰ
tόπον, οὐδὲ τὸ γινόμενον, τὸ δὲ αὐξανόμενον καὶ
tὸ φθινόν, ἀλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ φερομένου. τὸ μὲν
gὰρ φερόμενον ὅλον ἀλλάττει τόπον, τὸ δὲ αὐξα

νόμενον ὁσπερ τὸ ἔλαυνόμενον τοῦτον γὰρ μένου
tος τὰ μόρια μεταβάλλει κατὰ τόπον, οὐχ ὁσπερ
tὰ τῆς σφαίρας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὅσῳ τὸπῳ μετα
βάλλει τοῦ ὅλον μένουτος, τὰ δὲ τοῦ αὐξανομέ

25 νου ἀει ἐπὶ πλείω τόποιν, ἐπ’ ἐλάττω δὲ τὰ τοῦ
φθινόντος.

1 καὶ φθορᾶς προὶ γενέσεως add. Bekker.

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certain kinds of contrariety. Let this, then, be our decision on the question about coming-to-be, whether it exists or not, and how it exists, and about "alteration."

5. It remains, therefore, for us to deal with "growth" and to discuss (a) how it differs from coming-to-be and from "alteration," and (b) how "growth" takes place in each thing that grows and how "diminution" occurs in each thing that diminishes. First we must consider whether the difference between them lies only in the sphere of each. For example, is it because the change from one thing to another (for instance, from potential to actual substance) is coming-to-be, while the change in respect of magnitude is "growth"; and the change in respect of property is "alteration," and both the last two involve a change from what is-actually to what is-potentially? Or does the difference also lie in the manner of the change? For it is manifest that, whereas neither that which is altering nor that which is coming-to-be necessarily changes in respect of position, that which is growing and that which is diminishing do change in this respect but in a manner different from that in which that which is moving changes. For that which is moving changes its place as a whole, but that which is growing changes its position like a metal which is being beaten out; for, while it retains its place, its parts undergo local change, but not in the same manner as the parts of a revolving globe. For the latter change their places while the whole remains in an equal space, whereas the parts of that which is growing change so as to occupy an ever larger space, and the parts of that which is diminishing contract into an ever smaller space.
"Οτι μὲν οὖν η' μεταβολὴ διαφέρει οὐ μόνον περὶ 
δ' ἄλλα καὶ ὡς τοῦ τε γινομένου καὶ ἄλλουνμένου 
καὶ αὐξανομένου, δῆλον. περὶ δὲ δ' ἐστὶν η' μετα-
βολὴ η' τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ η' τῆς φθίσεως (περὶ 
μέγεθος δὲ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ φθίνειν),
30 ποτέρως ὑποληπτέον, πότερον ἐκ δυνάμει μὲν 
μεγέθους καὶ σώματος, ἐντελεχεία δ' ἀσωμάτου 
καὶ ἀμεγέθους γίνεσθαι σῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, καὶ 
τούτῳ διχῶς ἐνδεχομένου λέγειν, ποτέρως η' 
αὔξησις γίνεται; πότερον ἐκ κεχωρισμένης αὐτής 
καθ' αὐτὴν τῆς ὕλης, ἡ ἐνυπαρχούσης ἐν ἄλλω 
σώματι; ἡ ἀδύνατον ἀμφότερος; χωρίστῃ μὲν 
γὰρ οὐδα η' οὐδένα καθέξει τόπον, [ἡ] οἶον στιγμὴ 
τις, ἡ κενὸν ἐσται η' σῶμα οὐκ αἰσθητόν. τούτων 
δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς 
eiναι: ἄεὶ γὰρ που ἐσται τὸ γινόμενον ξ' αὐτῶν,
5 ὥστε κάκεινο, ἡ καθ' αὐτὸ ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. 
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὲν κεχωρισμένῳ 
οὕτως ὥστε μὴ ἐκείνῳ καθ' αὐτὸ ἡ κατὰ συμ-
bεβηκός τι εἶναι, συμβῆσεται πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα. 
λέγω δ' οἶον εἰ γίνεται ἄπρ' ξ' ὕδατος, οὐ τοῦ 
ὕδατος ἐσται μεταβάλλοντος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ὁσπερ 
10 ἐν ἀγγείῳ τῷ ὕδατι ἐνείναι τῆς ὕλης αὐτῶν. 
ἀπείρους γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει ὕλας εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ 
γίνεσθαι ἐντελεχεία. ἔτι δ' οὐδ' οὕτω φαίνεται

*a i.e. either as itself occupying a place, or contained in something else.*
It is clear, then, that the changes both of that which comes-to-be and of that which "alters" and of that which "grows," differ not only in sphere but also in manner. But how are we to conceive the sphere of the change which is growth and diminution? Growth and diminution are generally regarded as taking place in the sphere of magnitude. Are we, then, to suppose that body and magnitude come-to-be out of what is potentially body and magnitude but is actually incorporeal and without magnitude? And since this can be meant in two different senses, in which of these senses does growth take place? Does it come from matter which exists separately by itself or matter previously existing in another body? Or is it impossible for growth to take place under either of these conditions? For, since the matter is separate, either it will take up no space, like a point, or else it will be void or, in other words, an imperceptible body. Of these alterations the first is impossible, and in the second the matter must be in something. For, in the first case, what comes-to-be from it will always be somewhere, so that the matter too must exist somewhere, either directly or indirectly; in the second case, supposing it is to be in something else, if it is so separated as not to belong to that something, either directly or indirectly, many impossibilities will arise. For example, if Air comes-to-be from Water, it will not be due to any change in the Water but owing to the presence of the matter of the Air in the Water, as in a vessel. For there is nothing to prevent there being an infinite number of matters contained in the Water, so that they might actually come-to-be; and, furthermore, the Air cannot be seen coming-to-be
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gινόμενος ἂν ἐξ ὑδατος, οἰον ἔξιὼν ὑπομένον-
tος.

Βέλτιον τοίνυν ποιεῖν πάσιν ἀχώριστον τὴν ὕλην ὡς οὕσαν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν τῷ ἄριθμῷ, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ μὴ μίαν. ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲ στιγμάς θετέον οὐδὲ γραμμάς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὕλην διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας. ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ ταῦτα ἔσχατα, ἡ ὕλη, ἢν οὐδὲποτ' ἀνευ πάθους οἰόν τε εἶναι οὐδ' ἀνευ μορφῆς. γίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀπλῶς ἐτέρους ἐξ ἐτέρου, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται, καὶ ὑπὸ τινος δὲ ἐντελεχεία.

20 ὄντος ἡ ὀμοιοειδοῦς ἡ ὀμογενοῦς, οἶον πῦρ ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἡ ἀνθρώπος ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου, ἡ ὑπ' ἐντελεχείας: σκληρῶν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπὸ σκληροῦ γίνεται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὐσίας ὕλη σωματικῆς, σώματος δ' ἢδη τουοὴ (σῶμα γὰρ κοινὸν οὐδέν), ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ με-
γέθους καὶ πάθους ἐστὶ, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ χωριστῇ,

25 τόπῳ δ' οὐ χωριστῇ, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰ πάθη χωριστά.

Φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν διηπορημένων ὁτι οὐκ ἐστιν ἡ αὐξῆσις μεταβολὴ ἐκ δυνάμει μεγέθους, ἐντελε-
χεία δὲ μηδὲν ἐχοντος μέγεθος: χωριστῶν γὰρ ἃν εἶν τὸ κενὸν, τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀδύνατον, εἰρηται ἐν ἐτέρους πρότερον. ἐτὶ δ' ἢ γε τοιαῦτη μεταβολὴ

30 οὐκ αὐξῆσεως ἰδιος ἀλλὰ γενέσεως: ἡ γὰρ αὐξῆσις ἐστι τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος μεγέθους ἐπίδοσις, ἡ δὲ φθίσις μείωσις (διὸ δὴ ἐχειν τι δεῖ μέγεθος τὸ

a See Met. 1032 a 12 ff.
b Or "form"; see Met. l.c. 25 ff.
c In 320 a 27–b 12.
d Phys. iv. 6-9.
in this manner out of Water, namely, issuing forth while the Water is left as it was.

It is better, therefore, to suppose that the matter in anything is inseparable, being the same and numerically one, though not one by definition. Further, for the same reasons also, we ought not to regard the matter of the body as points or lines; matter is that which has points and lines as its limits and cannot possibly ever exist without qualities and without form. Now one thing comes-to-be, in the unqualified sense, out of another, as has been determined elsewhere and by the agency of something which is actually either of the same species or of the same genus—for example, Fire comes-to-be through the agency of Fire and Man through that of Man—or through an actuality (for that which is hard does not come-to-be through that which is hard). But since there is also a matter out of which corporeal substance comes-to-be, but already belonging to a body of such-and-such a kind (for there is no such being as body in general), this same matter is also the matter of magnitude and quality, being separable by definition but not in place, unless the properties are also separable.

Now it is clear from the difficulties which we have discussed, that growth is not a change from a potential magnitude which actually has no magnitude; for then, "the void" would be separable, and that is impossible, as has already been stated elsewhere. Moreover, such a change is not peculiar to growth but characteristic of coming-to-be; for growth is an increase, just as diminution is a reduction, of the already existing magnitude (hence that which grows must already possess a certain magni-
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αὐξανόμενον), ὥστε οὐκ εἶ ἀμεγέθους ὑλὴς δεῖ εἶναι τῆν αὐξήσιν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν μεγέθους· γένεσις γὰρ ἄν εἰη σῶματος μᾶλλον, οὐκ αὐξήσις. ληπτέον δὴ

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μᾶλλον οἶον ἀποτομέονος τῆς ζητήσεως εἰς ἀρχῆς, ποίου τινὸς οὖντος τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ φθίνειν τὰ αἴτια ζητοῦμεν.

Φαίνεται δὴ τοῦ αὐξανομένου ὕποιον μέρος ηὐ-

ξῆσθαι, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ φθίνειν ἐλαττον γε-

γονέαν, ἐτὶ δὲ προσιόντος τινὸς αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ

5 ἀπιόντος φθίνειν. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ ἡ ἀσωμάτω ἀυ-

ξάνεσθαι ἢ σώματι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀσωμάτω, ἔσται

χωριστὸν τὸ κενὸν· ἀδύνατον δὲ μεγέθους ὑλὴν

εἶναι χωριστὴν, ὡσπερ εἰρηταὶ πρότερον· εἰ δὲ

σώματι, δῦο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματα τόπω ἔσται, τὸ

tε αὐξόμενον καὶ τὸ αὐξόν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο

10 ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ οὕτως ἐνδεχεται λέγειν
gίνεσθαι τὴν αὐξήσιν καὶ τὴν φθίσιν, ὡσπερ ὅταν

ἐξ ὑδατος ἀήρ· τότε γὰρ μείζων ὁ ὅγκος γέγονεν·

οὗ γὰρ αὐξήσις τοῦτο ἀλλὰ γένεσις μὲν τοῦ εἰς ὁ

μετέβαλεν ἔσται, φθορά δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίον· αὐξήσις

dὲ οὐδετέρου, ἀλλ’ ἡ οὕδενδος ἡ εἰ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῦ

15 ὑπάρχει, τῷ γυνομένῳ καὶ τῷ φθαρέντι, οἶον εἰ

σῶμα. τὸ δ’ ὕδωρ οὐκ ἦξηται οὐδ’ ὁ ἀήρ, ἄλλα

tὸ μὲν ἀπόλωλε τὸ δὲ γέγονεν· τὸ σῶμα δὲ, εἴπερ,

ηὔξηται. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀδύνατον. δεί γὰρ σῶ-
tude), so that growth must not be from matter without magnitude to an actuality of magnitude; for that would be rather a coming-to-be of a body and not a growth. We must, therefore, lay hold more closely and, as it were, get to grips with our inquiry from the beginning as to the nature of growth and diminution, the causes of which we are seeking.

It appears that every part of that which grows has increased, and likewise in diminution every part has become smaller, and, further, that growth occurs when something is added and diminution when something departs. Growth, then, must be due to the addition of something incorporeal or of a body. If it is due to something incorporeal, there will be a void existing separately; but, as has been stated before, it is impossible for matter of magnitude to exist separately; whereas, if it grows by the addition of a body, there will be two bodies in the same place, one which grows and the other which causes the growth, and this also is impossible. But neither is it admissible for us to say that growth or diminution occurs in the manner in which it occurs when air is produced from water. For then, the volume has become greater; for it will not be a case of growth but of a coming-to-be of that into which the change has taken place, and a passing-away of its contrary. It is a growth of neither, but either of nothing or of something (for example, "body") which belongs in common both to that which is coming-to-be and to that which has passed-away. The water has not grown nor has the air, but the former has perished and the latter has come-to-be; and the "body," if anything, has grown. But this is also impossible; for in our account we must preserve the character-
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ζειν τῷ λόγῳ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ αὐξανομένῳ καὶ φθίνοντι. ταῦτα δὲ τρία εστὶν, ὃν ἐν μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὅτι οὖν μέρος μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι τοῦ αὐξανομένου μεγέθους, ὦν εἰ σὰρξ τῆς σαρκὸς, καὶ προσιόντος τινός, καὶ τρίτον σωζομένου τοῦ αὐξανομένου καὶ ὑπομένοντος. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ γίγνεσθαι τι ἀπλῶς ἡ φθείρεσθαι οὐχ ὑπομένει, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἡ αὐξάνεσθαι ἡ φθίνειν ὑπομένει τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ αὐ-

25 ἔναν ομένον ἡ ἀλλοιοῦμενον. ἄλλο ἐνθα μὲν τὸ πάθος ἐνθα δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ μένει. ἐτ ἐστιν ἡ εἰρημένη αὐξήσις, ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄν μηθεῖς γε προσιόντος μηδὲ ὑπομένοντος αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ μηθεῖς ἀπόντος φθίνειν καὶ μὴ ὑπομένειν τὸ αὐξανόμενον. ἄλλα δὲ τοῦτο σώζειν. ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡ αὐξήσις τοιοῦτον.

30 Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις καὶ τί ἐστὶ τὸ αὐξανόμενον, πότερον ὁ προστίθεται τι, ὦν εἰ τὴν κνήμην αὐξάνει, αὐτὴ μεῖζων, ὃ δὲ αὐξάνει, ἡ τροφή, οὗ. διὰ τί δὴ ὅταν ὁ θέσης ἄμφω ἡ ἦν ἔστιν; μεῖζων γὰρ καὶ ὃ καὶ ὃ, ὅσπερ ὅταν μίξης ὁ θέσης ὑδατί ὁμοίως γὰρ πλεῖον ἐκάτερον. ἡ ὅτι τοῦ μὲν μένει ἡ οὐσία, τοῦ δ' οὐ, ὦν τῆς τροφῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἔπικρατοῦν λέγεται ἐν τῇ μίξει, ὦν ὅτι οἴνος-ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ οἴνου ἔργον ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ ὑδατος τὸ σύνολον μῦγμα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ' ἀλλοιώσεως, εἰ μένει σὰρξ οὕσα καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι, πάθος δὲ τι

a i.e. the generation of air from water.  
b i.e. the persistence of that which grows.  
c In line 22 above.  
d With λέγεται understand πλεῖον.
istics which belong to what is growing and diminishing. These characteristics are three: 

(a) that every part of the growing magnitude is greater (for example, if flesh grows, every part of it grows); 

(b) that it grows by the accession of something; 

and (c) that it grows because that which grows is preserved and persists. For while a thing does not persist in unqualified coming-to-be or passing-away, in alteration and growth or diminution that which grows or alters persists in its identity, but, in the case of alteration the quality, and, in the case of growth, the magnitude does not remain the same. Now if the change mentioned above is to be growth, it would be possible for something to grow without anything being added to it or persisting and to diminish without anything going away, and for that which grows not to persist. But this quality must be preserved; for it has been assumed that growth has this characteristic.

One might also raise this difficulty: What is it which grows? Is it that to which something is added? For example, if a man grows in his leg, is it his leg which is greater, while that which makes him grow, namely, his food, is not greater? Why have not both grown? For both that which is added and that to which the addition was made are greater, just as when you mix wine with water; for each ingredient is similarly increased. Or is it because the substance of the leg remains unchanged, but that of the other (i.e. the food) does not? For in the mixture of the wine and water it is the prevailing ingredient which is said to increase, namely the wine; for the mixture as a whole performs the function of wine and not of water. Similarly, too, in the process of "alteration," flesh is "altered," if
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΗΛΗ

υπάρχει τῶν καθ’ αὐτό, ὁ πρῶτος οὐχ ὑπήρχεν,
5 ἡλλοίωται τούτο· ὃ δ’ ἡλλοίωται, ὅτε μὲν οὐδὲν
πέπονθεν, ὅτε δὲ κάκεινο. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄλλοιον καὶ
ἡ ἄρχη τῆς κινήσεως ἐν τῷ αὐξανομένῳ καὶ τῷ
ἀλλοιομενῷ· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
τὸ εἰσελθόν γένοντ’ ἄν ποτε μείζον, καὶ τὸ ἀπο-
λαύσαν αὐτοῦ σώμα, οἶνον εἰ εἰσελθὸν γένοιτο
πνεύμα. ἀλλ’ ἔφθαρταί γε τούτο παθόν, καὶ τὸ
κινοῦν οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ.

'Επεὶ δὲ διηπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν ἱκανῶς, δεῖ καὶ
tῆς ἀπορίας πειρᾶσθαι λύσιν ἐὑρεῖν, σωζόντας τὸ
ὑπομένοντός τε τοῦ αὐξανομένου καὶ προσιόντος
τινὸς αὐξάνεσθαι, ἀπιόντος δὲ φθίνειν, ἐτὶ δὲ τὸ
ὀτιοῦν σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν ἡ μεῖζον ἡ ἔλαττον γεγο-
νέναι, καὶ μὴτε κενὸν εἶναι τὸ σῶμα μῆτε δύο ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ τόπῳ μεγέθη μῆτε ἀσωμάτω αὐξάνεσθαι.
ληπτέον δὲ τὸ αὐτίον διορισαμένου πρῶτον ἐν μὲν
ὅτι τὰ ἄνωμοιμερῆ αὐξάνεται τῷ τὰ ὀμοιομερῆ
αὐξάνεσθαι (σύγκειται γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἐκαστον),
20 ἐπεὶθ’ ὅτι σὰρξ καὶ ὁστοῦ καὶ ἐκαστον τῶν τοιοῦ-
tων μορίων ἐστὶ δυτίτον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
ἐν ύλῇ εἶδος ἐχόντων· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ύλη λέγεται καὶ
tὸ εἶδος σὰρξ ἡ ὁστοῦν. τὸ οὖν ὀτιοῦν μέρος
αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ προσιόντος τινὸς κατὰ μὲν τὸ εἶδος
ἐστὶν ἑνδεχόμενον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ύλὴν οὐκ ἐστὶν.

a i.e. the organic parts. b i.e. the tissue.
it remains flesh and its substance remains the same, but some inherent quality now belongs to it which did not belong before; but that by which it has been altered sometimes has not been affected but sometimes has also been affected. But that which causes alteration and the source of movement reside in that which grows and in that which is altered (for the motive agent is within them); for that which has entered might sometimes become greater as well as the body which benefits by it (for example, if, after entering in, it were to become wind), but after having undergone this process, it has passed-away and the motive agent is not in it.

Now that the difficulties have been adequately discussed, we must try to find a solution of the problem. In doing so we must maintain the doctrine that growth occurs, when that which grows persists and grows by the accession of something (and diminishes by the departure of something), and that every perceptible particle has become greater (or less), and that the body is not void, and that there are not two magnitudes in the same place, and that growth does not take place by the addition of anything incorporeal. We must grasp the cause of growth by making the distinctions (i) that the parts which are not uniform grow by the growth of the parts which are uniform—for each part is composed of these—and (ii) that flesh and bone and every such part, like all other things which have their form in matter, are of a double nature; for the form as well as the matter is called flesh or bone. It is quite possible, then, that any part can grow in respect of form by the addition of something, but not in respect of matter; for we must regard the process as like that
321 b

dei gar nohsai wospers e1 tis metropi tiw autw
25 metriw udwpo. de1 gar allo kai allo to ginomepon.
ovtw d' avxanei he uli tis sarxos, kai oux otopoun panti prosyginei, alla to mev upkeirei
to de prosgerxetai, tou de skhematos kai tou eidous
otpouin moriw. epi de twon anoimoomerwv touto
malloin thelon, oion xeiros, sto anaalogon euexetai:
30 he gar uli etera ovsan theloin malloin tou eidous
entathia he epi sarxos kai twv omooomerwv. dio
kai tebneotos malloin an doxeiein einai eti sarxe
kai ostouin he xepri kaiv baxinov. wste esti men
ws otioin tis sarxos euexetai, esti de' ws ou.
kata men gar to eidos otopouin proselhlycein, kata
35 de thel outhei ovs. meiexon menoi to thelon geyone
322 a proselhontos mev tinov, d kalieita trophi kai
enantion, metaballontos de eis to autw eidov, oion
ei xepo prosoi ygron, proselbnon de metabalo
kai genostoto xepron. esti men gar ws to omoiwn
omoiw avxanei, esti de' ws to anoimouin1 ano-
moiw.

5 Aporhseie de an tis poion ti dei eina to wi
avxanei. fanevov dh' oti dynamei ekewo, oion
ei sarp, dynamei sarca. entelecheia ara allo-
tharev dh touto Sarx geyonev. oikouv oik autw
kath' autw (gennesis gar an hvs, oik avxexous). alla

1 to anoimouin addidi.

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which happens when a man measures water with the same measure, for there is first one portion and then another in constant succession. It is in this way that the matter of the flesh grows; something flows out and something flows in, but there is not an addition made to every particle of it, but to every part of its figure and "form." That the growth has taken place proportionally is more obvious in the parts which are not uniform, for instance, in the hand; for there the matter, being distinct from the form, is more noticeable than in the flesh and the parts which are uniform; for this reason one is more likely to think of a corpse as still possessing flesh and bone than that it has a hand and an arm. Therefore, in one sense it is true that every part of the flesh has grown, but in another sense it is untrue; for in respect to its form there has been an accession to every part, but not in respect to its matter; the whole, however, has become greater (a) by the accession of something which is called food, the "contrary" of flesh, and (b) by the change of this food into the same form as that of the flesh, just as if moist were to be added to dry, and, after having been added, were to change and become dry; for, it is possible that "like grows by like" and also that "unlike grows by unlike."

One might raise the question what must be the nature of that by which a thing grows. It is clear that it must be potentially that which is growing, for example, potentially flesh, if it is flesh which is growing; actually, then, it is something different. This, therefore, has passed-away and come-to-be flesh—not alone by itself (for that would have been a coming-to-be and not growth); but it is that which
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕ

322 α

to aúxanómenov toutw. tì oûn patòn upò toutou [ηυξήθη]: h' mikhèn, wòsper oûw ei tis épichéoi
10 ùdwr, ô de ðùnaito oûn povëvn to mikhèn; kai
wòsper tô pûr aûfâmenov touto kauostóu, oûtwès èn
tŵ aûxanoménoi kai ònti èntelècheia sárpì to ènwn
aûxètiKóon prosellóntos duvâmei sárpòs èpoinhê
èntelècheia sárpca. oûkoiôn àma òntos ei gàr xwris,
gênesis. êstì mèn gàr oûtw pûr povhìsai épì to
15 ùpàrkhôn èpithënta ëxila. all' oûtw mèn aûxèsiws,
ôtan de autà tâ ëxila aûfthè, gênesis.

Pròsòv de to mèn kathòlou ou ðinetai, wòsper
ouðe ðìîvon ðe mët' ánthropos mëte tîw kath' èkasta:
all' òws èntaûtha to kathòlou, kàkei to pòsòn.
sàrpze de ÷è òstovh ÷è xèir kai toutwv tâ ômoeimerh,
20 prosellóntos mèn dh' tîwos pòsoù, all' ou sàrpko
pòsíps. h' mèn oûn duvâmêi to suñamôteron, oûn
pòsoû sàrpze, tâútì mèn aûxèi kai gàr pòsoû dhê
gevèsthai kai sàrpca. h' de mònon sàrpze, trèfêi:
tâútì gàr diaphêrei trôphi kai aûxèsiws tîw lògws.
diò trèfêtaì mèn èwos ðèn suûzêtai kai ðhîn, 21
25 aûxènetai de ðè oûk âeî. kai h' trôphi tî aûxèsi to
autò mèn, to ð' ðìnai allh. h' mèn gàr êstì to

1 ÷èûxèthû seclusit Joachim.
2 ðhînôv L : ðhînêi F : ðhînê H.

a And not a growth of already existent tissue.
grows which now comes-to-be flesh owing to the food. How has the food been affected by the growing thing? Is it by admixture, as if one were to pour water into wine, and the latter were able to convert the mixture into wine? And like fire when it takes hold of inflammable material, so the principle of growth present in that which grows (i.e. in what is actually flesh) lays hold of the added food which is potentially flesh, and turns it into actual flesh. The added food must, therefore, be together with that which grows; for, if it is separate, it would be a case of coming-to-be. For it is possible to produce fire by placing logs on the fire which is already in existence; in this case there is growth, but, when the logs themselves are set on fire, there is a coming-to-be of fire.

"Quantum-in-general" does not come-to-be, just as "animal," which is neither man nor any other particular animal, does not come-to-be; but what "animal-in-general" is in coming-to-be, that "quantum-in-general" is in growth. But what comes-to-be in growth is flesh or bone or hand and the uniform parts of these, by the accession of such-and-such a quantity of something, but not of such-and-such a quantity of flesh. In so far, then, as the combination of the two, e.g., so much flesh, is a potentiality, it produces growth; for both quantity and flesh must come-to-be, but in so far as it is potentially flesh only, it nourishes; for it is here that nutrition and growth differ in their definition. Therefore the body is nourished as long as it is kept alive, even when it is diminishing, but it is not always growing; and nutrition, though it is the same as growth, is different in its being; for, in so far as that which is added is
προσιδιν δυνάμει ποσή σάρξ, ταύτη μὲν αὐξητικὸν σαρκός, ἢ δὲ μόνον δυνάμει σάρξ, τροφή.
Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ εἴδος [ἵναν ὑλής], οἶνον αὐλός, δύναμις τις ἐν ὑλῇ ἑστὶν. ἐὰν δὲ τις προσὶ ὑλή, οὕσα δυνάμει αὐλός, ἔχονσα καὶ τὸ ποσὸν δυνάμει, οὗτοι ἐσονται μείζους αὐλοί. ἐὰν δὲ μηκέτι ποιεῖν δύνηται, ἀλλ' ὁ εἶν ὑδωρ ὀὖν ἂεὶ πλεῖον μιγνύμενον τέλος ὑδρῇ ποιεῖ καὶ ὑδωρ, τότε φθίσων ποιεῖται τὸ ποσὸν, τὸ δ' εἴδος μένει.

6. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πρῶτον δεῖ περὶ τῆς ὑλῆς καὶ τῶν καλομεμένων στοιχείων εἶπεῖν, εἰτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ πότερον ἄδιον ἔκαστον ἡ γίνεται πως, καὶ εἰ γίνεται, πότερον εξ ἀλλήλων γίνεται πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἢ τι πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῶν ἑστιν, ἀνάγκη δὴ πρότερον εἴπειν περὶ ὁν ἀδιορίστως λέγεται νῦν. πάντες γὰρ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα γεννώντες καὶ οἱ τὰ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων διακρίσει χρωνται καὶ συγκρίσει καὶ τῶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. ἐστὶ δ' ἡ συγκρίσεις μίξις: πῶς δὲ μιγνυθαι λέγομεν, οὐ διώρισται σαφῶς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δυνατόν, οὐδὲ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, μη-δενός ποιοῦντος μηδὲ πάσχοντος: καὶ γὰρ οἱ πλεῖο τὰ στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντες γεννώσι τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ τοῖς εἰς ἐνὸς ἀνάγκη

1 ἀνευ ὑλῆς seclusit Joachim.
2 αὐλός . . . αὐλός . . . αὐλοὶ Joachim: ἄυλος . . . ἄυλος . . . ἄυλοι codd: tibia . . . tibia . . . tibiae vertit Vatablus.

a In 321 b 22 ff.
b i.e. the Pluralists, like Anaxagoras, Democritus and Plato, who regard Earth, Air, Fire and Water as composed of some prior constituents.
c i.e. other Pluralists, like Empedocles, who regard them as actual elements.
potentially so much flesh, it is productive of the growth of flesh, but, in so far as it is only potentially flesh, it is nutriment.

This "form" of which we spoke is a kind of power present in matter, as it were a channel. If, therefore, matter is added which is potentially a channel and also potentially possesses such-and-such a quantity, these channels will become bigger. But if the "form" is no longer able to function, but, as water mixed with wine in ever-increasing quantities eventually makes the wine waterish and converts it into water, it will cause a diminution of the quantity, though the "form" still persists.

6. We must first deal with the matter and the so-called "elements" and determine whether they exist or not, and whether each is eternal, or whether there is a sense in which they come-to-be, and, if so, whether they all come-to-be in the same manner out of one another, or whether one among them is something primary. We must, therefore, first deal with matters about which people at present speak only vaguely. For all those who generate the elements and those who generate the bodies composed of the elements, apply the terms "dissociation" and "association" and "action" and "passion." Now "association" is a process of mixing; but what we mean by mixing has not yet been clearly defined. But there cannot be "alteration" any more than there can be "dissociation" and "association" without an "agent" and a "patient." For those who suppose the elements to be several in number ascribe the generation of composite bodies to the reciprocal "action" and "passion" of these elements, whereas those who derive them from a
λέγειν τὴν ποίησιν, καὶ τοῦτ’ ὤρθῶς λέγει Διο-
γένης, ὡστε εἰ μὴ εξ ἐνὸς ἤν ἀπαντᾷ, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τὸ
15 ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ὑπ’ ἄλληλων, οἶον τὸ θερμὸν
ψύχεσθαι καὶ τοῦτο θερμαίνεσθαι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ
ἡ θερμότης μεταβάλλει καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης εἰς ἄλληλα,
ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡστε τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ὥστε ἐν οἷς τὸ
ποιεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀνάγκῃ τούτων μίαν
eἶναι τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάντ’
20 εἶναι τοιαῦτα φάσκειν οὐκ ἄληθὲς, ἀλλ’ ἐν ὀσοὶς
tὸ ὑπ’ ἄλληλων ἐστὶν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν καὶ
περὶ μίξεως θεωρητέου, ἀνάγκῃ καὶ περὶ ἀφῆς·
οὕτε γὰρ ποιεῖν ταῦτα καὶ πάσχειν δύναται κυρίως
ἀ μὴ οἶον τε ἄφασθαι ἄλληλων, οὕτε μὴ ἄφαμενά
25 πως ἐνδέχεται μιψήναι πρῶτον. ὥστε περὶ τριῶν
tούτων διοριστέον, τί ἀφῆ καὶ τί μίξεις καὶ τί
ποίησις.

Ἄρχην δὲ λάβωμεν τήνδε. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν
ὀντων ὀσοὶς ἐστὶ μίξεις, εἶναι ταῦτ’ ἄλληλων ἀπτικά:
καὶ εἰ τι ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ πάσχει κυρίως, καὶ τοῦτοις
ὡσαύτως. διὸ πρῶτον λεκτέον περὶ ἀφῆς. σχεδὸν
30 μὲν οὖν, ωσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄνομάτων ἐκαστοῦ
λέγεται πολλαχώς, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὁμονύμως τὰ δὲ
θάτερα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων καὶ τῶν προτέρων, οὕτως
έχει καὶ περὶ ἀφῆς. ὀμως δὲ τὸ κυρίως λεγόμενον
323 α ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἔχουσι θέσιν. θέσις δ’ οἴσπερ καὶ

a Fr. 2 (Diels).
single element must necessarily hold that there is "action"; and Diogenes \( a \) is right in saying that there could not be reciprocal action and passion, unless all things were derived from one. For example, what is hot would not become cold, and the cold become hot again; for it is not heat and cold which change into one another, but it is obviously the substratum which changes; so that, where action and passion exist, their underlying nature must be one. It is not, however, true to say that all things are of this kind; but it is true of all things between which there is reciprocal action and passion.

But if we must go into the question of "action" and "passion" and of "commingling," we must also investigate "contact." For action and passion ought properly to be possible only for such things as can touch one another; nor can things be mixed with one another in the first instance without coming in some kind of contact. Hence we must decide about these three things, namely, what is "contact," what is "mixture," and what is "action."

Let us take this as our starting-point. All existing things which can undergo mixture must be able to come into contact with one another, and this must also be true of any pair of things, one of which acts and the other is acted upon in the proper sense of the word. Therefore we must first speak about "contact." Practically speaking, just as every other term which is used in several senses is so used owing to verbal coincidence or because the different senses are derived from different prior meanings, so it is also with "contact." Nevertheless, "contact" in its proper sense belongs only to things which have "position," and "position" belongs to those things
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tόπος· καὶ γὰρ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ὁμοίως ἀποδο
tέων ἀφὴν καὶ τόπων, εἶτ' ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένον ἐκα
stον αὐτῶν εἶτ' ἄλλον τρόπον. εἰ οὖν ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ
dιωρίσθη πρῶτερον, τὸ ἀπτεσθαὶ τὸ τὰ ἔσχατα

5 ἔχειν ἃμα, ταῦτα ἄν ἀπτοιτο ἄλληλων ὡς διωρι-
σμένα μεγέθη καὶ θέσιν ἔχοντα ἃμα ἔχει τὰ ἔσχατα.
ἐπεὶ δὲ θέσις μὲν ὁσοὶ καὶ τόπος ὑπάρχει, τόπου
δὲ διαφορὰ πρῶτη τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ἀπαντα τὰ ἄλληλων ἀπτόμενα
βάρος ἄν ἔχοι ἡ κοινότητα, ἡ ἅμφω ἡ θάτερον.

10 τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα παθητικά καὶ ποιητικά· ὥστε φανερὸν
ὅτι ταῦτα ἀπτεσθαὶ πέφυκεν ἄλληλων, ὡς διηρη
mένων μεγεθῶν ἃμα τὰ ἔσχατα ἐστὶν, ὄντων κινη
tικῶν καὶ κινητῶν ὑπ’ ἄλληλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κίνοι
οὐχ ὁμοίως κινεῖ τὸ κινούμενον, ἄλλα τὸ μὲν ἀνάγκη
κινούμενον καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖν, τὸ δ’ ἀκίνητον ὦν, δὴ-

15 λον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἔροῦμεν ἀσαῦτως·
καὶ γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν τί φασι καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν
κινεῖν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα διαφέρει γε καὶ δεῖ διωρίζειν·
οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν ποιεῖν, εἰπερ τὸ
ποιοῦν ἀντιθέσομεν τῷ πάσχοντι, τούτῳ δ’ οἶος ἡ
κίνησις πάθος, πάθος δὲ καθ’ ὅσον ἄλλοιοῦται

a Phys. 226 b 21-23.
which have also a "place"; for "place," just as much as "contact," must be attributed to mathematical objects, whether each exists in separation or in some other manner. If, therefore, as has been defined in a previous work,* for things to be in "contact" they must have their extremities together, only those things would be in contact with one another, which, possessing definite magnitudes and a definite position, have their extremities together. Now, since position belongs to such things as also have a "place," and the primary differentiation of "place" is "above" and "below" and other such pairs of opposites, all things which are in contact with one another would have "weight" and "lightness," either both of these qualities or one or other of them. Now such things are capable of "acting" and "being acted upon"; so that it is clear that those things are of a nature to be in contact with one another, the extremities of whose separate magnitudes are "together" and which are capable of moving one another and being moved by one another. But, since that which moves does not always move that which is moved in the same way, but one mover must move by being itself moved, and another while itself remaining unmoved, it is clear that we must speak in the same terms about that which "acts"; for the "moving thing" is said to "act" (in a sense) and the "acting thing" to "move." There is, however, a difference, and a distinction must be made; for not every "mover" can "act," if we are going to employ the term "agent" in contrast to the term "patient," and the term "patient" is applied only to those things for which the movement is an "affection." b

* See Met. x. 1022 b 15 ff.

b See Met. x. 1022 b 15 ff.
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20 μόνον, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν: ἄλλα τὸ κινεῖν ἐπὶ πλέον τοῦ ποιεῖν ἑστίν. ἐκεῖνο δ’ οὖν φανέρον, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς τὰ κινοῦντα τῶν κινητῶν ἀπτομέν’ ἂν, ἐστὶ δ’ ὡς οὐ. ἀλλ’ ὁ διορισμὸς τοῦ ἀπτεσθαί καθόλου μὲν ὁ τῶν θέσιν ἐχόντων καὶ τοῦ μὲν κινητικοῦ τοῦ δὲ κινητοῦ, πρὸς ἀλληλα δὲ, κινήτη-25 τικοῦ καὶ κινητοῦ ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν. ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ἀπτό-μενον ἀπτομένου ἀπτόμενον· καὶ γὰρ κινεῖ κινοῦ-μενα πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ ἐμποδῶν, ὡσις ἀνάγκη καὶ φαίνεται τὸ ἀπτόμενον ἀπτεσθαί ἀπτομένου· ἐστὶ δ’, ὡς ἐνίοτε φαμεν, τὸ κινοῦν ἀπτεσθαί μόνον τοῦ κινουμένου, τὸ δ’ ἀπτόμενον μη ἀπτεσθαί ἀπτο-30 μένου· ἄλλα διὰ τὸ κινεῖν κινοῦμενα τὰ ὁμογενή, ἀνάγκη δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπτομένου ἀπτεσθαί. ὡστε εἰ τι κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ὃν, ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἄν ἀπτοῖτο τοῦ κινητοῦ, ἐκεῖνου δὲ οὐδέν· φαμὲν γὰρ ἐνίοτε τὸν λυποῦντα ἀπτεσθαί ἡμῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ἐκεῖνοι. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀφῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

323 b 7. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν λεκτέον ἐφ-εξῆς, παρειλήφαμεν δὲ παρὰ τῶν πρῶτων ὑπεναν-226
(an "affection," that is, such as whiteness and heat, in virtue of which they only undergo "alteration"), whereas to "move" is a wider term than to "act." But this, at any rate, is clear, that there is a sense in which the things which move can come into contact with the things which are capable of being moved, and a sense in which they cannot do so. But the distinction between contact in the most general sense and "reciprocal contact" is that, in the first sense, two objects should have position and that one should be capable of moving and the other of being moved; in the second sense, that there should be one thing capable of moving and another of being moved, possessing, respectively, the qualities of "agent" and "patient." Generally, no doubt, if one thing touches another, the latter also touches the former; for almost all things, when they move, cause motion in the things which stand in their way, and in these cases that which touches must, and obviously does, touch that which touches it. But it is possible, as we say sometimes, for that which causes motion merely to touch that which is moved, and that which touches need not touch something which touches it; but because things of the same kind impart motion by being moved, it seems to follow necessarily that they touch that which touches them. Hence, if anything causes motion without being itself moved, it might touch that which is moved, though not itself touched by anything; for we say sometimes that a man who grieves us "touches" us, though we ourselves do not "touch" him. So much for our definition of contact in the realm of Nature.

7. Next we must deal with "action" and "passion." We have inherited conflicting accounts from...
τίος άλληλοις λόγοις. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖστοι τοῦτό 
γε ὁμονοητικῶς λέγουσιν, ὡς τὸ μὲν ὁμοιὸν ὑπὸ 
tοῦ ὁμοίου πᾶν ἀπαθές ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλ-
λον ποιητικὸν ἢ παθητικὸν εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου 
(πάντα γὰρ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ταύτα τοῖς ὁμοίοις), 
tὰ δ' ἀνόμοια καὶ τὰ διάφορα ποιεῖν καὶ πᾶσχειν 
eἰς ἄλληλα πέφυκεν. καὶ γὰρ ὅταν τὸ ἔλαττον 
pῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλείονος φθείρηται, διὰ τὴν ἐναντίωσιν 
τοῦτό φασὶ πᾶσχειν· ἐναντίον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πολὺ 
tῶ ὀλίγω. Δημοκρῖτος δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἰδίως 
ἐλέξει μόνος· φησὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁμοιὸν εἶναι 
tὸ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πᾶσχον· οὔ γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖν τὰ 
ἐτερα καὶ διαφέροντα πᾶσχειν ὑπ' ἄλληλων, ἄλλα 
κἂν ἐτερα ὑπὸ τι έις ἄλληλα, οὖχ ἢ ἐτερα 
ἀλλ' ἢ ταὐτὸν τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτη τοῦτο συμβαίνειν 
αὐτοῖς.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν, ἐοίκασι δὲ 
οἱ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγοντες ὑπεναντία φαι-
νεσθαι λέγειν. αὐτικὸν δὲ τῆς ἐναντιολογίας ὡτι 
δέων ὀλὸν τὸ θεωρῆσαι μέρος τι τυγχάνουσι λέ-
γοντες ἔκατερον· τὸ τε γὰρ ὁμοιὸν καὶ τὸ πάντῃ 
πάντως ἀδιάφορον εὐλόγον μὴ πᾶσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ 
ὁμοίου μηδὲν (τὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον θάτερον ἐσται ποιη-
tικὸν ἢ θάτερον; εἰ τε ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τι πᾶσχειν 
δυνατὸν, καὶ αὐτὸ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ· καίτοι τοῦτων οὕτως 
ἐχὸντων οὐδὲν ἂν εἰς οὕτε ἀφβαρτον οὕτε ἀκίνη-
tον, εἰπερ τὸ ὁμοιὸν ἢ ὁμοιὸν ποιητικὸν, αὐτὸ γὰρ

1 εἰ τε Bonitz: εἰτε Bekker.
our predecessors. For most of them agree in declaring that (i) like is always unaffected by like because, of two things which are like, neither is, they argue, at all more liable than the other to act or to be acted upon (for all the same properties belong in a like degree to things which are like), and (ii) things which are unlike and different are naturally disposed to reciprocal action and passion; for, when the lesser fire is destroyed by the greater, it is said to be thus affected owing to its contrariety, the great being the contrary of the small. Democritus, however, in disagreement with all other philosophers, held a view peculiar to himself; for he says that the agent and the patient are the same and alike, for (he declares) it is not possible for things which are "other" and different to be affected by one another, but even if two things which are "other" do act in any way upon one another, this occurs to them not in as much as they are "other," but because some identical property belongs to them both.

These, then, are the views expressed, and it appears that those who so expressed them were obviously in opposition to one another. But the reason of this opposition is that each school, when they ought to have viewed the problem as a whole, in fact only stated part of the truth. For, firstly, it is reasonable to hold that that which is like another thing, that is, in every respect absolutely without difference from it, cannot be in any way affected by the other thing which is like it. (For why should one be more likely to act than the other? And if like can be affected by like, it can also be affected by itself; yet, if that were so—if like were liable to act *qua* like—nothing would be indestructible or immovable, for everything view of earlier philosophers.
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25 αὕτω κινήσει πάντες ἔτερον καὶ
tὸ μηδαμῇ ταὐτὸν ὡσαντως. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν πάθοι
λευκότητι ὑπὸ γραμμῆς ἢ γραμμῆ ὑπὸ λευκότητος,
πλὴν εἰ μὴ ποὺ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὔν εἰ συμ-
βέβηκε λευκῆ ἢ μέλαινα εἶναι τὴν γραμμῆν· οὐκ
ἐξίστησι γὰρ ἄλληλα τῆς φύσεως ὅσα μὴ τ’ ἑναντία
μὴ τ’ ἐξ ἑναντίων ἐστίν. ἀλλ’ ἐπει οὐ τὸ τυχὸν
πέφυκε πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅσα ἢ ἑναντία
ἐστὶν ἢ ἑναντίωσιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ
tὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει μὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ταύτῳ,
tῷ δ’ εἶδει ἄνόμοιον καὶ ἑναντίον (πέφυκε γὰρ
σῶμα μὲν ὑπὸ σώματος, χυμὸς δ’ ὑπὸ χυμοῦ,
χρώμα δ’ ὑπὸ χρώματος πάσχειν, ὅλως δὲ τὸ
ὁμογενὲς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς. τούτου δ’ αἰτίων ὅτι
τάναντία ἐν ταύτῳ γένει πάντα, ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ πά-
σχει τάναντία ὑπ’ ἄλληλων), ὥστε ἀνάγκη πῶς μὲν
εἶναι ταύτα τὸ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, πῶς δ’
5 ἔτερα καὶ ἄνομοια ἄλληλους. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πά-
σχον καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν τῷ μὲν γένει ταύτα καὶ ὅμοια
tῷ δ’ εἶδει ἄνόμοια, τοιαύτα δὲ τάναντία, φανερὸν
ὅτι παθητικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ ἄλληλων ἐστὶ τὰ τ’
ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ· καὶ γὰρ ὅλως φθορὰ καὶ
γένεσις ἐν τούτοις.

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10 Διὸ καὶ εὐλογοῦν ἥδη τὸ τε πῦρ θερμαῖνει καὶ
tὸ ψυχρὸν ψύχειν, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιητικὸν ὅμοιοῦν
ἐαυτῷ τὸ πάσχον· τὸ τε γὰρ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον
ἐναντία ἐστί, καὶ ἡ γένεσις εἰς τούναντιον. ὥστ’
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 7

will move itself.) And, secondly, the same thing happens if there is complete difference and no kind of identity. For whiteness could not be affected in any degree by line, or line by whiteness, except perhaps incidentally, if, for example, it happened that the line was white or black; for unless the two things are contraries or made up of contraries, one cannot displace the other from its natural condition. But, since only such things as possess contrariety or are themselves actual contraries—and not any chance things—are naturally adapted to be acted upon and to act, both "agent" and "patient" must be alike and identical in kind, but unlike and contrary in species. For body is by nature adapted so as to be affected by body, flavour by flavour, colour by colour, and in general that which is of the same kind by something else of the same kind; and the reason of this is that contraries are always within the same kind, and it is contraries which act and are acted upon reciprocally. Hence "agent" and "patient" are necessarily in one sense the same, and in another sense "other" and unlike one another; and since "agent" and "patient" are identical in kind and like, but unlike in species, and it is contraries which have these characteristics, it is clear that contraries and their "intermediates" are capable of being affected and of acting reciprocally—indeed it is entirely these processes which constitute passing-away and coming-to-be.

It is, then, now reasonable to hold both that fire heats and that what is cold cools and, in general, that what is active assimilates that which is passive to itself; for the agent and patient are contrary to one another, and coming-to-be is a process into the
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άνάγκη τὸ πάσχον εἰς τὸ ποιοῦν μεταβάλλειν·
oútw γάρ ἔσται εἰς τούναντίον ἡ γένεσις. καὶ
15 κατὰ λόγον δὴ τὸ μὴ ταυτὰ λέγοντας ἀμφοτέρους

ομως ἀπεσεθαί τῆς φύσεως. λέγομεν γάρ πάσχειν

ότε μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον (οἶνον ὑγιάζεσθαι τοῦ ἀνθρω-

πόν καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι καὶ φύχεσθαι καὶ τάλλα τὸν

αὐτὸν τρόπον), ὅτε δὲ θερμαίνεσθαι μὲν τὸ ψυχρόν,

ὑγιάζεσθαι δὲ τὸ κάμνον· ἀμφότερα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ

20 (τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος· ὅτε

μὲν γὰρ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν φαμεν θερμαίνειν, ὅτε δὲ

τὸ θερμὸν· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡ ὕλη πάσχει, ἔστι δὲ

ὡς τούναντίον). οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐκεῖνο βλέπαντες

ταὐτὸν τι δεῖν ψήθησαν τὸ ποιοῦν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ

πάσχον, οἱ δὲ εἰς θάτερα τούναντίον.

25 Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ὑποληπτέον εἶναι περὶ τοῦ

ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὄντερ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κινεῖν καὶ

κινεῖσθαι. διιχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ τὸ κινοῦν· ἐν

ὅ τε γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, δοκεῖ τοῦτο κινεῖν

(ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ πρώτη τῶν αἰτιῶν), καὶ πάλιν τὸ

ἐσχατον πρὸς τὸ κινούμενον καὶ τὴν γένεσιν.

ἀμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος· καὶ γὰρ τὸν

30 ἰατρὸν φαμεν ὑγιάζειν καὶ τὸν οἶνον. τὸ μὲν οὖν

πρῶτον κινοῦν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν μὲν κινήσει ἀκίνη-

τον εἶναι (ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον), τὸ δὲ

ἐσχατον ἀεὶ κινεῖν κινούμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ ποιήσεως

a i.e. immediately next to that which is moved.
coming-to-be and passing-away, I. 7

contrary, so that the patient must change into the agent, since only thus will coming-to-be be a process into the contrary. And it is reasonable to suppose that both schools, though they do not express the same views, are yet in touch with the nature of things. For we sometimes say that it is the substratum which is acted upon (for example, we talk of a man as being restored to health and warmed and chilled and so on), and sometimes we say that what is cold is being warmed and what is ill is being restored to health. Both these ways of putting the case are true (and similarly with the agent: for at one time we say that it is the man that causes heat, and at another time that it is that which is hot; for in one sense it is the matter which is acted upon and in another sense it is the "contrary"). One school, therefore, directed its attention to the substratum and thought that the agent and patient must possess something identical, the other school, with its attention on the contraries, held the opposite view.

We must suppose that the same account holds good of "action" and "passion" as about moving and being moved. For "move" is also used in two senses; for that in which the original source of motion resides is generally held to cause motion (for the original source is the first of causes), and so also is that which is last in relation to that which is moved and to the process of coming-to-be. Similarly, too, in the case of the agent; for we speak of the doctor, and also of wine, as healing. Now, in motion, there is nothing to prevent the first mover being unmoved (in fact in some cases it is actually necessary), but the last mover always causes motion by itself being moved; and in action, there is nothing to prevent
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to mev prwton apathes, to de eschaton kai autto pason. osa gar mhe exei thn authyn vlyn, poiei
35 apathy ounta (oion h iatrikhi, auta gar poioudsa

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ugieian oudein pasei upo tou yngiazomenou), to
ded extrion poiouv kai autto pasei ti. h gar thermani-

vetai h yixeis ai allo ti pasei ama poiouv.

esti dedi men iatrikhi ws arxhi, to ded extrion to

eschaton kai aptomeun.

5 "Osa mev ouv mhe en vlyn exei thn morphi, tautta
mев apath thwn poihtikwn, osa de en vlyn, patheti-

c. thn mev gar vlyn legeomen omoiws ws eipein thn

authyn einai thwn antikeimewn opteroun, woste

geinos ou, to ded dynamenon thremoun einai

parontos tou thermaniakou kai plhosiagonotos anaigkh

10 thermanesva. dio, kataper eirhetai, ta meve thwn

poihtikon apath h ta ded pathetika. kai woste

epi kinhsesws, thn autoun exei tropon kai ep thwn

poihtikon. ekei te gar to prwto kiono akintonton,

kai epei thwn poihtikon to prwton poiouv apathes.

esti ded to poihtikon aution ws othen h arxhi ths

15 kinhsesws. to de ou eheka ou poihtikon (dioh h

ugieia ou poihtikon, ei mhe kath metaforan). kai

gar tou mev poioudtos othan uparxh, gineiv ti
to paseion, thn de efewn parousion ouketi gineivai,
a ll estin hde. ta de eido kai ta telh efweis twes.

* Of which the two opposites are species.

b Such as "health," or "disease."
the first agent being unaffected, but the last agent is itself also affected. For those things which have not the same matter act without being themselves affected (for example, the art of the physician which, while it causes health, is not itself acted upon by that which is being healed), but food, while it acts, is itself all somehow acted upon, for, while it acts, it is at the same time being heated or cooled or affected in some other way. Now the art of the physician is, as it were, an original source, while the food is, as it were, the final mover and in contact with that which is moved.

Of the things, then, which are capable of acting, those of which the form does not consist in matter are not affected, but those of which the form consists in matter are liable to be affected; for we say that the matter of either of the two opposed things alike is the same, so to speak, being, as it were, a kind; and that which is capable of being hot must become hot, if that which is capable of heating is present and near to it. Therefore, as has been said, some of the active agencies are unaffected, while others are liable to be acted upon; and what holds good of motion is also true of the active agencies; for as in motion the first mover is unmoved, so among active agencies the first agent is unaffected. The active agency is a cause, as being the source from which the origin of the movement comes, but the end in view is not "active" (hence health is not active, except metaphorically); for, when the agent is present, the patient becomes something, but when "states" are present, the patient no longer "becomes" but already "is," and the "forms," that is the "ends," are a kind of "state," but the matter, qua matter,
Η δ' ὤλη ἢ ὤλη παθητικόν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πῦρ ἐχει ἐν ὤλῃ τὸ θερμὸν· εἰ δὲ τι εἰθ’ θερμὸν χωριστόν, τοῦτο οὐδὲν ἀν πάσχοι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἵσως ἀδύνατον εἶναι χωριστόν· εἰ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐνα τοιαῦτα, ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνον ἂν εἰθ’ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθές. τι μὲν οὖν τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐστὶ καὶ τίς ὑπάρχει καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς, διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.

8. Πῶς δὲ ἐνδεχεται τούτο συμβαίνειν, πάλιν λέγωμεν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ πάσχειν ἐκαστὸν διὰ τινῶν πόρων εἰσιόντος τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐσχάτου καὶ κυριωτάτου, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ὅραν καὶ ἀκοῦειν ἡμᾶς φασί καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσας, ἔτι δὲ ὀράσθαι διὰ τὲ ἀέρος καὶ ύδατος καὶ τῶν διαφανῶν, διὰ τὸ πόρους ἔχειν ἀποράτους μὲν διὰ μικρότητα, πυκνοὺς δὲ καὶ κατὰ στοῖχον, καὶ μάλλον ἔχειν τὰ διαφανῆ μάλλον.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἔπι τινῶν οὕτω διώρισαν, ὀσπερ καὶ Ὁμπεδοκλῆς, οὐ μόνον ἔπι τῶν ποιοῦντων καὶ πασχόντων, ἄλλα καὶ μέγυνθαι φασιν ὅσων οἱ πόροι σύμμετροι πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰσίν· ὅδ’ ὃ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ πάντων ἐν λόγῳ διωρίκασι Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος, ἀρχικὴν ποιησάμενοι κατὰ φύσων ἢπερ ἐστίν. ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐδοξέ τὸ ὅν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν εἶναι καὶ ἀκάθεντον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κενὸν οὐκ ὄν, κινηθῆναι δ’ ὁ εὖ σύνασθαι μὴ ὄντος κενοῦ κεχωρισμένου, οὐδ’ αὐτὸ πολλὰ εἶναι μὴ ὄντος τοῦ διεύρυντος.

a Namely, Parmenides and Melissus.
is passive. Now fire holds the heat embodied in matter: but, if there were such a thing as "the hot" apart from matter, it could not be acted upon at all. Heat, therefore, perhaps cannot exist separately; but, if there are any such separate existences, what we are saying would be true of them also. Let this, then, be our explanation of "action" and "passion," and when they exist, and why and how.

8. Let us now go back and discuss how it is possible for action and passion to occur. Some people hold that each patient is acted upon when the last agent—the agent in the strictest sense—enters in through certain pores, and they say that it is in this way that we also see and hear and employ our other senses. Furthermore, they say that things are seen through air and water and the other transparent bodies, because they have pores, which, owing to their minuteness, are invisible, but are set close together and in rows, and are more transparent the closer together and in more serried array they are.

Some philosophers (including Empedocles) held this theory as regards certain bodies, not confining it to those which act and are acted upon; but mixture also, they assert, takes place only between bodies whose pores are symmetrical with one another. The most methodical theory, however, and the one of most general application has been that enunciated by Leucippus and Democritus, taking what is the natural starting-point. For some of the ancient thinkers a held that "what is" must necessarily be one and immovable; for they argued that the void does not exist, but that, if there is not a void existing separately, "what is" could not be moved; nor, again, could there be a multiplicity of things, since
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

τούτο δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρειν, εἴ τις οἴεται μὴ συνεχές εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ἄλλῳ ἀπτεσθαι διηρημένον, τοῦ φάναι πολλά καὶ μὴ ἐν εἶναι καὶ κενῶν. εἴ μὲν γὰρ πάντη διαφέτον, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν, ὡστε οὐδὲ πολλά, ἄλλα κενῶν τὸ ὀλον· εἴ δὲ τῇ μὲν τῇ δὲ μὴ, πεπλασμένως τινὶ τοῦτ' ἐνικέναι· μέχρι πόσου γὰρ καὶ διὰ τί τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει τοῦ ὀλον καὶ πλῆρες ἔστι, τὸ δὲ διηρημένον; ἐτὶ ὅμως φάναι ἀναγκαῖον μὴ εἶναι κίνησιν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν λόγων, ὑπερβάντες τὴν αἰσθήσιν καὶ παριδόντες αὐτὴν ὡς τῷ λόγῳ δέον ἀκολουθεῖν, ἐν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ πᾶν εἶναι φασιν, καὶ ἀπειρον ἑνοι̇ τὸ γὰρ πέρας περαινεῖν ἂν πρὸς τὸ κενῶν. οἷ μὲν οὖν οὕτως καὶ διὰ ταῦτα τὰς αἰτίας ἀπεφήναντο περὶ τῆς ἄληθείας· ἐτὶ δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων δοκεῖ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων μανία παραπλήσιον εἶναι τὸ δοξάζειν οὕτως· οὐδένα γὰρ τῶν μανομένων ἐξεστάναι τοσοῦτον ὡστε τὸ πῦρ ἐν εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ τὸν κρύσταλλον, ἄλλα μόνον τὰ καλά καὶ τὰ ψαυνόμενα διὰ συνήθειαν, ταῦτ' ἐνίοις διὰ τὴν μανίαν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν.

Λεύκιππος δ' ἕχειν ψήθη λόγους οὕτως πρὸς τὴν αἰσθήσιν ὁμολογοῦμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναφήσουσιν οὕτε γένεσιν οὕτε φθορὰν οὕτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν οὐντῶν. ὁμολογήσας δὲ ταῦτα μὲν τοῖσ φαινομένοις, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐν κατασκευάζουσιν ὡς οὐκ' ἂν

1 οὐκ E: οὕτε FHJL.

a i.e. the Monists.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8

there is nothing which keeps them apart; and they declare that, if one holds that the universe is not continuous but maintains contact in separation, this does not differ from saying that things are "many" (and not "one") and that there is a void. For if the universe is divisible throughout, there is no "one," and therefore no "many," but the whole is void; but to suppose that it is divisible at one point but not at another seems like a baseless invention. For how far is it divisible? And why is part of the whole indivisible and a plenum, and part divided? Moreover, they say that it is equally necessary to deny the existence of motion. As a result, then, of these arguments, going beyond and disregarding sense-perception, on the plea that they ought to follow reason, they assert that the universe is one and immovable; some add that it is infinite as well, for the limit would be a limit against the void. Some philosophers, then, set forth their views about the truth in this manner and based them on these grounds. Furthermore, though these opinions seem to follow logically from the arguments, yet, in view of the facts, to hold them seems almost madness; for no madman is so out of his senses as to hold that fire and ice are "one"; it is only between things which are good and things which, through habit, seem to be good, that some people, in their madness, see no difference.

Leucippus, however, thought that he had arguments, which, while agreeing with sense-perception, would not do away with coming-to-be and passing-away, or motion, or the multiplicity of things which are. While making these concessions to things as they appear, and conceding to those who postulate the oneness of things a that there could not be motion

The "atoms and void" theory of Leucippus and Democritus.
kίνησιν οὖσαν ἄνευ κενοῦ τὸ τε κενὸν μὴ ὄν, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος οὐδὲν μὴ ὄν φησιν εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ κυρίως ὄν παμπληθὲς ὄν. ἄλλ' εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐχ ἐν, ἄλλ'

30 ἀπειρὰ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀόρατα διὰ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων. ταῦτα δ' ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι (κενὸν γὰρ εἶναι), καὶ συνιστάμενα μὲν γένεσιν ποιεῖν, δια
lυόμενα δὲ φθοράν. ποιεῖν δὲ καὶ πάσχειν ἵ τυγ
χάνουσιν ἀπτόμενα (ταύτῃ γὰρ οὐχ ἐν εἶναι), καὶ

35 συντιθέμενα δὲ καὶ περιπλεκόμενα γεννάν. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἔνος οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι πλῆθος, οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν ἀληθῶς πολλῶν ἐν, ἄλλ' εἰναι τοὺτ' ἄδινα-

325 b τον, ἄλλ' ὄσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινές φασι πάσχειν διὰ πόρων, οὕτω πάσαν ἁλλοίωσιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ πάσχειν τοῦτον γίνεσθαι τὸν τρόπον, διὰ τοῦ κενοῦ γινομένης τῆς διαλύσεως καὶ τῆς φθο-

rᾶς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς αὐξῆσεως, ὑπεισδυνομένων στερεῶν.

Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆι ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν, ὄσπερ καὶ Λεύκιππός φησιν· εἰναι γὰρ ἄττα στερεᾶ, ἀδιαίρετα δὲ, εἰ μὴ πάντη πόροι συνεχεῖς εἰσίν. τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐσται ἔτερον στερεόν παρὰ τοὺς πόρους, ἄλλα πᾶν κενὸν. ἀνάγκη ἀρὰ

10 τὰ μὲν ἀπτόμενα εἶναι ἀδιαίρετα, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ αὐτῶν κενά, οὕς ἐκεῖνοι λέγει πόρους. οὕτως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος λέγει περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν.

Ὀι μὲν οὖν τρόποι καθ' οὓς τὰ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ δὲ πάσχει, σχεδὸν οὔτοι λέγονται· καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ-
without a void, he declares that the void is "not being," and nothing of "what is" is "not being"; for "what is" in the strictest sense is a complete plenum. "But this 'plenum,'" he says, "is not one but many things of infinite number, and invisible owing to the minuteness of their bulk. These are carried along in the void (for there is a void) and, when they come together, they cause coming-to-be and, when they dissolve, they cause passing-away. They act and are acted upon where they happen to come into contact (for there they are not one), and they generate when they are placed together and intertwined. But from that which is truly one, a multiplicity could never come-into-being, nor a one from the truly many; but this is impossible. But " (just as Empedocles and some of the other philosophers say that things are acted upon through their pores) "all 'alteration' and all 'passion' occur in this way, dissolution and passing-away taking place by means of the void, and likewise also growth, when solids creep into the voids."

Empedocles, too, is almost compelled to take the same view as Leucippus; for he says that there are certain solids, but they are indivisible, unless there are continuous pores throughout. But this is impossible; for then there will be nothing solid except the pores, but the whole will be void. It necessarily follows, therefore, that those things which are in contact are indivisible, but the spaces between them, which he calls pores, must be void. This is also Leucippus' view about "action" and "passion."

These, then, are, roughly speaking, the accounts given of the way in which some things "act" and other things are "acted upon." As regards this
των, καὶ πῶς λέγουσι, δήλον, καὶ πρὸς τᾶς αὐτῶν 15 θέσεις αἰ̂ς χρώνται σχέδον ὁμολογουμένως φαίνε- ται συμβαίνον. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἦττον, οἶον Ἕμπε- δοκλείς οὔν τινα τρόπον ἔσται γένεσις καὶ φθορά καὶ ἄλλοις ἐστι, οὐ δήλον. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἅδικορεται τὰ πρῶτα τῶν σωμάτων, σχήματι διαφέροντα μόνον, ἐξ ὧν πρῶτων σύγχειται καὶ εἰς ὧν ἐσχάτα 20 διαλυότας. Ἕμπεδοκλεῖς δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φανερὸν ὅτι μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθοράν, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πῶς γίνεται καὶ φθεί- ρεται τὸ σωρευόμενον μέγεθος, οὔτε δήλον οὔτε ἐνδέχεται λέγειν αὐτῷ μὴ λέγοντι καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς εἶναι στοιχείον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, 25 ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαῖῳ γέγραφε Πλάτων ὁ σωσότον γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦ μὴ τοῦ αὐτῶν τρόπον Λευκίππῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ὁ μὲν στερεὰ ὁ δὲ ἐπίπεδα λέγει τὰ ἅδικορετα, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπειρὸς ὑρίσθαι σχήματι 20 τῶν ἅδικορέτων στερεών ἐκαστὸν, ὁ δὲ ὦρισμένος, ἐπεὶ ἅδικορετά γε ἀμφότεροι λέγοντι καὶ ὦρισμένα 30 σχήματι. ἕκ δὴ τούτων αἰ̂ς γενέσεις καὶ αἰ̂ς δια- κρίσεις Λευκίππῳ μὲν ὁ δόξος τρόποι ἄν εἴην, ἃ γὰρ σαρκικῷ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς (ταύτῃ γὰρ διακριτὸν ἐκαστὸν), Πλάτων ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀφῆ μόνον· κενὸν γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι φησιν.

Καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἅδικορέτων ἐπισεῦδων εἰρή- καμεν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἅδι- 35 αἱρέτων στερεῶν τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον θεωρήσαι τὸ

a i.e. Leucippus and the other Atomists.
b i.e. the Atomists.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8

school, it is obvious what their views are and how they state them, and they are clearly more or less consistent with the suppositions which they adopt. This is less clearly the case with the other school; for example, it is not clear how, in the view of Empedocles, there are to be coming-to-be and passing-away and "alteration." For to the other school the primary bodies, from which originally bodies are composed and into which ultimately they are dissolved, are indivisible, differing only in structure; but to Empedocles, it is clear that all the other bodies, down to the elements, have their coming-to-be and passing-away, but it is not evident how the accumulated mass of the elements themselves comes-to-be and passes-away; nor is it possible for him to give an explanation without asserting that there is also an element of fire and likewise of all the other kinds, as Plato has stated in the Timaeus. For Plato is so far from giving the same account as Leucippus that, while both of them declare that the elementary constituents are indivisible and determined of figures, (a) Leucippus holds that the indivisibles are solid, Plato that they are planes, and (b) Leucippus declares that they are determined by an infinite number of figures, Plato by a definite number. It is from these indivisibles that the comings-to-be and dissolutions result: according to Leucippus, through the void and through the contact (for it is at the point of contact that each body is divisible); according to Plato, as a result of contact only, for he denies that a void exists.

Now we have dealt with indivisible planes in earlier discussions; but with regard to indivisible solids, let us leave for the moment further discussion.

Plato’s view compared with that of Leucippus.

Neither the theory of Empedocles nor that of
ARISTOTLE

συμβαίνον ἀφείσθω τὸ νῦν, ὡς δὲ μικρὸν παρεκ-
βάσιν εἰπεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον ἀπαθές τε ἐκαστὸν λέγειν
tῶν ἀδιαίρετων (οὐ γὰρ οἰόν τε πάσχειν ἄλλῳ ἐ
dιὰ τοῦ κενοῦ) καὶ μηδενὸς ποιητικὸν πάθος· οὔτε
gὰρ ψυχρὸν οὔτε σκληρὸν οἴον τ' εἰναι. καίτοι
τούτῳ γε ἀτοπον, τὸ μόνον ἀποδοῦναι τῷ περι-
5 φερεῖ σχῆματι τὸ θερμὸν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τοῦνα-
tίον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἄλλῳ τινὶ προσήκειν τῶν σχημάτων.
ἀτοπον δὲ κἂν εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ὑπάρξει, λέγω δὲ
θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, βαρύτης δὲ καὶ κοψφότης
καὶ σκληρότης καὶ μαλακότης μὴ ὑπάρξει: καίτοι
βαρύτερον γε κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν φησιν εἰναι
10 Δημόκριτος ἐκαστὸν τῶν ἀδιαίρετων, ὡστε δὴλον
ὅτι καὶ θερμότερον. τοιαῦτα δ' ὄντα μὴ πάσχειν
ὑπ’ ἄλληλως ἀδύνατον, οἷον ὑπὸ τοῦ πολὺ ὑπερ-
βάλλοντος θερμοῦ τὸ ἢρέμα θερμῶν. ἄλλα μὴν
εἰ σκληρῶν, καὶ μαλακῶν. τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν ἕδη τῷ
πάσχει τι λέγεται· τὸ γὰρ ὑπεικτικὸν μαλακῶν.
15 ἄλλα μὴν ἀτοπον καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ὑπάρξει ἄλλῳ ἐ
μόνον σχῆμα· καὶ εἰ ὑπάρξει, ἐν δὲ μόνον, οἷον τὸ
μὲν ψυχρὸν τὸ δὲ θερμὸν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν μία τις εἰη
ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ ἀδύνατον καὶ εἰ πλεῖω
τῷ ἐνν. ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ὅν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔξει τὰ πάθη,
20 ὡστε καὶ ἐάν πάσχῃ εἴπερ ψύχεται, ταύτῃ τῇ
καὶ ἄλλο ποιήσει ἡ πεῖσται. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων· τούτῳ γὰρ καὶ

1 ταύτῃ τῇ J: ταύτῃ τῇ EL: ταύτῃ τοι F: ταύτῳ τῇ H.

* i.e. of the Atomists.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, I. 8

of what they involve and deal with them in a short digression. It is a necessary part of the theory that each "indivisible" is incapable of being acted upon (for it cannot be acted upon except through the void) and incapable of producing an effect on anything else; for it cannot be either cold or hard. Yet it is certainly strange that heat can only be attributed to the spherical figure; for then it necessarily follows that its contrary, cold, must belong to another of the figures. It is also strange if these properties, I mean heat and cold, belong to the indivisibles, while heaviness and lightness and hardness and softness are not going to belong. Yet Democritus says that the more each of the indivisibles exceeds, the heavier it is, so that clearly it is also hotter. Being of this kind, it is impossible that the indivisibles should not be acted upon by one another, for example, the slightly hot should be acted upon by what far surpasses it in heat. Again, if an indivisible can be hard, it can also be soft; and the soft is always so-called because it can be acted upon; for that which yields to pressure is soft. But, further, it is strange that no property except figure should attach to the indivisible; and that, if properties do attach to them, only one should attach to each, e.g. that one "indivisible" should be cold and another hot; for, then, neither would their substance be uniform. It is equally impossible, too, that more than one property should belong to one indivisible, for, being indivisible, it will possess these properties in the same place; so that if it is acted upon by being chilled, it will also, in this way, act or be acted upon in some other way. And similarly with the other properties also; for this problem also confronts in
τοῖς στερεά καὶ τοῖς ἑπίπεδα λέγουσιν ἀδιαίρετα
συμβαίνει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· οὔτε γὰρ μανότερα
οὔτε πυκνότερα ὁ ὁ ὁ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ρ 1 παθητικά EHL: -όν F.

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* See Phys. 190 b 24, 192 a 1 ff.
the same way both those who assert that "indivisibles" are solid and those who say they are planes, for they cannot become either rarer or denser, because there can be no void in the "indivisibles." Further, it is strange that there should be small "indivisibles" but not large ones; for it is natural to suppose at this stage that the larger bodies are more liable to be shattered than the small, for the former, like large things in general, are easily dissolved, since they come into collision with many other bodies. But why should indivisibility in general attach to small things rather than large? Furthermore, is the substance of all these solids uniform or does it differ in different groups, as if, for example, some were fiery and some earthy in their bulk? For if they are all of one substance, what has separated them from one another? Or why do they not become one when they come into contact, just as water does when it touches water? For there is no difference between the two cases. But if they belong to different classes, what are their different qualities? Indeed it is clear that we ought to postulate that these classes rather than the "figures" are the origins and causes of the resulting phenomena. Moreover, if they were different in substance they would act and be acted upon reciprocally if they touched one another. Again, what sets these in motion? For if it is something other than themselves, they must be liable to be acted upon; but, if each is its own mover either it will be divisible, in part causing motion and in part being moved, or contraries will belong to it in the same respect, and the matter of it will be not only arithmetically but also potentially one.\(^a\)

As for those who say that the processes of being
tά πάθη συμβαίνειν, εἰ μὲν καὶ πεπληρωμένων
tῶν πόρων, περιεργον οἱ πόροι· εἰ γὰρ ταύτη τι
10 πάσχει τὸ πᾶν, κἂν μὴ πόρους ἔχον ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ
συνεχεῖς ὃν πάσχοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. έτι δὲ πῶς
ἐνδέχεται περὶ τοῦ διορᾶν συμβαίνειν ὡς λέγουσιν;
οὔτε γὰρ κατὰ τὰς ἀφὰς ἐνδέχεται διενέαν διὰ τῶν
dιαφανῶν, οὔτε διὰ τῶν πόρων, εἰ πλήρης ἐκαστος·
tί γὰρ διοίσει τοῦ μὴ ἔχειν πόρους; πάν γὰρ
15 ὁμοίως ἔσται πλήρες. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ καὶ κενὰ μὲν
tαῦτα (ἀνάγκη δὲ σώματα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν), ταὐτὸ
συμβιβασται πάλιν. εἰ δὲ τηλικάντα τὸ μέγεθος
ὡστε μὴ δέχοσθαι σῶμα μηδέν, γελοῖον τὸ μικρὸν
μὲν οἷος θαυμάζη κενὸν εἰναι, μέγα δὲ μὴ μηδ᾽ ὁπηλι-
κονοῦν, ἦ τὸ κενὸν ἀλλο τι οὐέσθαι λέγειν πλὴν
20 χώραν σώματος, ὡστε δὴλον ὅτι παντὶ σώματι τὸν
ὄγκον ἦσον ἔσται κενὸν.
"Ολως δὲ τὸ πόρους ποιεῖν περιεργον· εἰ μὲν γὰρ
μηδέν ποιεῖ κατὰ τὴν ἀφήν, οὔδε διὰ τῶν πόρων
ποιήσει διων· εἰ δὲ τῷ ἀπτεσθαί, καὶ μὴ πόρων
ὀντων τὰ μὲν πείσεται τὰ δὲ ποιήσει τῶν πρὸς
25 ἄλληλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πεφυκότων. ὁτι μὲν
οὐν οὕτως λέγειν τοὺς πόρους ὡς τινες ὑπολαμ-
βάνουσιν, ἡ ὑσεύδος ἡ μάταιων, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων
ἐστιν· διαρετῶν δ᾽ ὄντων πάντη τῶν σωμάτων
πόρους ποιεῖν γελοῖον· ἦ γὰρ διαιρετά, δύναται
χωρίζεσθαι.

* i.e. the body is none the less impenetrable, even if it is
held that the pores, though they contain bodies, are them-
selves, qua pores, empty channels.

^ i.e. the very fact that a body is everywhere divisible
makes it possible to open up a channel in it.
acted upon occur through movement in the pores, if this happens although the pores are filled, the pores are an unnecessary supposition; for if the whole body is acted upon at all in this way, it would be acted upon in the same way even if it had no pores, in its own continuous self. Again, how is it possible to carry out the process of seeing through a medium as they describe it? For it is not possible to penetrate through the transparent bodies either at the points of contact or through the pores, if each pore is full. For how will this condition differ from the possession of no pores at all? For the whole will be equally full throughout. Furthermore, if these channels, though they must contain bodies, are void, the same result will occur again; but if they are of such a size that they cannot admit any body, it is absurd to suppose that there is a small void but not a big one, of whatever size it be, or to think that "a void" means anything except a space for a body; so that it is clear that there will be a void equal in cubic capacity to every body.

In general, then, it is superfluous to postulate the existence of pores; for if the agent effects nothing by contact, neither will it effect anything by passing through pores. If, however, it effects anything by contact, then, even without there being any pores, some of those things which are by nature adapted for reciprocal effect of this kind will be acted upon, while others will act. It is clear, therefore, from what we have said that it is either false or useless to talk of pores of the kind which some people suppose to exist, and, since bodies are everywhere divisible, it is ridiculous to postulate pores at all; for since bodies are divisible, they can be separated into parts.
9. Τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσι γεννᾶν καὶ
30 ποιεῖν καὶ πᾶσχειν, λέγωμεν λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τὴν
πολλάκις εἰρημένην. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν δυνάμει
tὸ δ’ ἐντελεχεῖα τοιοῦτον, πέφυκεν οὐ τῇ μὲν τῇ
δ’ οὖ πᾶσχειν, ἀλλὰ πάντῃ καθ’ ὅσον ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον,
ἡττον δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοιοῦτον μᾶλλόν ἐστι καὶ
ἡττον καὶ ταύτῃ πόρους ἂν τις λέγοι μᾶλλον,
35 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς μεταλλευομένοις διατείνουσι τοῦ
327 a παθητικοῦ φλέβες συνεχεῖς. συμφυεῖς μὲν οὖν ἐκα-
στον καὶ ἐν ὑπὸ ἀπαθεῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ θυγγά-
νοντα μὴ τε αὐτῶν μὴ τ’ ἄλλων, ἃ ποιεῖν πέφυκε
καὶ πᾶσχειν. λέγω δ’ οἶνον οὐ μόνον ἀπτόμενον
θερμαίνει τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀποθεὶ τ’ τὸν μὲν γὰρ
5 ἀέρα τὸ πῦρ, ὁ δ’ ἄηρ τὸ σῶμα θερμαίνει, πέφυκὼς
ποιεῖν καὶ πᾶσχειν. τὸ δὲ τῇ μὲν οἷοσθαί πᾶσχειν
τῇ δὲ μῆ, διορίσαντας ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦτο λεκτέον. εἰ
μὲν γὰρ μὴ πάντῃ διαιρέτον τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ
սῶμα ἀδιαίρετον ἢ πλάτος, οὐκ ἄν εἰπῃ πάντῃ
10 παθητικόν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ συνεχὲς οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο
ψεύδος καὶ πᾶν σῶμα διαιρέτον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει
dιηρήσθαι μὲν ἀπτεθαί δε, ἡ διαιρέτον εἰναί. εἰ
gὰρ διακρίνεσθαι δύναται κατὰ τὰς ἀφὰς, ὥσπερ
φασὶ τινες, κἂν μῆπω ἢ διηρημένον, ἐσται διηρη-

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a It is difficult to extract any meaning from this sentence as it stands. Joachim supposes a lacuna after τῇ δὲ μή.
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9. Let us now deal with the question about the way in which existences have the power of generating and of acting and being acted upon, starting from the principle which we have often enunciated. For if there exists that which is potentially of a certain kind as well as that which is actually so, it is of a nature, in so far as it is what it is, to be acted upon in every part, and not in some part but not in another, and to a more or a less extent according as it is more or less of that particular nature; and one might speak of pores as having a particular nature in a greater degree, just as there are veins of substance which can be acted upon which stretch continuously in metals which are being mined. Every body, then, which is coherent and one is not acted upon; and this is equally true of bodies which do not touch either each other or other bodies which are of a nature to act or be acted upon. Fire is an example of what I mean: it heats not only when it is in contact with something, but also if it is at a distance; for it heats the air, and the air heats the body, being of a nature both to act and to be acted upon. But having enunciated the theory that a body is acted upon in one part but not in another, we must first make the following declaration: if the magnitude is not everywhere divisible, but there is a divisible body or plane, no body would be liable to be acted upon throughout, but neither would any body be continuous; but, if this is not true and every body is divisible, there is no difference between "having been divided but being in contact" and "being divisible"; for if it is possible for a body to be "separated at the points of contact"—a phrase which some people use—then, even if it has not yet been divided,
μένον· δύνατον γὰρ διαιρεθῆναι· γίνεται γὰρ οὐδὲν


ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΣ


15 ἀδύνατον. ὅλως δὲ τὸ τοῦτον γίνεσθαι τὸν τρόπον


σχιζομένων τῶν σωμάτων ἀτοποῦ· ἀναίρει γὰρ οὐ
tos ὁ λόγος ἀλλοίωσιν, ὅρωμεν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα


συνεχὲς ὅτε μὲν ὑγρὸν ὅτε δὲ πεπηγόσ, οὔ διαι-


ρέσει καὶ συνθέσει τούτῳ παθόν, οὐδὲ τροπῆ καὶ
diαθνηγῆ, καθάπερ λέγει Δημόκριτος· οὐτὲ γάρ


20 μετατεθὲν οὔτε μεταβαλὸν τὴν φύσιν πεπηγόσ ἐξ


ὑγροῦ γέγονεν· οὐδ' ἐνυπάρχει τὰ σκληρὰ καὶ πε-


πηγότα ἀδιαιρετα τοὺς ὅγκους· ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἀπαν


ὑγρὸν, ὅτε δὲ σκληρὸν καὶ πεπηγόσ ἐστιν. έτι


δ' οὐδ' αὔξησιν οἶον τ' εἶναι καὶ φθίσιν· οὐ γάρ


ὅτιον ἐσται γεγονός μεῖζον, εἴπερ ἐσται πρόσθεσις,


25 καὶ μὴ πᾶν μεταβεβληκός, ἡ μικθέντος τινὸς ἡ


καθ' αὐτὸ μεταβαλόντος.


"Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ γεννᾶν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ


gίνεσθαι τε καὶ πᾶσχειν ὅπ' ἄλληλων, καὶ τίνα
tρόπον ἐνδεχεται, καὶ τίνα φανὲρ μὲν τινὲς οὐκ


ἐνδεχεται δὲ, διωρίσθω τούτων τὸν τρόπον.


30 10. Λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι περὶ μὲξεως κατὰ τὸν


αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου· τοῦτο γὰρ ἢν τρίτον
tῶν προτεθέντων ἐξ ἀρχῆς. σκεπτέον δὲ τί τ'


ἐστὶν ἡ μίξις καὶ τί τὸ μικτὸν, καὶ τίσιν ὑπάρχει
tῶν ὀντῶν καὶ πῶς, έτι δὲ πότερον ἐστι μίξις ἡ


τοῦτο ψεῦδος· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐστὶ μικθῆναι τί ἐτε-


35 ρον ἐτέρῳ, καθάπερ λέγουσι τινες· ὀντων μὲν γὰρ


327 ἐτι τῶν μικθέντων καὶ μὴ ἡλλοιωμένων οὐδὲν μάλ-


a The other two being ἀφὶ (ch. 6) and ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (chs. 7-9).


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it will be in a condition of having been divided; for since it can be divided, nothing impossible results. And, in general, it is strange that it should happen in this way only, namely, if the bodies are being split; for this theory does away with "alteration," whereas we see the same body remaining in a state of continuity, though it is at one time liquid and at another solid, and it has not undergone this change by "division" or "composition," nor yet by "turning" and "mutual contact," as Democritus declares; for it has not become solid instead of liquid through any change of arrangement or alteration of its substance, nor do there exist in it those hard and congealed particles which are indivisible in their bulk, but it is liquid and at another time hard and congealed uniformly throughout. Furthermore, it is also impossible for there to be growth and diminution; for if there shall be any addition—as opposed to a change in the whole, either by the admixture of something or by a change in the body itself—no part of it will have become greater. Let this, then, be our explanation of the way in which things generate and act and come into being and are acted upon by one another, and the manner in which these processes can occur and the impossible theories which some philosophers enunciate.

10. It now remains to consider "mixture" by the same kind of method; for this is the third of the subjects originally proposed. We must consider what "mixture" is and what it is that can be mixed and of what things mixture is a property and how; and, further, whether there is such a thing as mixture, or is it a fiction. For, according to some people, it is impossible for one thing to be mixed with another; for (a) if the ingredients still exist and are not altered
λόν νῦν μεμίχθαι φασίν ἡ πρῶτην, ἀλλὰ ὀμοίως ἔχειν, θατέρου δὲ φθαρέντος οὐ μεμίχθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὸ δ’ οὐκ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ μίξιν ὀμοίως ἐχόντων εἶναι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ εἰ ἀμφότερων συνελθόντων ἐφθαρται τῶν μιγνυμένων ἐκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ εἶναι μεμιγμένα τὰ γε ὅλως οὐκ ὄντα.

Οὕτως μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἐσκε ἔστειν διορίσαι τί διαφέρει μίξις γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ τί τὸ μικτὸν τοῦ γεννητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς δεὶ διαφέρειν, εἴπερ ἐστιν. ὥστε τούτων ὄντων φανερῶν τὰ διαπορηθέντα λύοντ' ἂν.

'Αλλὰ μὴν οὖδὲ τὴν ὕλην τῷ πυρὶ μεμίχθαι φαμεν οὖδὲ μίγνυσθαι καιομένην, οὔτ' αὐτὴν αὐτῆς τοῖς μορίοις οὔτε τῷ πυρί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πῦρ γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ φθειρεσθαί. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον οὔτε τῷ σώματι τὴν τροφήν οὔτε τὸ σχῆμα τῷ κηρῷ μιγνύμενον σχηματίζειν τὸν ὄγκον. οὔδὲ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ λευκὸν οὖδ' ὅλως τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἐξεις οἴον τε μιγνυσθαί τοῖς πράγμασιν σωζόμενα γὰρ ὅραται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖδὲ τὸ λευκὸν γε καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐνδέχεται μιχθῆναι, οὔδ' ἀλλο τῶν μὴ χωριστῶν οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ τούτο λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ πάντα ποτὲ ὅμοιοι φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ μεμίχθαι. οὐ γὰρ

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a i.e. "white" and "knowledge" cannot exist by them-
at all, they are no more mixed than they were before, but are in a similar state; and (b) if one ingredient is destroyed, they have not been mixed, but one ingredient exists while the other does not, whereas mixture is composed of ingredients which remain what they were before; and in the same way (c) even if, both the ingredients having come together, each of them has been destroyed, there is no mixture; for things which have no existence at all cannot have been mixed.

This argument, then, seems to seek to define in what respect "mixing" differs from coming-to-be and passing-away, and how that which is "mixed" differs from that which comes-to-be and passes-away; for obviously "mixture," if there is such a thing, must be something different. When, therefore, these questions have been cleared up, our difficulties would be solved.

Now we do not say that wood has mixed with fire nor that it mixes, when it is burning, either with its own particles or with the fire, but we say that the fire comes-to-be and the wood passes-away. Similarly we do not say that the food mixes with the body or that the shape mixes with the wax and so forms the lump. Nor can "body" and "white" be "mixed" together, nor, in general, can "properties" and "states" be mixed with "things"; for we see them persisting unchanged. Again, "white" and "knowledge" cannot be mixed together, nor any of the terms which cannot be used separately. This is what is wrong in the theory of those who hold that formerly all things were together and mixed; for selves; a man can be "white" and "learned," but these attributes can only exist as properties of someone.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΟΛΕ

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ἀπαν ἀπαντὶ μικτὸν, ἀλλ’ ὑπάρχειν δεὶς χωριστὸν ἐκάτερον τῶν μιχθέντων· τῶν δὲ παθῶν οὐδὲν χωριστὸν. ἐπεί δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν δυνάμει τὰ δ’ ἐνεργεία τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδέχεται τὰ μιχθέντα εἶναι πως καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἐνεργεία μὲν ἐτέρου ὄντος τοῦ γεγονότος ἐξ αὐτῶν, δυνάμει δ’ ἐτὶ ἐκατέρου ἀπερ ἤσαν πρὶν μιχθῆναι, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολολότα· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ λόγος διηπόρει πρότερον· φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μιγνύμενα πρότερον τε ἐκ κεχωρισμένων συνιόντα καὶ δυνάμενα χωρίζοντα. οὔτε διαμένουσιν οὐν ἐνεργεία ὄσπερ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ λευκὸν, οὔτε φθείρονται, οὔτε θάτερον οὔτ’ ἄμφω· σώζεται γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν. διὸ ταῦτα μὲν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ συνεχὴς τούτους ἀπόρημα διαιρετέον, πότερον ἡ μέξις πρὸς τὴν αἰσθήσιν τι ἐστίν.

"Ὀταν γὰρ οὔτως εἰς μικρὰ διαιρεθῇ τὰ μιγνύ-

35 μενα, καὶ τεθῇ παρ’ ἄλληλα τούτων τὸν τρόπον ὡστε μὴ δῆλον ἐκαστὸν εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, τότε μέμκεται ἡ οὐ, ἀλλ’ ἐστίν ὡστε ὅτιοιν παρ’ ὅτι-

328 a οὐν εἶναι μόριον τῶν μιχθέντων; λέγεται μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως, οἷον κριθάς μεμίχθαι πυροῖς, ὅταν ἡτίσοιν παρ’ ὄντιον τεθῆ. εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ πᾶν σῶμα διαιρετόν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐστὶ σῶμα σῶματι μικτὸν ὁμοιομερέας, ὁ ὅτιοιν ᾧν δέοι μέρος γίνεσθαι παρ’ ὅτιοιν. ἐπεὶ 256
everything cannot be mixed with everything, but each of the ingredients which are mixed must originally exist separately, and no property can have a separate existence. Since, however, some things have a potential, and other things an actual, existence, it is possible for things which combine in a mixture to "be" in one sense and "not-be" in another, the resulting compound formed from them being actually something different but each ingredient being still potentially what it was before they were mixed and not destroyed. (This is the difficulty which arose in our earlier argument, and it is clear that the ingredients of a mixture first come together after having been separate and can be separated again.) They do not actually persist as "body" and "white," nor are they destroyed (either one or both of them), for their potentiality is preserved. Let us, therefore, dismiss these questions, but the problem closely connected with them must be discussed, namely, whether mixture is something relative to perception.

When the ingredients of the mixture have been divided into such small particles and so set side by side with one another that each is not apparent to the sense-perception, have they then been mixed? Or is this not so, and is mixture of such a nature that every particle of one ingredient is side by side with a particle of the other ingredient? The term certainly is used in the former sense; for instance, we say that barley is mixed with wheat when each grain of barley is placed side by side with a grain of wheat. But if every body is divisible, then since body mixed with body is made up of like parts, every part of each ingredient ought to be side by side with a part of the other. But since it is not possible for a body to be
10 μίξις, οὐδ' ἔξει τον αὐτὸν λόγον τῷ ὀλῷ τὸ μόριον. 

φαμὲν δὲ δεῖν,1 εἴπερ μέμικται,2 τὸ μυχθὲν ὅμωμερὲς ἐίναι, καὶ ὡςπερ τοῦ ὑδάτος τὸ μέρος ὑδρῷ, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ κραθέντος. ἃν δ' ἦ κατὰ μικρὰ σύνθεσις ἡ μίξις, οὕθεν συμβῆσεται τούτων, ἀλλὰ μόνον μεμιγμένα πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν· καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ 

15 τῷ μὲν μεμιγμένον, ἔὰν μὴ βλέπῃ δέξῃ, τῷ Λυγ- 

κεὶ δ' οὐδὲν μεμιγμένον) οὕτε τῇ διαφέρει ὡςτε ὀφθαλμὸν παρ' ὀφθαλμὸν μέρος· ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὕτῳ δια-

περεθῆναι. ἡ οὖν οὐκ ἔστι μίξις, ἢ λεκτέον τούτο 

πῶς εἰδέχεται γίνεσθαι πάλιν.

"Εστι δὴ, ὡς ἐφαμεν, τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ποιητικά, 

τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ τούτων παθητικά. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀντι-

20 στρέφει, ὂσων ἡ αὐτῇ ὑλή ἐστὶ, καὶ ποιητικὰ ἀλ-

λήλων καὶ παθητικὰ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· τὰ δὲ ποιεῖ 

ἀπαθῆ ὄντα, ὂσων μὴ ἡ αὐτῇ ὑλὴ. τούτων μὲν 

οὖν οὐκ ἔστι μίξις· διὸ οὐδ' ἡ ἱατρικὴ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν 

οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια μιγνυμένη τοῖς σώμασιν. τῶν δὲ

1 δ' EL.

2 μέμικται F: μεμίχθαι E: δεὶ μεμίχθαι τι I.

a One of the Argonauts, famous for his keen sight (Apollonius Rhodius i. 153 ff.).

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divided into its smallest parts and "composition" and mixture are not the same thing but different, it is clear (a) that we must not say that the ingredients, if they are preserved in small particles, are mixed (for this will be "composition" and not "blending" or "mixing," nor will the part show the same ratio between its constituents as the whole; but we say that, if mixing has taken place, the mixture ought to be uniform throughout, and, just as any part of water is water, so any part of what is blended should be the same as the whole. But if mixing is a composition of small particles, none of these things will happen, but the ingredients will only be mixed according to the standard of sense-perception, and the same thing will be a mixture to one man, if he has not sharp sight, but to the eyes of Lyneceus a will not be mixed); it is also clear (b) that we must not say that things are mixed by means of a division whereby every part of one ingredient is set by the side of a part of the other; for it is impossible for them to be thus divided. Either, then, there is no mixing, or another explanation must be given of the way in which it occurs.

Now, as we maintained, some of those things which exist are capable of action and others capable of being acted upon by them. Some things, then, namely, those whose matter is the same, "reciprocate," that is, are capable of acting and being acted upon by one another, while other things, namely, those which have not the same matter, act but are not liable to be acted upon. Of the latter, then, no mixing is possible; hence, neither the art of healing nor health mixing with the patients' bodies can produce health. But of things which are capable of
ποιητικῶν καὶ παθητικῶν ὀσα εὐδιαίρετα, πολλὰ
25 μὲν ὀλίγως καὶ μεγάλα μικροῖς συντιθέμενα οὐ
ποιεῖ μέξιν, ἀλλ’ αὐξησιν τοῦ κρατοῦντος· μετα-
βάλλει γὰρ θάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν, οἷον σταλαγμῶς
οίνου μυρίους χοεύσιν ὑδατὸς οὐ μίγνυται· λύεται
γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ πᾶν ὕδωρ.
ὅταν δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἑσάζῃ πως, τότε μετα-
βάλλει μὲν ἐκάτερον εἰς τὸ κρατοῦν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ
φύσεως, οὐ γίνεται δὲ θάτερον, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ καὶ
κοινὸν.

Φανερῶν οὖν ὅτι ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ μικτὰ ὡσα ἐναντίωσιν
ἐχει τῶν ποιοῦντων· ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ ὑπ’ ἄλλήλων
ἐστὶ παθητικά. καὶ μικρὰ δὲ μικροῖς παρατιθέμενα
μίγνυται μᾶλλον· ῥᾶν γὰρ καὶ θάττον ἄλληλα
35 μεθίστησιν. τὸ δὲ πολὺ καὶ ὑπὸ πολλοῦ χρονίως
328 b τοῦτο ὅρα. διὸ τὰ εὐόριστα τῶν διαιρετῶν καὶ
παθητικῶν μικτὰ (διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς μικρὰ ταῦτα
ῥαδίως· τοῦτο γὰρ ἂν τὸ εὐορίστῳ εἶναι), οἷον τὰ
ὕγρα μικτὰ μάλιστα τῶν σωμάτων· εὐόριστον γὰρ
μάλιστα τὸ ὑγρὸν τῶν διαιρετῶν, ἐὰν μὴ γλύσχρον
5 ἢ· ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ πλείω καὶ μείζω μόνον ποιεῖ
τὸν ὅγκον. ὅταν δ’ ἢ θάτερον μόνον παθητικὸν ἢ
σφόδρα, τὸ δὲ πάμπαν ἥρεμα, ἢ οὐδὲν πλείον τὸ
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action and capable of being acted upon, those which are easily divisible, when many of one of them are compounded with few of another or a large bulk with a small, do not produce a mixture but an increase of the predominant ingredient, for there is a change of the other ingredient into the predominant. (For example, a drop of wine does not mix with ten thousand measures of water, for its form is dissolved and it changes so as to become part of the total volume of water.) But when there is some sort of balance between the "active powers," then each changes from its own nature into the predominant ingredient, without, however, becoming the other but something between the two with common properties.

It is clear, therefore, that those agents are capable of admixture which show contrariety, for these can be acted upon by one another; and they mix all the better if small particles of the one ingredient are set side by side with small particles of the other, for then they more easily and more quickly cause a change in one another, whereas a large quantity of one takes a long time to be affected in this way by a large quantity of the other. Hence, those of the divisible and susceptible materials whose form is easily modified are capable of mixture; for they are easily divided into small particles (for that is what "to be easily modified in form" means); for example, the liquids are the most "mixable" of bodies, since of "divisibles" liquid is the most easily modified in form, provided it is not viscous (for viscous liquids merely increase the volume and bulk). But when one only of the ingredients is susceptible to action—or is excessively susceptible, while the other ingredient is only slightly so—the result of the mixture

Aristotle's view of "mixture."
μιχθεν εξ αμφοιη  
μικρον, οπερ συμβαινει περι
των καττιτερον και των χαλκων. 
εινα γαρ ψελλι-
ζεται προς αλληλα των οντων και επαμφοτερηζει.
φαινεται γαρ πως και μικτα ήρεμα, και ως
θατερον μεν δεκτικον θατερον δ' ειδος. 
οπερ επι
τουτων συμβαινει· ο γαρ καττιτερος ως παθος τι
ων ανευ υλης των χαλκων σχεδον αφανιζεται, και
μιχθεις οπεις χρωματισας μονον. 
ταυτο δε τουτο
συμβαινει και εφ' ετερων.
15 Φανερον τοινυν εκ των ειρημενων και οτι έστι
μιξις και τι έστι και δια τι, και ποια μικτα των
οντων, έπειπερ έστιν εναι τοιαυτα οια παθητικα
τε υπ' αλληλων και ευριστα και ευδιαιρετα· ταυτα
γαρ ουτ' εφθαρθαι αναγκη μεμηγενα ουτ' έτι
ταυτα άπλως ειναι, ουτε συνθεσιν ειναι την μιξιν
20 αυτων, ουτε προς την αισθησιν· αλλ' έστι μικτων
μεν ο αν ευριστον ουν παθητικων η και ποιητικων
και τοιουτω μικτων (προς ομωνυμον γαρ το μικτων),
η δε μιξις των μικτων αλλουωθεντων ενωσις.
of the two is no greater in volume or very little
greater, as happens when tin and copper are mixed.
For some things adopt a hesitant and wavering atti-
tude towards one another, for they appear somehow
to be only slightly "mixable," one, as it were, acting
in a "receptive" manner, the other as a "form." This
is what happens with these metals; the tin almost
disappears as though it were a property of the copper
without any material of its own and, after being
mixed, almost vanishes, having only given its colour
to the copper. And the same thing happens in other
instances too.

It is clear, then, from what has been said, that there
is such a process as mixing, and what it is, and how
it occurs, and what kind of existing things are "mix-
able," seeing that some things are of such a nature
as to be acted upon by one another and easily modi-
fied in shape and easily divisible. For it does not
necessarily follow either that they are destroyed by
having been mixed, or that they simply remain
still the same, or that their "mixture" is composi-
tion, or only dependent on perception; but any-
thing is "mixable" which, being easily modified in
shape, is capable of acting or being acted upon, and
is "mixable" with something of the same kind as
itself (for the term "mixable" is used in relation to
something else which is also called "mixable"), and
mixture is the union of "mixables," when they have
undergone alteration.
1. Περί μὲν οὖν μίξεως καὶ ἀφής καὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἰρήται πῶς ὑπάρχει τοῖς μεταβάλλονσι κατὰ φύσιν, ἐτὶ δὲ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ἁπλῆς, πῶς καὶ τίνος ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τίνα αὐτῶν. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀλλοιώσεως εἰρήτατι, τὸ ἀλλοιώσθαι καὶ τίν' ἔχει διαφορὰν αὐτῶν. λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ καλοῦμενα στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων.

Γένεσις μὲν γὰρ καὶ φθορὰ πάσχας ταῖς φύσει συνεστῶσαι ὁυσίαις οὐκ ἀνευ τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων τούτων δὲ τὴν ὑποκείμενην ὑλὴν οἱ μὲν φασιν εἶναι μίαν, οἳν ἀέρα τιθέντες ἢ πῦρ ἢ τι μεταξὺ τούτων, σῶμα τε ὅν καὶ χωριστὸν, οἵ δὲ πλεῖώ τὸν ἀρίθμον ἑνὸς, οἳ μὲν πῦρ καὶ γῆν, οἵ δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ ἀέρα τρίτον, οἵ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ τούτων τέταρτον, ὡσπερ Ἔμπεδοδοκῆς. ἐξ ὑν συγκρινομένων καὶ διακρινομένων ἔ ἀλλοιωμένων συμβαίνει τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν τοῖς πράγμασιν.

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ πρῶτα ἀρχὰς καὶ στοιχεῖα καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν, ἔστω συνομολογούμενον, ἐξ ὑν μεταβαλλόντων ἐ κατὰ σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν ἡ

1 πῶς καὶ τῖνος J¹Dᵇ: τῖνος καὶ πῶς E.J²: καὶ τῖνος καὶ πῶς HL.

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BOOK II

1. We have now dealt with the way in which mixture, contact and action-and-passion are attributable to things which undergo natural change; we have, moreover, explained how unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away exist, and with what they are concerned and owing to what cause they occur. Similarly, we have dealt with "alteration" and explained how it differs from coming-to-be and passing-away. It remains to consider the so-called elements of bodies.

Coming-to-be and passing-away occur in all naturally constituted substances, if we presuppose the existence of perceptible bodies. Some people assert that the matter underlying these bodies is one; for example, they suppose it to be Air or Fire, or an intermediate between these two, but still a single separate body. Others hold that there are more than one material, some thinking that they are Fire and Earth, others adding Air as a third, others (like Empedocles) adding Water as a fourth; and it is, they say, from the association and separation or alteration of these that coming-to-be and passing-away of things comes about.

Let us, then, be agreed that the primary materials from the changes of which, either by association or by separation or by some other kind of change,
κατ’ ἄλλην μεταβολὴν συμβαίνει γένεσιν εἶναι καὶ φθοράν. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ποιοῦντες μίαν ὠλὴν παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα, ταύτην δὲ σωματικὴν καὶ χωριστὴν, ἀμαρτάνουσιν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἂνευ ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι τὸ σῶμα τούτο αἰσθητής. ἡ γὰρ κούφων ἡ βαρὺ ἡ ψυχρὸν ἡ θερμὸν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ ἀπειρον τοῦτο, ὁ λέγουσι τινες εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν. ὡς δ’ ἐν τῷ Τιμαῖῳ γέγραπται, οὔδένα ἔχει διορισμὸν· οὐ γὰρ εἰρήκε σαφῶς τὸ πανδεχές, εἰ χωρίζεται τῶν στοιχείων. οὐδὲ χρήται οὔδέν, φήσας εἶναι ὑποκείμενον τὶ τοῖς καλομένοις στοιχείοις πρότερον, οἶνον χρυσὸν τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς χρυσοῖς. (καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς λέγεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λεγόμενον, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν ἀλλοίωσις, ἐστὶν οὖτως, ὡς δὲ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀδύνατον ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεται εἰς οὐ γέγονεν. καίτοι γε φησι μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτον εἶναι χρυσὸν λέγειν ἔκαστον εἶναι.) ἀλλὰ τῶν στοιχείων ὄντων στερεῶν μέχρι ἑπιπέδων ποιεῖται τὴν ἀνάλυσιν· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὴν τιθήνην καὶ τὴν ὠλὴν τὴν πρώτην τὰ ἐπίπεδα εἶναι. ἦμεῖς δὲ φαμέν μὲν εἶναι τινα ὠλὴν τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην οὐ χωριστὴν ἀλλ’ ἄει μετ’ ἐναντιώσεως, εἰς ἃς γίνεται τὰ καλομένα στοιχεῖα. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐτέροις ἀκριβεστέροις, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἔπειδή καὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐστὶν ἐκ τῆς ὠλῆς τὰ σώματα τὰ πρώτα, διοριστεῖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἀρχήν μὲν καὶ πρώτην οἴομένοις εἶναι

1 αἰσθητής HJ : αἰσθητόν E : τὸ αἰσθητὸν F : αἰσθητὸν ὑπὸ Ι.

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Plato, Timaeus 51 a.  
Ibid. 49 d—50 c.  
Ibid. 53 c ff.  
Ibid. 49 a.  
Phys. i. 6 and 7.
coming-to-be and passing-away occur, are rightly described as "sources" and "elements." But (a) those who postulate that there is a single matter, besides the bodies which we have mentioned, and that this is corporeal and separable, are mistaken; for it is impossible that this body can exist without "perceptible contrariety," for this "infinite," which some say must be the source of reality, must be either light or heavy, or hot or cold. And (b) what is written in the *Timaeus* is not accurately defined; for Plato has not clearly stated whether his "omnirecipient" has any existence apart from the elements, nor does he make any use of it, after saying that it is a *substratum* prior to the so-called elements, just as gold is the *substratum* of objects made of gold. (Yet put in this way the statement is not a happy one. Things of which there is coming-to-be and passing-away cannot be called after that out of which they have come-to-be, though it is possible for things which are altered to keep the name of that of which they are alterations. However, what he actually says is that by far the truest account is to say that each of the objects is "gold." ) However, he carries the analysis of the elements, though they are solids, back to "planes," and it is impossible for the "Nurse," that is the primary matter, to consist of planes. Our theory is that there is matter of which the perceptible bodies consist, but that it is not separable but always accompanied by contrariety, and it is from this that the so-called elements come into being; but a more accurate account of these things has been given elsewhere. However, since the primary bodies are also derived in this way from matter, we must explain about these also, reckoning as a source and as primary.

Aristotle's view that the elements are primary matter and certain "contrarieties."
τὴν ὑλὴν τὴν ἀχώριστον μὲν, ὑποκειμένην δὲ τοὺς ἐναντίον· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὑλὴ τῷ ψυχρῷ οὔτε τοῦτο τῷ θερμῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄμφοτέρων. ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἄρχη, δεύτερον δὲ αἱ ἐναντιώσεις, λέγω δὲ οἷον θερμότης 35 καὶ ψυχρότης, τρίτον δὲ ἤδη πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ
καὶ ὑποθέμενοι χρῶνται, καὶ οὔδὲν λέγουσι διὰ τί αὐταὶ ἢ τοσαῦτα.

2. Ἐπει οὖν ζητοῦμεν αἰσθητοῦ σῶματος ἄρχας, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἄπτος, ἄπτον δὲ οὗ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἄφη, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐναντιώσεις σώματος 10 εἰδὴ καὶ ἄρχας ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἄφην· κατ᾿ ἐναντιώσιν τε γὰρ διαφέρουσιν, καὶ κατὰ ἄπτην ἐναντιώσιν. διὸ οὔτε λευκότης καὶ μελανία οὔτε γλυκύτης καὶ πικρότης, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐναντιώσεων οὐδέν ποιεῖ στοιχεῖον. καὶ τοῖς πρῶτοις ὅψις ἄφης, οὔτε καὶ 15 τοῦ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον. ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἐστὶ σώματος ἄπτου πάθος ἢ ἄπτον, ἀλλὰ καθ᾿ ἐτερον, καὶ εἰ ἔτυχε τῇ φύσει πρότερον.

Αὐτῶν δὲ πρῶτον τῶν ἄπτῶν διαφερόμενοι ποιαὶ πρῶται διαφοραὶ καὶ ἐναντιώσεις· εἰσὶ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις κατὰ τὴν ἄφην αἴδε, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ἐπορν
the matter which is inseparable from, but underlies, the contrarieties; for "the hot" is not matter for "the cold," nor "the cold" for "the hot," but the substratum is matter for them both. Therefore, firstly, the potentially perceptible body, secondly, the contrarieties (for example, heat and cold), and thirdly, Fire and Water and the like are "sources." For the bodies in this third class change into one another and are not as Empedocles and others describe them (otherwise alteration could not have taken place), whereas the contrarieties do not change. Nevertheless, even so the question must be decided what kinds of contrariety and how many of them there are which are sources of body; for all other philosophers assume and make use of them without stating why they are these and why they are of a particular number.

2. Since, therefore, we are seeking the sources of perceptible bodies, and this means tangible, and tangible is that of which the perception is touch, it is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute "forms" and "sources" of body, but only those connected with touch; for it is in the matter of contrariety that they differ, that is, tangible contrariety. Therefore neither whiteness and blackness, nor sweetness and bitterness, nor any of the other perceptible contrarieties constitute an element. Yet sight is prior to touch, so that its subject is also prior; but it is a quality of tangible body not in virtue of its tangibility but because of something else, even though it happens to be naturally prior.

Of the tangible differences and contrarieties themselves we must distinguish which are primary. The following are contrarieties according to touch: hot

\[ ^a \text{i.e. as immutable.} \]
20 ὑγρόν, βαρὺ κοῦφον, σκληρὸν μαλακόν, γλύσχρον κραύρον, τραχὺ λείον, παχὺ λεπτὸν. τούτων δὲ βαρὺ μὲν καὶ κοῦφον οὐ ποιητικὰ οὐδὲ παθητικά· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιεῖν τι ἐτερον ἡ πάσχειν ὑφ᾽ ἐτέρου λέγονται. δεῖ δὲ ποιητικὰ εἶναι ἀλλήλων καὶ παθητικὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα· μίγνυται γὰρ καὶ μετα-
25 βάλλει εἰς ἀλληλα. θερμὸν δὲ καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν τὰ μὲν τῷ ποιητικὰ εἶναι τὰ δὲ τῷ παθητικὰ λέγεται· θερμὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ συγκρίνον τὰ ὁμογενῆ (τὸ γὰρ διακρίνειν, ὅπερ φασὶ ποιεῖν τὸ πῦρ, συγκρίνειν ἐστὶ τὰ ὁμόφυλα· συμβαίνει γὰρ ἔξαρεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια), ψυχρὸν δὲ τὸ
30 συνάγον καὶ συγκρίνον ὁμοίως τὰ τε συγγενῆ καὶ τὰ μὴ ὁμόφυλα, ὑγρὸν δὲ τὸ ἀόριστον οἰκεῖῳ ὀρῷ εὐόριστον ὄν, ξηρὸν δὲ τὸ εὐόριστον μὲν οἰκεῖῳ ὀρῷ, δυσόριστον δὲ. τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν καὶ παχὺ καὶ γλύσχρον καὶ κραύρον καὶ σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακὸν καὶ αἰ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ἐκ τούτων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ
35 ἀναπληστικὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγροῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρίσθαι
330 α μὲν εὐόριστον δ' εἶναι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἀπτο-
μένῳ, τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν ἀναπληστικὸν (λεπτομερές γὰρ, καὶ τὸ μικρομερές ἀναπληστικὸν· ὅλον γὰρ 270
and cold, dry and moist, heavy and light, hard and soft, viscous and brittle, rough and smooth, coarse and fine. Of these heavy and light are not active nor yet passive; for they do not get their names because they act on something else or are acted upon by something else; elements, on the other hand, must be mutually active and passive, for they mix and change into one another. But hot and cold, and dry and moist are terms of which the first pair get their names because they are active, the second pair because they are passive; for "hot" is that which associates things of the same kind (for to "dissociate," which, they say, is an action of Fire, is to associate things of the same class, since the result is to destroy things which are foreign), but cold is that which brings together and associates alike both things which are of the same kind and things which are not of the same class. Moist is that which, though easily adaptable to form, cannot be confined within limits of its own, while dry is that which is easily confined within its own limits but is not easily adaptable in form. From the moist and the dry are derived the fine and the coarse, the viscous and the brittle, the hard and the soft and the other contrasted pairs. For since "capacity for filling up something" is characteristic of the moist, because it is not confined within bounds but is adaptable in form and follows the shape of that which comes into contact with it, and that which is "fine" is "capable of filling up something" (for it consists of small particles, and that which consists of small particles is capable of filling up something, for the whole is in

Aristotle means liquid.

* e.g., water conforms with the shape of the vessel into which it is poured.
ολον ἀπτεται· τὸ δὲ λεπτὸν μάλιστα τοιοῦτον),

φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν λεπτὸν ἐσται τοῦ ὕγρου, τὸ δὲ

παχὺ τοῦ ἕξηροῦ. πάλιν δὲ τὸ μὲν γλύσχρον τοῦ

ὕγρου (τὸ γὰρ γλύσχρον ὕγρον πεπονθὸς τι ἐστιν,

οἷον τὸ ἐλαιον), τὸ δὲ κραῦρον τοῦ ἕξηροῦ· κραῦρον

γὰρ τὸ τελέως ἕξηρόν, ὡστε καὶ πεπηγέναι δι᾽ ἐλλευψιν ὕγρότητος. ἔτι τὸ μὲν μαλακὸν τοῦ ὕγρου

(μαλακὸν γὰρ τὸ ὑπείκον εἰς ἐαυτὸ καὶ μὴ μεθιστά-

μενον, ὅπερ ποιεῖ τὸ ὕγρον· διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἐστι τὸ

ὕγρον μαλακόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μαλακὸν τοῦ ὕγρου), τὸ

dὲ σκληρὸν τοῦ ἕξηροῦ· σκληρὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πε-

πηγός, τὸ δὲ πεπηγὸς ἕξηρον. λέγεται δὲ ἕξηρον

καὶ ὕγρον πλεοναχῶς· ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῷ ἕξηρῷ καὶ
tὸ ὕγρον καὶ τὸ διερόν, καὶ πάλιν τῷ ὕγρῳ καὶ τὸ

ἕξηρόν καὶ τὸ πεπηγός· ἀπαντὰ δὲ ταύτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦ

ἕξηροῦ καὶ τοῦ ὕγρου τῶν πρῶτων λεχθέντων. ἐπεὶ

γὰρ ἀντίκειται τῷ διερῷ τῷ ἕξηρῷ, καὶ διερόν μὲν

ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον ἀλλοτριὰν ὕγρότητα ἐπιπολῆς, βε-

βρεγμένον δὲ τὸ εἰς βάθος, ἕξηρὸν δὲ τὸ ἐστερημένον
tαύτης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν διερόν ἐσται τοῦ ὕγρου,

tὸ δ᾽ ἀντικείμενον ἕξηρον τοῦ πρῶτου ἕξηροῦ. πάλιν
dὲ τὸ ὕγρον καὶ τὸ πεπηγός ὄσαυτως· ὕγρον μὲν
gὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον οἰκεῖαν ὕγρότητα, βεβρεγμένον
dὲ τὸ ἔχον ἀλλοτριὰν ὕγρότητα ἐν τῷ βάθει, πε-

πηγός δὲ τὸ ἐστερημένον ταύτης. ὡστε καὶ τού-

των ἐσται τὸ μὲν ἕξηροῦ τὸ δὲ ὕγροῦ. δῆλον τοῖνυν

ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ἀνάγονται εἰς τὰς

a See 329 b 30 ff.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 2

contact with the whole, and that which is fine consists of the smallest possible particles), it is clear that the fine is derived from the moist and the coarse derived from the dry. Again, the viscous is derived from the moist (for that which is viscous is moisture which has undergone a certain treatment, as in the case of oil), and the brittle is derived from the dry; for the completely dry is brittle, so that it has become solid through lack of moisture. Further, the soft is derived from the moist (for the soft is that which gives way and sinks into itself but does not change its position, as does the moist; hence, too, the moist is not soft, but the soft is derived from the moist). The hard, on the other hand, is derived from the dry; for that which has solidified is hard, and the solid is dry.

Now "dry" and "moist" are used in several senses; for both moist and damp are opposed to dry, and, again, solid as well as dry is opposed to moist. But all these qualities are derived from the dry and the moist which we mentioned originally. For the dry is opposed to the damp, and the damp is that which has foreign moisture on its surface, soaked being that which is damp to its innermost depth, while dry is that which is deprived of foreign moisture. Therefore, clearly the damp will be derived from the moist, and the dry, which is opposed to it, will be derived from the primary dry. So likewise, on the other hand, with the moist and the solidified; for moist is that which contains its own moisture in its depth, while soaked is that which contains foreign moisture there, and solidified is that which has lost its foreign moisture; so that of these the latter derives from the dry, the former from the moist. It is clear, then, that all the other differences are re-
πρώτας τέτταρας. αὐταὶ δὲ οὐκέτι εἰς ἑλάττουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ὀπερ ύγρὸν ἢ ὀπερ ἕηρον, οὔτε τὸ ύγρὸν ὀπερ θερμὸν ἢ ὀπερ ψυχρὸν, οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἕηρον οὖθ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἄλληλα ὀὖθ᾽ ὑπὸ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ύγρὸν εἰσὶν. ὡστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τέτταρας εἶναι ταῦτας.

30 3. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα τὰ στοιχεῖα, τῶν δὲ τεττάρων εἴς αἱ συζεύξεις, τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία οὐ πέφυκε συνδιάζεσθαι (θερμὸν γὰρ καὶ ψυχρὸν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάλιν ἕηρον καὶ ύγρὸν ἀδύνατον), φανέρων ὅτι τέτταρες ἐσονται αἱ τῶν στοιχείων συζεύξεις, θερμοῦ καὶ ἕηροῦ, καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ύγροῦ, καὶ πάλιν ψυχροῦ καὶ ύγροῦ, καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ἕηροῦ. καὶ ἆκολούθησε κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἀπλοῖς φαινομένοις σώμασι, πυρὶ καὶ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι καὶ γῆ: τὸ μὲν γάρ πῦρ θερμὸν καὶ ἕηρον, δ᾽ ἀέρ θερμὸν καὶ 5 ύγρὸν (οἷον ἀτμίς γὰρ ὁ ἀέρ), τὸ δ᾽ ὑδρῷ ψυχρὸν καὶ ύγρὸν, ἢ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἕηρον, ὡστ᾽ εὐλόγως διανεμεῖσθαι τὰς διαφορὰς τοῖς πρώτοις σώμασι, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἶναι κατὰ λόγον. Ἀπαντεῖς γὰρ οἱ τὰ ἀπλὰ σώματα στοιχεῖα ποιοῦντες οἱ μὲν ἐν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τρία, οἱ δὲ τέτταρα ποιοῦσιν. 10 ὡσοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐν μόνον λέγουσιν, εἶτα πυκνώσι καὶ μανώσι τάλλα γεννώσι, τούτοις συμβαίνει δύο ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς, τὸ τε μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν ἡ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν· τάυτα γὰρ τὰ δημιουργοῦντα, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν ὑπὸκείται καθάπερ ὑλή. οἱ δ᾽ εὐθὺς δύο ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης πῦρ καὶ 15 γῆ, τὰ μεταξὺ μίγματα ποιοῦσι τούτων, οἷον ἀέρα καὶ ύδρῷ. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ οἱ τρία λέγοντες,
duced to the first four, and these cannot be further reduced to a lesser number; for the hot is not that which is essentially moist or essentially dry, nor is the moist essentially hot or essentially cold, nor do the cold and the dry fall in the category of one another nor in that of the hot and moist; hence these must necessarily be four of these elementary qualities.

3. Now since the elementary qualities are four in number and of these four six couples can be formed, but contraries are not of a nature which permits of their being coupled—for the same thing cannot be hot and cold, or again, moist and dry—it is clear that the pairs of elementary qualities will be four in number, hot and dry, hot and moist, and, again, cold and moist, and cold and dry. And, according to theory, they have attached themselves to the apparently simple bodies, Fire, Air, Water and Earth; for Fire is hot and dry, Air is hot and moist (Air, for example, is vapour), Water is cold and moist, and Earth is cold and dry. Thus the variations are reasonably distributed among the primary bodies, and the number of these is according to theory. For all those who make out that the simple bodies are elements make them either one or two or three or four. Therefore (a) those who hold that there is only one and then generate everything else by condensation and rarefaction, as a result make the sources two in number, the rare and the dense or the hot and the cold; for these are the creative forces, and "the one" underlies them as matter. But (b) those who hold that there are two from the beginning—as Parmenides held that there were Fire and Earth—make the intermediates, Air and Water, mixtures of these; and (c) the same thing is done also by

The four elementary qualities (hot, cold, dry, moist) by being coupled together in different ways, constitute four simple bodies, Earth, Air, Fire and Water.
καθάπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν· τὸ γὰρ μέσον μέγα μακροεῖ. καὶ σχεδὸν ταῦτα λέγονσιν οἱ τε δύο καὶ οἱ τρία ποιοῦντες· πλήν οἱ μὲν τέμνουσιν εἰς δύο τὸ μέσον, οἱ δὲ ἐν μόνῳ ποιοῦσιν. ἔνιοι

20 δὲ εὐθὺς τεττάρα λέγονσιν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. συναγεῖ δὲ καὶ οὕτως εἰς τὰ δύο· τῷ γὰρ πυρὶ τάλλα πάντα ἀντιτίθεσιν.

Οὐκ ἦστι δὲ τὸ πῦρ καὶ οἳ ἄρη καὶ έκαστόν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ μικτῶν. τὰ δὲ ἀπλὰ τοιαύτα μὲν ἦστιν, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα, οἷον εἴ τι τῷ πυρὶ ὤμοιον, πυροειδές, οὐ πῦρ, καὶ τὸ τῷ ἀέρι

25 ἀεροειδεῖς· ὤμοιος δὲ κατὶ τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή θερμότητος, ὥσπερ καὶ κρύσταλλος ψυχρότητος· ἡ γὰρ πῆξις καὶ ἡ ζέσις ὑπερβολαί τινὲς εἰσὶν, ἡ μὲν ψυχρότητος, ἡ δὲ θερμότητος. εἰ οὖν ὁ κρύσταλλός ἐστιν πῆξις ὕγροῦ ψυχροῦ, καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἔσται ζέσις ἔγρου θερμοῦ. διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν

30 οὔτ' ἐκ κρύσταλλον γίνεται οὔτ' ἐκ πυρὸς.

Οὐτων δὲ τεττάρων τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων, ἐκάτερον τοῖς δυοῖς ἐκατέρου τῶν τόπων ἔστιν· πῦρ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄρη τοῦ πρὸς τὸν ὀρὸν φερομένου, γῆ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ μέσον. καὶ ἄκρα μὲν καὶ εἰλικρινέστατα πῦρ καὶ γῆ, μέσα δὲ καὶ μεμψύχον μᾶλλον ὕδωρ καὶ ἄρη. καὶ ἐκάτερα ἐκάτεροι ἐναντία· πυρὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίον ὕδωρ, ἀέρι δὲ γῆ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων παθημάτων


a It is doubtful what is meant here. The commentator Philoponos suggests that it was a collection of otherwise unpublished doctrines of Plato and thinks that Aristotle is referring to a theory of Plato that there was “the great” and “the small” and a third ἄρχη, which was a mixture of these and served as matter; but there is nothing to support this theory. H. H. Joachim takes “the Divisions” to mean the

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those who hold that there are three, as Plato does in the "Divisions," for he makes "the middle" a mixture. Those who hold that there are two and those who postulate three say practically the same things, except that the former divide the middle into two, while the latter treat it as one. But some declare that there are four from the start, for instance Empedocles, though he also reduces these to two, for he too opposes all the others to Fire.

Fire, however, and Air and each of the other bodies which we have mentioned are not simple but mixed, while the simple forms of them are similar to them but not the same as they are; for example, that which is like fire is "fiery," not fire, and that which is like air is "air-like," and similarly with the rest. But fire is an excess of heat, just as ice is an excess of cold; for freezing and boiling are excesses, the former of cold, the latter of heat. If, therefore, ice is a freezing of moist and cold, so fire will be a boiling of dry and hot; and that is why nothing comes to be from ice or from fire.

The simple bodies, then, being four in number, make up two pairs belonging to two regions; for Fire and Air form the body which is carried along towards the "limit," while Earth and Water form the body which is carried along towards the centre; and Fire and Earth are extremes and very pure, while Water and Air are intermediates and more mixed. Further, the members of each pair are contrary to the members of the other pair, Water being the contrary of Fire, and Earth of Air, for they are sections in the Timaeus (35 a ff.), where Plato makes the middle of his three kinds of substance a blend of the other two.

\[\text{Cf. De Caelo 308 a 14 ff.}\]
ARISTOTLE

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συνέστηκεν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἀπλῶς γε τέτατρα ὑντα ἐνὸς ἔκαστον ἐστι, γῇ μὲν ἐπηροῦ μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχροῦ,
5 ὕδωρ δὲ ψυχροῦ μᾶλλον ἡ ὕγροῦ, ἀλή δὲ ὕγροῦ μᾶλλον ἡ θερμοῦ, πῦρ δὲ θερμοῦ μᾶλλον ἡ ἐπηροῦ.

4. 'Επει δὲ διώρισται πρότερον ὅτι τοῖς ἀπλοῖς σώμασιν εξ ἀλλήλων ἡ γένεσις, ἀμα δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν φαίνεται γνώμενα (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἄλ-
10 λοιώσις· κατὰ γὰρ τὰ τῶν ἀπτῶν πάθη ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἐστιν), λεκτέον τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς εἰσ ἀλληλα μετα-
βολῆς, καὶ πότερον ἀπελὲταν εἴς ἀπαντός γίνεσθαι δυνατόν ἡ τὰ μὲν δυνατόν τὰ δ' ἀδύνατον. ὅτι μὲν ὁν ἀπαντα πέφυκεν εἰς ἀλληλα μεταβάλλειν, φανε-
ρόν· ἡ γὰρ γένεσις εἰς ἐναντία καὶ εἴς ἐναντίων, τὰ
15 δὲ στοιχεία πάντα ἐχεὶ ἐναντίωσιν πρὸς ἀλληλα διὰ τὸ τᾶς διαφορὰς ἐναντίας εἶναι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀμφότεραι ἐναντίαι, οἶον πυρὶ καὶ ὑδατί (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπηροῦ καὶ θερμόν, τὸ δ' ὕγρον καὶ ψυχρόν),
τοῖς δ' ἡ ἐτέρα μόνον, οἶον ἀέρι καὶ ὑδατί (τὸ μὲν
20 γὰρ ὕγρον καὶ θερμόν, τὸ δὲ ὕγρον καὶ ψυχρόν). ὡστε καθόλου μὲν φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶν ἐκ παντός γί-
νεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἣδη δὲ καθ' ἐκαστὸν οὐ χαλεποὺν ἰδεῖν πῶς· ἀπαντα μὲν γὰρ εἴς ἀπάντων ἐσται,
dioίσει δὲ τῷ θάττον καὶ βραδύτερου καὶ τῷ ῥάον καὶ χαλεπώτερον. ὡσα μὲν γὰρ ἐχει σύμβολα
25 πρὸς ἀλληλα, ταχεία τούτων ἡ μετάβασις, ὡσα δὲ

* De Caelo 304 b 23 ff.
made up of different qualities. However, since they are four, each is described simply as possessing a single quality, Earth a dry rather than a cold quality, Water a cold rather than a moist, Air a moist rather than a hot, and Fire a hot rather than a dry.

4. Since it has been determined in a former discussion that the coming-to-be of simple bodies is out of one another, and at the same time, too, it is evident from sense-perception that they do come-to-be (for otherwise there would have been no alteration—for alteration is concerned with the qualities of tangible things), we must state (a) what is the manner of their reciprocal change, and (b) whether any one of them can come-to-be out of any other one of them, or some can do so and others cannot. Now it is manifest that all of them are of such a nature as to change into one another; for coming-to-be is a process into contraries and out of contraries, and all the elements are characterized by contrarieties one to another, because their distinguishing qualities are contrary. In some of them both qualities are contrary, for example, in Fire and Water (for the former is dry and hot, the latter is moist and cold), in others only one, for example, in Air and Water (for the former is moist and hot, the latter is moist and cold). Hence, it is clear, if we take a general view, that every one of them naturally comes-to-be out of every one of them and, if we take them separately, it is not difficult now to see how this happens; for all will be the product of all, but there will be a difference owing to the greater and less speed and the greater and less difficulty of the process. For the change will be quick in those things which have qualities which correspond with one
μὴ ἔχει, βραδεία, διὰ τὸ ῥάον εἶναι τὸ ἐν ἧ τὰ πολλὰ μεταβάλλειν, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς μὲν ἐσται ἀὴρ θατέρου μεταβάλλοντος (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢν θερμὸν καὶ ἔστρων, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν καὶ υγρὸν, ὥστε ἂν κρατηθῇ τὸ ἔστρων ὑπὸ τοῦ υγροῦ, ἀὴρ ἐσται). τάλιν δὲ ἐξ ἀέρος ὑδωρ, ἦν κρατηθῇ τὸ θερμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢν θερμὸν καὶ υγρὸν, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν καὶ υγρὸν, ὥστε μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ὑδωρ ἐσται). τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐξ ὑδatos γῆ καὶ ἐκ γῆς πῦρ· ἔχει γὰρ ἀμφω πρὸς ἀμφω σύμβολα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑδωρ ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, ἢ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἔστρων, ὥστε κρατηθέντος τοῦ υγροῦ γῆ ἐσται. καὶ πάλιν ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἔστρων καὶ θερμὸν, ἢ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἔστρων, εὰν φθαρῇ τὸ ψυχρὸν, πῦρ ἐσται ἐκ γῆς.

"Ωστε φανερὸν ὅτι κύκλῳ τε ἐσται ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἀπλοῖς σώμασι, καὶ ράστος οὕτως ὁ τρόπος τῆς μεταβολῆς διὰ τὸ σύμβολα ἐνυπάρχειν τοῖς εἴρητος. ἐκ πυρὸς δὲ ὑδωρ καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος γῆν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὑδatos καὶ γῆς ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ ἐνδέχεται μὲν γίνεσθαι, χαλεπώτερον δὲ διὰ τὸ πλεῖόνων εἶναι τῆς μεταβολῆς· ἀνάγκῃ γάρ, ἐὰν ἐσται ἐξ ὑδatos πῦρ, φθαρῆται καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ υγρὸν, καὶ πάλιν εἴ ἐκ γῆς ἀὴρ, φθαρῆται καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἔστρων. ὥστε ἐκ καὶ εἴ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος ὑδωρ καὶ γῆ, ἀνάγκῃ ἀμφότερα μεταβάλλειν. αὐτὴ μὲν οὐν χρονιωτέρᾳ ἡ γένεσις· εὰν δ' ἐκα-

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*a σύμβολα was originally used of two pieces of wood or bone broken away from one another and kept by the two parties to a contract as a means of identification.

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another, but slow when these do not exist, because it is easier for one thing to change than for many; for example, Air will result from Fire by the change of one quality; for Fire, as we said, is hot and dry, while Air is hot and moist, so that Air will result if the dry is overpowered by the moist. Again, Water will result from Air, if the hot is overpowered by the cold; for Air, as we said, is hot and moist, while Water is cold and moist, so that Water will result if the hot undergoes a change. In the same way, too, Earth will result from Water, and Fire from Earth; for both members of each pair have qualities which correspond to one another, since Water is moist and cold, and Earth is cold and dry, and so, when the moist is overpowered, Earth will result. Again, since Fire is dry and hot, and Earth is cold and dry, if the cold were to pass away, Fire will result from Earth.

It is clear, therefore, that the coming-to-be of simple bodies will be cyclical; and this manner of change will be very easy, because the corresponding qualities are already present in the elements which are next to one another. The change, however, from Fire to Water and from Air to Earth, and again from Water and Earth to Air and Fire can take place, but is more difficult, because the change involves more stages. For if Fire is to be produced from Water, both the cold and the moist must be made to pass-away; and, again, if Air is to be produced from Earth, both the cold and the dry must be made to pass-away. In like manner, too, if Water and Earth are to be produced from Fire and Air, there must be a change of both qualities. This method of coming-to-be is, therefore, a lengthier process; but if one
τέρον φθαρη θάτερον, ράων μέν, οὐκ ἐἰς ἅλληλα
de ἡ μετάβασις, ἀλλ' ἐκ πυρὸς μέν καὶ ὦδατος
ἔσται γῆ καὶ ἄηρ, ἐξ ἀέρος δὲ καὶ γῆς πῦρ καὶ

15 ὦδωρ. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ὦδατος φθαρῆ τὸ ψυχρόν
tοῦ δὲ πυρὸς τὸ ἕλερον, ἄηρ ἔσται (λείπεται γὰρ
τοῦ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ δὲ τὸ ὕγρον), ὅταν δὲ τοῦ
μὲν πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ δ' ὦδατος τὸ ὕγρον, γῆ
dia τὸ λείπεσθαι τοῦ μὲν τὸ ἕλερον τοῦ δὲ τὸ
ψυχρόν. ὁσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς πῦρ

20 καὶ ὦδωρ· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀέρος φθαρῆ τὸ θερμὸν
τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ἕλερον, ὦδωρ ἔσται (λείπεται γὰρ
τοῦ μὲν τὸ ὕγρον τῆς δὲ τὸ ψυχρόν), ὅταν δὲ τοῦ
μὲν ἀέρος τὸ ὕγρον τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ψυχρόν, πῦρ
dia τὸ λείπεσθαι τοῦ μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τῆς δὲ τὸ ἕλερον,
ἀπερ ἣν πυρὸς. ὁμολογουμένη δὲ καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει

25 ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς γένεσις· μᾶλλον μὲν γὰρ πῦρ ἡ φλόξ,
αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καπνὸς καιόμενος, ὁ δὲ καπνὸς ἐξ
ἀέρος καὶ γῆς.

'Εν δὲ τοῖς ἐφέξης οὐκ ἐνδέχεται φθαρέντος ἐν
ἔκατερῳ θατέρῳ τῶν στοιχείων γενέσθαι μετά-
βασιν εἰς οὐδὲν τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ λείπεσθαι ἐν
ἀμφοῖν ἡ ταυτὰ ἡ τάναντια. ἐξ οὐδετέρων δὲ

30 ἐγχωρεῖ γίνεσθαι σῶμα, οἷον εἰ τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς
φθαρεῖ τὸ ἕλερον, τοῦ δ' ἀέρος τὸ ὕγρον· λείπεται
gὰρ ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ θερμὸν· εὰν δ' ἐξ ἐκατέρου τὸ
θερμὸν, λείπεται τάναντια, ἕλερον καὶ ὕγρον.

a i.e. those which pass into one another by the "cyclical"
process described in 331 b 2 ff.

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quality of each element were to be made to pass away, the change will be easier but not reciprocal; but from Fire and Water will come Earth and (alternatively) Air, and from Air and Earth Fire and (alternatively) Water; for when the cold of the Water and the dryness of the Fire have passed-away, there will be Air (for the heat of the Fire and the moisture of the Water are left), but, when the heat of the Fire and the moisture of the Water have passed-away, there will be Earth, because the dryness of the Fire and the cold of the Water are left. In the same manner also Fire and Water will result from Air and Earth; for when the heat of the Air and the dryness of the Earth pass-away, there will be Water (for the moisture of the Air and the cold of the Earth are left), but when the moisture of the Air and the cold of the Earth have passed-away, there will be Fire, because the heat of the Air and the dryness of the Earth, which are, as we saw, the constituents of Fire, are left. Now the manner in which Fire comes-to-be is confirmed by our sense-perception; for flame is the most evident form of Fire, and flame is burning smoke, and smoke is composed of Air and Earth.

No change, however, into any of the bodies can take place from the passing-away of one of the elements in each of them taken in their consecutive order,* because either the same or the contrary qualities are left in the pair, and a body cannot come-to-be out of identical or contrary qualities; for example, it would not result if the dryness of Fire and the moisture of the Air were to pass-away (for the heat is left in both), but, if the heat passes-away from both, the contraries, dryness and moisture, are
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όμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἐν ἄπασι γὰρ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς ἐνυπάρχει τὸ μὲν ταύτῳ τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον.

35 ὥσθ' ἀμα δῆλον ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἐνὸς εἰς ἐν μετα-
βαίνοντα ἐνὸς φθαρέντος γίνεται, τὰ δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν

332 a εἰς ἐν πλειόνων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄπαντα ἐκ παντὸς
γίνεται, καὶ τίνα τρόπον εἰς ἄλληλα μετάβασις
γίνεται, εἰρηται.

5. Οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἔτι καὶ ὡδὲ θεωρήσωμεν περὶ
αὐτῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τῶν φυσικῶν σωμάτων ὑλή,

5 ὡσπερ καὶ δοκεῖ ἐνίοις, ὅδωρ καὶ ἄπερ καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα, ἀνάγκη ἦτοι ἐν ἡ δύο εἰναι ταύτα ἡ πλείω.
ἐν μὲν δὴ πάντα οὐχ οἶνον τε, οἶνον ἀέρα πάντα ἡ

ὑδωρ ἡ πῦρ ἡ γῆν, εἴπερ ἡ μεταβολὴ εἰς τὰναντία.

εἰ γὰρ εὖ ἄπερ, εἰ μὲν ὑπομένει, ἀλλοιωσὶς ἔσται

ἀλλ' οὖ γενεσὶς. ἀμα δ' οὐδ' οὕτω δοκεῖ, ὡστε

10 ὑδωρ εἶναι ἀμα καὶ ἄερα ἡ ἄλλ' ὀσιοῦν. ἔσται δὴ
τις ἐναντίωσις καὶ διαφορὰ ἢς ἔξει τι θάτερον

μόριον τὸ πῦρ οἶνον θερμότητα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ
ἔσται τὸ γε πῦρ ἄπερ θερμός· ἀλλοιωσὶς τε γὰρ τὸ

τοιοῦτον, καὶ οὐ φαίνεται. ἀμα δὲ πάλιν εἰ ἔσται

15 ἐκ πυρὸς ἄπερ, τοῦ θερμοῦ εἰς τοὐναντίον μετα-
βάλλοντος ἔσται. ὑπάρξει ἀρα τῷ ἄερι τοῦτο,

καὶ ἔσται ὁ ἄπερ ψυχρὸν τι. ὡστε ἄδυνατον τὸ

πῦρ ἄερα θερμὸν εἶναι· ἀμα γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ θερμὸν

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*a* See Phys. 224 a 21 ff.
left. So likewise with the others too; for in all the consecutive elements there exists one identical and one contrary quality. It is, therefore, at the same time clear that some elements come-to-be by being transformed from one into one by the passing-away of one quality, but others come-to-be by being transformed from two into one by the passing-away of more than one quality. We have now stated that all the elements come-to-be from any one of them, and how their change into one another takes place.

5. Let us, however, proceed to discuss the following points about them. If Water, Air and the like are, as some people hold, matter for the natural bodies, there must be either one or two or more than two of them. Now they cannot all of them be one (for example, they cannot all be Air or Water or Fire or Earth), because change is into contraries. For if they were all Air, then, if Air continues to exist, "alteration" will take place and not coming-to-be. Furthermore, no one holds that Water is at the same time also Air or any other element. There will, then, be a contrariety (or difference), and the other member of this contrariety will belong to some other element, for example, heat will belong to Fire. Fire, however, will certainly not be "hot air"; for such a change is an "alteration" and also is not observed to happen. Another reason, too, is that, if Air is to be produced from Fire, it will be due to the changing of heat into its contrary. This contrary, therefore, will belong to Air, and Air will be something cold; hence it is impossible for Fire to be "hot air," for, in that case,
καὶ ψυχρὸν ἦσται. ἄλλο τι ἄρ’ ἀμφότερα τὸ αὐτὸ ἦσται, καὶ ἄλλη τις ὑλή κοινή.
‘Ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος περὶ ἀπάντων, ὅτι οὐκ ἦστιν 20 ἐν τούτων ἔστιν ὡς οὔ τὰ πάντα. οὐ μὴν οὖν ἄλλο τι
γε παρὰ ταῦτα, οἷον μέσον τι ἄερος καὶ ὑδάτως ἢ
ἀέρος καὶ πυρός, ἄερος μὲν παχύτερον καὶ πυρός,
tῶν δὲ λεπτότερον· ἦσται γὰρ ἄηρ καὶ πῦρ ἐκεῖνο
μετ’ ἐναντιότητος· ἀλλὰ στέρησις τὸ ἐτερον τῶν ἐν-
αντίων· οὕτω οὖν ἐνδεχεται μονοοῦσθαι ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ-
25 ποτε, ὥσπερ φασὶ τινες τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ περιέχον.
ὁμοίως ἀρα ὅτι οὖν τούτων ἤ οὐδὲν.
Εἰ οὖν μηδὲν αἰσθητὸν γε πρότερον τούτων, ταῦ-
τα ἂν εἰ ἐν πάντα. ἀνάγκη τοῖνυν ἢ ἂεὶ μένοντα καὶ
ἀμετάβλητα εἰς ἄλληλα, ἢ μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ ἢ
ἀπαντα, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ’ οὔ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαιῷ
30 Πλάτων ἔγραψεν. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν μεταβάλλειν
ἀνάγκη εἰς ἄλληλα, δεδεικται πρότερον· ὅτι δ’ οὖχ
ὁμοίως ταχέως ἄλλο ἔστιν ἄλλον, εἰρήται πρότερον,
ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἔχοντα σύμβολον θάττον γίνεται ἐς
ἀλλήλων, τὰ δ’ οὖκ ἔχοντα βραδύτερον. εἰ μὲν
τοῖνυν ἢ ἐναντιότητα μία ἦστι καθ’ ἢν μεταβάλ-
35 λουσιν, ἀνάγκη δύο εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ ὑλή τὸ μέσον

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a Aristotle’s πρῶτη ὑλή.
b i.e. without having some quality attached to it.
c This was the doctrine of Anaximander.
d The “boundless” cannot exist without being qualified by a contrary; if it is qualified by a contrary, it is one of the elements.
e i.e. there can be no simple bodies but Earth, Air, Fire and Water.
f Timaeus 54 b-d.
g 331 a 12 ff.
h See 331 a 23 ff. and note.

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the same thing will be hot and cold. Both Fire and Air will, therefore, be something else which is the same, that is, there will be some other "matter" which is common to both.

The same argument holds good of all the elements and shows that there is no single one of them from which all are derived. Yet neither is there anything other than these from which they come, for example, an intermediate between air and water (coarser than Air, but finer than Water) or between Air and Fire (coarser than Fire, but finer than Air). For the intermediate will be Air and Fire with the addition of a pair of contraries; but one of the contraries will be a privation, so that it is impossible for the intermediate to exist by itself, as some people declare that the "boundless" or "all-embracing" exists; it is, therefore, one of the elements (it does not matter which), or nothing.

If, therefore, there is nothing—nothing perceptible at any rate—prior to the four elements, these must be all that there are; it follows, therefore, necessarily, that they must either persist and be unable to change into one another, or they must undergo change, either all of them or some of them only, as Plato wrote in the *Timaeus.* Now it has been shown above that they must change into one another; and it has previously been stated that they do not come-to-be equally quickly from one another, because elements which have a corresponding quality come-to-be more quickly out of one another, while those which have not this do so more slowly. If, therefore, the contrariety, in virtue of which they change, is one, the elements must be two; for the matter, which is imperceptible and inseparable, is the intermediate
332 b ἀναίσθητος οὖσα καὶ ἀχώριστος. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω ὀρᾶται οὖν, δύο ἄν εἰεν αἱ ἐλάχισται. δύο δ’ ὄντων οὐχ οἶον τε τρία εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τέσσαρα, ὡσπερ φαίνεται: τοσάوتαι γὰρ αἱ συνεγίασι· ἐξ γὰρ οὐσῶν τὰς δύο ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἕναντίας εἰναι ἄλληλαις.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦτων ἐφηται πρότερον· ὅτι δ’ ἐπειδὴ μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀδύνατον ἀρχὴν τινα εἶναι αὐτῶν ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ ἀκρῷ ἡ μέσω, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀκροῖς οὐκ ἔσται, ὅτι πῦρ ἔσται ἡ γῆ πάντα· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος τῷ φάναι ἐκ πυρὸς ἡ γῆς εἶναι πάντα· ὅτι δ’ οὐδὲ μέσον, ὡσπερ δοκεῖ τισὶν ἄπρο μὲν καὶ εἰς πῦρ μεταβάλλειν καὶ εἰς ὑδωρ, ὑδωρ δὲ καὶ εἰς ἀέρα καὶ εἰς γῆν, τὰ δ’ ἐσχάτα ὀυκέτι εἰς ἄλληλα ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.1· δει μὲν γὰρ στῆναι καὶ μὴ εἰς ἀπειρον τοῦτο ἕναι ἐπ’ εὐθείας ἕφ’ ἔκατέρα· ἀπειροι γὰρ αἱ ἕναντιό-τητες ἐπὶ τοῦ ἕνος ἐσονται. γῆ ἕφ’ ὡ Γ, ὑδωρ ἕφ’ ὡ Υ, ἄπρο ἕφ’ ὡ Α, πῦρ ἕφ’ ὡ Π. εἰ δὴ τὸ Λ μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ Π καὶ Υ, ἕναντιότης ἔσται τῶν ἈΠ. ἐστώ ταῦτα λευκότης καὶ μελανία. πάλιν εἰ εἰς τὸ Υ τὸ Λ, ἐσται ἄλλη· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτο τὸ Υ καὶ Π. ἐστώ δὲ ἕφρος καὶ υγρότης, τὸ μὲν Ξ ἕφροτης, τὸ δὲ Υ υγρότης. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν μένει τὸ λευκόν, ὑπάρξει τὸ ὑδωρ υγρὸν καὶ λευκόν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, μέλαν ἔσται τὸ ὑδωρ· εἰς τάναντια γὰρ ἡ μεταβολή. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἡ λευκὸν ἡ μέλαν εἶναι

1 ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον add. Joachim.

a Bk. II. chs. 2 and 3.
between them. But since the elements are seen to be more than two, the contrarieties would be at least two; but if the latter are two, the elements cannot be three but must be four, as is evidently the case; for the couples are of that number, since, though six are possible, two of these cannot occur because they are contrary to one another.

These matters have been dealt with before,* but that, when the elements change into one another, it is impossible for any one of them, whether at the end or in the middle of the series, to be a "source" is clear from the following considerations. There will be no "source" at the ends, since they will all be Fire or Earth; and this is the same as arguing that all things are derived from Fire or Earth. That the "source" cannot be in the middle either—as some people hold that Air changes both into Fire and into Water, and Water both into Air and into Earth, while the end-elements are not further changed into one another—is clear from these considerations. There must be a halt, and the process cannot continue in either direction in a straight line to infinity; for, otherwise, the number of contrarieties belonging to a single element will be infinite. Let E stand for Earth, W for Water, A for Air and F for Fire. Then (a), if A changes into F and W, there will be a contrariety attaching to AF. Let this contrariety be whiteness and blackness. Again (b), if A changes into W, there will be another contrariety; for W is not the same as F. Let this contrariety be dryness (D) and moisture (M). If, then, the whiteness persists, Water will be moist and white; if not, Water will be black, for change is into contraries. Water, therefore, must be either white or black. Let it, then, be the
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tò ὑδωρ. ἔστω δὴ τὸ πρῶτον. ὁμοίως τοῖνυν καὶ τῷ Π τὸ Ξ ὑπάρξει ἡ ἕρωται. ἔσται ἀρα
25 καὶ τῷ Π τῷ πυρὶ μεταβολῆ εἰς τὸ ὑδωρ· ἐναντία γὰρ ὑπάρχει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ τὸ πρῶτον μέλαν ἦν,
ἐπειτα δὲ ἔρησιν, τὸ δ’ ὑδωρ ύγρόν, ἐπείτα δὲ λευκόν. φανερῶν δὴ ὅτι πᾶσιν εξ ἄλληλων ἔσται
ἡ μεταβολή, καὶ ἐπὶ γε τούτων, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ Γ
30 τῇ γῇ ὑπάρξει τὰ λοιπὰ καὶ δύο σύμβολα, τὸ
μέλαν καὶ τὸ ύγρόν· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ συνεδύσασται
πώς.

"Οτι δ’ εἰς ἀπειρον οὐχ οἰὼν τ’ ἱέναι, ὅπερ μελ-
λήσαντες δείξειν ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐμπροσθεν ἡλθομεν, δή-
λον ἐκ τῶνδε. εἰ γὰρ πάλιν τὸ πῦρ, ἐφ’ ὁ Π, εἰς
ἀλλο μεταβαλεὶ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμψει, οἶνον εἰς τὸ Ψ,
ἐναντίοτης τις τῷ πυρὶ καὶ τῷ Ψ ἀλλή ὑπάρξει
35 τῶν εἰρημένων· οὐδενὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπόκειται τῶν

333 a Γ Υ Α Π τὸ Ψ. ἔστω δὴ τῷ μὲν Π τὸ Κ, τῷ δὲ
Ψ τὸ Φ. τὸ δὴ Κ πᾶσιν ὑπάρξει τοῖς Γ Υ Α Π·
μεταβάλλουσι γὰρ εἰς ἄλληλα. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο
μὲν ἔστω μῆς δεδειγμένον· ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο δῆλον,
5 ὅτι εἰ πάλιν τὸ Ψ εἰς ἄλλο, ἄλλη ἐναντίοτης καὶ
tῷ Ψ ὑπάρξει καὶ τῷ πυρὶ τῷ Π. ὁμοίως δ’
ἀεὶ μετὰ τοῦ προστιθεμένου ἐναντίοτης τις ὑπάρξει
tοῖς ἐμπροσθεν, ὥστ’ εἰ ἀπειρα, καὶ ἐναντιότητες
ἀπειροῦ τῷ ἐν ὑπάρξουσιν. εἰ δὲ τούτο, οὐκ ἔσται
οὔτε ὀρίσασθαι οὔδεν οὔτε γενέσθαι· δεῖσης γὰρ,
eἰ ἄλλο ἔσται ἐξ ἄλλου, τοσαύτας διεξελθεὶν ἐν-
10 ἀντιότητας, καὶ ἐτὶ πλείους, ὥστ’ εἰς ἐνια μὲν
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first of these. Similarly, D will also belong to F; therefore a change into Water will be possible also for Fire (F); for it has qualities which are contrary to those of Water, since Fire was first black and then dry, while Water was first moist and then white. It is clear, then, that the change of all the elements from one another will be possible, and that, in the above examples, E (Earth) will possess also the two remaining “corresponding qualities,” blackness and moisture (for these have not yet been in any way coupled together).

That the process cannot go on to infinity—which was the thesis that we were about to prove when we digressed to the above discussion—will be clear from the following considerations. If Fire (F) is to change in turn into something else and not to revert again, for example into Z, another contrariety other than those already mentioned will belong to Fire and Z; for it has been laid down that Z is not the same as any of the four, E, W, A and F. Let K belong to F, and Φ to Z; then K will belong to EWAF; for they change into one another. But, let us admit that this has not yet been demonstrated; yet this is evident that, if Z in turn is to be changed into another element, another contrariety will belong both to Z and also to Fire (F). Similarly, with each addition which is made, a fresh contrariety will attach to the preceding elements of the series, so that if the elements are infinite in number, infinitely numerous contrarieties will also attach to the single element. But if this is the case, it will be impossible to define any element and for any element to come-to-be. For if one is to result from another, it will have to pass through so many contrarieties and then through still more. Therefore (a), change into some elements
οὐδέποτε ἔσται μεταβολή, οἷον εἰ ἄπειρα τὰ μεταξὺ ἀνάγκης δ', εἰπερ ἄπειρα τὰ στοιχεῖα. ἔτι δ' οὐδ' ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς πῦρ, εἰ ἄπειροι αἱ ἐναντιότηται. γίνεται δὲ καὶ πάντα ἐν ἀνάγκῃ γὰρ πάσας ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν κατω τοῦ Π τὰς τῶν ἀνωθεν, τούτους δὲ τὰς τῶν κάτωθεν, ὡστε πάντα ἐν ἔσται.

6. Θαυμάσεις δὲ ἂν τῶν λεγόμενων πλείω ἐνὸς τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων ὡστε μὴ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλληλα, καθάπερ Ἔμπεδοκλῆς φησί, πῶς ἐνδέχεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς εἶναι συμβλητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα. καῖτοι λέγει οὖτω. "ταῦτα γὰρ ἴσα τε πάντα." εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν, ἀνάγκη ταύτῳ τι εἶναι ὑπάρχον ἀπασὶ τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ὃ μετροῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἐξ ὑδάτων κοτύλης εἰς ἀέρος δέκα· τὸ αὐτὸ τι ἢν ἄρα ἀμφω, εἰ μετρεῖται τῷ αὐτῷ. εἰ δὲ μὴ οὖτω κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν συμβλητὰ 25 ὡς ποσὸν ἐκ ποσοῦ, ἀλλ' ὅσον δύναται, οἷον εἰ κοτύλη ὑδάτως ὅσον δύναται φύχεων καὶ δέκα ἀέρος, καὶ οὕτως κατὰ τὸ ποσὸ ὡς ἢ ποσὸν συμβλητά, ἀλλ' ἢ δύναται τι. εἰῷ δ' ἂν καὶ μὴ τῷ τοῦ ποσοῦ μέτρῳ συμβάλλεσθαι τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ὡς τόδε λευκὸν τόδε θερμὸν. τὸ δ' ὡς τόδε σημαίνει ἐν μὲν ποιῷ τὸ ὁμοιόν, ἐν δὲ ποσῷ τὸ ὅσον. ἄτοπον δὴ φαίνεται, εἰ τὰ σώματα ἀμετάβλητα ὑντα μὴ ἀναλογία συμβλητὰ ἔστων,

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a Fr. 17 line 27 (Diels).

b i.e. if one element is as hot as another is white, they have “by analogy” the same amount, one of heat, the other of whiteness.
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 5–6

will never take place, for instance, if the intermediates are infinite in number (and they must be so if the elements are infinite): and further (b), there will not even be a change from Air into Fire, if the contrarieties are infinitely many: and (c) all the elements become one, for all the contrarieties of the elements above F must belong to those below F, and vice versa; they will all, therefore, be one.

6. One may well express astonishment at those who, like Empedocles, declare that the elements of bodies are more than one (and, therefore, do not change into one another), and ask them how they can assert that the elements are comparable. Yet Empedocles says, \(^a\) "For these are all not only equal . . . ." Now (a) if what is meant is that they are equal in amount, all the "comparables" must all possess something identical by means of which they are measured, if, for instance one pint of Water is equivalent to ten pints of Air, in which case both have always had something identical about them, since they were measured by the same standard. But (b) if they are not comparable in amount (in the sense that so much of the one is produced from so much of the other), but in power (for instance, if a pint of water and ten pints of air have an equal cooling power), even so they are comparable in amount, though not \(qua\) amount, but \(qua\) so much power. And (c) it would be possible also to compare their power not by the measure of quantity, but by an "analogy": for example, "as X is hot, so Y is white." \(^b\) But "analogy," while it signifies similarity in quality, signifies equality in quantity. Now it is obviously absurd that the bodies, though unchangeable, are comparable not merely by "analogy," but by the
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΛΕΣ

333 a ἄλλα μέτρῳ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῷ εἶναι ἵσως¹ θερμόν ἡ ὁμοίωσις² πυρὸς τοσοῦτο καὶ ἀέρος πολλαπλάσιον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ πλεῖον τῷ ὁμογενὲς εἶναι τοιούτων ἔξει τὸν λόγον.

35 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖδ` αὐξῆσίς ἂν εἰη κατ᾽ Ἐμπε-

333 b δοκλέα, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν πυρὶ γὰρ αὔξει τὸ πῦρ· "αὔξει δὲ χθῶν μὲν σφέτερον δέμας,³ αὐθέρα δ’ αἴθήρ." ταῦτα δὲ προστίθεται· δοκεῖ δ’ οὖν οὖτως αὔξεσθαι τὰ αὐξανόμενα. πολὺ δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἀποδοῦναι περὶ γενέσεως τῆς κατὰ 5 φύσιν. τὰ γὰρ γνώμενα φύσει πάντα γίνεται ἡ ἀεὶ ὡδὶ ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης. τὶ οὖν τὸ αἰτίον τοῦ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρωπον ἡ ἂεί ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πυροῦ πυρὸν ἄλλα μὴ ἐλαιαν; ὡς καὶ, ἐάν ὡδὶ συντεθῇ, ὀστοῖν; οὐ 10 γὰρ ὅπως ἔτυχε συνελθόντων οὖδὲν γίνεται, καθ᾽ ἄτε ἐκεῖνος φησιν, ἄλλα λόγῳ τυί. τὶ οὖν τοῦτον αἰτίον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ πῦρ γε ἡ γῆ. ἄλλα μὴν οὖδ’ ἡ φυλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος· συγκρίσεως γὰρ μόνον, τὸ δὲ διακρίσεως αἰτίον. τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ οὖσία ἡ ἐκάστου, ἀλλ’ οὐ μόνον "μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε 15 μυγέντων," ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνος φησιν. τύχη δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦτων ὁνομάζεται, ἀλλ’ οὐ λόγος· ἔστι γὰρ μιχθῆναι ὡς ἐτυχεί. τῶν δὴ φύσει οὖντων αἰτίον

1 ἵσως: ἵζον codd. 2 ὁμοίωσις F.: ὁμοίων FHL. 3 δέμας H: γένος EFL. 4 καθά EHL: καθάπερ F.

* Empedocles, fr. 37 (Diels).
measure of their powers; that is, that so much Fire and many times as much Air are comparable because they are equally or similarly hot. For the same thing, if greater in amount, will, by being of the same kind, have its ratio increased correspondingly.

Further, according to Empedocles, growth, too, would be impossible except by addition: for in his view Fire increases by Fire and “Earth increases its own body, and ether increases ether,” a and these are additions; and it is not generally held that things which increase do so in this way. And it is much more difficult for him to give an account of coming-to-be by a natural process. For the things which come-to-be naturally all come-to-be, either always or generally, in a particular way, and exceptions or violations of the invariable or general rule are the results of chance and luck. What, then, is the reason why man always or generally comes-to-be from man, and why wheat (and not an olive) comes-to-be from wheat? Or does bone come-to-be, if the elements are put together in a certain manner? For, according to Empedocles, nothing comes-to-be by their coming together by chance but by their coming together in a certain proportion. What, then, is the cause of this? It is certainly not Fire or Earth; but neither is it Love and Strife, for the former is a cause of “association” only and the latter of dissociation only. No: the cause is the substance of each thing and not merely, as he says, “a mingling and separation of things mingled” b; and chance, not proportion, is the name applied to these happenings: for it is possible for things to be mixed by chance. The cause, then, of things which exist naturally is that they are in

a Empedocles, fr. 8 (Diels); see also above, 314 b 7 f.

b Empedocles, fr. 8 (Diels); see also above, 314 b 7 f.
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333 b
to oútws ēxeiv, kai η ἐκάστου φύσις αὐτῇ, peri ἦς οὐδὲν λέγει. οὐδὲν ἀρα peri φύσεως λέγει. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ τούτο καὶ ἀγαθὸν. ὦ δὲ τὴν 20 μίξιν μόνον ἐπαινεῖ. καἰτοι τὰ γε στοιχεία δια- κρίνει οὐ τὸ νεῖκος, ἀλλ' ή φιλία τὰ φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ. θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταύτα.

"Ετι δὲ περὶ κινήσεως ἀπλῶς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ ἰκανὸν εἰπεῖν. διότι ή φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος κινεῖ, εἰ μὴ τοῦτ' ἦν φιλία εἶναι τὸ κινῆσει τοιαδή, νεικεί 25 δὲ τὸ τοιαδί. ἐδει οὖν ή ὀρίσασθαι ή ὑποθέσθαι ή ἀποδείξαι, ή ἀκριβῶς ή μαλακῶς, ή ἀλλὰς γε πως. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ φαίνεται καὶ βία καὶ παρὰ φύσιν κινούμενα τὰ σώματα, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν (οἶνον τὸ πῦρ ἄνω μὲν οὐ βία, κάτω δὲ βία), τῷ δὲ βία τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐναντίον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ βία, ἔστιν ἄρα 30 καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν κινεῖσθαι. ταύτην οὖν ή φιλία κινεῖ, ή οὐ; τοῦναντίον γὰρ τὴν γῆν κάτω καὶ διακρίσει ἐοικεν· καὶ μᾶλλον τὸ νεῖκος αὐτοῦ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν κινήσεως ή ή φιλία. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως παρὰ φύσιν ή φιλία ἀν εἰη μᾶλλον. ἀπλῶς δὲ εἰ μὴ ή φιλία ή τὸ νεῖκος κινεῖ, αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων 35 οὐδεμία κίνησις ἔστιν οὐδὲ μονή. ἀλλ' ἀποπον.

334 a ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαίνεται κινούμενα· διέκρινε μὲν γὰρ τὸ νεῖκος, ἡνέχθη δ' ἄνω ὁ αἰθήρ οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν φήσιν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τύχης

1 κάτω ΕΗ: ἄνω FL.

a Although it is entitled peri Фύσεως.

b i.e. natural motion.

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such and-such a condition, and this is what constitutes
the nature of each thing, about which he says nothing.
There is nothing " About the Nature of Things " in his
treatise. And yet it is this which is the excellence
and the good of each thing, whereas he gives all the
credit to the mixing process. (Yet it is not Strife
but Love that dissociates the elements which are by
nature prior to God, and they are also gods.)

Further, his account of motion is superficial. For
it is not enough to say that Love and Strife move
things, unless Love has been given a certain faculty
of movement and Strife a certain other. He should,
then, have either defined or laid down or demonstrat-
ed their powers of movement either accurately
or loosely, or at any rate in some manner. Further-
more, since the bodies are seen to move by compul-
sion (that is, unnaturally) and also naturally (for
example, Fire moves upwards without compulsion,
but downwards by compulsion), and that which is
natural is contrary to that which is by compulsion,
and movement by compulsion actually occurs, it
follows that natural motion also occurs. Is this, then,
the motion which Love sets going, or not ? No : for,
on the contrary, it moves the Earth downwards and
resembles " dissociation," and Strife rather than Love
is the cause of natural motion; and so, generally
speaking, Love rather than Strife would be contrary
to nature, and unless Love or Strife is actually setting
them in motion, the simple bodies themselves have
no motion or rest at all. But this is strange; and,
moreover, they are actually seen to move. For
although Strife caused dissociation, it was not by
Strife that the ether was carried upwards, but at one
time Empedocles talks as if it were due to chance,
334 a

("οὔτω γὰρ συνέκυρισε θέων τότε, πολλάκις δ’ ἄλλως’’), ὅτε δὲ φησὶ πεφυκέναι τὸ πῦρ ἀνω 5 φέρεσθαι, ὁ δ’ αἰθήρ, φησὶ, "μακρῆσαι κατὰ χθόνα δύσετο ῥίζαις.’’ ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον ὁμοίως ἐχειν φησὶν ἐπί τε τοῦ νείκους νῦν καὶ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ κίνοιν πρῶτον καὶ αὐτικὸν τῆς κινήσεως; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νείκος, ἀλλὰ των κινήσεως ταῦτα αὕτη, εἰ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνο ἄρχῃ.

10 Αὐτοποιοῦν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ἡ ἐν τι αὐτῶν: αἱ γὰρ ἀλλοιώσεις αἰ τῆς ψυχῆς πῶς ἔσονται, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν εἶναι καὶ πάλιν ἁμοῦσον, ἡ μνήμη ἡ λήθη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἰ μὲν πῦρ ἡ ψυχὴ, τὰ πάθη ὑπάρξει αὐτῇ ὡσα πυρὶ ἡ πῦρ εἰ δὲ μικτὸν, τὰ σωματικὰ τούτων δ’ οὐδέν σωμα- 15 τικὸν.

7 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐτέρας ἐργον ἔστι θεωρίας. περὶ δὲ τῶν στοιχείων ἐξ ὧν τὰ σώματα συνεστήκεν, ὅσοις μὲν δοκεῖ τι εἶναι κοινῶς ἡ μεταβάλλειν εἰς ἄλληλα, ἀνάγκη εἰ θάτερον τούτων, καὶ θάτερον συμβαίνειν· ὅσοι δὲ μὴ πουσοῦν ἐξ ἄλληλων γένεσιν μηδ’ ὡς ἐξ ἐκάστου, πλῆν ὡς ἐκ 20 τοῖχοι πλίνθους, ἀτοποιοῦν πῶς ἐκείνων ἔσονται σάρκες καὶ ὅστα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν. ἐξεὶ δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀπορίαν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἄλληλων γεν-

1 εἰ ἔστι ΕΗΕ : ἔστων Φ : εἰ δ’ ἔστι.

a Fr. 53 (Diels).  
b Fr. 54 (Diels).
saying, "For thus in its rush it encountered them then, but oft-times in other wise," \(^a\) whereas on another occasion he says that it is the nature of Fire to be borne upwards, and ether, he says, "sank with long roots into the Earth." \(^b\) At the same time he also says that the Earth is in the same condition now under the rule of Strife as it was formerly under that of Love. What, then, is the "prime mover" and cause of motion? It certainly is not Love and Strife; but these are the causes of a secondary motion, if the "prime mover" is the original source.

It is also strange that the soul should consist of the elements or be one of them; for how, then, will the "alterations" in the soul take place? How, for example, could the change from being musical to being unmusical occur, or could memory or forgetfulness occur? For evidently, if the soul is Fire, only such effects will be produced upon it as can be produced by Fire \textit{qua} Fire; whereas, if it is a mixture of elements, only the corporeal effects will be produced; but no one of these effects is corporeal.

7. The discussion, however, of these questions is the task of another investigation. But, as regards the elements of which bodies are composed, those who think that they all have something in common or that they change into each other, if they hold one of these views, must necessarily hold the other. For those, on the other hand, who do not make them come-to-be out of each other nor one from another taken singly (except in the sense that bricks come-to-be out of a wall), there is the paradox as to how flesh and bones and any of the other compounds will result from the elements. This suggestion involves a difficulty also for those who generate the elements.
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334 a

νώσιν, τίνα τρόπον γίνεται εξ αυτῶν ἐτερόν τι παρ’ αυτά. λέγω δ’ οἷον ἐστιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ καὶ ἐκ τούτου γίνεσθαι πῦρ· ἐστὶ γὰρ τι κοινὸν 25 τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ σάρξ εξ αυτῶν γίνεται καὶ μυελὸς· ταῦτα δὴ γίνεται πῶς; ἐκεῖνοι τε γὰρ τοῖς λέγουσιν ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τίς ἐσται τρόπος; ἀνάγκη γὰρ σύνθεσιν εἶναι καθάπερ ἐκ πλίθων καὶ λίθων τοῖχος· καὶ τὸ μῆγα δὲ τούτο ἐκ σωζομένων μὲν ἐσται τῶν στοιχείων, 30 κατὰ μικρὰ δὲ παρ’ ἄλληλα συγκεκιμένων. οὕτω δὴ σάρξ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστον. συμβαίνει δὴ μὴ εἰς ὅτουον μέρους σαρκὸς γίνεσθαι πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ὡσπερ ἐκ κηροῦ γένοιτ’ ἂν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ τοῦ μέρους σφαῖρα, πυραμὶς δ’ εἰς ἄλλου τινὸς· ἀλλ’ ἐνεδέχετο γε εἰς ἐκατέρου ἐκάτερον γενέσθαι. 35 τούτο μὲν δὴ τούτων γίνεται τὸν τρόπον ἐκ τῆς

334 b σαρκὸς εἰς ὅτουον ἀμφῶ· τοῖς δ’ ἐκείνως λέγουσιν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐκ τοῖχου λίθος καὶ πλίθος, ἐκάτερον εἰς ἄλλου τόπου καὶ μέρους. ομοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ποιοῦσι μίαν αὐτῶν ὑλὴν ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν, πῶς ἐσται τι εἰς ἀμφοτέρων, οἷον ψυχροῦ καὶ 5 θερμοῦ ἡ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ σάρξ εἰς ἀμφὸν καὶ μιθέτερον ἐκείνων, μηδ’ αὐτὸ σύνθεσις σωζομένων, τί λείπεται πλὴν ὕλην εἶναι τὸ εξ 300
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 7

from each other, namely, in what manner does anything else other than the elements themselves come-to-be out of them. The following is an example of what I mean: Water can come-to-be out of Fire and Fire out of Water (for their substratum is something common to both), but flesh, too, and marrow come-to-be out of them; how do they come-to-be? What manner of coming-to-be is ascribed to them by those who hold such a view as that of Empedocles? They must maintain that the process is composition, just as a wall comes-to-be from bricks and stones; moreover, this "mixture" will consist of the elements preserved intact but placed side by side with one another in minute particles. This, supposedly, is what happens in the case of flesh and each of the other compounds. The result is that Fire and Water do not come-to-be out of any and every part of the flesh; for example, while a sphere might come-to-be from one part of a piece of wax and a pyramid from another, yet it was possible for either shape to have come-to-be out of either part of the material. This, then, is how coming-to-be occurs when both Fire and Water come-to-be out of any part of the flesh. But for those who hold the above view this is impossible, but the process can only take place as stone and brick come-to-be out of a wall, that is, each out of a different place and part. Similarly, a difficulty arises also for those who make out that the elements have a single matter, namely, how anything will result from two of them taken together, for instance, cold and hot or Fire and Earth. For if flesh consists of both and yet is neither of them, and again is not a compound in which they are preserved intact, what possibility remains except that the result of their composition
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334 b

ἐκείνων; ἡ γὰρ θατέρου φθορὰ ἡ θάτερον ποιεῖ ἡ τὴν ὠλην.

Ἀρ’ οὖν ἐπειδή ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ὅταν μὲν ἀπλῶς ἡ θάτερον ἐντελεχεία,

dυνάμει θάτερον ἐσται· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παντελῶς, ἀλλ’ ὡς μὲν θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ὡς δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν διὰ τὸ μιγνύμενα φθείρειν τὰς ὑπεροχὰς ἀλλήλων, τότε ὁὐθ’ ἡ ὠλη ἐσται οὔτε ἐκείνων τῶν ἐναντίων ἐκατέρων ἐντελεχεία ἄπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ

dυνάμει μᾶλλον εἶναι θερμὸν ἡ ψυχρὸν ἡ τοῦναντίον,

κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον διπλασίως θερμὸν δυνάμει ἡ ψυχρόν, ἡ τριπλασίως, ἡ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον; ἐσται δὴ μιχθέντων ταλλ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ τῶν στοιχείων, καὶ τὰ στοιχεία ἐξ ἐκείνων

dυνάμει πως οὖντων, οὐχ οὖτω δὲ ὡς ἡ ὠλη, ἀλλὰ
tὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον καὶ ἐστιν οὖτω μὲν μῖξις,

ἐκείνως δὲ ὠλη τὸ γινόμενον. ἑπεὶ δὲ καὶ πάσχει
tάναντια κατὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις διορισμοῖς ἐστι γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργεία θερμὸν δυνάμει ψυχρόν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεία ψυχρὸν δυνάμει θερμὸν, ὡστε εάν μὴ ἵσαζῃ, μεταβάλλει εἰς ἀλληλα. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
tῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων καὶ πρῶτον οὖτω τὰ στοι-

χεία μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὲ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὀστά
kαὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοῦ μὲν θερμοῦ γινομένου ψυχ-

ροῦ, τοῦ δὲ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον

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a It is difficult to see any meaning in the words and they should perhaps be omitted.

b i.e. the case where one contrary destroys the other, (lines 6, 7).

c See 323 b 1 ff., where the law of the reciprocal action-and-passion of contraries is stated.

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COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 7

Is matter? For the passing-away of either of them produces either the other or the matter.

Is the following a possible solution based on the fact that there are greater and less degrees in hot and cold? When one of them is actually in being without qualification, the other will be potentially in existence; but when neither completely exists but (because they mix and destroy one another's excesses) there is a hot which, for a hot, is cold, and a cold which, for a cold, is hot, then the result will be that neither their matter nor either of the two contraries will be actually in existence without qualification but an intermediate, and according as it is potentially more hot than cold or, vice versa, it will possess a power of heating greater in proportion—whether double or treble or in some such ratio—than its power of cooling. The other bodies will result from the contraries (that is, from the elements) when mixed together, and the elements will result from the contraries existing somehow potentially—not in the sense in which matter exists potentially but in the manner already explained. Thus "mixture" takes place, whereas what comes-to-be in the other case is matter. But since the contraries also are acted upon according to the definition given in the first part of this treatise—for the actually hot is potentially cold, and the actually cold is potentially hot, so that, unless the hot and cold are equalized, they change into one another (and the like happens in the case of the other contraries)—thus in the first place the elements are transformed; but out of them flesh and bones and the like come-to-be when the hot is becoming cold and the cold becoming hot and they reach the mean, for at that point there is neither hot
334 b

'ἐλθῃ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδέτερον, τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἄδιαίρετον. ὃμοιως δὲ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ

30 ύγρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ μεσότητα ποιοῦσι σάρκα καὶ ὠστοῦν καὶ τὰλλα.

8. Ἄπαντα δὲ τὰ μικτὰ σώματα, ὃσα περὶ τὸν τοῦ μέσου τόπου ἐστίν, ἐξ ἄπαντων σύγκειται τῶν ἀπλῶν. γῆ μὲν γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει πάσι διὰ τὸ ἐκαστὸν εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ πλεῖστον ἐν τῷ οἴκειῳ τόπῳ,

35 ὕδωρ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεῖν μὲν ὀρίζεσθαι τὸ σύνθετον,

335 a μόνον δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπλῶν εὐόριστον τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἀνευ τοῦ ύγροῦ μὴ δύνασθαι συμ-

μένειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ εἶναι τὸ συνέχον· εἰ γὰρ ἐξ-

αἰρεθεῖ τελέως ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸ ύγρόν, διαπίπτοι ἂν.

Γῆ μὲν οὖν καὶ ὕδωρ διὰ τάς ἐνυπάρχει τὰς

5 αἰτίας, ἀνὴρ δὲ καὶ πῦρ, ὅτι ἐναντία ἐστὶ γῆ καὶ

ὑδατί· γῆ μὲν γὰρ ἀέρι, ὕδωρ δὲ πυρὶ ἐναντίον ἐστίν,

ὡς ἐνδέχεται σουσίαν σουσία ἐναντίαν εἶναι. ἐπεὶ

οὖν αἰ γενέσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰσίν, ἐνυπάρχει

δὲ θάτερα ἀκρα τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀνάγκη καὶ θάτερα ἐνυπάρχει,

ὡστ’ ἐν ἀπαντὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ πάντα τὰ

10 ἀπλὰ ἐνέσται. μαρτυρεῖν δ’ ἐοικε καὶ ἡ τροφὴ ἐκάστων· ἀπαντα μὲν γὰρ τρέφεται τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐξ

ἀντερ ἐστίν, ἀπαντα δὲ πλείσσι τρέφεται. καὶ γὰρ

ἀπερ ἂν δοξειν ἐνὶ μόνῳ τρέφεσθαι, τῷ ὕδατι τὰ

φυτά, πλείσσι τρέφεται· μέμικτα γὰρ τῷ ὕδατι

a i.e. the Earth as the centre of the universe.
b i.e. because the region in which mixed bodies exist consists mainly of earth.
c i.e. cold-dry (Earth) and cold-moist (Water).
d i.e. hot-moist (Air) and hot-dry (Fire).
nor cold. (The mean, however, has considerable extension and is not indivisible.) In like manner also it is in virtue of being in a "mean" condition that the dry and the moist and the like produce flesh and bone and the other compounds.

8. All the mixed bodies, which exist about the region of the centre, are compounds of all the simple bodies. For Earth enters into their composition, because every simple body exists specially and in the greatest quantity in its own place; and Water forms part of them, because that which is composite must have limits, and Water is the only one of the simple bodies which is easily confined within limits, and furthermore, the Earth cannot remain coherent without moisture, and this is what holds it together; for if the moisture were entirely removed from it, it would fall apart.

Earth, therefore, and Water enter into the composition of simple bodies for these reasons; so also do Air and Fire because they are contraries of Earth and Water—Earth of Air, and Water of Fire, in the sense in which one substance can be contrary to another substance. Since, then, comings-to-be result from contraries, and one pair of extreme contraries is already present, the other pair must also be present, so that all the simple bodies are found in every compound. The food of each compound serves to supply evidence of this; for they are all nourished by foods which are identical with their constituents, and all are nourished by more than one food. For indeed the plants, which would seem to be nourished by one food only, namely, Water, are fed by more than one food, for there is Earth mixed with the Water—and this, too, is why farmers experiment by

Every compound body must have all four simple bodies as its constituents.
γῆ· διὸ καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ πειρῶνται μίξαντες ἀρδεύν. 19 ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔστιν ἢ μὲν τροφὴ τῆς ὕλης, τὸ δὲ τρεφό- 
μενον συνειλημένον τῇ ὕλῃ ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος, 
εὐλογον ὡδὴ τὸ μόνον τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων τρέ-
φεσθαι τὸ πῦρ ἀπάντων ἐξ ἀλλήλων γινομένων, 
ὡσπερ καὶ οἱ πρότεροι λέγουσιν· μόνον γὰρ ἐστὶ 
καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ εἶδους τὸ πῦρ διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι 
20 φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ὄρον. ἐκαστὸν δὲ πέφυκεν εἰς 
τὴν ἐαυτοῦ χώραν φέρεσθαι· ἢ δὲ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ 
eἴδος ἀπάντων ἐν τοῖς ὀροῖς. ὁτι μὲν οὖν ἄπαντα 
tὰ σώματα ἐξ ἀπάντων συνέστηκε τῶν ἀπλῶν, 
eὑρηται.

9. Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔστιν ἐνια γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτά, καὶ 
25 ἡ γένεσις τυγχάνει οὐδὰ ἐν τῷ περὶ τὸ μέσον τό- 
πω, λεκτέον περὶ πάσης γενέσεως ὁμοίως πόσαι τε 
kαὶ τίνες αὐτῆς αἱ ἄρχαι· βάζειν γὰρ οὐτω τὰ καθ’ 
ἐκαστὸν θεωρήσωμεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν καθόλου λά-
βωμεν πρῶτον.

Εἰσιν οὖν καὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὑσαι καὶ τῶ γένει αἱ 
30 αὐταὶ αὐτέρ εἰν τοῖς ἀidineis τε καὶ πρῶτοις· ἢ μὲν 
γὰρ ἔστιν ὃς ὑλή, ἢ δ’ ὃς μορφή. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τῆν 
τρίτην ἐτι προσυπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκακαὶ πρὸς τὸ 
γεννῆσαι αἱ δύο, καθάπερ οὐδ’ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις. 
ὡς μὲν οὖν ὑλή τοῖς γεννητοῖς ἐστίν αὐτῶν τὸ δυ-
νατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
35 ἐστίν, οἷον τὰ ἄιδια, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἐστίν.

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a See 321 b 16 ff.
making mixtures and use them for watering. Now whereas food is of the nature of matter, and that which is fed is the "shape" and "form" taken together with the matter, it is reasonable to suppose that of the simple bodies, while all come-to-be out of one another, Fire is the only one which is fed, as is the view also of the earlier philosophers. For Fire alone—and to a greater extent than the rest—is of the nature of "form," because it naturally tends to be borne towards the limit. Now each of the simple bodies tends to be borne to its own place, and the "shape" and "form" of all of them depend on their limits. It has now been explained that all the compound bodies are composed of the simple bodies.

9. Since some things are of a nature to come-to-be and to pass-away, and since coming-to-be actually takes place in the region about the centre, we must discuss the number and the nature of the sources of all coming-to-be alike; for we shall more easily form a theory about the particulars when we have first grasped the universals.

These sources, then, are equal in number to and identical in kind with those which exist among eternal and primary things. For there is one in the sense of material cause, a second in the sense of formal cause, and the third too must be present also; for the two sources are not enough to generate things which come-to-be, just as they are not enough in the case of primary things either. Now cause in the sense of matter for things which are of a nature to come-to-be is "the possibility of being and not-being." For some things exist of necessity, for example, the things which are eternal, and some things of necessity do not exist; and of these two classes it is impossible
ARISTOTLE

τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἄλλως ἔχειν. ἐνιαὶ δὲ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι δυνατά, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ γεννητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν. ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ποτὲ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη γέ-
5 νεσίν εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν περὶ τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. διὸ καὶ ὡς μὲν ὑλὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αἰτίων τοῖς γενητοῖς, ὡς δὲ τὸ οὐ ἐνεκεν ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ἐκάστου οὐσίας.

Δει δὲ προσέιναι καὶ τὴν τρίτην, ἣν ἀπαντεῖς μὲν ὄνειρωττοσί, λέγει δ' οὔδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν
10 ἰκανὴν ᾧθήσαν αἰτίαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν φύσιν, ὅσπερ ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοις, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσιν, ὑποτίθεται ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν οὖν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἰδὴ τὰ δὲ μεθεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ὅτι εἶναι μὲν ἐκαστὸν λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, γίνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ
15 τὴν μετάληψιν καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποβολὴν, ὥστ' εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, τὰ εἰδὴ οἴεται εἰς ἀνάγκης αἰτία εἶναι καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. οἱ δ' αὐτὴν τὴν ὑλὴν· ἀπὸ ταύτης γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν. οὖ-
δέτεροι δὲ λέγουσιν καλῶς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν αἰτία τὰ εἰδὴ, διὰ τὶ οὐκ ἄει γεννᾶ συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ
20 μὲν ποτὲ δ' οὐ, οὖντων καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ἄει καὶ τῶν

* Plato, Phaedo 96 a—99 c.
for the first not to be, while for the second it is impossible to be, because they cannot be other than they are in violation of the law of necessity. Some things, however, can both be and not be. This is the case with that which can come-to-be and pass-away; for at one moment it exists, at another it does not exist. So coming-to-be and passing-away must occur in the sphere of what can-be-and-not-be. This, then, is the cause, in the sense of material cause, of things which are of a nature to come-to-be, whereas cause, in the sense of their “end in view,” is their shape and form; and this is the definition of the essential nature of each of them.

But the third source must also be present, of which everyone dreams but never puts into words. But some people have thought the nature of the “forms” was enough to account for coming-to-be. Socrates, for instance, did so in the Phaedo; for he, after finding fault with the other philosophers for having made no pronouncement on the subject, lays it down that some of the things which exist are “forms” and others “partakers in the forms,” and that each thing is said to exist in virtue of the “form” and to come-to-be in virtue of its participation in the “form” and to pass-away because of its rejection of it. Hence he thinks that, if this is true, the “forms” are necessarily the causes of both coming-to-be and passing-away. On the other hand, some have thought that the matter in itself was the cause; for it is from this, they said, that movement arises. But neither of these schools of thought is right. For, if the “forms” are causes, why do they not always generate continually but only intermittently, since the “forms” and the partakers in them are always there? Further-
μεθεκτικῶν; ἐτὶ δ' ἐπ' ἐνίων θεωροῦμεν ἄλλο
tὸ αἰτίον οὖν ὑγίειαν γὰρ ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐμποιεῖ καὶ
ἐπιστήμην ὁ ἐπιστήμων, οὖσα καὶ ὑγιείας αὐτῆς
cαὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν μεθεκτικῶν· ὡσαύτως
dὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ δύναμιν πρατ-
tομένων. εἰ δὲ τὴν ύλήν τις φήσει γεννᾶν διὰ
25 τὴν κίνησιν, φυσικῶτερον μὲν ἂν λέγοι τῶν οὕτω
λεγόντων· τὸ γὰρ ἄλλοιον καὶ τὸ μετασχηματίζον
αἰτιώτερον τε τοῦ γεννᾶν, καὶ ἐν ἄπασιν εἰσώθαμεν
tοῦτο λέγειν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὁμοίως ἐν τε τοῖς φύσει
cαὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, ὅ ἂν ἦ κινητικόν. οὐ μὴν
ἀλλὰ καὶ οὐτοὶ οὐκ ὃρθῶς λέγουσιν· τῆς μὲν
30 γὰρ ύλῆς τὸ πάσχειν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ
dὲ κινεῖν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν ἑτέρας δυνάμεως (δῆλον δὲ
cαὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τέχνης καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσεις γινομένων·
οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὸ ύδωρ ζῴου ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ
tὸ ἄτυλον κλίνην, ἀλλ' ἡ τέχνη). ὡστε καὶ οὐτοὶ
dιὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν οὐκ ὃρθῶς, καὶ ὅτι παραλεί-
35 πουσι τὴν κυριωτέραν αἰτίαν· ἐξαιροῦσι γὰρ τὸ τά
336 a ἂν εἴλαν καὶ τὴν μορφήν. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις
ἀποδιδόσαι τοῖς σώμασι, δι' ἃς γεννᾶσι, λίαν
ὁργανικῶς, ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αἰτίαν.
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφυκεν, ὡς φασί, τὸ μὲν θερμὸν δια-
κρίνειν τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν συνιστάναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
5 ἐκαστὸν τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκ τούτων
λέγουσι καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀπαντα τάλλα γίνεσθαι
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more, in some cases we see that something else is the cause; for it is the physician who implants health and the scientific man who implants scientific knowledge, although health itself and science itself exist and also the participants in them; and the same thing is true of the other operations carried out in virtue of a special faculty. On the other hand, if one were to say that matter generates by means of its movement, he would speak more in accordance with the facts of nature than those who state the view given above; for that which "alters" and transforms is a more potent cause of bringing things into being, and we are always accustomed, in the products alike of nature and of art, to make out that whatever can cause motion is the acting cause. However, these thinkers are also wrong; for to be acted upon, that is, to be moved, is characteristic of matter, but to move, that is to act, is the function of another power. (This is evident both in the things which come-to-be by art and in those which come-to-be by nature; for water does not itself produce an animal out of itself, nor does wood produce a bed, but art). So, for this reason, these thinkers are not correct in what they say, and also because they omit the most potent cause; for they exclude the essential nature and the "form." Moreover, also, when they do away with the formal cause, the powers which they attribute to bodies and which enable them to bring things into being are too instrumental in character. For since, as they assert, it is the nature of the hot to separate and of the cold to bring together and of each of the other qualities the one to act and the other to be acted upon, it is out of these and by means of these, so they say, that all the other things come-to-be and
καὶ φθείρεσθαι· φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ κυνούμενον καὶ πάσχον. ἦτι δὲ παραπλήσιον ποιοῦσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις τῷ πρίνι καὶ ἐκάστω τῶν ὄργανων ἀπονέμοι τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν γινομένων· ἀνάγκη γὰρ πρίοντος διαμεισθαι καὶ ξέοντος λεαινεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀμοίως. ὥστ' εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ καὶ κινεῖ τὸ πῦρ, ἄλλα πῶς κινεῖ οὐ προσθεωροῦσιν, ὅτι χεῖρον ἢ τὰ ὄργανα. ἥμων δὲ καθόλου τε πρότερον εὑρήται περὶ τῶν αἰτίων, καὶ νῦν διώρισται περὶ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς.

10. "Ετι δὲ ἐπεὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν φορὰν κίνησις δεδεικται ὅτι αἴδοις, ἀνάγκη τούτων ὄντων καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι συνεχῶς· ἢ γὰρ φορὰ ποιήσει τὴν γένεσιν ἐνδελεχῶς διὰ τὸ προσάγει καὶ ἀπάγει τὸ γεννητικόν. ἀμα δὲ δήλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ πρότερον καλῶς εὑρήται, τὸ πρῶτην τῶν μεταβολῶν τὴν φορὰν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν γένεσιν εἰπεῖν· πολὺ γὰρ εὐλογώτερον τὸ ὅν τῷ μὴ ὄντι γενέσεως αἴτιον εἶναι ἡ τὸ μῆ ὃν τῷ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι. τὸ μὲν οὐν φερόμενον ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ γινομένον οὐκ ἔστιν· διὸ καὶ ἡ φορὰ προτέρα τῆς γενέσεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται καὶ δὲ-25 δεικταί συνεχῆς οὕσα τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, φαμέν δ' αἰτίαν εἶναι τὴν φορὰν τοῦ γίνεσθαι, φανερὸν ὅτι μιᾶς μὲν ὀὕσης τῆς φορᾶς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι ἀμφοῦ διὰ τὸ ἐναντία εἶναι.

1 οὗ προσθεωροῦσι: οὐ προσθεωροῦσιν Ε: οὐ προσθεωροῦσιν Η: οὐχ ὀρῶσιν ΦL.
pass-away. But it is evident that Fire itself is moved and is acted upon; moreover, they are doing much the same thing as if one were to ascribe to the saw or to any other tool the causation of objects which are brought into being; for division must take place when a man saws and smoothing when he uses a plane, and a similar effect must be produced by the use of the other tools. Hence, however much Fire is active and causes motion, yet they fail to observe how it moves things, namely, in a manner inferior to that in which the tools act. We have ourselves dealt with causes in general in a previous work, and we have now distinguished between matter and form.

10. Moreover, since the change caused by motion has been proved to be eternal, it necessarily follows, if that is so, that coming-to-be goes on continuously; for the movement will produce coming-to-be un-interruptedly by bringing near and withdrawing the “generator.” At the same time it is evident that our statement in a former work was also right in which we spoke of motion, not coming-to-be, as the “primary kind of change.” For it is far more reasonable that that which is should be a cause of coming-to-be of that which is not, than that that which is not should be cause of being to that which is. For that which is being moved exists, but that which is coming-to-be does not exist; therefore movement is prior to coming-to-be. Now since it has been suggested and proved that coming-to-be and passing-away happen to things continuously, and we maintain that motion is the cause of coming-to-be, it is clear that, if motion is simple, both processes cannot go on because they are contrary to one another; for nature has ordained

1 Cf. 317 b 33 ff.
τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πέφυκε
pouev. ὡστε ἦτοι γένεσις ἀεὶ ἐσται ἥ φθορά. 
30 δὲ πλείους εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις καὶ ἐναντίας, ἥ τῇ
φορᾷ ἡ τῇ ἀνωμαλίᾳ: τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τάναντια
αἴτια.

Διὸ καὶ οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φορὰ αἰτία ἐστὶ γενέσεως
καὶ φθορᾶς, ἀλλ’ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λοξὸν κύκλον· ἐν
tαύτῃ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεχές ἐστι καὶ τὸ κινεῖται
dύο κινήσεις· ἀνάγκη γὰρ, εἴ γε ἀεὶ ἐσται συνεχῆς
γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀεὶ μὲν τι κινεῖται, ἢν μὴ
ἐπιλείπωσιν αὐταί aι μεταβολαί, δύο δ’, ὅπως μὴ
θάτερον συμβαίνῃ μόνον. τῆς μὲν οὖν συνεχείας
ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φορᾶ αἰτία, τού δὲ προσείναι καὶ
ἀπείναι ἡ ἐγκλίσις· συμβαίνει γὰρ ὅτε μὲν πόρρω
5 γίνεσθαι ὅτε δ’ ἐγγύς. ἀνίσου δὲ τοῦ διαστή-
ματος ὅντος ἀνώμαλος ἐστοι ἡ κίνησις· ὡστ’ εἰ
tῷ προσείναι καὶ ἐγγύς εἶναι γεννᾶ, τῷ ἀπείναι
tαυτῶν τοῦτο καὶ πόρρω γίνεσθαι φθείρει, καὶ εἰ
tῷ πολλάκις προσείναι γεννᾶ, καὶ τῷ πολλάκις
ἀπελθείν φθείρει· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τάναντια
αἴτια.
10 καὶ ἐν ἵσω χρόνῳ καὶ ἥ φθορὰ καὶ ἡ γένεσις ἡ
κατὰ φύσιν. διὸ καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ οἱ βίοι ἐκάστων
ἀριθμὸν ἔχουσι καὶ τοῦτο διορίζονται· πάντων γὰρ
ἔστι τάξις, καὶ πᾶς βίος καὶ χρόνος μετρεῖται
περιόδῳ, πλὴν οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ πάντες, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν

a The revolution of the πρώτος οὐρανός or outermost sphere
which revolves once every twenty-four hours.
b The annual course of the sun in the ecliptic circle.
c i.e. of the πρώτος οὐρανός, which also involves the revolu-
d the inclination of the ecliptic to the equator of the outer-
that the same thing, as long as it remains in the same state, always produces the same result, so that either coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. The movements, however, must be more than one and contrary to one another either in the direction of their motion or in their irregularity; for contraries are the causes of contraries.

It is not, therefore, the primary motion which is the cause of coming-to-be and passing-away, but the motion along the inclined circle; for in this there is both continuity and also double movement, for it is essential, if there is always to be continuous coming-to-be and passing-away, that there should be something always moving, in order that this series of changes may not be broken, and double movement, in order that there may not be only one change occurring. The movement of the whole is the cause of the continuity, and the inclination causes the approach and withdrawal of the moving body; for since the distance is unequal, the movement will be irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching and being near, this same body causes destruction by withdrawing and becoming distant, and if by frequently approaching it generates, by frequently withdrawing it destroys; for contraries are the cause of contraries, and natural passing-away and coming-to-be take place in an equal period of time. Therefore the periods, that is the lives, of each kind of living thing have a number and are thereby distinguished; for there is an order for everything, and every life and span is measured by a period, though this is not the same for all, but some are

most sphere; according to Aristotle, the equator of the Universe is in the same plane as the earth's equator.
336 Β

ελάττωνι οί δὲ πλείων· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐνιαυτός, τοῖς
dὲ μείζων, τοῖς δὲ ἐλάττων περίοδος ἕστι τὸ
μέτρον.

Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ 2 κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν ὡμολογού-
μενα τοῖς παρ’ ἦμῶν λόγους· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι
προσιόντος μὲν τοῦ ἡλίου γένεσις ἐστὶ, ἄπιόντος
δὲ φύσις, καὶ ἐν ἵσι χρόνω ἐκάτερον· ὑπὸς γὰρ ὁ
χρόνος τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ τῆς γενέσεως τῆς κατὰ

25 Ἀεὶ δ’, ὥσπερ εἰρηταί, συνεχῆς ἐσται η γένεσις
καὶ η φθορᾶ, καὶ οὐδέποτε ὑπολείψει δι’ ἣν εἴσημεν
αὐτίας. τοῦτο δ’ εὐλόγως συμβεβηκεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ
ἐν ἀπασιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βελτίωνος ὁρέγεσθαι φαμεν τὴν
φύσιν, βελτίων δὲ τὸ εἶναι ἡ τὸ μὴ εἶναι (τὸ δ’ εἶναι
30 ποσαχῶς λέγομεν, ἐν ἄλλως εἰρηται), τοῦτο δ’
ἀδύνατον ἐν ἀπασιν ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὸ πόρρω τῆς
ἀρχῆς ἀφίστασθαι, τῷ λειπομένῳ τρόπῳ συνε-
πληρώσε τὸ ὄλον ὁ θεός, ἐνδελεχή 3 ποιήσας τὴν
γένεσιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν μάλιστα συνείρουτο τὸ εἶναι
diὰ τὸ ἐγγύτατα εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας τὸ γίνεσθαι ἀεὶ
337 Α καὶ τὴν γένεσιν. τούτου δ’ αὐτίων, ὥσπερ εἰρηται

1 ἣ ante perīοδος omisi.
2 tā addidi.
3 ἐνδελεχῇ FH: ἐντελεχῇ E.

a See 318 a 9 ff.

b Metaphysics, passim.
measured by a smaller and some by a greater period; for some the measure is a year, for others a greater or a lesser period.

The evidence of sense-perception clearly agrees with our views; for we see that coming-to-be occurs when the sun approaches, and passing-away when it withdraws, and the two processes take an equal time; for the space of time occupied by natural passing-away and coming-to-be is equal. It often happens, however, that things pass away in too short a time owing to the commingling of things with one another; for, their matter being irregular and not everywhere the same, their comings-to-be must also be irregular, sometimes too quick and sometimes too slow. The result is that the coming-to-be of certain things becomes the cause of the passing-away of other things.

As has already been remarked, coming-to-be and passing-away will take place continuously, and will never fail owing to the cause which we have given. This has come about with good reason. For nature, as we maintain, always and in all things strives after the better; and "being" (we have stated elsewhere the different meanings of "being") is better than "not-being," but it is impossible that "being" can be present in all things, because they are too far away from the "original source." God, therefore, following the course which still remained open, perfected the universe by making coming-to-be a perpetual process; for in this way "being" would acquire the greatest possible coherence, because the continual coming-to-be of coming-to-be is the nearest approach to eternal being. The cause of this continuous process, as has been frequently remarked, is cyclical


ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

πολλάκις, ἡ κύκλῳ φορά· μόνη γὰρ συνεχὴς. διὸ καὶ τάλλα ὅσα μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, οἶνον τὰ ἀπλὰ σώματα, μιμεῖται τὴν κύκλῳ φοράν· οὕτω γὰρ ἕξ ὤδατος ἀὴρ γένηται καὶ ἐξ ἀέρος πῦρ καὶ πάλιν ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ, κύκλῳ φαμέν περιεληλυθέναι τὴν γένεσιν διὰ τὸ πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν. ὅστε καὶ ἡ εὐθεία φορὰ μιμομένη τὴν κύκλῳ συνεχῆς ἔστων.

"Αμα δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὅ τινες ἀποροῦσιν, διὰ τί, ἐκάστου τῶν σωμάτων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν φε- ρομένου χώραν, ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ χρόνῳ οὐ διεστάσαι τὰ σώματα. αὐτίον γὰρ τοῦτον ἔστων ἢ εἰς ἄλληλα μετάβασις· εἰ γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἐμενεν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ καὶ μῇ μετέβαλλεν ύπὸ τοῦ πλησίον, ἤδη ἀν διεστήκεσαν. μεταβάλλει μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν φοράν διπλῆν οὕσαν· διὰ δὲ τὸ μεταβάλλειν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μένειν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ χώρᾳ τεταγμένη.

Διότι μὲν οὖν ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορά καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, καὶ τί τὸ γενητὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν, φανερῶν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι τί τὸ κινοῦν, εἰ κίνησις ἔσται, ὡσπερ ἐῴρηται πρῶτον ἐν ἑτέροις, καὶ εἰ ἄει, ὅτι ἄει τί δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ 20 εἰ συνεχῆς, ἐν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον· καὶ εἰ πλείους εἶναι αἱ κύκλῳ κινήσεις, πλείους μὲν, πάσας δὲ πως εἶναι ταύτας ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ μίαν ἀρχήν· συνεχοῦς δ' ὄντος τοῦ

\[\textit{a} \textit{Phys. 255 b 31 ff.}\]
motion, the only motion which is continuous. Hence also the other things which change into one another, for instance, the simple bodies, by being acted upon or having power to act, imitate cyclical movement. For when Air comes-to-be from Water, and Fire from Air, and Water again from Fire, we say that coming-to-be has completed the cycle, because it has come back to its starting-point. Hence motion in a straight line is also continuous because it imitates cyclical motion.

This at the same time clears up a point which some people find puzzling, namely, the reason why, since each of the bodies is being borne along towards its own place, the bodies have not become separated in the infinity of time. The reason is their reciprocal change of position; for if each remained in its own place and was not transformed by its neighbour, they would have long ago been parted. Their transformation, then, is due to the movement of a double kind; and, owing to their transformation, none of them can remain in any fixed position.

From what has been said, it is evident that coming-to-be and passing-away take place, and why this is so, and what it is that comes-to-be and passes-away. But if there is to be movement, there must, as has been explained elsewhere in an earlier treatise, a be something which causes movement, and if movement is to go on always, that which causes it must go on always and, if it is to be continuous, that which causes it must be one and the same and unmoved, ungenerated and unalterable; and if the cyclical movements are to be more than one, they must, in spite of being more than one, be all subject somehow to one cause; and since time is continuous, the move-
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χρόνου ἀνάγκη τὴν κίνησιν συνεχῆ εἶναι, εἰπέρ ἀδύνατον χρόνον χωρὶς κινήσεως εἶναι. συνεχοῦς

25 ἀρα τινὸς ἀριθμὸς τοῦ χρόνος, τῆς κύκλῳ ἀρα, καθ- ἀπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγοις διωρίσθη. συνεχῆς δ' ἡ κίνησις πότερον τῷ τὸ κινούμενον συνεχῆς εἶναι ἡ τῷ τὸ ἐν ὧν κινεῖται, ὅπων τὸν τόπον λέγω ἡ τὸ πάθος; δήλον δὴ ὅτι τῷ τὸ κινούμενον· πῶς γὰρ τὸ πάθος συνεχῆς ἀλλ' ἡ τῷ τὸ πράγμα ὧν συμβέβηκε συνεχῆς εἶναι; εἰ δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐν ὧν, μόνῳ τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ὑπάρχει· μέγεθος γὰρ τι ἔχει. τούτου δὲ τὸ κύκλῳ μόνον συνεχῆς, ὡστε αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ἄεὶ συνεχῆς. τούτῳ ἀρα ἐστὶν δ' ποιεῖ συνεχῆ κίνησιν, τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα φερόμενον· ἡ δὲ κίνησις τοῦ χρόνου.

11. 'Επει δ' ἐν τοῖς συνεχῶς κινούμενοις κατὰ 35 γένεσιν ἡ ἄλλοισιν ἡ ὅλης μεταβολῆν ὅρμυμεν 337 b τὸ ἑφεξῆς ὑν καὶ γινόμενον τόδε μετὰ τόδε ὡστε μὴ διαλείπειν, σκεπτέον πότερον ἐστὶ τι δ' εἰς ἀνάγκης ἐσται, ἡ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ενδεχεται μὴ γενέσθαι. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἔνια, δήλον, καὶ εὐθὺς τὸ ἐσται καὶ τὸ μέλλων ἐτερον διὰ τοῦτο· δ' μὲν γὰρ 5 ἄληθες εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐσται, δεῖ τούτῳ εἰναι ποτε ἄληθες ὅτι ἐστιν· δ' δὲ νῦν ἄληθες εἰπεῖν ὅτι μέλλει, οὐδέν

a Phys. 217 b 29 ff.
ment must be continuous, because it is impossible for there to be time without movement. Time, then, is a way of reckoning some kind of continuous movement and, therefore, of cyclical movement, as was laid down in our original discussion. But is movement continuous because that which is moved is continuous or because that in which it moves is continuous (for example, the place or the quality)? Clearly because that which is moved is continuous; for how could the quality be continuous except because the thing to which it belongs is continuous? And if it is because the place in which it occurs is continuous, continuity is to be found only in the place in which it occurs; for it has a certain magnitude. But of that which moves, only that which moves in a circle is continuous in such a way that it is always continuous with itself. This, then, is what produces continuous motion, namely, the body which is moved in a circle, and its movement makes time continuous.

11. When in things which are moved continuously in the course of coming-to-be or alteration or change generally, we observe a sequence, that is, one thing coming-to-be after another in such a way that there is no cessation, we must inquire whether there is anything which will necessarily exist in the future or whether there is no such thing, or whether any one of them may possibly fail to come-to-be. For it is evident that some of them fail to come-to-be, and the readiest example is the difference which for this reason exists between "something will be" and "something is about to be"; for if it is true to say "something will be," it must be true at some future date to say that it is. On the other hand, though it is true now to say that "something is about to happen,"
κωλύει μὴ γενέσθαι. μέλλων γὰρ ἂν βαδίζειν τις οὐκ ἂν βαδίσειν. ὅλως δ', ἐπεὶ ἐνδεχεται ἕνα τῶν ὄντων καὶ μὴ εἶναι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ γινόμενα 10 οὕτως ἔξει, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτ' ἔσται. πότερον οὖν ἀπαντὰ τοιαῦτα ἦ οὕ, ἀλλ' ἐνια ἀναγκαῖον ἁπλῶς γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἔστιν ὑσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι τα μὲν ἀδύνατα μὴ εἶναι τὰ δὲ δυνατά, οὕτως καὶ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν; οἷον τροπάς ἄρα ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐχ οἴον τε μὴ ἐνδεχεσθαι.

Εἰ δὴ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι, εἰ τὸ 15 οὐστερον ἔσται (οἷον εἰ οἰκία, θεμέλιον, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πηλόν), ἃρ' οὖν καὶ εἰ θεμέλιος γέγονεν, ἀνάγκη οἰκίαι γενέσθαι; ἦ οὐκέτι, εἰ μὴ κάκειν ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι ἁπλῶς; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀνάγκη καὶ θεμελίου γενομένου γενέσθαι οἰκίαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἦν τὸ πρότερον ἔχον πρὸς τὸ ὑστερον, ὥστε εἰ ἐκεῖνο 20 ἔσται, ἀνάγκη ἐκεῖνο πρότερον. εἰ τοῖνυν ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι τὸ ὑστερον, καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀνάγκη· καὶ εἰ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ τὸ ὑστερον τοῖνυν ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὑπέκειτο εξ ἀνάγκης ἐσόμενον. ἐν οἷς ἄρα τὸ ὑστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐν τούτοις ἀντιστρέφει, καὶ ἂεὶ τοῦ προτέρου γενο- 25 μένου ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι τὸ ὑστερον.

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there is nothing to prevent its not happening—a man might not go for a walk, though he is now "about to" do so. In general, since it is possible for some of the things which "are" also "not to be," obviously things which are coming-to-be are also in this case and their coming-to-be will not necessarily take place. Are, then, all the things which come-to-be of this kind? Or is this not so, but it is absolutely necessary for some of them to come-to-be? And does the same thing happen in the sphere of coming-to-be as in that of being, where there are some things for which it is impossible "not to be" and for others which it is possible? For example, solstices must come-to-be and it is impossible that they should be unable to occur.

If it is necessary for that which is prior to come-to-be if that which is posterior is to be—for example, foundations must have come-to-be if a house is to exist, and there must be clay if there are to be foundations—does it follow that, if the foundations have come-to-be, the house must necessarily do so? Or is this no longer so, if there is no such absolute necessity? In this case, however, if the foundations have come-to-be, the house must come-to-be; for such was the assumed relation of the prior to the posterior that, if the posterior is to be, the prior must have preceded it. If, therefore, it is necessary that the posterior should come-to-be, it is necessary also that the prior should have come-to-be, and, if the prior, then also the posterior, not, however, because of the prior, but because the future being of the posterior was assumed as necessary. Hence, whenever the posterior is necessary, the reverse is also true, and always when the prior has come-to-be, the posterior must also come-to-be.
The argument is as follows: let x be one of the future members of the series of events, x's occurrence is contingent on the future occurrence of a still later member of the series, which is itself contingent on a still later member, y. The occurrence of every subsequent member of the infinite series is therefore conditionally, not absolutely, necessary. If x's occurrence were absolutely necessary, x would be the begin-
COMING-TO-BE AND PASSING-AWAY, II. 11

Now if the series is to go on indefinitely downwards, any particular later member of the series must come-to-be not by absolute, but only by conditional, necessity; for it will always be necessary that another later member of the series should exist first in order to make it necessary that the earlier member of the series should come-to-be. Hence, since the infinite has no beginning, neither will there be any primary member of the series which will make it necessary for the other members to come-to-be. And further, it will not be possible to say with truth, even in the case of members of a series which is limited, that there is an absolute necessity that they should come-to-be. For example, a house will not necessarily come-to-be when its foundations have come-to-be; for unless it is always necessary for a house to come-to-be, the result will be that when its foundations have come-to-be, a thing, which need not always be, must always be. No: if its coming-to-be is of necessity, there must be an "always" about its coming-to-be; for what must necessarily be, must at the same time always be, since what "must necessarily be" cannot "not-be"; hence, if a thing is "of necessity," it is eternal, and, if it is eternal, it is "of necessity"; if, therefore, the coming-to-be of a thing is "of necessity," it is eternal and, if it is eternal, it is "of necessity."

If, then, the coming-to-be of anything is absolutely necessary, it must be cyclical and return upon itself; for coming-to-be must either have a limit or not have a limit, and if it has not a limit, it must proceed either

ning of the series (i.e. would necessitate the earlier members); but the series is infinite and therefore has no beginning or end.
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eis evthi ἡ κύκλω. τοῦτων δ’ εἰπερ ἦσται ἄῤῥιος, ὥν εἰς εὐθὺ οἱ ὑπὸ τοῦ διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς εἰναι ἀρχὴν μῆτ’ ἀν κατω, ὡς ἔπὶ τῶν ἐσομένων, λαμβάνομεν, μῆτ’ ἄνω, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν γινομένων· ἀνάγκη δ’ εἰναι 10 ἀρχὴν, μὴ πεπερασμένης ὀφθής, καὶ ἄῤῥιον εἰναι. διὸ ἀνάγκη κύκλω εἰναι. ἀντιστρέφειν ἂρα ἀνάγκη ἦσται, οἷον εἰ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἂρα· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ υστεροῦ ἀνάγκη γένεσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἂεὶ δὴ συνεχῶς· οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρει λέγειν διὰ δύο ἡ πολλῶν. εὖ τῆς
15 κύκλῳ ἂρα κινήσει καὶ γενέσει ἦστι τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπλῶς· καὶ εἰτε κύκλῳ, ἀνάγκη ἑκαστον γίνεσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ ἀνάγκη, ἡ τοῦτων γένεσιν κύκλῳ.

Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ εὐλόγως, ἐπεὶ ἄῤῥιος καὶ ἄλλως ἐφάνη ἡ κύκλῳ κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ὅτι 338 b ταῦτα ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται καὶ ἦσται, οὔσαι ταύτης κινήσεις καὶ οὔσαι διὰ ταύτην· εἰ γὰρ τὸ κύκλῳ κινούμενον ἂεὶ τι κινεῖ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦτων κύκλῳ εἰναι τὴν κίνησιν, οἷον τῆς ἄνω φορᾶς οὐσίας κύκλῳ ὁ ἥλιος ὁ ἥλιος F, Bonitz.

1 κύκλῳ ὁ ἥλιος F, Bonitz.

a Rectilinear movement, proceeding ad infinitum, does
in a straight line or in a circle. But of these alter-
natives, if it is to be eternal, it cannot proceed in a
straight line, because it can have no source, whether
we take the members of the series downwards as
future events or upwards as past events. But there
must be a source of coming-to-be, though without
coming-to-be itself being limited, and it must be
eternal. Therefore, it must be a cyclical process.
It will, therefore, have to return upon itself; for
example, if a certain member of the series is neces-
sary, then the one before it is also necessary, and
further, if the latter is necessary, then the one which
follows must necessarily come-to-be. And this goes
on always continuously; for it makes no difference
whether we speak of a sequence of two or many
members of the series. Therefore, it is in cyclical
movement and cyclical coming-to-be that absolute
necessity is present, and if the process is cyclical,
each member must necessarily come-to-be and have
come-to-be, and, if this necessity exists, their coming-
to-be is cyclical.

This conclusion is only reasonable, since cyclical
movement, that is, the movement of the heavens,
has been shown on other grounds to be eternal,
because its own movements and the movements
which it causes come-to-be of necessity and will con-
tinue to do so; for if that which moves in a cycle is
continually seeking something else in motion, the
movement of those things which it moves must also
be cyclical. For example, since the upper revolution
is cyclical, the sun moves in a particular way, and
since this is so the seasons come-to-be in a cycle and
not involve an δρχί from which coming-to-be might derive
its necessity.  
\[b\ Phys.\ viii.\ 7-9.\]
5 κύκλω γίνονται καὶ ἀνακάμπτουσιν, τούτων δὲ οὖτω γινομένων πάλιν τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων.

Τὴν δὴ ποτὲ τὰ μὲν οὖτω φαίνεται, οἶον ὡδετά καὶ ἀὴρ κύκλω γινόμενα, καὶ εἰ μὲν νέφος ἔσται, δεῖ ύσαν, καὶ εἰ ύσει γε, δεὶ καὶ νέφος εἶναι, ἀνθρώποι δὲ καὶ ζῶα οὐκ ἀνακάμπτουσιν εἰς αὐτοὺς ὡστε

10 πάλιν γίνεσθαι τὸν αὐτόν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὁ πατήρ ἐγένετο, σὲ γενέσθαι· ἀλλ' εἱ σῦ, ἐκεῖνον, εἰς εὐθὺ δὲ ἐοικεν εἶναι αὐτή ἡ γένεσις); ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς σκέψεως πάλιν αὐτή, πότερον ὁμοίως ἀπαντα ἀνακάμπτει ἡ οὖ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀριθμῶ τὰ δὲ εἴδει μόνον. ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἀφθαρτὸς ἡ οὐσία ἡ κινου-

15 μένη, φανερὸν οὖτι καὶ ἀριθμῶ ταῦτα ἔσται (ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ κινομένῳ), ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἀλλὰ φθαρτή, ἀνάγκη τῷ εἴδει, ἀριθμῶ δὲ μὴ ἀνα-

κάμπτειν. Διὸ ὡδερ εξ ἀέρος καὶ ἀὴρ εξ ὡδατὸς εἴδει ὁ αὐτός, οὐκ ἀριθμῶ. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀριθμῶ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡν ἡ οὐσία γίνεται οὕσα τοιαῦτῃ οἷα ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ εἶναι.

a The sun moves in a circle in the ecliptic, and solar motion causes the cyclical changes of season, on which depend the vital periods of living things upon the earth.

b And not to be cyclical.

c In some cycles the same individual always recurs, in others successive individuals of the same species.

d As was the doctrine of Empedocles (cf. 315 a 4 ff.).
return upon themselves; and since they come-to-be in this manner, so do those things which they cause to come-to-be.\(^4\)

Why, then, is it that some things evidently come-to-be cyclically, for example rains and air, and if there is to be cloud, it must rain, and if it is to rain, there must also be a cloud, yet men and animals do not return upon themselves, so that the same creature comes-to-be a second time? For there is no necessity, because your father came-to-be, that you should come-to-be; but if you are to come-to-be, he must have done so; and in this case the course of coming-to-be seems to be in a straight line.\(^6\) The starting-point for the discussion of this problem is this, to ask the question again whether all things alike return upon themselves, or whether some things recur numerically and others only specifically.\(^8\) Therefore, obviously, those things of which the substance (which is what is moved) is imperishable will be numerically the same; for the nature of the movement depends on that of the thing moved; but those things which are not of this kind but perishable must recur specifically and not numerically. Hence, when Water comes-to-be from Air or Air from Water, the Water or the Air is the same specifically but not numerically; and if these things also do seem numerically the same,\(^d\) yet this is not true of those things whose "substance" comes-to-be, when it is such that it is possible for it not to be.
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PSEUDO-ARISTOTLE
DE MUNDO
INTRODUCTION

Analysis

The treatise opens with a short introductory chapter, commending to Alexander the study of "the cosmos and the greatest things in the cosmos," and continues with a description of the various parts of the cosmos, working from the region of the aether on the outside of the sphere to the earth at the centre. Chapter 2 describes the shape, the arrangement and the material of the heavens, and indicates very briefly the nature of the "fiery element" and the air that lie inside the outer sphere of aether. Chapter 3 describes the geography of the sea and the earth; the author naturally concentrates on the "inhabited world," though he maintains that there are other inhabited worlds also, beyond the seas. Chapter 4 is a very summary account of the "most notable phenomena in and about the inhabited world"; a section on meteorology, including an elaborate catalogue of winds, is followed by a description of the things that happen on or in the earth or sea—volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tidal waves, etc.

The last sentence of Chapter 4 introduces the main theme of the work: there are many changes in the sublunary world, but the system as a whole remains constant, and is subject neither to generation nor to
destruction. In Chapter 5 the language is heightened in what is virtually a hymn to the eternal cosmos. Chapters 6 and 7 tell of the cause that ensures its eternity—the god who rules everything with his all-pervading power. This god is described in Chapter 6 by means of a series of similes, which show how a remote and transcendent god can maintain the order and arrangement of the cosmos without personal intervention; Chapter 7 lists a number of names by which God is known and shows how they arise from various aspects of his function.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Before examining the problem of the authorship and date of the De Mundo, we must consider its purpose and its philosophical position. It is an open letter, written with the most careful attention to style and language, summarizing persuasively the results of a study of the cosmos. The open letter was a common form of literary expression, particularly for protreptic discourses; the outstanding examples are Isocrates' Ad Nicoclem and Aristotle's lost Protrepticus, addressed to Themison, the prince of Cyprus. The De Mundo shows many similarities to these protreptic addresses in style; but the author's purpose, emphasized several times, is to provide a summary of his subject, and in this he approaches the pattern of Epicurus's letters or the popular "Introductions" (εἰσαγωγαὶ) of the Hellenistic period.

The author's attitude of mind is given in a word in the first chapter: "let us theologize (θεολογῶμεν) about all these things." A.-J. Festugière has shown a

a Le Dieu cosmique, pp. 341 ff.
ON THE COSMOS

how typical this is of that "koine spirituelle" which grew in the late Hellenistic age and flowered in the Roman Empire; nature is explored, not as the object of scientific enquiry, but as the expression of the cosmic deity, and the results are presented straightforwardly as dogma.

The theology and cosmology of the De Mundo is, in general, Peripatetic, but the author borrows his details from many schools. Parallel passages and possible sources have been analysed in great detail by W. Capelle, W. L. Lorimer and Joseph P. Maguire, and there is no need to repeat their analysis. Capelle traced many of the details to Posidonius, and this view was for many years generally accepted. Maguire, however, found no reason to believe that anything came from Posidonius except some of the meteorology, and showed that the closest parallels are in the Neo-Pythagorean writers; he established at least that we cannot attribute a doctrine to Posidonius simply because it occurs in the De Mundo, but it would be surprising if a work written after the time of Posidonius were not considerably influenced by him. The paramount difficulty is that the author was an eclectic, living in an age when eclecticism was the fashion and there was a great deal of common ground between different schools; it is therefore sometimes impossible to say which authors, or even which schools, were chosen as sources.

The scientific chapters of the De Mundo are typical of many "introductions" and summaries, and very likely are themselves derived from similar elementary handbooks rather than from the detailed expositions of original authors. The doctrine of the cosmic deity,

a See Bibliographical Note, below.
which is the climax of the book, developed gradually in the history of Greek religion. Its chief exponents were the Stoics, and no doubt the *De Mundo* is influenced by Stoic religious thought. But the author rejects an important part of the Stoic doctrine: his god is not immanent in the world, interpenetrating all things, but remote, unmoved and impassive. He maintains the order of the cosmos by means of an undefined "power," which relieves him of the dishonourable necessity of personal intervention.

Clearly we have here a development, however remote, of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. At first sight the god of the *De Mundo* seems far removed from the god of *Physics* viii and *Metaphysics* Α, who is inferred as the necessary result of a theory of motion, whose only activity is thought which has itself as its object, and who moves "as the object of love." Aristotle himself, however, seems to have spoken with a rather different voice in his published works. In the *De Philosophia* he said that the orderly movement of the heavenly bodies was one of the reasons for man's belief in gods. Cicero reports an elaborate passage from Aristotle to this effect: suppose there were men who had lived all their lives in caves under the earth and were then released; "when they saw, suddenly, the earth and seas and sky, when they learnt the vastness of the clouds and the force of the winds, when they beheld the sun and learnt its great size and beauty and the efficacy of its work, that it spreads its light over all the sky and makes day, and when night darkened the lands and then they saw the whole sky adorned with a pattern of stars, and the changes in the moon's light

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as it waxes and wanes, and the rising and setting of them all, and their courses planned and immutable for all eternity—when they saw this, they would think at once that there are gods and that these mighty works are the works of gods.” This is close to the spirit of the De Mundo.

In one other important respect the author sides with the Peripatetics and Neo-Pythagoreans against the Stoics. Most of the Stoics believed that the element of fire was more powerful than the other elements, and that it periodically enveloped the cosmos in a universal conflagration (ἐκπυρώσεις). Pseudo-Aristotle is emphatic in his rejection of this doctrine: the elements are equally balanced and there is no universal conflagration, nor any other kind of cosmic destruction. The eternity of the cosmos was maintained by Aristotle in the lost De Philosophia, and in the De Caelo. In Hellenistic times it was believed by the Stoic Panaetius, but his successor Posidonius apparently reverted again to ἐκπυρώσεις. There are two Hellenistic treatises extant which argue that the cosmos is eternal—De Universi Natura, falsely attributed to the Pythagorean Ocellus of Lucania, and Philo (or Pseudo-Philo), De Aeternitate Mundi.

Author and Date

It is almost universally agreed that this treatise is not a genuine work of Aristotle. The style and various details of doctrine all make it unthinkable that it was written either by Aristotle himself or during his lifetime; but no such certainty is possible about the identity of the author or the date of composition.

a Cf. fr. 22 Rose. b Bk. I. 10-12.
The first problem to be decided is whether the treatise was attributed to Aristotle by the author or by someone else. The probability is that it was a deliberate forgery. Attempts have been made to show that the Alexander to whom the work is addressed is someone other than Alexander the Great: but it is difficult to find another Alexander who might be called "the best of princes." Probably the author followed the example of an earlier forger, the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, in the hope that his work might be taken as a respectful tribute from the master to his most famous pupil.

The late Hellenistic author Demetrius says that Aristotle's letters to Alexander were more like treatises (συγγραμματα) than real letters. A man called Artemon, who is mentioned by Demetrius, arranged the letters then supposed to be by Aristotle into eight books. We can conclude from this that at the time of Demetrius, who was roughly contemporary with Pseudo-Aristotle, there was in circulation a collection of Aristotle's letters, which included letters to Alexander which were in the form of "treatises." It would seem therefore that the author of the *De Mundo* had ample precedent for the form of his work, whether the *De Mundo* was known to Demetrius or not.

The habit of attributing one's writings to an older and greater author in the same tradition was par-

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*a* Max Pohlenz (*Die Stoa*, 1948, pp. 361-362) returns to a suggestion of Bernays that the addressee is Tiberius Alexander, nephew of Philo and governor of Egypt soon after A.D. 63.

*b* *On Style* iv. 234. Demetrius wrote some time after 100 B.C. (see J. F. Lockwood, in *C.R*. lii (1938), p. 59) and probably before A.D. 100.
particularly common among the Pythagoreans of the Hellenistic age; the author of the *De Mundo* owes much to these Neo-Pythagoreans, and he certainly reproduces enough genuinely Aristotelian thought to make it reasonable that he should wish to usurp Aristotle's name.

This is an important point. Those who have proved that the work is a forgery have sometimes overlooked that it is a forgery of *Aristotle*, and that in this fact we might find a little help in dating the treatise. For if the author is imitating Aristotle at all, it is surely the Aristotle of the *Protrepticus* and *De Philosophia*, the Aristotle whose "flumen orationis aureum" was praised by Cicero,\(^a\) rather than the Aristotle of the school-treatises which survive to-day. The school-treatises were either lost or disregarded after the death of Theophrastus, and did not begin to occupy the attention of the learned world again until the appearance of Andronicus's edition in the late first century B.C.\(^b\)

These considerations will be variously interpreted. Those who believe that knowledge of Aristotle's work was *absolutely* confined to the published writings until Andronicus's edition, will say that the author of the *De Mundo* shows knowledge of doctrines (e.g. of the Unmoved Mover, if this was not contained in the *De Philosophia*, and various meteorological details) which were known only after Andronicus. But it is likely that much of Aristotle's doctrine was known throughout the period, at least in his own school,

\(^a\) *Acad. Pr.* ii. 38. 119.

\(^b\) The date usually given for this is c. 40 B.C. I. Düring (*Notes on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings*, Göteborg, 1950) thinks this is the earliest possible date, and would prefer 40–20 B.C.
even though it did not appear in the published works. I am inclined to believe that the author of the *De Mundo* could have known all the Aristotelian matter that he reproduces before the publication of Andronicus’s edition, and that the style and manner of the work indicate a date before this edition made Aristotle’s school-treatises more widely known.

Other evidence for the date is confused and difficult. It is certain that Apuleius *De Mundo* is a translation of the Greek, but it is not quite certain that this is genuinely by Apuleius. If it is, we have a *terminus ante quem* of c. A.D. 140. The work seems to have been known to Maximus of Tyre and must therefore be before A.D. 180–190. From other reports, references and imitations in later authors nothing firmer than this can be deduced.

To reach a *terminus post quem* by an analysis of the sources is equally difficult, since it is usually hard to say who was the first to express a particular doctrine. Nevertheless some of the meteorology appears to depend on Posidonius and his pupil Asclepiodotus, and we might therefore give c. 50 B.C. as the *terminus*. There is no agreement about the date of the Neo-Pythagorean sources. Attempts have been made to argue from the silence of Cicero, Seneca and Pliny, but arguments from silence do not carry much weight.

The date has been given by various scholars as follows: Zeller, 1st cent. A.D.; Diels, in the reign of Augustus; Wilamowitz, in the Julio-Claudian dynasty; Capelle, the first half of the 2nd cent. A.D.; Lorimer, probably A.D. 40–140; Maguire and Festugière, the first few decades of the 1st cent. A.D. In my view there is some slight reason for saying that
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it was written before or not long after Andronicus's edition, and virtually no reason for choosing any other time within the limits already mentioned.\(^a\)

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The *editio princeps* (1497) was based on a single ms., and this remained the common text until Bekker added the results of collation of four more mss. in the Berlin *Aristotle* (1831). Parts of the treatise were edited by Wilamowitz and Wendland and printed in Wilamowitz's *Griechisches Lesebuch*, Text II (1906), pp. 188-199.

W. L. Lorimer took into account the readings of over seventy mss., the quotations in Stobaeus and others, the Latin version of Apuleius, the Armenian and Syriac versions, and two mediaeval Latin versions. He published his results in three books: The *Text Tradition of Ps.-Aristotle 'De Mundo'* (St. Andrews University Publications, xviii, 1924); *Some Notes on the Text of Ps.-Aristotle 'De Mundo'* (St. Andrews University Publications, xxi, 1925); and *Aristotelis De Mundo* (Paris, 1933). The last of these contains the Greek text with a very detailed *apparatus criticus* and a German translation by E. König of the Syriac version (chaps. v-vii only).

On the sources, the most important works are: W. Capelle, "Die Schrift von der Welt," *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Alt.* xv (1905), pp. 529-568; and Joseph P. Maguire, "The Sources of Ps.-Aristotle 'De Mundo,'" *Yale Classical Studies*, vi (1939).

The important article by Hans Strohm, "Studien

\(^a\) Prof. E. H. Warmington has pointed out to me that the geography of ch. 3 confirms an early date.
zur Schrift von der Welt,” Mus. Helv. ix (1952), pp. 137-175, did not reach me until this book was in proof. Strohm agrees with me in minimizing the influence of Posidonius and in marking the connexions with early Aristotle.


I am indebted to all these, and particularly (as all students of the De Mundo must be) to W. L. Lorimer.

TEXT

The text is based on Bekker’s edition in the Berlin Aristotle; I have indicated deviations from Bekker, except those that seem trivial.

The four mss. used by Bekker are designated as follows:

- O = Vat. 316.
- P = Vat. 1339.
- Q = Marc. 200.
- R = Paris. 1102.

Where necessary I have added references to mss. collated by Lorimer, as follows:

- B = Hieros. Patr. 108.
- C = Laur. 87, 14.
- D = Paris. 1302.
- E = Vat. Urbin. 125.
- F = Laur. 87, 16.
- G = Vat. 1025.
- W = Paris. 1038.

Nearly all the deviations from Bekker follow Lorimer; to avoid complicating the notes unduly, where I have followed Lorimer against Bekker and the mss. are fairly equally divided, I have used the abbreviations "Bekk." and "Lor." without listing the mss. "Lor. (Notes)" refers to the second and "Lor. (De Mundo)" to the third of Lorimer's works cited in the Bibliographical Note above.

I wish to record my indebtedness to Professor T. B. L. Webster for reading my work in typescript; I am very grateful for his criticisms and suggestions.

D. J. F.
1. Πολλάκις μὲν ἔμοιγε θείόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον ὀντὸς χρῆμα, ὦ Ἀλέξανδρε, ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔδοξεν εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν ὦς μόνῃ διαραμένῃ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων θέαν ἐσποῦδασε γνώναι τὴν ἐν αὕτοῖς ἀλῆθειαν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταύτης ἀποστάντων διὰ τὸ ύψος καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, αὕτη τὸ πράγμα οὐκ ἔδεισεν οὕτω αὕτην τῶν καλλίστων ἀπηξίωσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγγενεστάτην έαυτή καὶ μάλιστα πρέπουσαν ἐνόμισεν εἶναι τὴν ἐκείνων μάθησιν. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὦχι οἶον τε ἢ τῷ σώματι εἰς τὸν οὐράνιον ἀφικέσθαι τόπον καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐκλιπόντα τὸν οὐράνιον ἐκείνων χῶρον κατοπτεύσαι, καθάπερ οἱ ἀνόητοι ποτὲ ἐπενόουν Ἁλωάδαι, ἡ γοῦν ψυχή διὰ φιλοσοφίας, λαβοῦσα ἡγεμόνα τὸν νοῦν, ἐπεραιώθη καὶ ἐξεδήμησεν, ἀκοπιστῶν τινα ὦδὸν εὐροῦσα, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον ἄλληλων ἀφεστῶτα τοῖς τόποις τῇ διανοίᾳ συνεφρόνησε, ῥαδίως, οἷμαι, τὰ συγγενῆ γνωρίσασα, καὶ θείως ψυχῆς ὄμματι τὰ θεία κατα-

* See Introduction, p. 338.
1. I have often thought, Alexander, that philosophy is a divine and really god-like activity, particularly in those instances when it alone has exalted itself to the contemplation of the universe and sought to discover the truth that is in it; the other sciences shunned this field of inquiry because of its sublimity and extensiveness; philosophy has not feared the task or thought itself unworthy of the noblest things, but has judged that the study of these is by nature most closely related to it and most fitting. It was not possible by means of the body to reach the heavenly region or to leave the earth and explore that heavenly place, in the manner once attempted by the foolish Aladae: so the soul, by means of philosophy, taking the mind as its guide, has crossed the frontier, and made the journey out of its own land by a path that does not tire the traveller. It has embraced in thought the things that are most widely separated from each other in place; for it had no difficulty, I think, in recognizing things that were related to it, and with “the soul’s divine eye” it

b Otus and Ephialtes, the mythical Giants, who tried to reach heaven by piling Pelion on Ossa.

c Probably a quotation: cf. the eye of the soul in Plato, Rep. 533 d.
λαβοῦσα, τοὺς τε ἀνθρώπους προφητεύουσα. τούτο δὲ ἔπαθε, καθ' ὅσον οἶδον τε ἦν, πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως μεταδοῦναι βουληθεῖσα τῶν παρ' αὐτῇ τιμῶν. διὸ καὶ τοὺς μετὰ σπουδῆς διαγράψαντας ἦμῖν ἐνὸς τόπου φύσιν ἢ μιᾶς σχῆμα πόλεως ἢ ποταμοῦ μέγε-20 θος ἢ ὄρους κάλλος, οἶα τινες ἢ ἦδη πεποιήκασι, φράζοντες οἱ μὲν τὴν "Οσσαν, οἱ δὲ τὴν Νύσσαν,1 οἱ δὲ τὸ Κωρύκιον ἄντρον, οἱ δὲ ὀσιοῦν ἐτυχε τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους, οὐκίσχειν ἃν τῆς τῆς μικροψυχίας, τὰ τυχόντα ἐκπεπληγμένους καὶ μέγα φρονοῦντας ἐπὶ
25 θεωρία μικρᾶ. τούτῳ δὲ πάσχοναι διὰ τὸ ἀθέατω 

391 b τῶν κρειττόνων εἶναι, κόσμου λέγω καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ μεγίστων" οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἂν τούτως γνῆ-

σίως ἐπιστήσαντες ἑθαύμαζόν τι τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ

391 b πάντα αὐτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα μικρὰ κατεβαίνετο ἀν καὶ

οὐδενὸς ἄξια πρὸς τὴν τούτων ὑπεροχήν.

Δέγαμεν δὴ ἡ ἡμεῖς καὶ, καθ' ὅσον ἐφικτόν, 

θεολογώμεν περὶ τούτων συμπάντων, ὡς ἔκαστον

5 ἔχει φύσεως καὶ θέσεως καὶ κινῆσεως. πρέπειν δὲ 

γε οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ, ἵνα ἤγεμόνων ἀρίστω, τὴν τῶν 

μεγίστων ἱστορίαν μετίηναι, φιλοσοφία τε μηδὲν 

μικρὸν ἐπινοεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοιούτοις δῶρος δέξι-

5 οὐθαί τοὺς ἀρίστους.

2. Κόσμος μὲν οὖν ἐστι σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ

10 γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτωι περιεχομένων φύσεων. 

λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἑτέρως κόσμος ἢ τῶν ὅλων τάξις τε 

καὶ διακόσμησις, ὑπὸ θεοῦ2 τε καὶ διὰ θεοῦ3 

1 Νύσσαν Lor.: Νύσσαν Bekk.


3 θεῶν codd. Lor.: θεῶν codd. al. Stob. Bekk.

* Cf. Pausanias x. 32. 2.

* Cf. Introduction, p. 334.

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grasped things divine, and interpreted them for mankind. This came about because it wished to impart to all unsparingly, as far as possible, a share of its own privileges. So those who have earnestly described to us the nature of a single place, or the plan of a single city, or the size of a river, or the beauty of a mountain, as some have done before now—some of them tell us of Ossa, some of Nyssa, others of the Corycian cave, or whatever other detail it happens to be—all these might well be pitied for their meanness of spirit, since they are overawed by commonplaces and pride themselves on insignificant observations. The reason is that they are blind to the nobler things—I mean the cosmos and the greatest features of the cosmos. For if they once genuinely gave their attention to these things, they would never wonder at any other; everything else would appear small and worthless to them, in comparison with the matchless superiority of these.

Let us, then, take up the subject, and so far as they are attainable let us theologize about all the greatest features of the cosmos, discussing the nature, position and motion of each. It is right, I think, that even you, the best of princes, should undertake the study of the greatest things, and that philosophy should have no humble intentions, but should greet the most excellent men with worthy gifts.

2. Cosmos, then, means a system composed of heaven and earth and the elements contained in them. In another sense, cosmos is used to signify the orderly arrangement of the universe, which is preserved by God and through God. The centre of

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τομένη. ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν μέσον, ἀκίνητον τε καὶ ἐδραῖον ὦν, ἡ φερέσιος εἶληκε γῆ, παντοδαπῶν ξώων ἐστὶα τε οὐσα καὶ μήτηρ. τὸ δὲ ὑπερθεν 15 αὐτῆς, πάν τε καὶ πάντη πεπερατωμένον εἰς 1 τὸ ἀνωτάτω, θεῶν οἰκητήριον, οὐρανὸς ὁνόμασται. πλήρης δὲ ὁν σωμάτων θείων, ἡ δὴ καλεῖν ἀστρα εἰώθαμεν, κυνούμενοι κίνησιν ἀίδιον, μᾶ περιαγωγῇ καὶ κύκλῳ συναναχορεῖσε πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπαύστως δι' αἰῶνος. τοῦ δὲ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ 20 κόσμου σφαιροειδὸς ὄντος καὶ κυνούμενον, καθ-άπερ εἶπον, ἐνδελεχῶς, δύο ἀκίνητα εξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ σημεία, καταντικρὺ ἄλληλων, καθάπερ τῆς ἐν τόρνῳ κυκλοφορουμένης σφαίρας, στερεὰ μένοντα καὶ συνέχοντα την σφαίραν, περὶ ἃ ὁ πᾶς ὄγκος 25 κύκλῳ στρέφεται2. καλοῦνται δὲ οὕτωι πόλοι. δι' ὅν εἰ νοὴσαμεν ἐπεζευγμένην ἐνθεῖαν, ἡν τινες 392 α ἄξονα καλοῦσι, διάμετρος ἐσται τοῦ κόσμου, μέσον3 μὲν ἔχουσα τὴν γῆν, τοὺς δὲ δύο πόλους πέρατα. τῶν δὲ ἀκινήτων πόλων τούτων ὁ μὲν ἀεὶ φανερός ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ κορυφῆν ὧν κατὰ τὸ βόρειον κλίμα, ἀρκτικὸς καλούμενος, ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ γῆν ἀεὶ κατακέ- 5 κρυπταὶ, κατὰ τὸ νότιον, ἀνταρκτικὸς καλούμενος. Οὐρανοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀστρων οὐσίαν μὲν αἰθέρα καλοῦ-

1 eis codd. Lor. : ἦς P Bekk.
2 πᾶς ὄγκος κύκλῳ στρέφεται Stob. Lor. : πᾶς κόσμος κινεῖται. ὁ μὲν οὖν κόσμος ἐν κύκλῳ περιστρέφεται codd. Bekk.
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the cosmos, which is unmoved and fixed, is occupied by "life-bearing earth," the home and mother of living beings of all kinds. The region above it, a single whole with a finite upper limit everywhere, the dwelling of the gods, is called heaven. It is full of divine bodies which we call stars; it moves eternally, and revolves in solemn choral dance with all the stars in the same circular orbit unceasingly for all time. The whole of the heaven, the whole cosmos, is spherical, and moves continuously, as I have said; but there are necessarily two points which are unmoved, opposite one another, just as in the case of a ball being turned in a lathe; they remain fixed, holding the sphere in position, and the whole mass revolves in a circle round them; these points are called poles. If we think of a straight line joining these two together (some call this the axis), it will be a diameter of the cosmos, having the earth at its centre and the two poles at its extremities. One of these two stationary poles is always visible, above our heads in the North: it is called the Arctic pole. The other is always hidden under the earth, in the South: it is called the Antarctic pole.

The substance of the heaven and the stars we call

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\( a \) Cf. Hesiod, Theog. 693.

\( b \) Ps.-Aristotle seems to recall Euripides, Ion 1079 ὡτε καὶ Διὸς ἄστερωσὶς ἀνεχόρευσεν αἰθήρ, χορεύει δὲ σελάνα. Cf. also Soph. Ant. 1146 f. He develops the same image below, 399 a 14.

\( c \) Ps.-Aristotle here uses κόσμος in a third sense, as a synonym for οὐρανός. This sense is quite common from Plato onwards.

\( d \) The terms Arctic and Antarctic do not appear in extant literature before Hipparchus (2nd cent. B.C.).

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\( ^3 \) μέσου TWZ Lor.: μέσην codd. cet. Bekk.
The author follows Aristotle in making aether a fifth
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*aether,* not, as some think, because it is fiery in nature and so burns (they fall into error about its function, which is quite different from that of fire), but because it always moves in its circular orbit; it is an element different from the four elements,⁶ pure and divine. Now, of the stars which are encompassed in it, some are fixed and move in concert with the whole heaven always keeping the same position in it; in the middle of these the *circle of the zodiac,* as it is called, set obliquely through the tropics, passes round like a girdle, divided into the twelve regions of the zodiac. The others, the *planets,* move, according to their nature, at speeds different from the fixed stars and from each other, each in a different circle, in such a way that one is nearer the earth, another higher in the heavens. The number of the fixed stars is not to be known by men, although they all move on one visible surface, namely that of the whole heaven: but the class of planets contains seven units, arranged in the same number of circles in a series, so that the higher is always greater than the lower, and all the seven, though contained one within another, are nevertheless encompassed by the sphere of the fixed stars. The circle which is always in the position next to this sphere is that which is called the circle of Phaenon (the Bright one) or Cronus (Saturn); then comes the circle of Phaëthon (the Shiner) or Zeus (Jupiter); next Pyroeis (the Fiery one), named after Heracles or Ares (Mars); next Stilbon (the Glittering one) which some dedicate to Hermes (Mercury), some element: the Stoics identified it with fire. He rejects the derivation of the word from *aiθεοθαυ* (to burn) and relates it to *αυθιν* (move always), as Plato and Aristotle did (*cf.* Plato, *Crat.* 410 b, Aristot. *De Caelo* 270 b 22).

⁶ Earth, air, fire and water.
This is the "Pythagorean" order of the planets, adopted by Aristotle, Eudoxus, Eratosthenes, and probably the early Stoics. The other order commonly given by ancient writers, the "Chaldean," puts Venus and Mercury below the sun; this order was adopted by Panaetius, and probably also by...
to Apollo; after this is the circle of Phosphorus (the Light-bearer), which some call after Aphrodité (Venus) and others after Hera; then the circle of the sun; and the last, the circle of the moon, is bounded by the terrestrial sphere. The aether, then, contains the divine bodies and their ordered orbits.

After the aetherial and divine element, which is arranged in a fixed order, as we have declared, and is also unchangeable, unalterable and impassive, there comes next the element that is through the whole of its extent liable to change and alteration, and is, in short, destructible and perishable. The first part of this is the fine and fiery substance that is set aflame by the aether because of the latter’s great size and the swiftness of its motion. In this fiery and disorderly element, as it is called, meteors and flames shoot across, and often planks and pits and comets, as they are called, stand motionless and then expire.

Next under this is spread the air, opaque and icy by nature, but when it is brightened and heated by movement, it becomes bright and warm. In the air, which itself also has the power to change, and alters in every kind of way, clouds are formed and rain falls in torrents; there is snow, frost and hail, and gales and whirlwinds; thunder and lightning.

Posidonius. Lorimer writes (Notes, p. 51) that there were few upholders of the “Pythagorean” order after 200 B.C., though it appears in an unknown astronomer in Rhodes of about 100 B.C. (I.G.Ins. i. 913).

\[2\] Here must refer to the whole “sublunary” sphere, not to the earth proper.

\[3\] This is inconsistent with 395 a 29 ff. where these phenomena are put in the air.

\[4\] The coldness of the air is a Stoic doctrine; Aristotle said it was warm and capable of being inflamed by motion (Meteor. 341 a 18).
392 b

...καὶ πτώσεις κεραυνῶν μυρίων τε γνόφων συμπληγάδες.

3. 'Εξῆς δὲ τῆς ἀερίου φύσεως γῆ καὶ θάλασσα
15 ἐρήμεισαι, φυτοὶς βρύοισα καὶ ζώοις πηγαίς τε καὶ
ποταμοῖς, τοῖς μὲν ἀνὰ γῆν ἐλιττομένοις, τοῖς δὲ
ἀνερευγομένοις εἰς θάλασσαν. πεποίκιλται δὲ καὶ
χλώαις μυρίαις ὀρεσί τε ύψηλοις καὶ βαθυζύλοις
δρυμοῖς καὶ πόλεσιν, ἃς τὸ σοφὸν ζώον, ὁ ἄνθρωπος,
20 ἢδυσάτο, νήσοις τε ἐναλίωι καὶ ἡπείροις. τῇ μὲν
οὖν οἰκουμένῃ ὁ πολὺς λόγος εἰς τε νῆσους καὶ
ἡπείρους διείλεν, ἀγνοοῦν ὅτι καὶ ἡ σύμπασα μία
νῆσος ἐστίν, ὑπὸ τῆς Ἀτλαντικῆς καλομένης θα-
λάσσης περιπρεμένη. πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ἄλλας εἰκός
ὑπὸ ἄντιπόρθμους ἀπώθην κείσθαι, τὰς μὲν μεὶ-25
ζωὺς αὐτῆς, τὰς ἀλάττους, ἠμῖν δὲ πάσας πλῆν
τῆς ἀοράτους· ὅπερ γὰρ αἱ παρ' ἡμῖν νῆσοι
πρὸς ταῦτα τὰ πελάγη πεπόνθασι, τούτο ἢδη ἡ
οἰκουμένη πρὸς τὴν Ἀτλαντικὴν θάλασσαν πολλαῖς
τε ἐτεραὶ πρὸς σύμπασαν τὴν θάλασσαν· καὶ γὰρ
αὐται μεγάλαι τινὲς εἰσὶ νῆσοι μεγάλοι περικυλ-
30 ἃμεναι πελάγεσιν. ἡ δὲ σύμπασα τοῦ υγροῦ
φύσεως ἐπιπολάξουσα, κατὰ τινάς τῆς γῆς σπίλους
τὰς καλομένας ἀναπεφαγκυῖα ὁ οἰκουμένας, εξῆς
ἂν εἰ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀερίου μάλιστα φύσεως. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτην
ἐν τοῖς βυθοῖς κατὰ τὸ μεσαίτον τοῦ κόσμου
ςυνερεμεσμένη γῆ πάσα καὶ πεπισμενή συνέστη-
35 κεν, ἀκύνητος καὶ ἀσάλευτος· καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστι τοῦ

1 ἀναπεφαγκυῖα coni. Usener Lor.: ἀναπεφυκυῖα codd. Bekk.

* Aristotle apparently thought nothing but sea lay from Gibraltar westwards to India (Meteor. 362 b 28). Strabo (i. 4. 6 = 65 c) notices the possibility of other inhabited worlds in his discussion of Eratosthenes.
too, and falling thunderbolts, and the clash of innumerable storm-clouds.

3. Next to the element of air comes the fixed mass of earth and sea, full of plants and animals, and streams and rivers, some winding about the surface of the earth, others discharging themselves into the sea. This region is adorned with innumerable green plants, high mountains, deep-shaded woodland, and cities established by the wise creature, man; and with islands in the sea, and continents. The inhabited world is divided by the usual account into islands and continents, since it is not recognized that the whole of it is really one island, surrounded by the sea which is called Atlantic. Far away from this one, on the opposite side of the intervening seas, there are probably many other inhabited worlds, some greater than this, some smaller, though none is visible to us except this one; for the islands we know stand in the same relation to our seas as the whole inhabited world to the Atlantic Ocean, and many other inhabited worlds to the whole ocean; for these are great islands washed round by great seas. The whole mass of the wet element lies on the surface of the earth, allowing the so-called inhabited worlds to show through where there are projections of the earth; it is this element that would properly be next in order to the air. After this, set in the depths at the centre of the cosmos, densely packed and compressed, is the whole mass of the earth, unmoved and unshaken. And this is the whole of that part of the

b Taking μάλιστα with the verb; it is probably postponed for rhythmic effect. The meaning is that water is in theory next to air, but earth sometimes protrudes through the water. σπιλους (properly "stains" or "marks") in the previous line seems to be used in the sense of σπιλάδας ("projections").
κόσμου τὸ πᾶν ὁ καλοῦμεν κάτω. πέντε δὴ στοι-
χεία ταῦτα ἐν πέντε χώραις σφαιρικῶς ἐγκείμενα, περιεχομένης ἀεὶ τῆς ἑλάττονος τῇ μείζονο—λέγω
dὲ γῆς μὲν ἐν ὑδατι, ὦδατος δὲ ἐν ἀέρι, ἀέρος δὲ
ἐν πυρί, πυρὸς δὲ ἐν αἰθέρι—τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συν-
estήσατο, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνω πᾶν θεῶν ἀπέδειξεν
5 οἰκητήριον, τὸ κάτω δὲ ἐφημέρων ζῶν ἡμῶν. αὐτὸῦ
gε μὴν τούτου τὸ μὲν ύγρὸν ἐστιν, ὁ καλεῖν ποτα-
mοὺς καὶ νάματα καὶ θαλάσσας εἰθύσμεθα, τὸ δὲ
ξηρὸν, ὁ γῆν τε καὶ ἡπεῖρους καὶ νήσους ὁνομά-
ζομεν.

Τῶν δὲ νῆσων αἱ μὲν εἰςι μεγάλαι, καθάπερ ἦ
10 σύμπασα ἦδε οἰκουμένη λέκεται πολλαὶ τε ἐτεραὶ
μεγάλοις περιττομέναι πελάγειν, αἱ δὲ ἑλάττους,
φανεραὶ τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἐντὸς οὖσαι. καὶ τούτων αἱ
μὲν ἄξιόλογοι, Σικελία καὶ Σαρδώ καὶ Κύρνος
Κρήτη τε καὶ Εὔβοια καὶ Κύπρος καὶ Λέσβος, αἱ
15 δὲ ὑποδεότεραι, ὅν αἱ μὲν Σποράδες, αἱ δὲ Κυ-
κλάδες, αἱ δὲ ἄλλως ὅνομαζονται.

Πέλαγος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔξω τῆς οἰκουμένης Ἀτλαν-
tικὸν τε καὶ Ὀκεανὸς καλεῖται, περιπερεῖν ἡμῶς.
ἐν δὲ τῷ πρὸς δύσεις στενοπόρῳ διανεωγώς
στόματι, κατὰ τὰς Ἡρακλείους λεγομένας στήλας
20 τὸν ἔστρων εἰς τὴν ἐσωθάλασσαν ὡς ἂν εἰς λυμένα
ποιεῖται, κατὰ μικρὸν δὲ ἐπιπλατυνόμενος ἀνα-
χείται, μεγάλους περιλαμβάνων κόλπους ἀλλήλους
συναφεῖς, πῇ μὲν κατὰ στενοπόρους αὐχένας ἀν-
εστομωμένος, πῇ δὲ πάλιν πλατυνόμενος. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν λέγεται ἐγκεκολπωσθαι ἐν δεξιᾷ εἰσπλέοντι
25 τὰς Ἡρακλείους στήλας, δικός, εἰς τὰς καλο-
μένες Σύρτεις, ὅπερ τὴν μὲν Μεγάλην, τὴν δὲ Μικράν,
καλοῦσιν. ἐπὶ βάτερα δὲ οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἀποκολοποῦ-

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cosmos that we call the lower part. So these five elements, occupying five spherical regions, the larger sphere always embracing the smaller—earth in water, water in air, air in fire, fire in aether—make up the whole cosmos; the upper part as a whole is distinguished as the abode of the gods, and the lower part as that of mortal creatures. Of the latter, some is wet, and this part we call rivers and springs and seas; the rest is dry, and this part we name land and continents and islands.

There are various kinds of island: some are large, like this whole inhabited world of ours, as I have said, and many others which are surrounded by great oceans; others are smaller, visible to us and within the Mediterranean. Some of these are quite considerable—Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, Euboea, Cyprus and Lesbos; some are smaller, like the Sporades, the Cyclades, and others with various names.

The ocean that is outside the inhabited world is called the Atlantic, or Ocean, and surrounds us. To the West of the inhabited world, this ocean makes a passage through a narrow strait called the Pillars of Heracles, and so makes an entry into the interior sea, as if into a harbour; gradually it broadens and spreads out, embracing large bays joined up to each other, here contracting into narrow necks of water, there broadening out again. They say that the first of these bays that the sea forms, to starboard, if you sail in through the Pillars of Heracles, are two, called the Syrtes, of which one is called the Major, the other the Minor; on the other side it does not form gulfs

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1 διανεώγυς Lor.: διανεώγυς Bekk.
The Ocean makes three separate incursions into the inhabited world—the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Caspian (see n. c below). Festugière (op. cit. p. 465) thinks these Eastern seas are spoken of as prolongations of the Mediterranean; but πάλιν εἰσρέων here is parallel to τὸν εἰσρόν... ποιεῖται at 393 a 19.

Are these two gulfs or one? If two, they are respectively the Gulf of Cutch (or the Gulf of Cambay) and the Persian Gulf; if one, probably the Persian Gulf is meant. The Greek could be interpreted either way.

By Ἔρυθρα (red) the author probably means what was
at first in the same way, but makes three seas, the Sardinian, Galatian and Adriatic; next to these, and across the line of them, is the Sicilian sea; after this, the Cretan; and continuing this on one side are the Egyptian and Pamphylian and Syrian seas, on the other the Aegean and Myrtoan. Lying opposite these that I have described, in another direction, is the Pontus, and this has very many parts: the innermost part is called Maeotis, and the outermost part, towards the Hellespont, is joined by a strait to the sea called Propontis.

In the East, the Ocean again penetrates <the inhabited world> a; it opens out the gulf of India and Persia b and without a break reveals the Red Sea, c embracing these as parts of itself. Towards the other promontory <of Asia>, d passing through a long narrow strait and then broadening out again, it makes the Hyrcanian or Caspian sea e; beyond this, it occupies a deep hollow beyond Lake Maeotis. Then little by little, beyond the land of the Scythians and Celts, it confines the inhabited world as it passes towards the Galatian Gulf and the Pillars of Heracles, already described, on the farther side of which the Ocean generally called the Erythraean Sea, which might include our Red Sea (called the Arabian Gulf at 393 b 28).

a Lorimer (Notes, p. 80, n. 3) quotes Mela i. 2 (9) to confirm this interpretation. In Mela, the two promontories are the land between the Nile and the Red Sea, and that between the Tanaïs and the Caspian.

b Or "bounding the Hyrcanian and Caspian country." (Forster). But θάλασσαν is easier to understand here than γῆν; admittedly ὄριζων has an odd sense (perhaps "marking out"), but the author is running short of synonyms for "forming" seas. At all events, he means the Caspian Sea, which was thought of as a gulf of the Northern Ocean from the time of Alexander to Ptolemy.
"Ωκεανός. ἐν τούτῳ γε μὴν νῆσοι μέγισται τυχ-χάνουσιν οὖσαι δύο, Βρεττανικαὶ λεγόμεναι, Ἀλβι-ων καὶ Ἰέρυ, τῶν προϊστορημένων μείζους, ὑπὲρ τοὺς Κέλτους κεῖμεναι. τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἔλαττος ἦ τε Ταπροβάνη πέραν Ἰνδῶν, λοξὴ πρὸς τὴν οἰκουμένην, καὶ ἩΦεβὸλ καλομενή, κατὰ τὸν Ἀραβικὸν κειμένη κόλπον. οὐκ ἔλυγαν δὲ μικρὰ περὶ τὰς Βρεττανικὰς καὶ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν κύκλῳ περιεστεφάνωνται τὴν οἰκουμένην ταύτην, ἦν δὴ νῆσον εἰρήκαμεν. ἦς πλάτος μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ βαθὺ-τατόν τῆς ἡπείρου βραχὺ ἀποδέου τετρακισμυρίων σταδίων, ὡς φασίν οἱ εὐ γεωγραφήσαντες, μὴκός δὲ περὶ ἐπτακισμυρίων μάλιστα. διαφεῖται δὲ εἰς τε Εὐφώπην καὶ Ἀσίαν καὶ Λιβύην.

Εὐφώπη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἤς ὁροὶ κύκλῳ στῆλαι τε Ἡρακλεός καὶ μιχοὶ Πόντου θάλαττὰ τε ἴρ-κανία, καθ’ ἦν στενοτάτος ἱσθμὸς εἰς τὸν Πόντον διήκει τινὲς δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἱσθμοῦ Τάναϊν ποταμὸν εἰρήκασιν. Ἀσία δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου ἱσθμοῦ τοῦ τοῦ Πόντου καὶ τῆς Ἰρκανίας θαλάσσης μέχρι θατέρου ἱσθμοῦ, ὡς μεταξὺ κεῖται τοῦ τε Ἀραβικοῦ κόλπου καὶ τῆς ἐσω θάλασσης, περι-

1 post μέγισται add. τε Bekk.
2 Βρεττανικαί Lor.: Βρεττανικαί Bekk.
3 'Αλβιών Lor.: 'Αλβιών Bekk.
4 ἀντὶ Stob. Lor.: ἀπὸ codd. Bekk.

*a Very mysterious. It might well be Socotra, as Bochert suggests (Arist. Erdkunde, p. 93); Capelle (op. cit. p. 539) suggests Madagascar; Müllerhoff (Deutsche Altertumskunde, pp. 322 f.), quoted with approval by Lorimer (Notes, p. 37, n. 1), suggests it is the island in Lake Tana (Psebo in Strabo) in Abyssinia, magnified and transplanted.
ON THE COSMOS, 3

flows round the earth. There are two very large islands in it, called the British Isles, Albion and Ierne; they are larger than those already mentioned, and lie beyond the land of the Celts. No smaller than these are Taprobane (Ceylon) beyond the Indians, which lies obliquely to the inhabited world, and the island known as Phebol, by the Arabian Gulf. There is quite a number of other small islands round the British Isles and Spain, set in a ring round this inhabited world, which as we have said is itself an island; its breadth, at the deepest point of the continent, is a little short of 40,000 stades, in the opinion of good geographers, and its length is approximately 70,000 stades. It is divided into Europe, Asia and Libya.

Europe is the area which is bounded in a circle by the Pillars of Heracles and the inner parts of the Pontus and the Hyrcanian Sea, where a very narrow isthmus passes between it and the Pontus; but some have said the river Tanaïs, instead of this isthmus. Asia is the region from this isthmus of the Pontus and the Hyrcanian Sea to another isthmus, which lies between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean;

b Posidonius put the length of the at 70,000 stades, but no one reports his figure for the width; since he thought the Ocean was quite close to Maeotis in the North, his figure would presumably be under 30,000 stades "in agreement with the view then current" (Thomson, History of Ancient Geography, p. 213). Eratosthenes estimated the length at 70,800 stades (with the addition of 7,000 for bulges and possible islands), and the width at 38,000.

c Strabo reports (xi. i. 5=491 c) that Clitarchus and others made this isthmus absurdly narrow, while Posidonius thought it was 1500 stades.

d These variant opinions are noted by Eratosthenes ap. Strabo i. 4. 7 (65 c).
393 b

30 εχόμενος ύπο τε ταύτης καὶ τοῦ περί Ὀκεανοῦ τινὲς δὲ ἀπὸ Ταναίδους μέχρι Νείλου στομάτων τὸν τῆς Ἀσίας τίθενται ὄρον. Λιβύη δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀραβικοῦ ἱσθμοῦ ἔως Ἡρακλέους στηλῶν.

394 a οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Νείλου φασίν ἔως ἐκείνων. τὴν δὲ Αἴγυπτον, ύπὸ τῶν τοῦ Νείλου στομάτων περισσομένην, οἱ μὲν τῆς Ἀσίας, οἱ δὲ τῆς Λιβύης προσάπτουσι, καὶ τὰς νῆσους οἱ μὲν ἐξαιρέτους ποιοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ προσνέμουσι ταῖς γείτοσιν ἀεὶ μοίραις.

5 Γῆς μὲν δὴ καὶ θαλάττης φύσιν καὶ θέσιν, ἤμινα καλεῖν εἰσώθαμεν οἰκουμένην, τοιάνδε τινὰ ἱστορῆ-καμεν.

4. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀξιολογωτάτων ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς παθῶν ὑν λέγωμεν, αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαία κεφα-λαιούμενοι.

Δύο γὰρ δὴ τινὲς ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀναθυμιάσεις ἀνα-10 φέρονται συνεχῶς εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀέρα, λεπτο-μερεῖς καὶ ἀόρατοι παντάπασιν, εἰ [τι]2 μὴ κατὰ τὰς ἔως ἐστὶν αἱ [τε] διὰ3 ποταμῶν τε καὶ ναμά-των ἀναφερόμεναι θεωροῦνται. τοῦτων δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ ξηρὰ καὶ καπνώδης, ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀπορρεόουσα, ἡ δὲ νοτερὰ καὶ ἀτμώδης, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυ-15 μωμένη φύσεως. γίνονται δὲ ἀπὸ μὲν ταύτης ὁμίχλαι καὶ δρόσου καὶ πάγων ἱδέα νέφη τε καὶ ὀμβροὶ καὶ χιόνες καὶ χάλαζαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ξηρᾶς ἀνέμοι τε καὶ πνευμάτων διαφοραὶ βρονταὶ τε καὶ ἀστραπαὶ καὶ πρηστήρες καὶ κέραυνοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα

1 post δὲ add. τὸ CGZ Bekk.  2 τι secl. Lor.
it is surrounded by the Mediterranean and the en-
circling stream of the Ocean; but some say that Asia
stretches from the Tanaïs to the mouths of the Nile.
Libya lies between the Arabian isthmus and the
Pillars of Heracles (but some say from the Nile to
the Pillars). Egypt, which is encompassed by the
mouths of the Nile, is attached by some to Asia, and
by others to Libya, and some make the islands
separate, others attribute them to their nearest
region of mainland.

We have now given some account of the nature
and situation of the land and sea which we call "the
inhabited world."

4. Now let us turn to the most notable phenomena
in and about the inhabited world, summarizing only
the most essential points.

There are two exhalations* from it, which pass
continually into the air above us, composed of small
particles and entirely invisible, except that in the
early mornings some can be observed rising along
rivers and streams. One of these is dry and like
smoke, since it emanates from the earth; the other
is damp and vaporous, since it is exhaled from the
wet element. From the latter come mists, dews, the
various kinds of frost, clouds, rain, snow and hail;
from the dry exhalation come the winds and various
breezes, thunder and lightning, fiery bolts (πρητήρες)⁵
and thunderbolts and all the other things of the same

* For the two exhalations and their products cf. Aristot.
Meteor. i. 4-12. Much of this chapter derives, ultimately, from
Aristotle; the proximate sources are discussed by Maguire
(op. cit. pp. 128-133).

⁵ Cf. 395 a 10 and note.
[ARISTOTLE]

394 a

α δὴ τούτως ἐστὶ σύμφωνα. ἐστὶ δὲ ὀμίχλη μὲν
20 ἀτμώδης ἀναθυμίασις ἁγόνος ὕδατος, ἄερος μὲν
παχυτέρα, νέφους δὲ ἀραιοτέρα· γίνεται δὲ ἦτοι εἰς
ἀρχῆς νέφους ἢ ἢ ὑπολείμματος. ἀντίπαλος δὲ
αὐτῇ λέγεται τε καὶ ἐστὶν αἰθρία, οὐδὲν ἄλλο οὕσα
πλὴν ἄηρ ἀνέφελος καὶ ἀνόμιχλος. δρόσος δὲ ἐστὶν
ὺγρὸν εἰς αἰθρίας κατὰ σύστασιν λεπτῆν φερόμενον,
25 κρύσταλλος δὲ ἀθρόον ὕδωρ ἢ αἰθρίας πεπηγός,
pάχυς δὲ δρόσος σεπηγόν, δροσοπάχυν ἢ ἡμ-
pαγῆς δρόσος. νέφος δὲ ἐστὶ πάχος ἀτμώδες
συνεστραμμένον, γόνιμον ὕδατος· ὀμβρος δὲ γίνεται
μὲν κατ’ ἐκπεισμὸν νέφους εὐ μάλα πεπαχυσμένου,
dιαφορὰς δὲ Ἰσχει τοσάδε ὅσα καὶ ή τοῦ νέφους
30 θλύσις· ἡπία μὲν γὰρ οὕσα μαλακὰς ψικάδας δια-
στείρει, σφοδρὰ δὲ ἀδροτέρας· καὶ τοῦτο καλοῦμεν
ύετον, ὀμβρον μεῖξι καὶ συνεχή συστρέμματα ἐπὶ
γῆς φερόμενον. ἥ χιὼν δὲ γίνεται κατὰ νεφῶν πε-
πυκνωμένων ἀπόθραυσιν πρὸ τῆς εἰς ὕδωρ μετα-
35 βολῆς ἀνακοπεῖνων· ἐργαζέται δὲ ή μὲν κοπῆ τὸ
ἀφρῶδες καὶ ἐκλεικοῦν, ἢ δὲ σύμπτηξι τοῦ ἐνὸντος
ὕγρῳ τὴν ψυχρότητα οὕτω χυθέντος οὐδὲ ἡραω-
μένου. σφοδρά δὲ αὐτῇ καὶ ἀθρόᾳ καταφερομένη
νυφετὸς ὑνόμασται. χάλαζα δὲ γίνεται νυφετοῦ
συστραφέντος καὶ βρίθος ἐκ πιλῆματος εἰς κατα-
φορὰν τάχυτεραν λαβόντος· παρὰ δὲ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν
ἀπορρηγνυμένων θραυσμάτων οἱ τε ὤγκοι μεῖξις
394 b

5 αἱ τε φοραὶ γίνονται βιαστεραί. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
ὲκ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως πέφυκε συμπίπτειν.
'Εκ δὲ τῆς ἑράς ὑπὸ ψύχους μὲν ὁσθείσης ὥστε
ῥεῖν ἀνέμος ἐγένετο· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν οὗτος πλὴν
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class. Mist is a vaporous exhalation which does not produce water, denser than air but less dense than cloud; it comes into being either from a cloud in the first stage of formation or from the remnant of a cloud. The condition contrary to this is rightly called a clear sky, for it is simply air, with no cloud or mist. Dew is moisture that falls out of a clear sky in a light condensation; ice is solidified water, frozen in a clear sky: hoar-frost is frozen dew, and dew-frost is half-frozen dew. Cloud is a dense, vaporous formation, productive of water: rain comes from the compression of a well-compacted cloud, and varies in character according to the pressure on the cloud: if the pressure is light it scatters gentle drops of rain, but if it is heavy the drops are fuller: and we call this latter condition a downpour, for it is larger than a shower of rain and pours continuous drops of rain upon the earth. Snow occurs when well-condensed clouds break up and split before the formation of water: the split causes the foamy and brilliantly white condition of the snow, and its coldness is caused by the coagulation of the moisture contained in it, which has not had time to be either fused or rarefied. If there is a thick and heavy fall of snow, we call it a snow-storm. Hail occurs when a snow-storm is solidified and gathers weight because of its increased density so as to fall more rapidly; the hailstones increase in size and their movement increases in violence according to the size of the fragments that are broken off the cloud. These then are the natural products of the wet exhalation.

From the dry exhalation, when it is forced to flow by the cold, wind is produced: for this is nothing but

1 φερόμενον Lor.: φερόμενα Bekk.
[ARISTOTLE]

394 b

ἄηρ πολὺς ῥέων καὶ άθρόος· οὕστις ἄμα καὶ πνεῦμα
10 λέγεται. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἑτέρως πνεῦμα ἦ τε ἐν
φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα ἐμφυχός
tε καὶ γόνιμος οὐσία, περὶ ἣς νῦν λέγειν οὐκ ἀναγ-
καίον. τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀέρι πνεύματα πνεῦμα καλούμεν
ἀνέμους, αὖρας δὲ τὰς ἔξυγροὶ φερομένας ἐκπνοάς.
tῶν δὲ ἄνεμων οἱ μὲν ἐκ νενοτιομένης γῆς πνεύματος
15 ἀπόγειοι λέγονται, οἱ δὲ ἐκ κόλπων διεξάγοντες
ἐγκολπίαι· τούτως δὲ ἀνάλογὸν τι ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐκ
ποταμῶν καὶ λιμνῶν. οἱ δὲ κατὰ ρῆξιν νέφους
gινόμενοι καὶ ἀνάλυσιν τοῦ πάχους πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς
ποιούμενοι ἐκνεφία λαλοῦνται· μεθ' ὦδατος δὲ
ἀθρόως ῥαγέντες ἐξυδρίαι λέγονται. καὶ οἱ μὲν
20 ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς συνεχεῖς ἐνροὶ κέκλημεν, βορεῖα δὲ
οἱ ἀπὸ ἀρκτοῦ, ζέφυροι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ δύσεως, νότοι
dὲ οἱ ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας. τῶν γε μὴν εὖρων κακίας
μὲν λέγεται ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὰς θερινὰς ἀνατολάς
τὸποὺ πνεῦμων ἄνεμος, ἀπηλιώτης δὲ ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ
tὰς ἱσημερινὰς, ἐνροὶ δὲ ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὰς χει-
25 μερινὰς. καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ζεφύρων ἀργεότητις μὲν
ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς θερινῆς δύσεως, ὥν τινες καλοῦσιν ὀλυμ-
pίαν, οἱ δὲ ἱάπυγα· ζέφυρος δὲ ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς ἱση-
μερινῆς, λυφ δὲ ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς χειμερινῆς. καὶ τῶν
βορεών ἵδιως ὁ μὲν ἐξῆς τῷ κακίᾳ καλεῖται βορεάς,
ἀπαρκίας δὲ ὁ ἐφεξῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ πόλου κατὰ τὸ
30 μεσημβρινὸν πνεῦμα, θρασκίας δὲ ἐξῆς πνεῶν τῷ

1 ραγέντες B Lor.: ραγέντος codd. cet. Bekk.

α This is a common Greek way of describing points of
the compass. They divided each quarter by three; so their
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air moving in quantity and in a mass. It is also called breath. In another sense "breath" means that substance found in plants and animals and pervading everything, that brings life and generation; but about that there is no need to speak now. The breath that breathes in the air we call wind, and the breath that comes from moisture we call breeze. Of the winds, some blow from the earth when it is wet and are called land-winds; some arise from gulfs of the sea and are called gulf-winds. There is a similarity between these winds and those which come from rivers and lakes. Those which arise at the breaking up of a cloud and resolve its density against themselves are called cloud-winds: those which burst out all at once accompanied by water are called rain-winds. Eurus is the name of the winds that blow steadily from the East, Boreas is the name of the North winds, Zephyrus of the West winds, and Notus of the South winds. One of the Euri is called Caecias: this is the one that blows from from the direction of the summer sunrise. Apeliotes is the one that comes from the direction of the equinoctial sunrise, and Eurus proper the one that comes from the direction of the winter sunrise. Of the Zephyri, which blow in the opposite direction, Argestes comes from the direction of the summer sunset; some call this Olympias, and some Iapyx. Zephyrus proper comes from the direction of the equinoctial sunset, Lips from the direction of the winter sunset. Of the winds called Boreas, the one properly so-called is next to Caecias; next to it is Aparctias, which blows from the North pole to the South; Thrascias is the one minor points cannot be translated simply into modern terms. Equinoctial sunrise and sunset can be taken as E. and W.
ἀργέστη, διν ἐνοι κιρκίαν¹ καλοῦσιν. καὶ τῶν
νότων ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀφανὸς πόλου φερόμενος
ἀντίπαλος τῷ ἀπαρκτίᾳ καλεῖται νότος, εὐρόνοτος
dὲ ὁ μεταξὺ νότου καὶ εὐροῦ· τὸν δὲ ἐπὶ θάτερα
μεταξὺ λιβός καὶ νότου οἱ μὲν λιβόνοτον, οἱ δὲ

λιβοφοίνικα, καλοῦσιν.

Τῶν δὲ ἀνέμων οἱ μὲν εἰσὶν εὐθύνουοι, ὅποσοι
διεκπένευοι πρόσω κατ’ εὐθείαν, οἱ δὲ ἀνακαμψί-

πνοοὶ, καθάπερ ὁ κακίας λεγόμενος, καὶ οἱ μὲν
χειμάων, οὕσπερ οἱ νότοι, δυναστεύοντες, οἱ δὲ
θέρους, ὥσ οἱ ἐτησίαι λεγόμενοι, μίξην ἔχοντες τῶν
tε ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρκτοῦ φερομένων καὶ ζεφύρων· οἱ δὲ
ὄρνιθαι καλούμενοι, ἐαρινοὶ τινες ὀντες ἄνεμοι,

βορέαι εἰσὶ τῷ γένει.

Τῶν γε μὴν βιαίων πνευμάτων καταγίζεις μὲν ἐστὶ
πνεῦμα ἀνωθεν τύπτον ἐξαίφνης, θύελλα δὲ πνεῦμα
βίαιον καὶ ἀφίω προσαλλόμενον, λαῖλαφ δὲ καὶ
στρόβιλος πνεῦμα εἰλούμενον κάτωθεν ἀνω, ἀνα-
φύσημα δὲ γῆς πνεῦμα ἀνω φερόμενον κατὰ τὴν

1 ἐκ βυθοῦ τινος ἢ ῥήγματος ἀνάδοσιν· ὅταν δὲ
eἰλούμενον πολὺ φέρηται, πρηστὴρ χθόνιος ἐστὶν.
εἰληθὲν δὲ πνεῦμα ἐν νέφει παχεὶ τε καὶ νοτερῷ,
καὶ ἐξωσθὲν δι’ αὐτοῦ, βιαίως ῥηγνύον τὰ συνεχή
πιλῆματα τοῦ νέφους, βρόμον καὶ πάταγον μέγαν
ἀπειργάσατο, βροντήν λεγόμενον, ὦσπερ ἐν ὕδατι

¹ κιρκίαν Forster : κακίαν codd. Bekk.

Phenomena connected with wind and those connected
with thunder and lightning are not clearly distinguished in
Greek, and translation is difficult. Here πρηστὴρ seems to
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next Argestes, though some call this Circias. Of the winds called Notus, the one that comes from the invisible pole, opposite to Aparctias, is properly called Notus, and Euronotus is the one between Notus and Eurus. The one on the other side, between Notus and Lips, is sometimes called Libonotus, sometimes Libophoenix.

The current of some winds is direct—that is, they blow straight ahead; the current of others varies in direction, as in the case of Caecias. Some of them prevail in the winter, like the Noti; some prevail in the summer, like those called Etesian winds, which are a mixture of North winds and Zephyri. Those which are called Ornithian winds, which occur in the spring, belong to the class Boreas.

Of the violent types of wind, a squall is a wind that strikes suddenly from above; a gust is a violent wind that suddenly jumps up at you; a whirlwind, or cyclone, is a wind that whirls upwards in a spiral. A blast of wind from the earth is a gust caused by the expulsion of wind from some pit or chasm; when it moves with a fierce whirling motion, it is an earth-hurricane (πρηστήρ). When the wind whirls round in a thick cloud full of water and is pushed out through it and forcibly breaks up the closely packed material of the cloud, it makes a great din and crash, which is called thunder—as air does when it is passed violently

mean some kind of whirlwind, but in 394 a 18 and 395 a 24 it is a sort of thunderbolt. Aristotle says (Meteor. 371 a 15): “When it (i.e. the cloud pulled down by a descending whirlwind) is inflamed as it is pulled downwards . . . it is called a πρηστήρ; for it inflames (συνεκπήμπησι) the neighbouring air and colours it with its fire.” The name implies a connexion with fire and perhaps here the πρηστήρ comes up from a fiery chasm (cf. 395 b 20).
πνεύμα σφοδρός ἠλαυνόμενον. κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ νέφους ἐκρήξειν πυρωθὲν τὸ πνεύμα καὶ λάμψαν ἀστραπῆ λέγεται. ὃ δὴ πρῶτον τῆς βροντῆς προσέπεσεν, ὕστερον γενόμενον, ἐπεί τὸ ἀκουστὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀρατοῦ πέφυκε φθάνεσθαι, τοῦ μὲν καὶ πόρρωθεν ὀρωμένου, τοῦ δὲ ἐπειδὰν ἐμπελάσῃ τῇ ἀκοῇ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν τὸ μὲν τάχιστον ἦ τῶν ὀντῶν, λέγω δὲ τὸ πυρῶδες, τὸ δὲ ἔττον ταχύ, ἀερῶδες ὦν, ἐν τῇ πλῆξει πρὸς ἀκοήν ἀφικνούμενον. τὸ δὲ ἀστράψαν ἀναπυρωθέν, βιαῖς ἄχρι τῆς γῆς διεκθέουν, κεραυνὸς καλεῖται, ἐὰν δὲ ἡμίπυρο πᾶν, σφοδρὸν δὲ ἄλλως καὶ ἀθρόον, προστήρ, ἐὰν δὲ ἄπυρον παντελῶς, τυφῶν· ἐκαστὸν δὲ τούτων κατασκήνωσαν εἰς τὴν γῆν σκηπτὸς ὄνομάζεται. τῶν δὲ κεραυνῶν οἱ μὲν αἰθαλώδεις ψολδέντες λέγονται, οἱ δὲ ταχέως διάττοντες ἄργυρης, ἔλλικαι δὲ οἱ γραμμοειδῶς φερόμενοι, σκηπτοὶ δὲ ὁσοὶ κατασκήνωσαν εἰς τι.

Συλλήβδην δὲ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι φαντασμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ κατ᾽ ἐμφάσιν, τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν—κατ᾽ ἐμφάσιν μὲν ἱρίδες καὶ ράβδοι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καθ᾽ ὑπόστασιν δὲ σέλα τε καὶ διάττοντες καὶ κομῆται καὶ τὰ τούτων παραπλήσια. Ἰρος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐμφάσις ἡλίου τμήματος ἡ σελήνης, ἐν νέφει νοτερῷ καὶ κοιλῷ καὶ συνεχεῖ πρὸς φαντασίαν, ὡς ἐν 35 κατόπτρῳ, θεωρομένῃ κατὰ κύκλον περιφέρειαν. ράβδος δὲ ἐστὶν ἱρίδος ἐμφάσις εὐθεία. ἄλως δὲ ἐστὶν ἐμφάσις λαμπρότητος ἀστρον περίανγος.

See p. 368, n. a.

tυφῶν is often a typhoon or hurricane (cf. 400 a 29), but here it is connected with lightning. In mythology Typhon
through water. Because of the breaking up of the cloud the wind is set on fire, and flashes: this is called lightning. This lightning falls upon our senses before the thunder, though it occurs later, because what is heard is by nature slower than what is seen: for the latter is seen a great way off, the former only when it approaches the ears; particularly when one is that swiftest thing of all, the element of Fire, while the other is less swift, since it is of the nature of air and impinges upon the hearing by physical contact. When the flashing bolt is aflame and hurtles violently to the ground it is called a thunderbolt; if it is half alight, but in other respects strong and dense, it is called a fiery bolt; if it is altogether fireless it is called a smoking bolt; but each one of these when it falls upon the ground is called a falling-bolt. Lightning is called smoky when it looks dark, like smoke; vivid, when it moves very rapidly; and forked, when it moves along jagged lines; but when it falls on to something it is called a falling-bolt.

Briefly, the phenomena of the air are divided into those which are mere appearances and those which are realities: the appearances are rainbows and streaks in the sky and so on; the realities are lights and shooting stars and comets and other such things. A rainbow is the appearance in reflection of a portion of the sun or moon, seen, like an image in a mirror, in a cloud that is wet and hollow and presents an unbroken surface, and shaped like an arc of a circle. A streak is a straight rainbow. A halo is an appearance of brightness shedding its light round a star;

is the son of Typhos, the giant, who causes the eruption of Etna; hence the connexion with fire.

\( \textit{kepav\'os} \) is used for "lightning" and "thunderbolt."

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διαφέρει δὲ ἵνδος ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἴρις εἶ ἐναντίας φαίνεται ἥλιον καὶ σελήνης, ἡ δὲ ἀλώς κύκλῳ παντὸς ἀστροῦ. σέλας δὲ ἐστὶ πυρὸς ἄθροον ἐξαιτὶς ἐν ἀέρι. τῶν δὲ σελάων ἡ μὲν ἀκοντίζεται, ἡ δὲ 5 στηρίζεται. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐξακοντισμὸς ἐστὶ πυρὸς γένεσις ἐκ παρατρύχεως ἐν ἀέρι φερομένου ταχέως καὶ φαντασίαν μῆκους ἐμφαίνοντος διὰ τὸ τάχος, ὁ δὲ στηργμός ἐστὶ χωρίς φορᾶς προμήκης ἐκτασις καὶ οἶνον ἀστροῦ ρύσις πλατυνομένη δὲ κατὰ θάτερον κομῆτης καλεῖται. πολλάκις δὲ τῶν 10 σελάων τὰ μὲν ἐπιμένει πλείονα χρόνον, τὰ δὲ παραχρήμα σβέννυται. πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι φαντασμάτων ἱδέαι θεωροῦνται, λαμπάδες τε καλοῦμεναι καὶ δοκίδες καὶ πίθοι καὶ βόθυνοι, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ὁμοιότητα ὥς ὑπὸ προσαγορευθεῖσα. καὶ τὰ μὲν τούτων ἐσπέρια, τὰ δὲ ἐφα, τὰ δὲ ἀμφιφαθηθεῖσα τρέφεται, σπανίως δὲ βόρεια καὶ νότια. πάντα δὲ ἀβέβαια· οὐδέποτε γάρ τι τούτων ἂν ἔστω ἀνενθρησκευται κατεστηριγμένον. τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἀέρια τοιαύτα.

ὥστε καὶ ἡ γῆ πολλὰς ἐν αὐτῇ, καθάπερ ὑδατος, οὐτως καὶ πνεύματος καὶ πυρὸς πηγάς. 20 τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ γῆν εἰσὶν ἀόρατοι, πολλαὶ δὲ ἀναπνοὰς ἔχουσι καὶ ἀναφυσάταις, ὥσπερ Λυπάρα τε καὶ Λίτνη καὶ τὰ ἐν Αἰόλου νῆσοι· αἱ δὲ ἡ καὶ ἰόνιον πολλάκις ποταμοῦ δίκην, καὶ μύδρους ἀναρριπτοῦσι διαστύρος. ἐνιαὶ δὲ ὑπὸ γῆν οὕσαι πλησίον πηγαίων ὑδάτων θερμαῖνον ταῦτα, καὶ τὰ 25 μὲν χλιαρὰ τῶν ναμάτων ἀναίοι, τὰ δὲ ὑπέρζεστα, τὰ δὲ εὖ ἐχοντα κράσεως.
it differs from a rainbow in that the rainbow appears opposite the sun or moon, but the halo is in a circle round the whole of the star. A light is the kindling of a mass of fire in the air. Some lights shoot like javelins, others are set in one position in the sky. The shooting is a generation of fire by friction in the air; the fire moves rapidly, giving the impression of length because of its rapidity. The latter, the stationary light, is extended and lengthy but keeps the same position, as if it were an elongated star; if it spreads out towards one end it is called a comet. Often there is a variation in the duration of the light, some lasting a long time, some being extinguished at once. There are also many phenomena of different kinds to be seen, called torches and planks and jars and pits, taking their names from their likeness to these objects. Some of these can be seen in the West and some in the East, and some in both; they rarely appear in the North and South. All of them are unstable; for none of them has ever been described as always visible in the same place. So much, then, for the things of the air.

The earth contains in itself many sources, not only of water, but also of wind and fire. Some of these are subterranean and invisible, but many have vents and blow-holes, like Lipara and Etna and the volcanoes in the Aeolian islands. These often flow like rivers and throw up fiery, red-hot lumps. Some of the subterranean sources, which are near springs of water, impart heat to these: some of the streams they make merely lukewarm, some boiling, and some moderately and pleasantly hot.
395 b

'Ομοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν πνευμάτων πολλὰ πολλαχοῦ γῆς στόμια ἀνέωκται: ὅπε τὰ μὲν ἐνθουσιάν ποιεὶ τοὺς ἐμπελάξοντας, τὰ δὲ ἀτροφεῖν, τὰ δὲ χρησμωδεῖν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Λεβαδεία, τὰ δὲ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀναίρεῖ, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν Φυγίᾳ. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ συγγενέσ πνεύμα εὐκρατον ἐν γῇ παρεξώσθέν εἰς μυκίους σήμαγγας αὐτῆς, ἔξεδρον γενόμενον ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων τόπων, πολλὰ μέρη συνεκράδανεν. πολλάκις δὲ πολὺ γενόμενον ἔξωθεν ἐγκατευλήθη τοῖς ταύτης κοιλώμασι καὶ ἀποκλεισθέν ἔξοδον μετὰ βίας αὐτὴς συνετίμαξε, ζητοῦν ἔξοδον ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ἀπειργάσατο πάθος τοῦτο ο ἱαλείν εἰσώθαμεν σεισμὸν. τῶν δὲ σεισμῶν οἱ μὲν εἰς πλάγια σείστηκες κατ' ὀξείας γωνίας ἐπικλύτω καλοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἄνω ῥυτοῦντες καὶ κάτω κατ' ὀρθάς γωνίας βράσται, οἱ δὲ συνιζήσεις ποιουντες εἰς τὰ κοίλα ἰζηματιαί. οἱ δὲ χάσματα ἀνοί-5 γοντες καὶ τὴν γῆν ἀναρρηγνύντες ῥήκται καλοῦνται. τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ πνεύμα προσαναβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ πέτρας, οἱ δὲ πηλόν, οἱ δὲ πηγάς φαίνουσι τὰς πρώτους τοὺς οὐκ οὖσας. τινες δὲ ἀνατρέπουσι κατὰ μίαν πρώσιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ῥώσας. οἱ δὲ ἀνταπ-πάλλοντες καὶ ταῖς εἰς ἐκάτερον ἐγκλίσεις καὶ 10 ἀποπάλσεις διορθοῦντες αἰεὶ τὸ σεισμὸν ταχυτίαν λέγονται, τρόμῳ πάθος ὄμοιον ἀπεργαζόμενοι. γίνονται δὲ καὶ μυκητια σείσμοι, σείστες τὴν γῆν μετὰ βρόμου. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ χωρίς σεισμοῦ γίνεται μύκημα γῆς, ὅταν τὸ πνεύμα σεῖν μὲν μὴ αὐταρκεῖς ἢ, ἐνειλούμενον δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ κόπτεται μετὰ


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Similarly, too, there are in many places on the earth's surface open vents for the winds, which have various effects on those who approach them, causing ecstatic inspiration, or wasting sickness, or in some cases prophecy, like those at Delphi and Lebadeia, or even complete destruction, like the one in Phrygia. Often, too, a moderate earth-born wind, forced into deep, hollow caves in the earth and becoming dislodged from its home, causes shocks in many places. Often when a large quantity from outside is confined within the hollows of the earth and cut off from exit, it shakes the earth violently, seeking an exit for itself, and produces the effect that we call an earthquake. Earthquakes which shake the earth obliquely at a very acute angle we call horizontal; those which blast upwards and downwards perpendicularly are called heaving earthquakes; those which cause a settlement of the earth into hollows are called sinking earthquakes; and those which open up chasms and split the earth are called splitting earthquakes. Some of them stir up a wind, or rocks, or mud; and some reveal springs that were not there before. Some, called thrusting earthquakes, overturn things with a single heave. Others cause recoil this way and that, and in the process of lurching to one side and rebounding again the things that are shaken are held upright: these are called oscillating earthquakes, and their effect is a sort of trembling. There are also roaring earthquakes, which shake the earth with a great din. There is often, also, a roaring of the earth without an earthquake, when the wind is not sufficient to shake the earth but lashes about enveloped in the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2} áνατρέπουσι Lor.: áνατρέποντες Bekk.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{3} áνταποπάλλοντες Lor.: áνταπάλλοντες Bekk.}\]
396 a

15 ὁ δὲ ἄναλογον συμπίπτει τούτως καὶ ἐν θαλάσσῃ: χάσματά τε γὰρ γίνεται θαλάσσης καὶ ἀναχωρῆματα πολλάκις καὶ κυμάτων ἐπιδρομαί, τοτέ μὲν ἀντανακοπὴν ἐχουσαί, τοτέ δὲ πρῶσιν μόνον, ὥσπερ ἵστορεῖται περὶ Ἑλικην τε καὶ Βοῦραν. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀναφυσήματα γίνεται πυρὸς ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ καὶ πηγῶν ἀναβλύσεις καὶ ποταμῶν ἐκβολαι καὶ δένδρων ἐκφύσεις ῥοάι τε καὶ δίναι τοῖς τῶν πνευμάτων ἀνάλογον, αἱ μὲν ἐν μέσοις πε-25 λάγεσιν, αἱ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς εὐρίτους τε καὶ πορθμοὺς. πολλαὶ τε ἀμπώτεις λέγονται καὶ κυμάτων ἀρσεις συμπεριοδεῦειν ἀεὶ τῇ σελήνῃ κατὰ τινα ωρισμένοις καιροὺς.

Ὡς δὲ τὸ πᾶν εἶπεῖν, τῶν στοιχείων ἐγκεκραμένων ἀλλήλοις ἐν ἀέρι τε καὶ γῆ καὶ θαλάσσῃ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς αἱ τῶν παθῶν ὁμοιότητες συνισταν- ταί, τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ μέρους φθοράς καὶ γενέσεις φέρουσαι, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν ἀνώλεθρον τε καὶ ἀγένητον φυλάττουσαι.

5. Καίτοι γε τις ἐθαύμασε πῶς ποτε, εἰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀρχῶν συνεστηκέν ὁ κόσμος, λέγω δὲ 35 ἔνθερν τε καὶ ύγρῶν, ψυχρῶν τε καὶ θερμῶν, οὐ πάλαι διέφθαρται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὡς καὶ εἰ πό- λιν τινὲς θαυμάζοιες, ὅπως διαμένει συνεστηκυῖα ἐκ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων ἐθνῶν, πενήτων λέγω καὶ πλουσίων, νέων γερόντων, ἀσθενῶν ἰσχυρῶν, πονηρῶν χρηστῶν. ἀγνοοοῦσι δὲ ὅτι τοῦτ’ ἡν πολιτι-

1 ἐναντιωτάτων codd. pler. I.or.: ἐναντίων codd. cet. Bekk.
earth with tumultuous force. The blasts of wind that enter the earth are recondensed also by the moisture that is hidden in the earth.\(^a\)

There are also analogous happenings in the sea: chasms occur in the sea, and its waves often withdraw; and there are incursions of waves, sometimes with a recoil, sometimes with a forward rush only, as they say was the case at Helice and Bura.\(^b\) Often too there are exhalations of fire in the sea and eruptions of fountains, and rivers are shot forth, and trees grow, and there are currents and vortices like those of the winds, some in the middle of the oceans, some in the narrows and straits. There are many tides and tidal waves too, which are said to occur in concert with the moon at certain definite times.

To sum up, since the elements are mingled one with another, it is natural that phenomena in the air and land and sea should show these similarities, which involve destruction and generation for the individual parts of nature, but preserve the whole free from corruption and generation.

5. Some people, however, have wondered how the cosmos, if it is composed of the "opposite" principles (I mean dry and wet, cold and hot), has not long ago been destroyed and perished; it is as if men should wonder how a city survives, composed as it is of the most opposite classes (I mean poor and rich, young and old, weak and strong, bad and good). They do not recognize that the most wonderful thing of all about

\(^a\) *i.e.*, wind entering the earth may *(a)* cause an earthquake, *(b)* cause a roar only, or *(c)* be recondensed and so cause neither.

\(^b\) Cf. Strabo viii. 7. 2 (384 c), i. 3. 10 (54 c), Aristot. *Meteor.* 343 b 1, etc., on the destruction of these two cities in Achaia. The date was 373/2 B.C.
396 b

κης ὀμονοιας τὸ θαυμασιώτατον, λέγω δὲ τὸ¹ ἐκ πολλῶν μίαν καὶ ὀμοιαν ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἀποτελεῖν¹
dιάθεσιν, ύποδεχομένην² πάσαν καὶ φύσιν καὶ τύχην.
Ἡσως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ φύσις γλίστεται καὶ ἐκ
tούτων ἀποτελεῖ τὸ σύμφωνον, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ὀμοίων,
ὕστερ ἀμέλει τὸ ἄρρεν συνήγαγε πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ καὶ

5 οὐχ ἐκάπερον πρὸς τὸ ὀμόφυλον, καὶ τὴν πρώτην
ὁμονοιαν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων σηνήσεων, οὐ διὰ τῶν
ἀμοίων. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ τεχνὴ τὴν φύσιν μιμομένη
tοῦτο ποιεῖν. ζωγραφία μὲν γὰρ λευκῶν τε καὶ
μελάνων, ὥχρων τε καὶ ἐρυθρῶν, χρωμάτων ἐγ-
κερασαμένη φύσεις τὰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προηγου-

10 μένοις ἀπετέλεσε συμφώνους, μουσική δὲ ὄξεις
ἀμα καὶ βαρεῖς, μακροῦς τε καὶ βραχεῖς φθόγγους
μύξασα ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς μίαν ἀπετέλεσεν ἀρμο-
νίαν, γραμματική δὲ ἐκ φωνηόντων καὶ ἀφόνων
γραμμάτων κράσων ποιησαμένη τὴν ὅλην τέχνην
ἀπ’ αὐτῶν συνεστήσατο. ταύτῳ δὲ τοῦτο ἦν καὶ

15 τὸ παρὰ τῷ σκοτεινῷ λεγόμενον Ἡρακλείτῳ:
"συνάψεις ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερό-
μενον, συνάδου διάδου καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ
ἐνὸς πάντα."

20 οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων σύ-
στασιν, οὐρανοῦ λέγω καὶ γῆς τοῦ τε σύμπαντος
κόσμου, διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων κράσεως ἀρχῶν

2 The idea that art imitates nature occurs in Aristotle's
Protrepticus (see Jaeger, Aristotle, pp. 74 f.), and in Phys.
B 199 a 15, Meteor. 381 b 5, De Part. Anim. 639 b 15 ff. But
in Aristotle the point of comparison concerns teleology, not

1 τὸ ... ἀποτελεῖν Lor.: δ’τι ... ἀποτελεῖ Bekk.
2 ύποδεχομένη Lor.: ύποδεχομένη Bekk.
3 sic Diels (Vorsokr. 6 22 B 10): v. Lor. ad loc.

The idea that art imitates nature occurs in Aristotle's
Protrepticus (see Jaeger, Aristotle, pp. 74 f.), and in Phys.
B 199 a 15, Meteor. 381 b 5, De Part. Anim. 639 b 15 ff. But
in Aristotle the point of comparison concerns teleology, not
the harmonious working of a city-community is this: that out of plurality and diversity it achieves a homogeneous unity capable of admitting every variation of nature and degree. But perhaps nature actually has a liking for opposites; perhaps it is from them that she creates harmony, and not from similar things, in just the same way as she has joined the male to the female, and not each of them to another of the same sex, thus making the first harmonious community not of similar but of opposite things. It seems, too, that art does this, in imitation of nature: for painting mixes its whites and blacks, its yellows and reds, to create images that are concordant with their originals; music mixes high and low notes, and longs and shorts, and makes a single tune of different sounds; by making a mixture of vowels and consonants, grammar composes out of them the whole of its art. This is precisely what Heracleitus the Dark meant when he said "Junctions are wholes and not-wholes, concord and discord, consonance and dissonance. One out of All; All out of One." So in the same way the complex of the Universe, I mean heaven and earth and the whole cosmos, by means of the mixture of the most opposite elements has been

the harmony of opposites. The four colours mentioned by Pseudo-Aristotle are the colours of the restricted palette used by the Four Colour Painters, of whom the earliest recorded is Polygnotus and the latest Aétion in the age of Alexander the Great. Cf. Pliny, N.H. xxxv. 50, and A. Rumpf, JHS lxvii (1947), p. 16. It has been suggested that Empedocles’ comparison of painting and creation (Diels, Vorsokr. 31 B 23) was inspired by Four Colour Painting.

It is not likely that the author read Heracleitus in the original, or that the whole context is to be attached too closely to Heracleitus. Maguire (op. cit. pp. 134 ff.) finds the closest parallels to this passage in the Neo-Pythagoreans.
μία διεκόσμησεν ἀρμονία. ἦρων γὰρ ὑγρῷ, θερμὸν δὲ ψυχρῷ, βαρεὶ τε κούφον μυγέν, καὶ ὀρθὸν περιφερεὶ, γῆν τε πάσαν καὶ θάλασσαν αὐθέρα τε καὶ ἡλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸν ὁλὸν ὄυραν διεκόσμησε μία ἡ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις, ἐκ τῶν ἀμίκ-30 των καὶ ἑτεροίων, ἄερος τε καὶ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς καὶ ύδατος, τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον δημιουργήσασα καὶ μιᾷ διαλαβοῦσα σφαῖρας ἐπιφανείᾳ τὰς τε ἐναντιω-τάτας ἐν αὐτῷ φύσεις ἀλλήλαις ἀναγκάσασα ὁμο-λογήσαι καὶ ἐκ τούτων μηχανησμένη τῷ παντὶ σωτηρίαν. αὐτία δὲ ταύτης μὲν ἡ τῶν στοιχείων
35 ὁμολογία, τῆς δὲ ὁμολογίας ἡ ἴσομοιρία καὶ τὸ
397 a μηδὲν αὐτῶν πλέον ἑτέρον ἑτέρου δύνασθαι: τὴν
gὰρ ἵστον ἀντίστασιν ἔχει τὰ βαρέα πρὸς τὰ κούφα
καὶ τὰ θερμὰ πρὸς θάτερα, ἡς φύσεως ἐπὶ τῶν
μειζόνων διασκούσης ὥστε τὸ ἱσον σωστικὸν πῶς
ἐστιν ὁμοιοίας, ἡ δὲ ὁμόνοια τοῦ πάντων γενετήρος
5 καὶ περικαλλεστάτου κόσμου. τίς γὰρ ἂν εἴη φύσις
τοῦτο δρικτῶν; ἢν γὰρ ἂν εἴπῃ  
1 τίς, μέρος ἐστὶν
αὐτῶν. τὸ τε καλὸν πᾶν ἐπώνυμόν ἐστὶ τούτου καὶ
tὸ τεταγμένον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου λεγόμενον κεκο-
σμηθαι. τι  
3 δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους δύνατ' ἄν ἐξισο-
θήμαι τῇ κατ' ὄυραν τἄξει τε καὶ φορᾷ τῶν
10 ἀστρῶν ἤλιον τε καὶ σελήνης, κινομένων ἐν ἀκρι-
βεστάτοις μέτροις ἐξ αἰῶνος εἰς ἑτέρον αἰώνα; τίς
dὲ γένοτ' ἂν ἄφειδεια τοιάδε, ἤπω καὶ φυλάττοσιν
αἱ καλαὶ καὶ γόνυμοι τῶν ὅλων ὅραι, θέρη τε καὶ
χειμῶνας ἐπάγουσαι τεταγμένος ἐμέρας τε καὶ
1 θάτερα ETZ Lor.: τὰ θάτερα codd. cet. Bekk.
organized by a single harmony: dry mixed with wet, hot with cold, light with heavy, straight with curved—the whole of earth and sea, the aether, the sun, the moon and the whole heaven have been set in order by the single power which interpenetrates all things: from things unmixed and diverse, air and earth and fire and water, it has fashioned the whole cosmos and embraced it all in the surface of a single sphere, forcing the most opposite elements in the cosmos to come to terms, and from them achieving preservation for the whole. The cause of its preservation is the agreement of the elements, and the cause of the agreement is the principle of equal shares and the fact that no one of them has more power than each of the others: for the heavy is in equipoise with the light, and the hot with its opposite. In these greater matters nature teaches us that equality is the preserver of concord, and concord is the preserver of the cosmos, which is the parent of all things and the most beautiful of all. For what being could be better than this? Anything that might be suggested is a part of it. And everything that is beautiful takes its name from this, and all that is well-arranged; for it is called "well-ordered" (κεκοσμηθαι) after this "universal order" (κόσμος). What particular detail could be compared to the arrangement of the heavens and the movement of the stars and the sun and moon, moving as they do from one age to another in the most accurate measures of time? What constancy could rival that maintained by the hours and seasons, the beautiful creators of all things, that bring summers and winters in due order, and days and nights to make

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3 τι Lor.: τίς Bekk.
νῦκτας εἰς μηνὸς ἀποτέλεσμα καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς; καὶ
15 μὴν μεγέθει μὲν οὕτως πανυπέρτατος, κυνήσει δὲ
ἐξύτατος, λαμπρότητι δὲ εὐανεγάπατος, δυνάμει δὲ
ἀγήρως τε καὶ ἀφθαρτος. οὕτως ἐναλίων ζῷων καὶ
πεζῶν καὶ ἀερίων φύσεις ἔχωμι καὶ βίους ἐμέτρησε ταῖς ἐναυτοῖς κυνήσειν. ἐκ τούτου πάντα ἐμπνεῖ τε καὶ ψυχὴν ἒσχε τὰ ζῴα. τούτου καὶ αἱ
20 παράδοξοι νεοχμώσεις τεταγμένως ἀποτελοῦνται, συναραττόντων μὲν ἀνέμων παντοτών, πυπτόντων δὲ εὖ ὀυρανοῦ κεραυνῶν, ῥηγυμένων δὲ χειμῶνων ἐξαισίων. διὰ δὲ τούτων τὸ νοτερὸν ἐκπειζόμενον τὸ τε πυρώδες διαπνεόμενον εἰς ὦμονοιαν ἁγεῖ τὸ πάν καὶ καθίστησιν. ἦ τε γῆ φυτοῦς κομῶσα παντο-
25 δαποῖς νάμασί τε περιβλύσουσα καὶ περιοχουμένη ζῷων, κατὰ καιρὸν ἐκφύσουσα ταῖς πάντας καὶ τρέ-
φουσα καὶ δεχομένη, μυρίας τε φέρουσα ἱδέας καὶ
πάθη, τὴν ἀγήρω φύσιν ὦμοιως τηρεῖ, καίτοι καὶ
σεισμοῖς τινασσομένη καὶ πλημμρίσιν ἐπικλυζομένη
30 πυρκαίαις τε κατὰ μέρος φλογιζομένη. ταῦτα δὲ
πάντα ἐσκεύα αὐτὴ πρὸς ἀγαθοῦ γινόμενα τὴν δι'
αιῶνος σωτηρίαν παρέχειν. σειομένης τε γάρ δι-
εξάττουσιν αἱ τῶν πνευμάτων παρεμπτώσεις κατὰ
tὰ ῥήγματα τὰς ἀναπνοὰς ὑσχούσαι, καθὼς ἄνω
λέεται, καθαυρομένη τε ὀμβροὺς ἀποκλύζεται
35 πάντα τὰ νοσώδη, περιπνεομένη δὲ αὖραι τὰ τε
ὑπ' αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ ὑπέρ αὐτῆς εἰλικρινεῖται. καὶ
397 b μὴν αἱ φλόγες μὲν τὸ παγετῶδες ἥπιανουσίν, οἱ
πάγοι δὲ τὰς φλόγας ἀνιᾶσιν. καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους
tὰ μὲν γίνεται, τὰ δὲ ἀκμάζει, τὰ δὲ φθείρεται.

1 οὕτωs Lor.: ὁ οὕτωs Bekk.
2 ἥπιανουσίν) BCFG Lor.: πιαίνουσιν codd. cet. Bekk.
up the number of a month or a year? In size too the cosmos is mightiest, in motion swiftest, in brightness most brilliant, in power never-aging and indestructible. It is this that has given a different nature to the creatures of the sea, the land and the air, and measured their lives in terms of its own movements. From this all creatures breathe and take their life. Of this even the unexpected changes are accomplished in due order—the winds of all kinds that dash together, thunderbolts falling from the heavens, and storms that violently burst out. Through these the moisture is squeezed out and the fire is dispersed by currents of air; in this way the whole is brought into harmony and so established. The earth, too, that is crowned with plants of every kind and bubbles with springs and teems with living creatures everywhere, that brings forth everything in season and nurtures it and receives it back again, that produces a myriad shapes and conditions—this earth still keeps its never-aging nature unchanged, though it is racked by earthquakes, swamped by floods, and burnt in part by fires. All these things, it seems, happen for the good of the earth and give it preservation from age to age: for when it is shaken by an earthquake, there is an upsurge of the winds transfused within it, which find vent-holes through the chasms, as I have already said; when it is washed by rain it is cleansed of all noxious things; and when the breezes blow round about it the things below and above it are purified. Furthermore the fires soften things that are frozen, and frost abates the force of the fires. And of the particular things on the earth some come into being while some are in their prime and others are perishing:

\[ \text{395 b 26.} \]
καὶ αἱ μὲν γενέσεις ἐπαναστέλλουσι τὰς φθορὰς,
5 αἱ δὲ φθοραὶ κουφίζουσι τὰς γενέσεις. μία δὲ ἐκ πάντων περαινομένη σωτηρία διὰ τέλους ἀντιπερι-
σταμένων ἄλληλοι καὶ τοτε μὲν κρατοῦντων, τοτὲ
dὲ κρατοῦμένων, φυλάττει τὸ σύμπαν ἀφθαρτὸν δι᾿
αἰῶνος.

6. Λοιπῶν δὲ δὴ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὀλων συνεκτικῆς
10 αἰτίας κεφαλαιωδῶς εἰσεῖν, ὅπ τρόπων καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἄλλων: πλημμελεῖς γὰρ περὶ κόσμου λέγοντας, εἰ
καὶ μὴ δὲ ἀκριβεῖας, ἄλλ’ οὖν γε ὡς εἰς τυπώδη
μᾶθησιν, τὸ τοῦ κόσμου κυριώτατον παραλιπεῖν.
ἀρχαῖος μὲν οὖν τὶς λόγος καὶ πάτρος ἔστι πάσιν
ἀνθρώποις ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν
15 συνέστηκεν, οὐδεμία δὲ φύσις αὐτὴ καθ’ ἐαυτὴν
ἔστιν αὐτάρκης, ἐρμηθεῖσα τῆς ἐκ τούτου σω-
τηρίας. διὸ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰπεῖν τινες προήχθη-
σαν ὅτι πάντα ταύτα ἐστὶ θεῶν πλέα τὰ καὶ δι’
ὀφθαλμὸν ἰνδαλλόμενα ἡμῖν καὶ δι’ ἀκοῆς καὶ
πάσης αἰσθήσεως, τῇ μὲν θείᾳ δυνάμει πρέποντα
20 καταβαλλόμενοι λόγον, οὐ μὴν τῇ γε οὐσίᾳ. σωτήρ
μὲν γὰρ ὄντως ἀπάντων ἔστι καὶ γενέτωρ τῶν
ὀπωσδήποτε κατὰ τὸν τόν κόσμον συντελο-
μένων ὁ θεός, οὐ μὴν οὐτουργοῦ καὶ ἑπιτόνον
ζῷον κάματον υπομένων, ἄλλα δυνάμει χρώμενος
ἀτρύτω, δι’ ἦς καὶ τῶν πόρρω δοκοῦντων εἶναι
25 περιγίνεται. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρῶτην
ἐδραν αὐτὸς ἤλαχεν, ὑπατός τε διὰ τοῦτο ὠνό-
μασται, [καὶ]¹ κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν "ἀκροτάτη κο-

¹ καὶ om. BCG Lor.
and generation is set in the balance against destruction, and destruction lightens the weight of generation. There is one single principle of preservation, maintained without interruption among all these things that interchange with one another, ascending to power and declining in turn, and this keeps the whole system safe, eternally indestructible.

6. It remains now to discuss summarily, as the rest has been discussed, the cause that holds the world together; for in describing the cosmos, if not in detail, at least sufficiently to convey an outline, it would be wrong for us to omit altogether that which is supreme in the cosmos. It is indeed an ancient idea, traditional among all mankind, that all things are from God and are constituted for us by God, and nothing is self-sufficient if deprived of his preserving influence. So some of the ancients were led to say that all the things of this world are full of gods, all that are presented to us through our eyes and hearing and all the senses; but in saying this they used terms suitable to the power of God but not to his essence. For God is indeed the preserver of all things and the creator of everything in this cosmos however it is brought to fruition; but he does not take upon himself the toil of a creature that works and labours for itself, but uses an indefatigable power, by means of which he controls even things that seem a great way off. God has his home in the highest and first place, and is called Supreme for this reason, since according to the poet it is on "the loftiest crest"

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*Cf. the saying attributed to Thales (Diels, Vorsokr. 11 A 22 = Aristot. De Anima 411 a 7).

*b The αὐτόοργὸς (cf. 398 a 5, b 4) is the man who works his own land without a slave, *e.g.* Electra’s husband in Euripides’ *Electra*.  

*c* Hom. *Il.* i. 499.
397 b

ρυφή " τοῦ σύμπαντος ἐγκαθιδρυμένος οὐρανοῦ· μάλιστα δὲ πως αὐτοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπολαῦει τὸ πλησίον αὐτοῦ σῶμα, καὶ ἐπείτα τὸ μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, 30 καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἀχρὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς τῶν. διό

γῆ τε καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς έοικεν, ἐν ἀποστάσει πλειστῇ τῆς ἐκ θεοῦ ὄντα ὕφελείας, ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀκατάλληλα εἶναι καὶ πολλῆς μεστὰ ταραχῆς· οὐ μὴν ἄλλα

[kai] 1 καθ᾽ ὁσον ἐπὶ πάν διυκνείσθαι πέφυκε τὸ

θεῖον, καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ὑμοίως συμβαίνει τὰ τε

35 ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, κατὰ τὸ ἔγγιον τε καὶ πορρωτέρω θεοῦ

398 a εἶναι μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἦττον ὕφελείας μεταλαμβά-

νοντα. κρείττον οὖν ὑπολαβεῖν, δ καὶ πρέπον ἐστὶ

καὶ θεω τοῖς μάλιστα ἀρμοζον, ὡς ἡ ἐν οὐρανῷ δύναμις

ἐδρυμένη καὶ τοῖς πλείστον ἀφεστηκόσιν, ὡς ἐν

γε εἰπεῖν, καὶ σύμπασιν αὐτία γίνεται σωτηρία,

5 μᾶλλον ἡ ὡς διήκουσα καὶ φοιτώσα ἐνθα μὴ καλὸν

μηδὲ εὐσχημον αὐτουργεῖ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς. τοῦτο μὲν

γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων ἡγεμόσιν ἀρμόττει, παντὶ καὶ

τῷ τυχόντι ἐφίστασθαι ἔργῳ, οἰον στρατιᾶς ἄρχοντι

ἡ πόλεως ἡ οἰκου, [kai] 2 εἰ χρεῶν στρωματο-

dεσμον εἰη δῆσαι καὶ εἰ τι φαυλότερον ἀποτελεῖν

10 ἔργον, δ 3 καὶ τὸ τυχὸν ἀνδράποδον ποιήσειεν, ἄλλο

οἰον ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἱστορεῖται. τὸ

〈γὰρ〉 Καμβύσου 3 Ξέρξου τε καὶ Δαρείου πρό-

1 kai om. CGZ Lor.
2 kai del. Wendland et Wilamowitz.
3 δ ... Καμβύσου sic Lor.: δ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως οὐκ ἂν τὸ τυχὸν ἀνδράποδον ποιήσειεν ἄλλο οἶον ἱστορεῖτο Καμβύσου κτλ. Bekk.: v. Lor. ad loc.
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of the whole heaven that he dwells: his power is experienced most of all by the body that is closest to him, less by the next, and so on down to the regions inhabited by us. So earth and the things that are on earth, being at the farthest remove from the help of God, seem to be feeble and discordant and full of confusion and diversity; but nevertheless, in that it is the nature of the Divine to penetrate to everything, even the things around us occur in the same way as the things above us, each having a greater or smaller share of God's help in proportion to its distance from him. So it is better to suppose, what is also fitting and most appropriate to God, that the power which is based on the heavens is also the cause of preservation in the most remote things, as we may say, and indeed in everything, rather than that of itself it carries out its tasks on earth by penetrating and being present where it is not honourable or fitting that it should. For it is not fitting even among men for princes to superintend each and every action that may have to be done—for example, the commander of an army or leader of a city or head of a household, if it were necessary to pack up bedding or perform some other menial task which could be done by any slave—but rather it is fitting that they should act in the manner which was adopted, according to the records, under the Great King. The pomp of Cambyses and Xerxes and Darius was ordered on a

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a The "power" has here become identified with god; this is literally inconsistent with 397 b 19 above.

b Pseudo-Aristotle describes the King of Persia in his glory in the 6th/5th century B.C. He accords well with Herodotus's (i. 98) account of Deioces' palace and régime at Ecbatana. This is a description of a fabulous past such as Aristotle would hardly have given.
σχήμα εἰς σεμνότητος καὶ ὑπεροχῆς ύψος μεγαλοπρεπῶς διεκεκόσμητο· αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ, ὡς λόγος, ἤδρυτο ἐν Σοῦσοι ἢ Ἐκβατάνοις, παντὶ ἀόρατος,

15 θαυμαστῶν ἐπέχων βασιλευον ὁικὸν καὶ περίβολον χρυσῶ καὶ ἠλέκτρῳ καὶ ἐλέφαντι ἀστράπτοντα· πυλώνες δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ συνεχεῖς πρόθυρα τε σύχνους εἰργόμενα σταδίους ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων θύραις τε χαλκαῖς καὶ τείχεσι μεγάλους ὑχύρωτο· ἐξω δὲ τούτων ἄνδρες οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ δοκιμώτατοι διεκεκόσμητο,

20 οἱ μὲν ἄμφι αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα δορυφόροι τε καὶ θεράποντες, οἱ δὲ ἐκάστου περιβόλου φύλακες, πυλωροὶ τε καὶ ὡτακονσταὶ λεγόμενοι, ὡς ἂν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτὸς, δεσπότης καὶ θεὸς ὄνομαζόμενος, πάντα μὲν βλέποι, πάντα δὲ ἀκοῦοι. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ἄλλοι καθειστήκεσαν προσόδων ταῖμαί καὶ

25 στρατηγοὶ πολέμων καὶ κυνηγεσίων δῶρων τε ἀποδεκτῆρες τῶν τε λοιπῶν ἔργων ἐκαστοί κατὰ τὰς χρείας ἐπιμεληταί. τήν δὲ σύμπασαν ἀρχὴν τῆς Ἀσίας, περατουμένην Ἔλλησπόντῳ μὲν ἐκ τῶν πρῶς ἐσπέραν μερῶν, Ἰνδῶ δὲ ἐκ τῶν πρῶς ἐω, διελήφθεσαν κατὰ ἑθνὶ στρατηγοὶ καὶ σατράπαι

30 καὶ βασιλεῖς, δοῦλοι τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως, ἡμεροδρόμου τε καὶ σκοποὶ καὶ ἀγγελιαφόροι φρυκτωρίων τε ἐποπτῆρες. τοσούτος δὲ ἦν ὁ κόσμος, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν φρυκτωρίων, κατὰ διαδοχάς πυρσενότον ἀλλήλους ἐκ περάτων τῆς ἀρχῆς μέχρι Σοῦσων καὶ Ἐκβατάνων, ὥστε τὸν βασι-

35 λέα γινώσκειν αὐθημερόν πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ

398 b καινουργούμενα. νομιστέον δὴ τὴν τοῦ μεγά-

lou βασιλέως ύπεροχήν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τοῦ κόσμου

1 φρυκτωρίων . . . φρυκτωρίων scripsi : φρυκτωρίων . . . φρυκτωρίων Bekk.

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grand scale and touched the heights of majesty and
magnificence: the King himself, they say, lived in
Susa or Ecbatana, invisible to all, in a marvellous
palace with a surrounding wall flashing with gold,
electrum and ivory; it had a succession of many gate-
towers, and the gateways, separated by many stades
from one another, were fortified with brazen doors
and high walls; outside these the leaders and most
eminent men were drawn up in order, some as per-
sonal bodyguards and attendants to the King himself,
some as guardians of each outer wall, called Guards
and the Listening-Watch, so that the King himself,
who had the name of Master and God, might see
everything and hear everything. Apart from these
there were others appointed as revenue officials,
leaders in war and in the hunt, receivers of gifts to
the King, and others, each responsible for administ-
ering a particular task, as they were necessary. The
whole Empire of Asia, bounded by the Hellespont in
the West and the Indus in the East, was divided into
nations under generals and satraps and kings, slaves
of the Great King, with couriers and scouts and
messengers and signals-officers. And such was the
orderly arrangement of this, and particularly of the
system of signal-beacons which were ready to burn
in succession from the uttermost limits of the Empire
to Susa and Ecbatana, that the King knew the same
day all that was news in Asia. Now we must suppose
that the majesty of the Great King falls short of the
majesty of the god who rules the cosmos by as much

2 πυρσευόντων ἄλληλοις Lor.: πυρσευοῦσών ἄλληλαις Bekk.
ἐπέχοντος θεοῦ τοσούτων καταδειστέραν ὡςον τῆς ἐκείνου τῆς τοῦ φαυλοτάτου τε καὶ ἀσθενεστά
tου ζῶου, ὥστε, εἴπερ ἄσεμνον ἦν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ
5 δοκεῖν Ξέρξην αὐτοτυργεῖν ἀπαντά καὶ ἐπιτελεῖν ἀ
βούλιον καὶ ἐφιστάμενον διοικεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀ
πρεπεῖν ἢν εὐθεῖα. σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ πρε-
pωδέστερον αὐτὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτῳ χώρᾳ
ιδρύθαι, τῆς δὲ δύναμιν διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κό-
σμου διήκουσαν ἡμῖν τε κινεῖν καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸν
10 πάντα οὐρανόν περιάγειν αὕτων τε γίνεσθαι τοῖς
ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σωτηρίας. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπιτεχνήσεως
αὐτῷ δεῖ καὶ ὑπηρεσίας τῆς παρ' ἐτέρων, ὥσπερ
tοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν ἄρχουσι τῆς πολυχειρίας διὰ τῆν
ἀσθένειαν, ἄλλα τούτο ἦν τὸ θειότατον, τὸ μετὰ
ῥαστώνης καὶ ἀπλῆς κινήσεως παντοδαπᾶς ἀπο-
15 τελεῖν ἱδέας, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει δρῶσιν οἱ μηχανοποιοί,
διὰ μᾶς ὀργάνου σχαστηρίας πολλάς καὶ ποικίλας
ἐνεργείας ἀποτελοῦντες. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ νευρο-
στάσται μίαν μὴρινθὸν ἐπιστασάμενοι ποιοῦσι καὶ
αὐχένα κινεῖσθαι καὶ χείρα τοῦ ζῶου καὶ ὁμον καὶ
ὄφθαλμον, ἐστὶ δὲ ὅτε πάντα τὰ μέρη, μετά τινος
20 εὐρυθμίας. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἡ θεία φύσις ἀπὸ τινος

1 μηχανοποιοὶ Z. Lor. (Notes): μηχανοτέχναι Lor. (De Mundo): μεγαλότεχνοι codd. pler. Bekk.

* It is not clear what kind of machine is meant; the
as the difference between the King and the poorest
and weakest creature in the world, so that if it was
beneath the dignity of Xerxes to appear himself
to be the actual executor of all things, to carry out
his wishes himself and to administer the Empire by
personal supervision, it would be still more unbe-
coming for God. It is more noble, more becoming,
for him to reside in the highest place, while his power,
penetrating the whole of the cosmos, moves the sun
and moon and turns the whole of the heavens and is
the cause of preservation for the things upon the
earth. He has no need of the contrivance and support
of others, as rulers among us men need a multitude
of workers because of their weakness; the most
divine thing of all is to produce all kinds of result
easily by means of a single motion, just like the
operators of machines, who produce many varied
activities by means of the machine's single release-
mechanism.\textsuperscript{a} In the same way too the men who run
puppet-shows,\textsuperscript{b} by pulling a single string, make the
creature's neck move, and his hand and shoulder and
eye, and sometimes every part of his body, according
to a rhythmical pattern. So also the divine being,

\textsuperscript{a} varied activities" probably refer to the various parts of
the machine, and do not imply multi-purpose machines.
\textit{Mechanopoios} is most frequently used of military engineers.
\textit{Schasteria} is used of the release mechanism of catapults and
ballistae. It is also used of the release-mechanism of auto-
matic machines (such as Hero's machine for providing holy
water); but in conjunction with \textit{mechanopoios} and \textit{organon}
a reference to catapults, etc., seems more likely.

\textsuperscript{b} Plato twice refers to puppets in the \textit{Laws} (644 d, 804 b)
as well as in the shadow-theatre of the \textit{Republic} (514); in the
\textit{Laws} the puppets are worked by wires. Aristotle uses
the example of puppets to illustrate a scientific theory in \textit{De Gen.}
\textit{An.} 734 b 10 ff.
398 b ἀπλῆς κινήσεως τοῦ πρῶτου τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὰ συνεχὴ δίδωσι καὶ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων πάλιν εἰς τὰ πορρωτέρω, μέχρις ἂν διὰ τοῦ παντὸς διεξέλθῃ· κινηθέν γὰρ ἐτερον ὑφ’ ἐτέρου καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν ἐκίνησεν ἄλλο σὺν κόσμῳ, δρώντων μὲν πάντων οἶκείως ταῖς 25 σφέτεραις κατασκευαῖς, οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς δὲ ὅδοι πᾶσιν οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ διαφόρου καὶ ἐτεροίας, ἔστι δὲ οὐς καὶ ἑναντίας, καὶ τοῦ τῆς πρώτης οἶον εὐδόσεως εἰς κίνησιν μᾶς1 γενομένης· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις εξ αὑτῶν3 ὁμοῦ ῥύμειε σφαιραν καὶ κύβον καὶ κώνον καὶ κύ-λινδρον—ἐκαστὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον κινη-30 θῆσεται σχῆμα—ἡ εἰ τις ὁμοὶ ζῷον ἐνυδρόν τε καὶ χερσαίον καὶ πτηνόν ἐν τοῖς κόλποις ἐχων ἐκβάλοι· ἤλιον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν νηκτὸν ἄλομον εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δίαιταν ἐκνήσεται, τὸ δὲ χερσαίον εἰς τὰ σφέτερα ἡθή καὶ νομοὺς διεξερτύσει, τὸ δὲ αέριον ἐξαρθὲν ἐκ γῆς μετάραιον οἰχῆσεται πετόμενον, 35 μᾶς τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας πᾶσιν ἀποδούσης τῆν 399 α οἰκείαι εὐμάρειαν. οὖτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ κόσμου· διὰ γὰρ ἀπλῆς τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ περιαγωγῆς ἴμερας καὶ νυκτὶ περατομενής ἄλλοιαν πάντων δι-έξοδοι γίνονται, καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ μᾶς σφαίρας περιεχο-μένων, τῶν μὲν θάττον, τῶν δὲ σχολαιότερον 5 κινομένων παρά τε τὰ τῶν διαστημάτων μῆκη καὶ τὰς ἱδίας ἐκάστων κατασκευάς. σελήνη μὲν γὰρ ἐν μηνὶ τὸν ἑαυτής διαπεραίνεται κύκλον αὑξο-μένη τε καὶ μειομένη καὶ φθίνουσα, ἦλιος δὲ ἐν
with a single movement of the nearest element distributes his power to the next part and then to the more remote parts until it permeates the whole. One thing is moved by another, and itself then moves a third in regular order, all things acting in the manner appropriate to their own constitution; for the way is not the same for all things, but different and various, in some cases quite opposite, though the key of the whole movement, as it were, is set by a single opening note. For instance, a similar effect would be produced if one threw from a height a sphere, a cube, a cone and a cylinder, all together: each of them will move in the manner appropriate to its own shape; or if one held in the folds of one's cloak an aquatic animal, a land animal and a winged animal, and then threw them out all together; clearly the animal that swims will leap into its own habitat and swim away, the land animal will crawl off to its own customary pursuits and pastures, and the winged creature will rise from the ground and fly away high in the air; a single cause has restored to all of them the freedom to move, each in the manner of its species. So too in the case of the cosmos: by means of a single revolution of the whole heaven completed in a night and a day, the various motions of all the heavenly bodies are initiated, and though all are embraced in one sphere, some move rapidly and others more slowly, according to their distances and their individual characters. For the moon completes its orbit in a month, waxing and waning and disappearing; the sun and those which have an equal

1 μιᾶς Lor. : μίαν codd. Bekk.
[ARISTOTLE]

399 a

ἐνιαυτῷ καὶ οἱ τοῦτον ἰσόδρομοι, ὁ τε Φωσφόρος καὶ ὁ Ἐρμοῦ λεγόμενος, ὁ δὲ Πυρόεις ἐν διπλασίοιν τούτων χρόνω, ὁ δὲ Δίος ἐν ἔξαπλασίοιν τούτου, καὶ τελευταίος ὁ Κρόνου λεγόμενος ἐν διπλασίοιν καὶ ἡμίσει τοῦ ὑποκάτω. μία δὲ ἐκ πάντων ἀρμονία συναδυόντων καὶ χορεύοντων κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔξ ἐνός τε γίνεται καὶ εἰς ἐν ἀπολήγει, κόσμου ἐτύμως τὸ σύμπαν ἀλλ' οὗκ ἀκοσμίαν ὀνομάσασα.

καθάπερ δὲ ἐν χορῷ κορυφαίου κατάρξαντος συνεπηχεὶ πᾶς ὁ χορός ἀνδρῶν, ἔσθι ὁτε καὶ γυναικῶν, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς ἡξυπέρας καὶ βαρύτερας μίαν ἀρμονίαν ἐμελή κεραυνών, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τὸ σύμπαν διέποντος θεοῦ κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἀνωθέν ἐνδόσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμου ἂν κορυφαίου προσαγορευθέντος κινεῖται μὲν τὰ ἀστρα ἀεὶ καὶ ὁ σύμπαν οὐρανός, πορεύεται δὲ διττὰς πορείας ὁ παμφαίς ἤλιος, τῇ μὲν ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτα διορίζων ἀνατολῆ καὶ δύσει, τῇ δὲ τὰς τέσσαρας ἄρας ἁγῶν τοῦ ἔτους, πρόσω τε βόρειος καὶ ὀπίσω νότιος διεξέρπων. γίνονται δὲ ὅταυ κατὰ καὶ ἀνεμοῖ καὶ ὀρέσοι τὰ τε πάθη τὰ ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι συμβαίνοντα διὰ τὴν πρώτην καὶ ἀρχέγονον αἰτίαν. ἐπονται δὲ τούτως ποταμῶν ἐκροια, θαλάσσης ἀνοιχήσεις, δένδρων ἐκφύσεις, καρπῶν πεπάνσεις, γοναὶ ζῶν, ἐκτροφαὶ τε πάντων καὶ ἀκμαὶ καὶ φθίσεις, συμβαλλομένης πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ τῆς ἐκάστου κατασκευῆς, ὡς ἐφην. ὅταν οὖν οἱ πάντων ἡγεμόν τε καὶ γενέτωρ, ἀώρατος οὖν ἀλλ' ἂρχέγονον Wendland et Wilamowitz, Lor.: ἀρχαιόγονον codd. Bekk. 394
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course with it, namely Phosphorus (Venus) and Hermes (Mercury), complete their course in a year, Pyroeis (Mars) in twice this time, Zeus (Jupiter) in twelve years, and lastly the star called after Cronus (Saturn) in two and a half times the period of the one below it. The single harmony that is produced by all these as they sing and dance in concert round the heavens has one and the same beginning and one and the same end, in a true sense giving to the whole the name of "order" (κόσμος) and not "disorder" (ἀκοσμία). Just as in a chorus at the direction of the leader all the chorus of men, sometimes of women too, join in singing together, creating a single pleasing harmony with their varied mixture of high and low notes, so also in the case of the god who controls the universe: the note is sounded from on high by him who might well be called the chorus-master; then the stars and the whole heavens move continually, and the all-shining sun makes his double journey, dividing night from day by his rising and setting, and bringing the four seasons of the year as he moves forwards to the North and back to the South. There are rains in due season, and winds, and falls of dew, and all the phenomena that occur in the atmosphere—all are the results of the first, original cause. These are followed by the springing up of rivers, the swelling of the sea, the growth of trees, the ripening of fruit, the birth of animals, the nurture, the prime and the decay of all things; and the individual constitution of each thing contributes to the process, as I have said. So when the leader and author of all things, unseen except to the eye of

a i.e. thirty years. These periods correspond to those of Eudoxus (ap. Simplic. In de Caelo 495. 26 ff.).
πλὴν λογισμῶ, σημῆνη πάση φύσει μεταξὺ οὐρανοῦ
tε καὶ γῆς φερομένη, κινεῖται πᾶσα ἐνδελεχῶς ἐν
cύκλοις καὶ πέρασιν ἰδίοις, ποτὲ μὲν ἀφανιζομένην,
35 ποτὲ δὲ φανομένη, μυρίας ἱδέας ἀναφαίνουσα
tε καὶ πάλιν ἀποκρύπτουσα ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς. ἔουε
399 b δὲ κομιδὴ τὸ δρόμενον τοῖς ἐν πολέμῳ καιροῖς
μάλιστα γινομένους, ἐπειδὰν ἡ σάλπιγξ σημῆνη τῷ
στρατοπέδῳ τότε γὰρ τῆς φωνῆς ἐκαστὸς ἀκού-
σας ὁ μὲν ἀσπίδα ἀναφεῖται, ὁ δὲ θώρακα ἐνδύεται,
5 ὁ δὲ κνημίδας ἡ κράνος ἡ ξωστήρα περιτίθεται·
καὶ ὁ μὲν ἵππον χαλινοῖ, ὁ δὲ συνωρίδα ἀναβαίνει,
ὁ δὲ σύνθημα παρεγγυᾷ· καθιστάται δὲ εὐθέως ὁ
μὲν λοχαγὸς εἰς λόχον, ὁ δὲ ταξιαρχὸς εἰς τάξιν,
ὁ δὲ ἵππεὺς ἐπὶ κέρας, ὁ δὲ ψιλὸς εἰς τὴν ἱδίαν
ἐκτρέχει χώραν· πάντα δὲ ύφ᾽ ἕνα σημάντερα δο-
10 νεῖται κατὰ προστάξιν τοῦ τὸ κράτος ἐχοντος ἡγε-
μόνος. οὕτω χρῆ καὶ περὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος φρονεῖν·
ὑπὸ γὰρ μιᾶς ῥοπῆς ὀστρυομένων ἀπάντων γίνεται
τὰ οἰκεῖα, καὶ ταύτης ἀοράτου καὶ ἀφανοῦς. ὅπερ
οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶν ἐμπόδιον οὕτε ἐκείνῃ πρὸς τὸ δρᾶν
οὕτε ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸ πιστεύσαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχή, δι᾽
15 ἦν ζωμέν τε καὶ οὐκους καὶ πόλεις ἔχομεν, ἀοράτους
οὐσά τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῆς ὁδράται· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ τοῦ βίου
dιάκοσμος ὑπὸ ταύτης εὐρήται καὶ διατετακτάς καὶ
συνέχεται, γῆς ἀρόσεις καὶ φυτεύσεις, τέχνης ἐπὶ-
νοια, χρήσεις νόμων, κόσμους πολιτείας, ἐνδημοὶ
πράξεις, ὑπερόριοι πόλεμοι, εἰρήνη. ταῦτα χρῆ
20 καὶ περὶ θεοῦ διανοεῖται, δυνάμει μὲν οὖντος ἀσχυ-
ροτᾶτον, κάλλει δὲ εὐπρεπεστάτου, ζωῆς δὲ ἀθανά-
tου, ἀρετῆ δὲ κρατίστου, διὸτι πάση θυντῆ φύσει
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reason, gives the sign to every moving thing between heaven and earth, everything is moved continually in its orbit and within its peculiar limits, now disappearing, now appearing, revealing innumerable different forms and concealing them again, all from a single beginning. The process is very like what happens, particularly at moments in a war, when the trumpet gives a signal in a military camp; then each man hears the sound, and one picks up his shield, another puts on his breast-plate, and a third his greaves or helmet or belt; one harnesses his horse, one mounts his chariot, one passes on the watchword; the company-commander goes at once to his company, the brigadier to his brigade, the cavalryman to his squadron, and the infantryman runs to his own station; all is stirred by a single trumpeter to a flurry of motion according to the orders of the supreme commander. It is a similar idea that we must have of the universe: by a single inclination all things are spurred to action and perform their peculiar functions—and this single agent is unseen and invisible. Its invisibility is no impediment either to its own action or to our belief in it; for the soul, whereby we live and build households and cities, though it is invisible is perceived through its deeds: for all the conduct of life is discovered, arranged and maintained by the soul—the ploughing and sowing of land, the inventions of art, the use of laws, the order of a city's government, the activities of people in their own country, and war and peace with foreign nations. This is what we must also believe about God, who is mightiest in power, outstanding in beauty, immortal in life, and supreme in excellence, because

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1 "αὐτῆς codd. Lor.: αὐτῶις codd. al. Bekk."
γενόμενος ἀθεώρητος ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐργῶν θεω-πείται. τὰ γὰρ πάθη, καὶ τὰ δι' ἀέρος ἀπαντα καὶ
tὰ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐν ύδατι, θεοῦ λέγοντ' ἄν ὄντως 
25 ἕργα εἶναι τοῦ τῶν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος: εἴς οὖ, κατὰ
tὸν φυσικὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα,

πάνθ' ὁσα τ' ἴν ὁσα τ' ἐσθ' ὁσα τ' ἐσται ὁπώσω, 
δένδρεα τ' ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἦδε γυναῖκες 
θηρές τ' οἰωνοὶ τε καὶ ύδατοθρέμμονες ἵθος.

ἔουε δὲ ὄντως, εἰ καὶ μικρότερον παραβαλεῖν, 
30 τοῖς ὁμφαλοῖς λεγομένοις τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ψαλίσσων
[λίθοις], οὐ μέσοι κείμενοι κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἐκάτερον 
μέρος ἐνδειξιν ἐν ἀρμονία τηροῦσι καὶ ἐν τάξει τὸ 
πάν σχῆμα τῆς ψαλίδος καὶ ἀκίνητον. 
φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγαλματοποιοῦν Φειδίαν κατασκευάζοντα 
35 ἀκροπόλει Αθηναν ἐν μέση τῇ ταύτης ἀσπίδι 
τὸ ἐαυτὸν πρὸςωπον ἐντυπώσασθαι, καὶ συνδόθαι τῷ
400 α ἀγάλματι διά τῶν ἀφανοῦς δημουργίας, ὥστε ἐξ
ἀνάγκης, εἰ τις βουλοῦτο αὐτὸ περιαρείν, τὸ σύμπαν 
ἀγαλμα λύει τε καὶ συγχεῖν. 
τούτον οὖν ἔχει τὸν 
λόγον ὁ θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ, συνέχων τὴν τῶν ὅλων 
5 ἀρμονίαν τε καὶ σωτηρίαν, πλὴν οὔτε μέσος ἂν, 
ἐνθα ἡ γῆ τε καὶ ὁ θολερὸς τόπος οὕτος, ἀλλ' ἄνω 
καθαρὸς ἐν καθαρῷ χωρῷ βεβηκός, ὃν ἔτύμως κα-
λούμεν οὐρανόν μὲν ἄπὸ τοῦ ὄρον εἶναι τὸν ἄνω, 
"Ολυμπὸν δὲ οἶνον ὀλολαμμῆτε τε καὶ παντὸς ξόφου καὶ

1 μικρότερον παραβαλεῖν Lor.: μικρότερον, παραβάλλειν τὸν κόσμον Bekk.
2 λίθοις del. Wendland et Wilamowitz.
3 κατασκευάζοντα BDZ; [Arist.] De Mir. Ause. 155; Lor.: 
κατασκευαζόμενον Bekk.
though he is invisible to every mortal thing he is seen through his deeds. For it would be true to say that all the phenomena of the air, the land and the water are the works of the God who rules the cosmos; from whom, according to Empedocles a the natural philosopher,

grows all that is and was and is yet to come,
the trees and the whole race of men and women,
beasts, birds and water-nurtured fish.

Though it is rather a humble comparison, he is truly like the so-called "keystones" of vaults, which lie in the middle and by their junction with each side ensure the proper fit of the whole structure of the vault and preserve its arrangement and stability. They say too that the sculptor Pheidias, when he was making the Athena on the Acropolis, carved his own face into the middle of her shield, and by some hidden trick of craftsmanship attached it to the statue in such a way that if anyone tried to remove it he inevitably destroyed and demolished the whole statue. b And this is the position held in the cosmos by God, who maintains the orderliness and preservation of the whole: except that he is not in the centre—for here lies the earth, this turbulent, troubled place—but high aloft, pure in a pure region, which we rightly call "heaven" (oivpavos) because it forms the uppermost boundary (opos . . . anw) or "Olympus" because it shines brightly all over (oloamapw) and is

a Diels, Vorsokr. 31 B 21.
b Cf. Ps.-Aristot. De Mir. Ausc. 846 a 19 ff.; Plut. Pericles 31; Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 15. 34; Val. Max. viii. 14. 6. Cicero and Plutarch only mention the portrait. The statue was the gold and ivory Athena in the Parthenon. In several economic crises the gold was removed and melted down and later restored.
[ARISTOTLE]

400 a

ατάκτου κινήματος κεχωρισμένον, οὐα γίνεται παρ' 

10 ἡμῖν διὰ χειμώνος καὶ ἀνέμων βίας, ὡσπερ ἔφη 

καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς ["Ομηρος"]

Οὐλυμπόνδ', θ'θι φασὶ θεών ἔδος ἄσφαλές αἰεὶ 

ἐμμεναι· οὔτ' ἀνέμοισι τινάσσεται οὔτε ποτ' ὦμβρῳ 

dεύεται, οὔτε χιόνι ἐπιπίλναται, ἀλλὰ μάλ' αἴθρη 

πέπταται ἄνεφελος, λευκὴ δ' ἐπιδέδομεν αἴγλη.

15 συνεπιμαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος ἁπάς, τὴν ἄνω χώραν 

ἀποδοὺς θεώ· καὶ γὰρ πάντες ἀνθρωποί ἀνατείνομεν 

tὰς χείρας εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν εὐχάς ποιούμενοι. καθ'

δὲν λόγον οὐ κακῶς κάκειν ἀναπεφώνηται 

Ζεὺς δ' ἐλαχ' οὐρανόν εὐρόν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλησι.

20 διὸ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὰ τιμώτατα τὸν αὐτὸν 

ἐπέχει τόπον, ἀστρα τε καὶ ἡλίους καὶ σελήνης. 

μόνα τε τὰ οὐράνια διὰ τοῦτο αἰεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν σώ-

ζοντα τάξιν διακεκόσμηται, καὶ οὕποτε ἀλλοω-

θέντα μετεκινήθη, καθάπερ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς εὐτρεπτὰ 

οντα πολλαὶ ἑπερούσεις καὶ πάθη ἀναδέδεκται.

25 σεισμοὶ τε γὰρ ἣδη βίαιοι πολλὰ μέρη τῆς γῆς 

ἀνέρρηξιν, ὦμβροι τε κατεκλυσαν ἐξ ἦλιον κατα-

ραγέντες, ἐπιδρομαί τε κυμάτων καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις 

πολλάκις καὶ ἥπειροις ἐθαλάττωσαν καὶ θαλάττας 

ἥπειρωσαν, βιαὶ τε πνευμάτων καὶ τυφώνων ἐστιν 

30 ὅτε πόλεις ὅλας ἀνέτρεψαν, πυρκαϊα τε καὶ φλόγες 

αἱ μὲν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ γενόμεναι πρότερον, ὡσπερ 

φασίν, ἐπὶ Φαέθοντος τὰ πρὸς ἐω μέρη κατέφλεξαν, 

αἱ δὲ πρὸς ἐσπέραν ἐκ γῆς ἀναβλύσασαι καὶ ἐκφυ-

σήσασαι, καθάπερ τῶν ἐν Αἴτνῃ κρατήρων ἀνα-

ραγέντων καὶ ἀνὰ τὴν γῆν φερομένων χειμάρρου 

400 b δίκην. ἐνθα καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐσεβῶν γένος ἐξόχως
removed from all darkness and disorderly motion such as occurs among us when there is a storm or a violent wind; as the poet says, a

To Olympus, where they say the gods' dwelling stands always safe; it is not shaken by winds, nor drenched by showers of rain, nor does snow come near it; always unclouded the air spreads out, and a white radiance lies upon it.

And all ages bear witness to this fact, and allot the upper region to God: all of us men stretch out our hands to the heavens when we pray. According to this reasoning, the following also has been well said b:

To Zeus belongs the wide heaven in the clouds and the aether.

So also the same place is occupied by the most honoured of perceptible things, the stars and the sun and the moon; and for this reason only the heavenly bodies always keep the same order and arrangement, and are never changed or altered; while the transient things on earth admit many alterations and conditions. For violent earthquakes before now have torn up many parts of the earth, monstrous storms of rain have burst out and overwhelmed it, incursions and withdrawals of the waves have often made seas of dry land and dry land of seas; sometimes whole cities have been overturned by the violence of gales and typhoons; flaming fires from the heavens once burnt up the Eastern parts, they say, in the time of Phaëthon, and others gushed and spouted from the earth, in the West, as when the craters of Etna erupted and spread over the earth like a mountain-torrent. Here, too, the race of pious

a Hom. Od. vi. 42-45. b Hom. II. xv. 192.
[ARISTOTLE]

400 b

'étímpse tò daimónion, perukatalphóthentwv úpò tòu peúmatos dia tò baoštázēvyn ýerontas épi tòwn ómwn gouveis kai sówzein' plhóion genvómenvos ó tòu výporos potámów ýešexíosth parétreivé tò te flog- 5 mou tò mèn èntha, tò dé èntha, kai étírmēzhen ñblan- béis áma tois gouveísi tois neaníaskos.

Kathóloù dé õper èn vηi mèn kuvberνíthēs, èn ármati dé ḷníoxos, èn xoròi dé koruvfaios, èn póleì dé vòmuο<θéth>si,1 èn strátospédw dé ḷγεmów, touto theós èn kósmw, plhèn kath' õson tois mèn kamaμtì- 10 ron tò árchein polukíntotò tò kai poluvmérinon, tò dé áluyon apòlon te kai páshys kekuvroménon svmmatikhès ástheveias. èn ákintwv gar 'idrménos pánta kinei kai períagei, õpotou boulétei kai õpòs, èn diafoρoùs ídeais te kai fúseis, õspoter ámēlei kai ῥòs pólewv vòmous ákintos wòv èn tais tòwv

15 xrwvménov ψυχαίς pánta oikovomei tà kata tìn poluteiav' efeptòmenoi gár autòv ḷholonótì éxiasìn árχontes mèn épi tò árcheia, thesmobétei dé eis tà oikeia dikaßtìria, bouléutai dé kai èkklyiasmá- tai eis svnedria tà prosékhtonta, kai õ mèn tis eis tò prwtanèòn bádīzei svthdosménon, ó dé pros tòus dikaßtìa àpologhosménon, ó dé eis tò desμwτh- 20 mìon ápòthanaúmenov. gínavtai dé kai dhmoðovniai nómmoi kai panvγýreis énnavsioi theòn te dhovía kai ḷrówv therapeiav kai choai kekmikhòtwv. allà dé ñllos énerygovména kata mìav próstataxì òi nó- mmov èxouśian swže tò tòu poʊshavtov õntwv õti

25 pólyis δ' ómou mèn ñvμmámátwv gémei, ómou dé paiánwv te kai stenvamátwv,

1 vòmuο<θéth>si coni. Lor. : vòmos codd. Bekk.
men was especially honoured by the divinity, when they were overtaken by the stream of lava, because they were carrying their old parents on their shoulders to keep them safe; for when the river of fire drew near them it was split in two and turned one part to this side and the other to that, and preserved unharmed both the young men and their parents.

In a word then, as the helmsman in his ship, as the charioteer in his chariot, as the leader in a chorus, as the lawgiver in a city, as the commander in a military camp, so is God in the cosmos, except that their command is wearisome and fraught with many movements and cares, while God rules without pain and toil, free from all bodily weakness: for he is established in the immovable, and moves and directs all things as and where he wishes, among the varieties of form and nature; just as the law of the city, itself immovably established within the minds of those who observe it, disposes all the activities of the state: for in obedience to the law the magistrates go to their offices, the judges to their appropriate courts, the councillors and members of the assembly to their appointed meeting-places; and one man goes to the prytaneum for his meals, another to the law-courts to defend himself, a third to prison to die. The law also ordains public feasts and annual festivals, sacrifices to the gods, cults of heroes and libations to the dead: and other varied activities, all arising from a single ordinance or authority of the law, accord well with these words of the poet:

The city is full of heavy incense-fumes, with crying for deliverance, and laments.

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a The story is told of Amphion and his brother by the poet of the Aetna (625 f.)
b Soph. O.T. 4-5.
οὐτως ὑποληπτέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μεῖζονος πόλεως, λέγω δὲ τοῦ κόσμου νόμος γὰρ ἦμιν ἰσοκλινὴς ὁ θεός, οὐδεμιᾶν ἐπιδεχόμενος διόρθωσιν ἡ μετὰ-30 θεσιν, κρείττων δὲ, οἷμαι, καὶ βεβαιότερος τῶν ἐν ταῖς κύρβεσιν ἀναγεγραμμένων. ἠγουμένου δὲ ἀκινήτως ἅπαντα τοῦ φόρου ὁ κύριος ὁ σύμπαν τοῖς οἰκονομεῖται διάκοσμος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, μεμερισμένος κατὰ τὰς φύσεις πάσας διὰ τῶν οἰκείων σπερμάτων εἰς τὲ φυτὰ καὶ ζώα κατὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ταύτῃ καὶ γὰρ ἀμπελοὶ καὶ φοίνικες καὶ περσέα

συνέατι τε γλυκεραὶ καὶ ἐλαϊναι,

ὥς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς, τὰ τε ἀκαρπα μὲν, ἄλλας δὲ παρεχόμενα χρείας, πλάτανοι καὶ πίτυες καὶ πύξιν

κλήθη τ' αὔγειρός τε καὶ εὐώδης κυπάρισσος,

5 αἰ τε καρπὸν ὑπώρας ἢδυν ἄλλως δὲ δυσθησάριστον φέρουσαι,

ὠχναι καὶ ροιαὶ καὶ μηλέαι ἀγλάοκαρποί,

τῶν τε ζώων τὰ τε ἀγρία καὶ ἡμέρα, τὰ τε ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ βοσκόμενα, γίνεται καὶ ἀκμάζει καὶ φθείρεται τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ πειθόμενα θεσμοῖς. "πάν γὰρ ἐρπετὸν πληγῇ νέμεται," ὡς φησιν Ὅρακλεῖτος.

7. Εἰς δὲ ὃν πολυώνυμός ἐστι, κατονομαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσιν πάσων ἀπερ αὐτὸς νεοχμοὶ. καλοῦμεν δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ Ζήνα καὶ Δία, παραλλήλως χρώμενοι 15 τοῖς ὁνόμασιν, ὡς κἀγὼ λέγομεν δι' ἄν ζωμεν. Κρόνου δὲ παῖς καὶ χρόνου λέγεται, δυνῆς εἰς αἰώνοις ἀτέρμονοι εἰς ἑτερον αἰώνα. ἀστραπαῖος τε καὶ βρονταῖος καὶ αἰθριος καὶ αἰθέριος κεραυνὸς

1 ἀκινήτως Stob. Lor.: ἀεικινήτως codd. Bekk.
So it is, we must suppose, with that greater city, the cosmos: God is a law to us, impartial and admitting no correction or change; he is surely a stronger and more stable law than those inscribed on tablets. Under his motionless and harmonious guidance all the orderly arrangement of heaven and earth is administered, extending over all things through the seed proper to their kind, to plants and animals by genus and species; vines, palms and perseae, "sweet figs and olives," as the poet says, and those that bear no fruit but serve some other purpose, planes and pines and box-trees, "the alder, the poplar and the sweet-scented cypress-tree"; and those which in the autumn bring forth a harvest that is sweet but hard to store, "pears and pomegranates and apples with shining fruit"; and animals, some wild, some tame, that live in the air and on the earth and in the water,—all these come into being and grow strong and perish, obedient to the laws of god. "For every creature that crawls is driven to pasture by his goad," as Heracleitus says.

7. Though he is one, he has many names, according to the many effects he himself produces. We call him both Zena and Dia, using the names interchangeably, as if we were to say "Him through whom (διὰ ὅν) we live (ὁν)." He is called the Son of Cronus and of time (Chronos), because he lives from endless age to another age; God of Lightning and of Thunder, God of the Air and Aether, God of the Thunderbolt

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*a* At Athens, tablets on which the early laws were written.

*b* Hom. *Od.* xi. 590.

*c* Hom. *Od.* v. 64.


*e* Diels, *Vorsokr.* 22 B 11.

*f* Ζήνα and Δία are used interchangeably as accusatives of Zeus.
τε καὶ ὀφέιος ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφείων καὶ κεραυνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καλεῖται. καὶ μήν ἐπικάρτιος μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν
20 καρπῶν, πολιεύς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων ὄνομάζεται,
γενέθλιος τε καὶ ἔρκειος καὶ ὦμογνιος καὶ πατρῶς
ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς ταῦτα κοινωνίας, ἐταυρεῖος τε καὶ
φίλιος καὶ ᾐνίος καὶ στράτιος καὶ τροπαίονχος,
καθάρσιος τε καὶ παλαμναῖος καὶ ἱκέσιος καὶ μελή-
χιος, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, σωτήρ τε καὶ
25 ἐλευθέρως ἑτύμως, ὃς δὲ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν, οὐράνιος
τε καὶ χθόνιος, πάσης ἐπώνυμος φύσεως ὦν καὶ
τύχης, ἄτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἰτίος ὦν. διὸ καὶ ἐν
tois Ὄρφιοις οὐ κακῶς λέγεται

Zeús πρῶτος γένετο, Zeús ὑστατος ἀρχικέραυνος. Zeús κεφαλῆ, Zeús μέσσα, Δίὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα
τέτυκτε.

401 b
Zeús πυθμήν γαϊῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστεροῦντος.
Zeús ἄρσην γένετο, Zeús ἄμφροτος ἐπλετο νύμφη.
Zeús πνοῆ πάντων, Zeús ἀκαμάτου πυρὸς ὀρμῆ.
Zeús πόντου βίζα, Zeús ἠλιος ἣδε σελήνη.
5 Zeús βασιλεύς, Zeús ἄρχος ἀπάντων ἀρχικέραυ-
nος.
pάντας γὰρ κρύψας αὖθις φάος ἐς πολυγηθὲς
ἐξ ἱερῆς κραδίης ἀνενέγκατο, μέρμερα ῥέζων.

Ὁμιαὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἄλλο τι λέγεσθαι
πλὴν τούτων, οἴονεί ἀνίκητον αἰτίαν ὄντα, Εἰμαρ-
10 μένην δὲ διὰ τὸ εἴρειν τε καὶ χωρεῖν ἀκωλύτως,
1 πατρῶς Wendland et Wilamowitz, Lor.: πατρίας codd. Bekk.
2 ἀρχικέραυνος P Lor.: ἀρχικέραυνος codd. cet. Bekk. (et
401 b 5).
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ON THE COSMOS, 7

and the Rain—he takes his name from all these things. He is called Harvest-God and City-God, God of the Family and the Household, God of Kinsmen and Ancestral God, because of his connexion with these things; God of Fellowship and Friendship and Hospitality, of War and Victory, of Purification and Vengeance, of Supplication and Grace, as the poets say, and in a true sense Saviour and Liberator. To sum up all, he is a God of Heaven and God of Earth, and takes his name from every kind of nature and estate; for he himself is the cause of all. So it is rightly written in the Orphic books:

Zeus is the first-born, Zeus is last, the lord of the lightning; Zeus is the head, Zeus the centre; from Zeus comes all that is;
Zeus is the foundation of the earth and the starry heavens;
Zeus is a man, Zeus an immortal maid;
Zeus is the breath of all things, Zeus is the spring of tireless fire;
Zeus is the root of ocean, Zeus is the sun and moon;
Zeus is king, Zeus is the master of all, the lord of the lightning.

For he hid all men away, and has brought them again to the lovely light from the holiness of his heart, working great marvels.

I think too that Necessity (Ἄναγκη), is nothing but another name for him, as being a cause that cannot be defeated (ἀνίκητος); and Destiny (Εἰμαρρένη), because he binds things together (εἰρεῖν) and moves

\[Xθόνος\] usually implies the Underworld; but Pseudo-Aristotle is probably stretching the meaning slightly to suit his own cosmology.

Kern, Fraggm. Orph. 21 a.

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\(^3\) vid. 401 a 28.
\(^4\) αἰριαν CG Lor.: οὐσιαν codd. al. Bekk.
Πεπρωμένην δὲ διὰ τὸ πεπερατώσθαι πάντα καὶ μηδὲν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀπειρον εἶναι, καὶ Μοίραι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεμερίσθαι, Νέμεσιν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκάστῳ διανεμήσεως, Ἄδραστειαν δὲ ἀναπόδραστον αἵτιναν οὖσαν κατὰ φύσιν, Ἀίσαν δὲ ἀεὶ οὖσαν. τὰ τε περὶ τὰς Μοίρας καὶ τὸν ἀτράκτον εἰς ταύτὸ πως νεύει· τρεῖς μὲν γὰρ αἱ Μοίραι, κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους με-μερισμέναι, νῆμα δὲ ἀτράκτου τὸ μὲν ἐξειργα-σμένον, τὸ δὲ μέλλον, τὸ δὲ περιστρεφόμενον· τέτακται δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ γεγονὸς μία τῶν Μοιρῶν, Ἄτροπος, ἐπεὶ τὰ παρελθόντα πάντα ἀτρεπτά ἐστιν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον Λάχεσις—[eis]¹ πάντα γὰρ ἢ κατὰ φύσιν μὲνει λήξις—κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἑνεστὸς Κλωθώ, συμπεραινουσά τε καὶ κλώθουσα ἑκάστῳ τὰ οἰκεία. περαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ μύθος οὐκ ἀτάκτως.

Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστίν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν ὁ θεός, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ γενναῖος Πλάτων φησίν· "ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων, εὐθεία περαινεῖ κατὰ φύσιν πορεύομενος· τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ εὐνύπηται δίκη, τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός—ἡς ὁ γενήσεσθαι² μέλλων μακάριός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς μέτοχος εἰη.

¹ eis del. Wendland et Wilamowitz.
without hindrance; Fate (Πεπρωμένη), because all things are finite (πεπερατωσθαὶ) and nothing in the world is infinite; Moira, from the division of things (μερίζειν); Nemesis, from the allocation of a share to each (διανέμησις); Adrasteia—a cause whose nature is to be inescapable (ἀναπόδραστος αἴτια); and Aisa—a cause that exists for ever (ἀεὶ οὖσα). The story of the Fates (Μοῖραι) and the spindle also has much the same tendency: there are three Fates, corresponding to different times, and part of the yarn on their spindles is already completed, part is still to be spun, and part is now being worked. The past is the concern of one of the Fates, called Atropos, because all past things are irreversible (ἀτρεπτὰ); the future belongs to Lachesis, for a fortune allotted (λῆξις) by nature awaits all things; the present is Clotho’s province, who settles each man’s own destiny and spins (κλωθεῖν) his thread. So the story ends, and it is well said.

All these things are no other than God, as the great Plato tells us: “God, as the ancient story says, holding the beginning and the end and the middle of all things that are, moves by a straight path in the course of nature, bringing them to fulfilment; and behind him, taking vengeance on all that fall short of the divine law, follows Justice—let no man be without this, even from his earliest years, if he is to live in blessed happiness.”

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## INDICES

### ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS

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